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How a Young Man Should Read Poetry = Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat (Πῶς δεῖ  
τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν) 
On Listening to Lectures = De recta ratione audiendi (Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν) 
How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend = Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur (Πῶς ἄν τις  
διακρίνειε τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου) 
On Moral Progres = Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus (Πῶς ἄν τις αἴσθοιτο  
ἑαυτοῦ προκόπτοντος ἐπ᾿ ἀρετῇ) 
How to Profit by One’s Enemies = De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (Πῶς ἄν τις ὑπ᾿ ἐχθρῶν  
ὠφελοῖτο) 
On Having Many Friends = De amicorum multitudine (Περὶ πολυφιλίας) 
On Virtue and Vice = De virtute et vitio (Περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας) 
Consolation to Apollonius = Consolatio ad Apollonium (Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον) 
Advice on Keeping Well = De tuenda sanitate praecepta (Ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα) 
Advice to Bride and Groom = Coniugalia praecepta (Γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα) 
Dinner of the Seven Wise Men = Septem sapientium convivium (Τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν συμπόσιον) 
On Superstition = De superstitione (Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας) 
Sayings of Kings and Emperors = Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata (Ἀποφθέγματα  
βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν) 
Sayings of the Spartans = Apophthegmata Laconica (Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά) 
Bravery of Women = Mulierum virtutes (Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί) 
Roman Questions = Quaestiones Romanae (Αἴτια Ῥωμαϊκά) 
On the Great Fortune or Virtue of Alexander 1 and 2 = De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute,  
libri ii (Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς, λόγοι β΄) 
On Isis and Osiris = De Iside et Osiride (Περὶ Ἴσιδος καὶ Ὀσίριδος) 
On the E at Delphi = De E apud Delphos (Περὶ τοῦ ΕΙ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς) 
On the Oracles at Delphi = De Pythiae oraculis (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ χρᾶν ἔμμετρα νῦν τὴν  
Πυθίαν) 
On the Obsolescence of Oracles = De defectu oraculorum (Περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων  
χρηστηρίων) 
Can Virtue be Taught = An virtus doceri possit (Εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή) 
On Moral Virtue = De virtute morali (Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς) 
On the Control of Anger = De cohibenda ira (Περὶ ἀοργησίας) 
On Tranquility of Mind = De tranquillitate animi (Περὶ εὐθυμίας) 
On Brotherly Love = De fraterno amore (Περὶ φιλαδελφίας) 
On Affection for Offspring = De amore prolis (Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργίας) 
 
 x 
Whether Vice is Sufficient for Unhappiness = An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat (Εἰ  
αὐτάρκης ἡ κακία πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν) 
Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse Than Those of the Body = Animine an corporis  
affectiones sint peiores (Πότερον τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη χείρονα) 
On Talkativeness = De garrulitate (Περὶ ἀδολεσχίας) 
On Being a Busybody = De curiositate (Περὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης) 
On Compliancy = De vitioso pudore (Περὶ δυσωπίας) 
On Envy and Hate = De invidia et odio (Περὶ φθόνου καὶ μίσους) 
On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance = De sera numinis vindicta (Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου  
βραδέως τιμωρουμένων) 
On Exile = De exilio (Περὶ φυγῆς) 
On the Sign of Socrates = De genio Socratis (Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου) 
Consolation to His Wife = Consolatio ad uxorem (Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα) 
Table-Talk = Quaestionum convivalium libri ix (Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία θ΄) 
Dialogue on Love = Amatorius (Ἐρωτικός) 
Philosophers and Men in Power = Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum (Περὶ  
τοῦ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῖς ἡγεμόσι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον διαλέγεσθαι) 
To an Uneducated Ruler = Ad principem ineruditum (Πρὸς ἡγεμόνα ἀπαίδευτον) 
Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics = An seni respublica gerenda sit (Εἰ  
πρεσβυτέρῳ πολιτευτέον) 
Precepts of Stagecraft = Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (Πολιτικὰ παραγγέλματα) 
Causes of Natural Phenomena = Questiones Naturales (Αἰτίαι φυσικαί) 
On the Face in the Moon = De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet (Περὶ τοῦ ἐμφαινομένου  
προσώπου τῷ κύκλῳ τῆς σελήνης) 
On the Principle of Cold = De primo frigido (Περὶ τοῦ πρώτως ψυχροῦ) 
On the Cleverness of Animals = Terrestriane an aquatilia animalia sint callidiora (Πότερα τῶν  
ζῴων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα) 
Beasts are Rational = Bruta animalia ratione uti, sive Gryllus (Περὶ τοῦ τὰ ἄλογα λόγῳ  
χρῆσθαι) 
On the Eating of Flesh 1 and 2 = De esu carnium orationes ii (Περὶ σαρκοφαγίας λόγοι β´) 
Platonic Questions = Platonicae quaestiones (Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα) 
On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus = De animae procreatione in Timaeo (Περὶ τῆς ἐν  
Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας) 
On Stoic Self-Contradictions = De Stoicorum repugnantiis (Περὶ Στωικῶν ἐναντιωμάτων) 
On Common Notions = De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos (Περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν  
πρὸς τοὺς Στωικούς) 
That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible = Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum  
(Ὅτι οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν ἡδέως κατ᾿ Ἐπίκουρον) 
Reply to Colotes = Adversus Colotem (Πρὸς Κωλώτην ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων) 
Whether “Live Unknown” is a Wise Precept = An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum (Εἰ  








Sandbach fragments (frr.) refer to the collection in Francis H. Sandbach (ed.) 1967, Plutarchi  
Moralia, vol. 7, Leipzig: Teubner.1 
 
Plutarch’s Lives are cited by single names, with Greek names in Latinized form, and by  
conjoined names for the comparisons of lives, e.g. Lycurgus for Plutarch’s biography on 
Lycurgus, the legendary founder of the Spartan constitution, and Lycurgus and Numa for 
the comparison of Lycurgus and Numa Pompilius, the legendary second king of Rome. 
 
 
                                                        
1 This collection can also be found, with translations, in the Loeb series: Francis H. Sandbach (ed. and trans.) 1969, 





My dissertation urges a reconsideration of Plutarch’s importance as a philosopher. 
Plutarch is well known for his biographies and as a source for other authors, but not for original 
views of his own. A study that attempts to understand Plutarch sympathetically is surprisingly 
untried. Far from the uncharitable perception of Plutarch as a mere eclectic disseminator of 
popular philosophy, Plutarch offers a distinctive and appealing ethical view, neglected in the 
history of philosophy, which affirms the centrality of our passions in ethical development and 
their essential place in the good life. It is a refreshing alternative to the overly rationalistic 
tradition of Stoicism, the main philosophical rival of Plutarch’s day. It is also different from 
other forms of Platonism. It does not ask us to abandon familiar, positive features of our 
emotional life and intimacy with others, unlike the otherworldly Platonisms we often find later in 
antiquity. 
 I explore the centrality of passions in Plutarch’s moral philosophy primarily through the 
close reading of his ethical writings, the Moralia, vis-à-vis Plato’s dialogues, the traditions 
spawned from Plato’s Academy, and rival philosophical schools. In the Introduction to my 
dissertation, I begin with Plutarch’s presentation of himself as part of the continuing tradition of 
Plato’s Academy, a living tradition for Plutarch that is united, from Socrates to his own day, by a 
commitment to critical reflection rather than by a commitment to a set of dogmas or doctrines. 
Given this view of Plato’s Academy, Plutarch takes a distinctive position in holding that 
 
 xiii 
emotions and emotional vulnerability are essential to social virtues and genuine concern for other 
individuals, in contrast with Stoicism. I take up this point in Chapter 1 of my dissertation, where 
I examine Plutarch’s criticisms of the rival ethical theory of Stoic “appropriation” or 
“identification” (oikeiōsis) which Plutarch argues ironically alienates us from our own human 
nature and from other human beings. In Chapter 2, I explore Plutarch’s Platonic psychology and 
analyze his arguments on the appropriateness and naturalness of grief. Plutarch’s position that 
passions should be moderated and serve specific purposes sits in contrast with the advice to 
minimize and eradicate emotions such as grief as far as one is able in Plato’s Republic. In 
Chapter 3, I show that for Plutarch passions are not only ineradicable aspects of embodied life, 
but are also necessary for acting in the world, can enhance and intensify virtuous action, and can 
aid in the pursuit of virtue. Life with passions is better than without them. Chapter 4 is an 
examination of the positive role that shame plays in correcting one’s actions and character in 
Plutarch’s moral psychology. In Chapter 5, I turn to the prominent role emotions play in the 
formation of character. In contrast to the Old Academy, Plutarch argues that the most important 
preparation for the virtuous life begins with the formation of our passionate nature in childhood. 
In Chapter 6, I argue that Plutarch provides an alternative theory of moral development to the 
Stoic theory of oikeiōsis, placing the passion of affection at the heart of our social development. 
Affection serves as the seed, as it were, of our ever-expanding sense of identification with others. 
As we attempt to fulfill our nature in imitation of the divine (homoiōsis theōi), we cultivate 






oὐκ “ἀνδριαντοποιός” ἐστιν ὁ τῆς φιλοσοφίας λόγος, “ὥστ’ ἐλινύοντα ποιεῖν ἀγάλματ’ 
ἐπ’ αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος ἑσταότα” κατὰ Πίνδαρον· ἀλλ’ ἐνεργὰ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν 
ἅψηται καὶ πρακτικὰ καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ κινητικὰς ὁρμὰς ἐντίθησι καὶ κρίσεις ἀγωγοὺς ἐπὶ 
τὰ ὠφέλιμα καὶ προαιρέσεις φιλοκάλους καὶ φρόνημα καὶ μέγεθος μετὰ πραότητος καὶ 
ἀσφαλείας, δι’ ὧν τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι καὶ δυνατοῖς ὁμιλοῦσιν οἱ πολιτικοὶ προθυμότερον. 
 
The purpose of philosophy is not “statue-making, with the result that one makes statues that rest 
without moving, standing still upon their own base” as Pindar puts it [Nemean Ode 5.1–3], but it 
is wont to make whatever it touches active, effective, and full of life. It establishes within one 
active impulses and judgments that lead to what is beneficial, policies that aim at what is noble, 
and thoughtfulness and greatness with gentleness and security. Through these characteristics 
those engaged in politics more eagerly associate with those who are powerful and in power. 
(Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power 776C8–D3) 
 
§I The Purpose and Scope of This Study 
Following a particularly negative evaluation of Plutarch’s philosophical work, which 
prevailed throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, scholars have shown a 
renewed interest in Plutarch as both a writer and thinker in the last few decades. Recent 
collections of essays, conferences and workshops, and numerous articles and books that explore 
Plutarch’s views in their own right attest to this renewed interest and reevaluation of Plutarch’s 
significance and his contribution to philosophy.1 But Plutarch has not, in my view, been fully 
                                               
1 See, for instance, recent collections of essays, such as Mossman 1997, Bonazzi and Opsomer 2009, Roskam and 
Van der Stockt 2011, Roig Lanzillotta and Muñoz Gallarte 2012, Beck 2014, Meeusen and Van der Stockt 2015, 
Opsomer, Roskam, and Titchener 2016, and Meeusen 2017. See also work from conventions in Gallo 1992; Pérez 
Jiménez, García Lopez and Aguilar 1999; Hirsch-Luipold 2005; and Volpe Cacciatore and Ferrari 2007. Notable 
book-length examinations by a single author include Ingenkamp 1971 and Van Hoof 2010, who examine Plutarch’s 
psychotherapeutic works, Kechagia 2011 and Corti 2014, who analyze Plutarch’s philosophical arguments in Reply 
to Colotes, and Xenophontos 2016, who provides a detailed study of education in Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives. 
Plutarch’s philosophy and approach to philosophy have been analyzed in detail in Babut 1969a, 1969b, and his 
collection of essays in Babut 1994; Becchi 1975, 1978, 1981, 1996, 1999, 2005, and 2014; Tarrant 1985; Opsomer 
1994, 1998, 2004, 2005, 2012, and 2014; Boys-Stones 1997a, 1997b, 2014, and 2017; Karamanolis 2006 and 2014; 
Shiffman 2010; and Bonazzi 2012a, 2012b. This list, which is representative of recent work that has focused on 
Plutarch as an intelligent writer and philosopher, is far from exhaustive. I mention other works below. 
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appreciated for the most attractive and distinctive feature of his own articulation of Platonic 
philosophy. I have chosen to draw out what I believe to be the most important and appealing 
feature that underlies Plutarch’s thought on moral virtue throughout both the Moralia and the 
Lives: the centrality of passions to human nature, moral progress, and the ideal human life.2 
Plutarch argues that passions are necessary components to this life. They are not 
necessary as evils due to embodiment but rather as part of our human nature. We must develop 
our passions. We become morally virtuous individuals through the proper education of our 
passions. As we work to fulfill our nature, our passions remain integral to it. Even as we attempt 
to become like god, we imitate the benevolence of god with the whole of human nature, which, 
for Plutarch, includes our passionate nature. Plutarch thus has a distinctive and compelling view 
of passions and their role in the moral and good life. His affirmation of human passion is in 
many ways surprisingly modern and unusual for his time period. Plutarch’s positive evaluation 
of the passions and embodied human nature is also refreshing and provides an alternative kind of 
life, especially compared to the austere, passionless tranquility advocated by the Stoics and the 
other-worldly ideal of becoming like god by leaving this world and the passions behind, which 
we find in some Platonists.3 
                                               
2 I have recently come across Machek 2018, who attempts to address the centrality of passions in Plutarch’s moral 
philosophy. Machek also discusses many of the same metaphors and descriptions of passions that I explore in this 
dissertation, such as the description of moral virtue as a compound with reason as its form and passion as its matter, 
the metaphor of taming the passions like animals, and the metaphor of cultivating our passions like plants. However, 
I find the conclusions Machek reaches unsatisfactory largely based on his approach and assumptions. From the 
outset, Machek writes that Plutarch’s view may not be coherent or part of a unified view. In taking this approach, his 
position is similar to that of Nikolaidis 1991 (pp. 169–71) and Spanneut 1994 (pp. 4704–11). Machek writes that 
Plutarch’s “polyphony” may be “just a plurality of more or less mutually incommensurable views.” Though non-
committal, Machek really stresses what he finds to be incoherent and incommensurable in Plutarch’s works. As will 
be clear in what follows, I take Plutarch to be an intelligent writer whose moral philosophy forms a whole with parts 
that are consistent. I also take Plutarch’s philosophy overall to describe a kind of life in which passions are integral 
and can contribute positively to our moral progress and to the good life itself. 
3 I touch on these points below in §V.c. and more fully in Chapter 6. 
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In this study, I focus primarily on Plutarch’s philosophical corpus, the Moralia. I do not, 
however, shy away from many sections of the Lives that demonstrate the nuanced inflections that 
Plutarch develops as part of his moral philosophy. The many asides, critiques, and applications 
of Plutarch’s own philosophical worldview in the Lives not only shed more light on Plutarch’s 
own position, but also reveal the extent to which Plutarch’s philosophical project permeates and 
informs his work. Taken together, Plutarch’s biographical and non-biographical works lay out 
philosophical points for his readers in a variety of formats for consumption with remarkably 
vivid descriptions and metaphors. 
Before providing an outline of each chapter in §VI below, I provide a short background 
of Plutarch’s life (§II). I also provide a brief history on the perception of Plutarch as a 
philosopher and writer for the last century and a half (§III). I then provide an overview of my 
own understanding of Plutarch’s self-conscious identification as part of the Platonic Academy, 
his understanding of the Platonic Academy as a living tradition (§IV), and several tenets that 
Plutarch holds to be central to Platonic philosophy (§V). 
 
§II Plutarch: A Philosophical and Political Life 
 
Born around 46 C.E.,4 Plutarch spent most of his life in his home town of Chaeronea.5 He 
was a prolific writer. The so-called Lamprias Catalogue6 alone attributes 227 titles to Plutarch, 
                                               
4 The date is inferred from Plutarch’s comments. Plutarch mentions that he was present for a conversation between 
his teacher, Ammonius, and Nero at Delphi (On the E at Delphi 385B). Nero visited Delphi around 66 C.E. So, 
assuming that Plutarch was around twenty years of age when he became a student of Ammonius, he was probably 
born around 46 C.E. For Nero’s visit to Greece and Delphi see Suetonius, Nero 25.1; Cassius Dio 63.14.2. Cf. Jones 
1971, pp. 13–19; Dillon 1977, pp. 189–90; Donini 1986. On Plutarch’s life and political engagements see Jones 
1971, pp. 20–38; Russell 1973; Centrone 2000, pp. 575–6; Van Hoof 2010, pp. 66–80; and Karamanolis 2014, “1. 
Life and Works.” Cf. also Hirzel 1912, pp. 5–22; Flacelière 1964, pp. 1–28; and Barrow 1967. 
5 Cf. Russell 1968 and 1973, esp. pp. 1–17.  
6 On the date and reliability of the Lamprias Catalogue see Treu 1873, who conjectures that the list was compiled as 
a catalogue of texts for a library in the third or fourth century C.E. The attribution to Lamprias, son of Plutarch, is 
inferred from an anonymous introductory letter attached to the MS Neapolitanus III. B 29 (D.L.), which has the 
Catalogue on foll. 246 verso and 247. (Wachsmuth collated and attributed this MS to the fourteenth century C.E. 
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nearly half of which have been lost.7 Apart from the Lamprias Catalogue, we have genuine 
works of Plutarch not listed in the Lamprias Catalogue that have been preserved in Maximus 
Planudes’ compilation of the late thirteenth–early fourteenth century C.E., which remains the 
basic collection of Plutarch’s works.8  
Though he spent most of his life in Chaeronea, Plutarch lived a politically engaged life as 
a member of the Greek elite under Roman rule.9 Plutarch was at one point the eponymous archon 
of Chaeronea.10 He led an embassy to Achaea11 and participated in several other embassies to 
Rome.12 Plutarch also served as a priest of Apollo at Delphi, which features thematically in 
several of his works.13 He was honored with the ornamenta consularia by Trajan14 and was 
appointed the procurator of Achaea by Hadrian shortly before his death around 120 C.E.15 
As I will discuss below, Plutarch identified as part of the Platonic tradition, which he 
considered to be a unified tradition that extended back to Socrates. Plutarch studied philosophy 
in Athens under the Egyptian Platonist, Ammonius, who is a prominent persona in several of 
                                               
See Wachsmuth 1863, p. 577.) The Suda also attributes a list of Plutarch’s works to his son, Lamprias (Λ 96 Adler): 
“Lamprias: son of Plutarch of Chaeronea. He wrote a Catalogue of his father’s works on all of Greek and Roman 
history” (Λαμπρίας, Πλουτάρχου τοῦ Χαιρωνέως υἱός. ἔγραψε Πίνακα ὧν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἔγραψε περὶ 
πάσης Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῆς ἱστορίας). See also Sandbach’s introduction to the Lamprias Catalogue in 
Moralia, vol. XV of the Loeb series (pp. 3–7). 
7 Around 130 works listed, apart from the Lives, appear to be lost. A few works listed are spuriously attributed to 
Plutarch, such as Aristotle’s Topics (no. 56 in the Lamprias Catalogue). 
8 Cf. Russell 1973, pp. 18–19 and 147. 
9 Cf. Preston 2001. 
10 Table-Talk 642F. Cf. ibid. 693F, Precepts of Statecraft 811A–B. 
11 Precepts of Statecraft 816C–D. Cf. Centrone 2000, pp. 575–6. 
12 Roman Questions 275B–C, Precepts of Statecraft 805A, On Exile 602C, Reply to Colotes 1126E.  
13 Plutarch mentions his role as a priest in Table-Talk 700E. Among Plutarch’s Moralia, several works are 
concerned with Plutarch’s identification as a Platonist and his understanding of religion, such as On the E at Delphi, 
On the Oracles at Delphi, On the Obsolescence of Oracles, On Isis and Osiris, On the Sign of Socrates, and 
Platonic Questions 1. Among lost works listed in the Lamprias Catalogue, we also have titles that suggest a defense 
of Academic skepticism as compatible with religion and prophecy, such as no. 71: On the Prophetic Art, That It is 
Preserved According to the Academy (Περὶ μαντικῆς ὅτι σῴζεται κατὰ τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκούς) and no. 131: On 
the Fact that the Principle of the Academy is not in Conflict with the Art of Prophecy (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ μάχεσθαι τῇ 
μαντικῇ τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν λόγον). 
14 Suda, Π 1793 Adler. 
15 Syncellus, p. 626 Mosshammer. On the date of Plutarch’s death see Jones 1966, p. 66.  
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Plutarch’s dialogues.16 Plutarch later became a teacher of philosophy with disciples of his own 
and developed a kind of mini-Academy about himself.17 He attempted to live out his own advice 
and the ideal that he describes in the quotation I have provided in the epigram to the 
introduction: philosophy’s purpose is to make humans actively engaged in life and politics. 
 
§III Perceptions of Plutarch: Reconsidering Eclecticism 
From the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, Plutarch was treated as an 
entertaining biographer who provided a window into the past.18 The rise of intense interest in 
Quellenforschung combined with Eduard Zeller’s work on Plutarch, which framed him within a 
Hegelian view of the development of philosophy,19 brought with it a low estimation of Plutarch’s 
own philosophical contributions. His philosophical works were mined for quotations and 
testimonia of earlier philosophers, historians, playwrights, etc.20 Apart from providing evidence 
of other “more important” writers and movements in the ancient world, Plutarch’s own 
philosophical oeuvre was considered of little value. As Christopher Jones writes in the preface to 
Plutarch and Rome, 
                                               
16 On Ammonius’ philosophical views our best evidence is inferred from what Plutarch puts in the mouth of his 
persona as an interlocutor in On the E at Delphi (391E–394C) and On the Obsolescence of Oracles (410F–414C), 
and in books 3, 8, and 9 of Table-Talk. According to the Lamprias Catalogue, Plutarch also appears to have written 
another work on Ammonius that has not survived: Ammonius, Or On Not Finding Pleasure in Involvement with Vice 
(Ἀμμώνιος, ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἡδέως τῇ κακίᾳ συνεῖναι), no. 84. On Ammonius’s philosophical position and role in 
Academic legacy see Opsomer 2009. Cf. also Jones 1967; Dillon 1977, pp. 189–92; Donini 1986, pp. 108–19; Puech 
1992, pp. 4835–6, 4886–9; Opsomer 1998, pp. 21–5, 129–31, 142–79. 
17 Demosthenes 2.2. Among Plutarch’s students were Aristaenetus, Aristodemus, Favorinus, and Taurus. Like 
Ammonius, Plutarch seems to have forged a mini-Academy in Chaeronea after the decentralization of Plato’s 
Academy in Athens after Antiochus. Cf. Dillon 1977, p. 186, and 1988b, p. 358; Glucker 1978, pp. 257–80; Donini 
1986; Opsomer 1998, pp. 21–6. 
18 See Westaway 1922, p. vii: “The popularity of Plutarch as the author of the Parallel Lives has never really waned. 
It is thus surprising that the other half of his extant work, the essays generally called by the collective title of the 
Moralia, should for long periods together be almost unread and unremembered.”  
19 Zeller 1868 (in the second half of 3.2 of Die nacharistotelische Philosophie), esp. pp. 141, 144–5. 
20 Plutarch is a prominent source in von Arnim’s SVF collection and in the collection of quotations and testimonia 
for Academic, Epicurean, and Stoic views in LS. He often provides evidence and quotations of lost tragedies 
(Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta), comedies (Comicorum Attica Fragmenta), and historical works (FGrH). 
 6 
 
Deposed in the last century [the nineteenth century] from his high position as a historian 
and a moralist, [Plutarch] came to be regarded as little more than a lifeless receptacle, 
valuable mainly for what he had preserved of earlier literature. His works became a 
quarry in the scramble for lost sources, his reputation dwindled by comparison with the 
cloudy trophies of which he was the involuntary savior.21 
 
Viewed through the sources that he preserved and as part of an overarching narrative in the 
development of philosophy, Plutarch was held to be largely unoriginal, derivative in his 
philosophical views, and an eclectic: “[T]he Moralia were, for the most part, taken to consist of 
either eloquent moralizing diatribes or unoriginal philosophical treatises marred by 
eclecticism.”22 Plutarch was thought to have disseminated philosophical points in a simplified 
and more pedestrian form, i.e. as “popular philosophy.”23 His own views were considered a 
muddled mixture of views that he drew from different schools, without considering their 
incompatibility. If he could be called a philosopher, he was “second-rate” at best.24 
In line with this view that Plutarch makes no substantial contribution to philosophy, 
scholars largely contextualized his own philosophical positions as part of a doxographic 
tradition, as though Plutarch repeated and slightly altered previous philosophical points from the 
past. The after-effects of this trend are evident even in Dillon’s remarks in The Middle 
Platonists, published in 1977:  
                                               
21 Jones 1971, p. v. 
22 Kechagia 2011, p. 2. On the history of the concept of eclecticism see the collection of essays in Dillon and Long 
1988, esp. Donini 1988 and Dillon 1988a. See also n. 26 below. 
23 Ziegler 1949, pp. 1–2: Ziegler’s categorization of a number of Plutarch’s works as “Popularphilosophisch-
ethische Schriften” took on a life of its own. As Van Hoof 2010 (pp. 2–3 and 6–7) and Van der Stockt 2011 point 
out, what Ziegler intended by this classification fit with the view that popular philosophy disseminated knowledge to 
non-elites so that they could make better informed personal judgments without committing themselves to 
philosophical systems or extensive study. The notion of popular philosophy, however, has been largely associated 
with “second-rate” moralism “originating in, or percolating to, the lower reaches of…society” (Morgan 2007, p. 2), 
both since Roman times (cf. Dio Chrysostom, Second Kingship Oration, 5–6) and in more modern contexts (cf. 
Hadot 1995, pp. 61–8, and Sellars 2007, p 140). Cf. Pelling 2011. Note that Dillon continues to describe certain 
works of Plutarch’s as promoting “popular philosophy” as recently as Dillon 2016, pp. 9 and 15. 
24 Centrone 2000, p. 576: Plutarch “is not a thinker of the first rank.” Cf. Goldhill 2002, p. 284, and Kechagia 2011, 
p. 2, for discussion of this view. 
 7 
 
Plutarch was by no means a great original philosopher, but he is an important link in the 
chain of evidence for the development of Middle Platonism, and he is also, as we shall 
see, not quite devoid of originality in his doctrines.25 
 
Not quite devoid of originality, but close to it, Plutarch was a necessary piece of the puzzle in 
tracing movements in philosophy, but his own positions were chiefly valuable as stepping stones 
for later, more creative epochs of philosophy. Even if Dillon denied that Plutarch was an eclectic, 
Plutarch’s philosophy was still second-rate.26 Dillon even considers “what appears most 
remarkable at first sight” in Plutarch’s philosophy as revelatory more of Middle Platonic thought 
than Plutarch’s own creativity.27  
Within the Platonic tradition, Plutarch was, as were many of the so-called Middle 
Platonists of his era, treated as part of dogmatic phase in Platonic philosophy, following the 
skeptical New Academy and preceding the revolutionary work of Neoplatonism initiated by 
Plotinus. “Middle” Platonism, much like the construction of the “Middle” Ages in retrospect 
from the Enlightenment, was viewed as a period of decline, a Dark Ages, if you will, in the 
history of Platonism. Even outside of the Platonic tradition, the period itself in which Plutarch 
writes, ca. the first century B.C.E. to the second C.E., was long considered “a source of 
embarrassment to intellectual historians,” between the new movements in the Hellenistic period, 
such as the founding of schools of Stoicism and Epicureanism, and the later revival of Aristotle 
                                               
25 Dillon 1977, p. 185. 
26 Dillon 1988a, p. 104: “[M]y protest [against this label of eclectic] is only valid if the term be used in a dismissive 
or pejorative sense, with the implication that the philosophers concerned were too muddleheaded or light-minded to 
stick to the principles of any of the four main Hellenistic schools.” But under what Dillon would consider a less 
disparaging sense, Plutarch could very well be thought to be eclectic. “If this is eclecticism, it is certainly not 
mindless eclecticism” (Dillon 1988b, p. 364). Cf. id. 1977, pp. xiv–xv. Cf. Babut 1969b, p. 6, for a similar definition 
of eclecticism as combining elements from different schools “sans discrimination des thèmes empruntés à plusieurs 
doctrines.” See also Becchi 1981. 
27 Dillon 1977, p. 196: “Discussion of Plutarch’s philosophy generally centres on those doctrines of his which 
appear most remarkable at first sight….These characteristics…are liable to be emphasized disproportionately, 
simply through an inadequate appreciation of the overall framework of Middle Platonism into which they fit.” 
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under Alexander of Aphrodisias alongside Neoplatonic innovation.28 Plutarch’s role in the 
history of philosophy might be a necessary link in a chain, but it was not thought to be in itself 
very important or remarkable. 
 Tides eventually began to turn toward a greater appreciation of Plutarch’s philosophy 
with Konrat Ziegler’s Plutarchos von Chaeroneia in 1949. Ziegler emphasized Plutarch’s 
creativity in contrast with the scholarship of the preceding century, arguing that the Lives present 
an original approach as part of Plutarch’s philosophical program.29 Plutarch’s Moralia and 
philosophical approach also became far better appreciated with Harold Tarrant’s work on the 
philosophical nuances and distinctive positions of Platonists in the so-called Middle Platonic 
period.30 In his 1985 monograph, Scepticism or Platonism?, Tarrant emphasized the skeptical 
tendencies of writers, including Plutarch, from what was previously considered the dogmatic 
low-point in Platonic creative potential. Tarrant’s work helped to reinvigorate appreciation of 
Plutarch and some of his contemporaries, showing that far from stitching quotations and dogmas 
together from their predecessors, authors like Plutarch were self-consciously engaged in working 
out their own philosophical positions with some skeptical distancing rather than dogmatic 
restatement.31 Tarrant’s approach was followed by Jan Opsomer, who focused extensively on 
these trends in Plutarch’s philosophy in his monograph In Search of the Truth.32  
                                               
28 Dillon and Long 1988, p. 1. Zeller greatly influenced this view in his Hegelian approach to the history of 
philosophy, describing the alternation between periods of high and low creativity. Though Dillon and Long 1988 
attempt to counter this view, they are nonetheless quite concessive to it and consider Plutarch, among other Middle 
Platonists, while not exactly “second-rate, dull, and largely derivative,” still to be part of a trend in which Platonists 
relied more on faith in ancient authority and were thus less adventurous in their own views (p. 2). 
29 Ziegler 1949, pp. 273–91. Cf. Theander 1959. 
30 Cf., however, the continued disparagement of writers in this period in Centrone 2000, p. 559: “There is not in fact 
any single Middle Platonist philosophy, but rather a group of writers who may be described as Platonist by virtue of 
their allegiance to a nucleus of ‘orthodox’ positions, contaminated in many instances by Aristotelian and Stoic 
doctrines, and not the same nucleus in all cases.” 
31 On the importance of Tarrant 1985 see Rist 1986; Stough 1987; Sharples 1987; Opsomer 1998, pp. 13–14. 
32 Opsomer 1998. 
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Plutarch was now considered a proponent of a moderate form of Academic skepticism.33 
He was not dogmatic, as though he merely reiterated teachings passed down through the Platonic 
tradition. Instead, he was actively engaged in the pursuit of truth through dialectical methods. 
His view of what it meant to be a Platonist included appreciation not only of the Platonic 
dialogues, the recorded sayings of Plato and Platonists, and the Platonic tradition carried on by 
Plato’s first followers, but also the works of Aristotle and the skeptical practices of the New 
Academy. 
But this new emphasis on Plutarch’s skeptical approach seemed to put some strain on the 
possibility of positive doctrines in Plutarch, even if he generally followed doctrines of Plato and 
the Academy but was not slavishly repeating them as dogmas. In reaction to the old dogmatic 
view of Plutarch, the new, more skeptical Plutarch that emerged was one in which positive 
assumptions of philosophy, especially those that Plutarch seemed to espouse as a follower of 
Plato, seemed to fit uneasily with his method and manner of attacking Stoic assertations of 
positive philosophy.34 How could Plutarch adopt such a skeptical stance and at the same time 
write works that implicitly or explicitly assume dogmas, or perhaps better, doctrines drawn from 
Plato’s views on the soul, on reality, and on the creation of the world, among others? Plutarch’s 
answer, we will see, lies in his view of the Platonic Academy as a unified tradition centered on 




                                               
33 Cf. Babut 1994a and 2007. Cf. also Bonazzi 2012a (pp. 271–3) who provides a concise overview of scholarship 
on Plutarch’s skepticism. Cf. also Dillon 1999, p. 305, who denies that Plutarch was interested in skepticism. 
34 Cf. Boys-Stones 1997b; Opsomer 2005: Opsomer notes that the emphasis on skeptical tendencies in his 1998 
monograph was partly due to the thesis of that work, though he does not wish to diminish the extent to which 




§IV The Unity of the Academy 
Plutarch self-identifies as part of the Platonic Academy, which, as we will see, he 
considers to be a living tradition that is capable of further development.35 Plutarch understands 
the Platonic Academy to be unified, extending in an unbroken line from Socrates and Plato up to 
his own circle, as suggested by the title of one of his lost works, On the Unity of the Academy 
from Plato (Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀκαδήμειαν).36 Pythagoras stands as an 
inspiring and almost honorary figure for Plutarch, though it is really Plato who first clearly 
understands the core tenets that were foreshadowed by Pythagoras.37 This understanding of the 
Academy as a unified tradition includes the earliest figures of the Academy as its members, such 
as Xenocrates and Polemo, whom Plutarch often quotes.38 It also includes the members of the 
Skeptical Academy, whose most notorious figures include Arcesilaus and Carneades. Not only is 
the line from Socrates through the Skeptical Academy unbroken diachronically, like the trunk of 
a tree, but also includes the seemingly lateral extension by incorporating Aristotle as part of the 
Platonic tradition.39 While Plutarch treats later Peripatetics, such as Strato, as deviating too far 
from some of Plato’s central views to count as part of the Academy, he is more favorable toward 
                                               
35 Jones 1916 helped to demystify Plutarch’s self-identification as a Platonist vis-à-vis his engagement with other 
schools. Cf. Opsomer 1998, pp. 127–212, esp. pp. 171–8; Brittain 2001, pp. 225–36. 
36 =No. 63 in the Lamprias Catalogue. Plutarch’s inclusion of Socrates in this tradition is well attested by Platonic 
Questions 1, On the Sign of Socrates, and Plutarch’s defense of Socrates in Reply to Colotes, which are discussed 
below. On Plutarch’s mini-Academy see n. 17 above. 
37 See, for instance, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441E1–442A5=[T45] in Chapter 2. See also the discussion of 
Pythagoras and Plutarch’s view of the Pythagorean tradition in Chapter 2, §VII, with the accompanying notes. Cf. 
Karamanolis 2006, p. 104, n. 60. 
38 For quotations and references to Xenocrates see On Listening to Lectures 38B, 47E; On Isis and Osiris 360D, 
361B; On the Obsolescence of Oracles 416C–D, 417B–C, 417E, 419A; On Moral Virtue 446E, 452D; On Being a 
Busybody 521A; On Fate 568E; On the Sign of Socrates 591B; Table-Talk 706C, 733A, 745B–C; On the Face in the 
Moon 943E–F, 945C; On the Eating of Flesh 1, 996A; Platonic Questions 8, 1007C and 9, 1007F; On the 
Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1012D, 1013A–B; On Common Notions 1065A, 1069A, 1069E, Reply to 
Colotes 1111D, 1124E; and Sandbach frr. 57 and 99. For quotations and references to Polemo see To an Uneducated 
Ruler 780D; Alcibiades 4.3–4; and Theseus and Romulus 1.6. 
39 See Babut 2007. 
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Aristotle, who, by Plutarch’s estimation, is generally still a faithful member to Plato’s philosophy 
and core tenets.40 
This view of the Academy may seem odd to modern interpreters, since the different 
figures that Plutarch sees as part of this tradition come to many different conclusions, or espouse 
none at all.41 Even among the ancients, these differences were felt to be significant enough to 
count not only as different sects or phases within the Platonic tradition, as Antiochus of Ascalon 
divides the phases of the Academy between Old and New,42 but also, in the case of Aristotle and 
his followers, as a break off into a different school of philosophy.43 As George Karamanolis has 
shown, Plutarch’s inclusion of Aristotle within this tradition is not based on his ignorance of 
Aristotle’s works: Plutarch had access to Aristotle’s exoteric and esoteric works and shows great 
                                               
40 Plutarch, Reply to Colotes 1115B–C. Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–126: “The crucial matter…is that, according 
to Plutarch, Strato came to contradict Plato extensively because he departed from Aristotle’s own doctrines. 
Plutarch’s implication apparently is that Aristotle is closer to Plato in many of the issues in which and later 
Peripatetics diverge strongly from Plato” (p. 97). I discuss these points further below and in Chapter 2, §VII. 
41 Arcesilaus wrote nothing of his own (On the Great Fortune or Virtue of Alexander 1, 328A). For the 
representation of Arcesilaus’ skepticism as pervasive, assuming that truth itself is unattainable, see Cicero, On Ends 
2.2, On the Nature of the Gods 1.11, On Fate 4, Academica 1.16. Plutarch does not share this view of Arcesilaus’ 
philosophy. See Reply to Colotes 1120C–1122A. 
42 Cf. Cicero, Academica 1.13, 1.46, 2.15, 2.70, and 2.136. 
43 Cf. Babut 2007. 
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knowledge of them.44 Nor is Plutarch unaware of Aristotle’s differences and rejection of certain 
Platonic arguments, which Plutarch sometimes notes.45 
Plutarch, however, thinks that this tradition follows from what we might today consider a 
synthesis of Socratic aporetic and Platonic positive approaches to philosophy. The roots, as it 
were, of the Platonic Academy for Plutarch contain the potential for a variety of different 
argumentative approaches and, as Plutarch sees it, seminally contain many of the routes that are 
explored within the tradition. Take, for example, Plutarch’s understanding of Socrates and the 
inception of the Platonic Academy. Socrates begins a search for truth (ζήτησις) that requires 
distancing oneself from one’s own arguments and proposals so that beliefs can be examined and 
rejected if contrary evidence requires.46 Plutarch takes the midwifery metaphors of the 
Theaetetus47 quite seriously (Platonic Questions 1): Socrates’ refutation of arguments is a form 
of therapy that helps others to abandon unfounded and contradictory beliefs as well as excessive 
                                               
44 Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–126, esp. 89–92, and Becchi 2014, pp. 73–4. Donini 1974 (pp. 66–8) and Sandbach 
1982 (p. 210–19) argue that Plutarch used a “standard view” of Aristotle, i.e. a later Peripatetic summary, in his 
discussions of the Topics, Nicomachean Ethics, and other Aristotelian works (cf. Becchi 1990, pp. 27–9, who 
provides a summary of different views on the topic through 1990). Karamanolis 2006 (pp. 89–121, esp. pp. 89–92), 
however, argues that Plutarch had access to more of Aristotle’s works than we do today: Plutarch often mentions 
having Aristotle’s works “at hand” (πρόχειρα, Table-Talk 616D3–5), he draws conclusions “that are clear from 
what he [Aristotle] wrote” (ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν, On Moral Virtue 442B3), he criticizes others for not 
looking at what Aristotle himself wrote in On the Heavens and On the Soul (Reply to Colotes 1115A; cf. Babut 
1996, pp. 10–16), and provides insight into Aristotle’s arguments in both the esoteric and exoteric works, 
acknowledging this division among Aristotle’s works (Reply to Colotes 1115B–C, Alexander 7.1–8) and mentioning 
what appear to be Aristotle’s dialogues, his “Platonic works” (ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς, Reply to Colotes 1118C). 
Plutarch, in fact, provides some of the best evidence that we have for Aristotle’s lost dialogues, mentioning On 
Nobility (fr. 3 Ross), Eudemus (frr. 1, 6, 9 Ross), On Philosophy (test. 1, fr. 6 Ross), Symposium (frr. 3, 11, 12 
Ross), On Wealth (fr. 1 Ross), Erotikos (frr. 2–3 Ross), On Justice (fr. 4 Ross). Karamanolis concludes that 
“Plutarch’s familiarity with Aristotle’s work must be beyond a doubt” (p. 92). For a useful discussion on the 
survival and availability of Aristotle’s works in Plutarch’s time see Janko 2011, pp. 390–8. Cf. also Betegh 2010. On 
the influence of Aristotelian ethics in Plutarch’s time see also Inwood 2014, pp. 73–104, esp. pp. 103–4. 
45 Plutarch writes, for instance, that Aristotle rejected the Theory of Forms in both his esoteric and exoteric works 
and notes that Aristotle departed from Plato’s view on the composition of the world (Reply to Colotes 1114F–
1115C). Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–126, esp. pp. 88, 92–100. I discuss these points further in Chapter 2, §VII 
and the accompanying notes. 
46 On the classification of Plato’s dialogues, among which some are thought to be ζητητικοί, see D.L. 3.49. Cf. 
Opsomer 1998, pp. 12 and 27–33. 
47 150c7–151d3, 157c9–d2, 161e4–6, 184a8–b2, 210b8–9. 
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love of themselves and their own opinions (φιλαυτία).48 This distancing and suspension of 
commitment to conclusions extends also to doctrines passed down from others. As we will see in 
the chapters that follow, Plutarch feels free to disagree with key figures from the Old Academy 
explicitly. He also at times goes against the grain of the dominant arguments in Plato’s 
dialogues, as we will see in Chapter 2 with the case of grief.49 
Plutarch would deny that the more skeptical and aporetic approach exemplified in 
Socrates and the more positive development of philosophical views found in works like the 
Timaeus and Republic could be easily sifted out and pulled apart. As Mark Shiffman has argued, 
Plutarch’s representation of Socrates in Platonic Questions 1, in fact, unites both the more 
skeptical and doctrinal approaches: drawing on Plato’s Symposium, Plutarch describes Socrates 
as the exemplar of a philosophical approach that is erotic at heart, desirous of truth, but not yet in 
full possession of it.50 Plutarch does not hold the view that Socrates believes truth to be 
unattainable.51 He even sees figures like Arcesilaus and Carneades as following Socrates’ 
example and likewise performing a service to others, purging them of false beliefs. Arcesilaus 
and Carneades, following in Socrates’ footsteps, aid their interlocutors in their search for truth by 
removing their poorly founded beliefs, promoting the suspension of judgement to avoid hasty or 
                                               
48 Cf. Opsomer 1998, pp. 150–61. Plutarch considers φιλαυτία a vice. See How to Tell a Friend from Flatterer 
48E–49B, 65E–66A; On Listening to Lectures 40F; Theseus and Romulus 2.2; Dion 46.2. Cf. also Ingenkamp 1971, 
pp. 131–2; Van der Stockt 1999 (esp. p. 594, n. 46); and Roskam 2004b, pp. 251–2 and n. 22. 
49 Although I do not discuss the topic at length in my dissertation, Plutarch also implicitly disagrees with the 
criticisms of poetry in Plato’s Republic 2, 3, and 10, in How a Young Man Should Read Poetry. See Chapter 2, n. 
124 and Chapter 5, §IV. Cf. also Neumayr 1963 and 1964; Zadorojnyi 2002; and Blank 2011. 
50 Shiffman 2010. On p. 271, Shiffman writes, “it is clear as well that the Platonic Socrates serves Plutarch as a 
fundamental fixed point of reference, a standard for the integrity of the practice of philosophy. One crucial measure 
of the integrity of that practice, it appears, is its ability to attain and maintain self-knowledge in the mode of erotic 
wisdom. This integrity demands the cathartic practices of elenchus, aporia, and ephexis; and while these tools from 
the skeptic’s kit do turn out to be instrumental, it is not to a partisan doctrinal piety. Rather, they are in the service of 
a zetetic and, ultimately, erotic understanding of Socratic skepticism.” 
51 See Platonic Questions 1, 1000C–D; Reply to Colotes 1122A–1124B; On the Principle of Cold 955C. Cf. Boys-




over-confident conviction. 52 Their therapeutic cross-examination and refutation of interlocutors 
serves as a preliminary purgation before entering into further serious investigation. 
The titles of several of Plutarch’s lost works in the Lamprias Catalogue attest to 
Plutarch’s view of the unifying nature of this approach, which incorporates both a skeptical 
element with the acceptance of doctrines that are the best available views on a given topic, which 
Plutarch usually thinks were developed by Plato himself. I believe that Opsomer is correct to see 
the proximity of On the Difference between the Pyrrhonians and Academics53 to On the Unity of 
the Academy from Plato as highly suggestive that Plutarch viewed the skeptical Academics as 
holding to key doctrines, even if they were willing, perhaps more than others in the Platonic 
tradition, to treat all views dialectically and with a suspension of judgment.54 This suggestion is 
corroborated in Plutarch’s defense of Arcesilaus in Reply to Colotes (1120C–1122), where 
Plutarch praises Colotes, tongue-in-cheek, for correctly situating Arcesilaus as a recipient of an 
ancient Academic tradition, following the example of Socrates who helped purge others of false 
beliefs (1122A).55 
In line with this understanding of the Academy, Plutarch incorporates a skeptical side to 
his philosophical approach as a corrective to the formation of and attachment to false beliefs, 
since this aspect of his approach checks over-confidence and unwarranted attachment to certain 
positions. Plutarch writes that one’s theory, no matter its provenance, must fit reality (τὰ 
δόγματα πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασιν); since we cannot force reality to fit our theories because of a 
                                               
52 On the Great Fortune or Virtue of Alexander 1, 328A–B. See also D.L. 1.16, 4.32; Cicero, On the Nature of the 
Gods 1.11, Tusculan Disputations 5.11. 
53 Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν Πυρρωνείων καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν, no. 64 in the Lamprias Catalogue. 
54  Opsomer 1998, p. 173. Cf. also Thorsrud 2010, p. 62. 




tradition (On Moral Progress 75F4–9), not even a Platonic tradition.56 Plato may have provided 
the best arguments in psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics, but his views are still subject 
to evaluation, criticism, and further exploration. In natural philosophy Aristotle often provides 
the best set of views available, which Plutarch takes to be in line with Plato’s own philosophical 
approach.57 The Platonic tradition has developed some of the best views, Plutarch believes, but 
still enjoins its members to continue to work them out. 
 
§V Core Doctrines and Tenets 
In conjunction with the more skeptical aspect of his philosophical approach, Plutarch 
holds certain Platonic teachings to be central features of Platonism. These doctrines are the best 
explanations of certain phenomena that have already withstood a great deal of critical 
examination. Certain core philosophical positions, which we commonly associate with both 
Plato’s dialogues and Platonists, resurface again and again in Plutarch’s works, defended and 
taken as starting-points for further philosophical exploration.58 I take it that these are doctrines 
that Plutarch himself holds to, though he is comfortable putting his own twist on how we are to 
understand them. One of the core tenets that Plutarch explicitly advocates and defends against 
rival philosophical schools, whose conclusions and methods Plutarch finds unconvincing, is that 




                                               
56 “But correctly has it been said, ‘Place the stone straight with the measuring line, not the measuring line with the 
stone.’ But those who do not align their teachings with the facts but instead try to force the facts unnaturally to agree 
with their own assumptions have filled philosophy with many puzzles” (ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς μὲν εἴρηται τὸ “πρὸς στάθμῃ 
πέτρον τίθεσθαι, μή τι πρὸς πέτρῳ στάθμην.’ οἱ δὲ μὴ τιθέμενοι τὰ δόγματα πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀλλὰ τὰ 
πράγματα πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὑποθέσεις ὁμολογεῖν μὴ πεφυκότα καταβιαζόμενοι πολλῶν ἀποριῶν 
ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν). I discuss this passage in Chapter 2, §VII. 
57 See Teodorsson 1999. Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–121, esp. pp. 86–9. 
58 Cf. Karamanolis 2006, p. 85. 
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§V.a. Platonic Psychology: Bipartition and Tripartition 
 Plutarch describes the embodied soul as a mixture of both rational and non-rational parts, 
whose distinction from one another is most evident in cases of psychic conflict, as when one’s 
non-rational desires oppose one’s rational judgments. In Chapter 1, I explore Plutarch’s use of 
the locus classicus of critical psychic conflict in Republic 4. While this distinction between the 
rational and non-rational parts of the soul is manifest in cases of internal struggle, Plutarch holds 
that the division persists in cases of psychic concord, when all desires both rational and non-
rational are harmonious.59 
 The division of the soul between a rational part and non-rational part is the first, basic 
division that Plutarch uses throughout his moral works on the soul. While some take Plutarch’s 
frequent use of this basic division as an indication that his psychology is essentially bipartite, 
arguing that Plutarch favors Aristotle’s own division of a soul divided between reason and non-
rational passions, Plutarch is nevertheless explicit that the non-rational part of the soul is subject 
to further subdivision into the spirited and appetitive parts, as we find them described in Plato’s 
Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus. Despite this further explication, many scholars have argued 
that Plutarch pays mere lip-service to Platonic tripartite psychology, perhaps in order to give 
greater clout to his claims of Platonic adherence, but his psychology is nonetheless bipartite in its 
main and important features and is essentially Aristotelian.60 
                                               
59 On Moral Virtue 448D1–3. 
60 Westaway 1922, p. 41: “The latter [the non-rational, affective part] can again be subdivided into the concupiscible 
(τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) and the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές); but this subdivision was rejected by Aristotle and is not 
important.” In Westaway’s view, the subdivision of the non-rational passionate part of the soul is not important for 
Plutarch as well as for Aristotle. Opsomer 2012 (pp. 316–24 and n. 68) argues that Plutarch’s overall commitment is 
to a bipartite soul of reason and non-rational passions, though he sometimes discusses the spirited element as 
separate, but he argues that tripartition should not be seriously considered, since Plutarch holds that the human soul 
is isomorphic with the world-soul, which is bipartite. On p. 319, Opsomer writes, “There can be no doubt that 
Plutarch regards the bipartition as fundamental; but of course, when a Platonist expressly discusses soul-division he 
has to take into account what Plato says about the three parts of the soul.”  Cf. also Vander Waerdt 1985b, pp. 284–
6; Opsomer 1994, pp. 33–6; 1998, pp. 33–6; 2006, p. 213; Beneker 2012, pp. 12–17. 
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 My own view is that we should take Plutarch at his word when he describes the soul as 
truly tripartite. This is not in conflict with his tendency to treat the soul as bipartite, since he 
often finds it sufficient to treat the soul according to the most distinctive and major division of a 
rational part and its separation from the non-rational. In doing so, he does not abandon Platonic 
psychology, but actually follows the Platonic precedent we find in Republic 10, where Socrates, 
after establishing the division of the soul into three parts in preceding books, nonetheless treats 
the soul as bipartite in the arguments of Republic 10.61 
 As I show in Chapters 4 and 5, the further subdivision of the non-rational part of the soul 
into the spirited and appetitive parts is crucial to Plutarch’s theory of moral formation. Plutarch 
carves out an important and necessary role for spirited emotions such as shame, the desire for 
honor, and ambition that help set the young on the path to virtue and help to draw them in pursuit 
of the virtuous life. If we assume that Plutarch holds the division between spirited and appetitive 
passions to be of no real significance because he does not always explicitly mark a distinction 
between them, we miss the important role that Plutarch assigns to the spirited passions and the 
spirited part of the soul. 
 
§V.b. Moderation or Eradication of Emotions? 
 Another significant point in Plutarch’s moral psychology vis-à-vis his Platonic heritage is 
the question of whether the passions should be moderated (μετριοπάθεια) in the moral life or 
eradicated altogether (ἀπάθεια). The question is more complex than it may first appear. One’s 
position is framed by how we understand the notions of (i) what a passion is, (ii) how passions 
arise in the soul, (iii) whether passions can be completely eliminated or merely suppressed, and 
                                               
61 Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 115–23. Cf. also Opsomer 2007a, p. 154, n. 15. 
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(iv) whether passions should be present or absent in the embodied life and in a possible after-life. 
Some have thought, for instance, that advocates of the elimination of passions (ἀπάθεια) really 
mean the suppression of immoderate passions (in answer to (iii)), which could bring their view 
much closer in line with whose who advocate the moderation of passions (μετριοπάθεια). If that 
is the case, some argue, then the dispute might merely be verbal rather than substantive.62 
I agree with Sorabji that the disagreement can be substantive.63 While particular 
individuals may blur the lines between major camps, Chrysippus presents the strongest position 
of ἀπάθεια that became the main line position of the Stoic school up through Epictetus’ time.64 
Chrysippus’ arguments for ἀπάθεια are decidedly in conflict with the view that passions can be 
both useful and good. In Chrysippus’ camp, in answer to (i) and (ii) above, passions are irrational 
and errors of belief and judgment; they are diseased states of an essentially rational soul. How 
can one have a good amount of disease or a moderate amount of irrationality and not consider it 
still bad?65 In answer to (iii), passions can be entirely eliminated by perfecting one’s rationality; 
they are not suppressed but replaced by correct reasoning. In answer to (iv), passions have no 
place in the best life on earth. Plutarch disagrees with the Stoics on nearly every point in (i)–(iv), 







                                               
62 Sandbach 1975, pp. 63–4; Dillon 1983; Annas 1992, pp. 103 and 114. 
63 Cf. Sorabji 2000, pp. 181–210, esp. 206–210. On the traditions of moderating or eradication passions see also 
Lilla 1971, pp. 99–106; Ferrari 2008, pp. 135–8. 
64 Cf. Sorabji 2000, pp. 183–4 and 195–6.  
65 Cf. Seneca, Letters 85.3–5, 116.1; cf. Irwin 1998, pp. 223–4; Sorabji 2000, pp. 207–9. 




§V.c. Moderation and Eradication of Passions from Plato through Porphyry 
Plato’s dialogues are somewhat ambiguous in the evaluation and proposed treatment of 
the passions, as will be explored in Chapter 2.67 In the Phaedo, for instance, passions seem to be 
evils of embodiment.68 In the Timaeus, passions appear to arise from the non-rational parts of the 
soul, which are added to the rational part of the soul as necessary evils of embodiment. In 
Republic 10, the truest nature of the soul is described as purely rational, and the passions and the 
passionate parts of the soul appear to be accretions, once again, due to embodiment. Passions are 
presented as non-ideal and are often described as pollutions of our better, rational nature that 
hinder and distract us in our pursuit of the best life. The extent to which passions serve useful or 
necessary purposes is unclear. Passions such as grief are to be suppressed as far as is possible.69 
On this point, Plutarch emphatically disagrees, as we will see in Chapter 2. In Plato’s Phaedrus 
and Symposium, however, passions such as ἔρως seem to play important roles in drawing one to 
the Good itself. They also seem to motivate moral agents in good actions.70 
Out of this ambiguity, the early members of the Platonic Academy of Aristotle’s time 
seem to have taken the view that passions should be eliminated (ἀπάθεια). Aristotle, in the 
Eudemian Ethics, writes that this view is ubiquitous within Plato’s Academy, and he seems to 
target Speusippus, the first head of the Academy after Plato, as an advocate for this position.71  
                                               
67 Cf. Dillon 1983, pp. 508–10; Sorabji 2000, p. 201. 
68 Sorabji 2000, p. 201, interestingly sees the issue as complicated by the fact that the rational part of the soul can 
experience pleasure due to intellectual activity (Phaedo 114e). Sorabji does not here distinguish rational pleasures 
and desires from non-rational passions. 
69 Republic 10, 606a–b. 
70 The definition of justice in Republic 4 may also indicate that each part of the soul, like each part of the city, 
contributes to the whole, doing its own part (432e4–436b4). 
71 Eudemian Ethics 2.4, 1222a2–5; Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b24–8; 7.13, 1153b1–7; 10.2, 1173a6–13; cf. 
Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 9.5.4; Clement, Miscellanies 2.22. Cf. Sorabji 2000, pp. 194–5 and nn. 4–6. Cf. Burnet 
1900, pp. 84–5, who in his commentary on 1104b24–6 identifies Plato’s Academy as Aristotle’s target. Note also 
the definition of ἀπάθεια in the pseudo-Platonic Definitions 413a5: “Passionlessness: the state according to which 
we are not liable to fall into passions” (ἀπάθεια ἕξις καθ’ ἣν ἀνέμπτωτοί ἐσμεν εἰς πάθη). So defined, the 
absence of passions seems to be a good thing, since it protects us from “falling into” passionate states. 
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Though we do not know what Plato’s own view on the subject might have been, nor do we have 
access to his views presented in conversation with his followers, one can see how the members 
of the early Academy might read into Plato’s dialogues the goal of ἀπάθεια, given the frequent 
presentation of passions as non-ideal. Plutarch, as we will see in Chapter 2, does not share this 
negative evaluation of emotions. 
Against figures such as Speusippus, Aristotle seems to be the first major champion for 
the moderation of passions.72 Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean (μεσότης) assumes that passions 
can be useful and are necessary components of moral virtue. Passions must be moderated and 
directed to appropriate ends, at the right time, in the right degree, under appropriate conditions, 
etc., but they do admit of correct proportions. We can err not only in having excessive passions, 
but also in being deficient in passions.73 This does not indicate that all passions alike have mean 
states, since there are bad emotions that do not have any appropriate place in the moral life, such 
as envy and taking delight in others’ misfortunes.74 
After Aristotle, most adherents of both Platonic and Peripatetic philosophy favor 
μετριοπάθεια over ἀπάθεια in their understanding of moral virtue.75 This holds true for figures 
of the Old Academy, such as Crantor, who, like Plutarch, goes against the grain of Plato’s 
Republic by defending the naturalness of grief.76 It also holds true for Plutarch’s near 
                                               
72 See the citations to Aristotle, Aulus Gellius, and Clement in the previous note. For this view of Aristotle among 
later philosophers cf. also D.L. 5.31; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.22, 4.38; Arius Didymus, quoted in Stob. 
2.7.13. 
73 Nicomachean Ethics 2.5–7; Eudemian Ethics 2.3, 2.5, 2.10. Cf. Sorabji 2000, pp. 194–5. 
74 Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a8–15. 
75 Cicero, Academica 1.19, 38–9; 2.131, 135–36; Stob. 2.7.20. Cf. Sorabji 2000, p. 196; Lilla 1971, pp. 99–106. 
76 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.12, 70–1; Academica 2.44, 135; cf. Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102D, 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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contemporaries within the Platonic tradition, such as Alcinous, Taurus, Maximus of Tyre, and 
Apuleius.77  
The controversy, however, is still more complicated. I mentioned above that one’s view 
of what should be done with the passions involves the question of (iv) whether the passions 
should be part of the embodied life and a possible after-life. That passions must be moderated 
certainly holds for the embodied, active life in Aristotle. Moderation of passions also seems to be 
necessary as part of embodiment in Plato’s dialogues. Some even take certain passages in the 
Republic as foreshadowing the doctrine of the mean as it is found in Aristotle’s works.78 The fact 
that Plato’s immediate followers overwhelmingly supported the goal of ἀπάθεια, however, casts 
doubt on how well this formulation in the Republic was understood as advocating 
μετριοπάθεια.79 But, even if Plato, Aristotle, and their immediate followers considered 
moderation of passions part of the story of how one achieves moral virtue in this life, Plato and 
Aristotle also speak of another ideal of pure contemplation that is free from the passions, which 
might be possible during the embodied life, or at least worth pursuing during the embodied life.80 
The Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry, writing some time after Plutarch, see 
μετριοπάθεια as preparatory for a higher kind of life. Moderation only applies to the civic 
virtues, or moral virtues of the embodied life, while the virtue of pure intellect is free of all 
                                               
77 Alcinous, Handbook 184.24 and 28; Taurus (reported by Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 1.26.5–11=Boys-Stones 18W 
in Boys-Stones 2017); Maximus of Tyre, Orations 27.7; Apuleius, On the Doctrines of Plato 2.20.247. 
78 Republic 4, 423e5–6, 431c5–7; 10, 619a5–6. Cf. Gronau 1914, p. 254; Lilla 1971, p. 99 and n. 4. I discuss these 
passages in Chapter 2. 
79 Dillon 1983, pp. 508–9, also believes that Plato, Statesman 284e outlines a nearly Aristotelian view of moderating 
passions as well as Laws 1, 631b. 
80 Plato, Phaedo 82d; Republic 10, 611b–612a; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178b8–23; Protrepticus fr. 12 
Ross. Cf. Sorabji 2000, pp. 187–9. 
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passions.81 Modern interpreters have often found it tempting to read these divisions and separate 
ideals back into Plato and Aristotle,82 as well as Plutarch.83 
 
§V.d. Plutarch and μετριοπάθεια 
Where does Plutarch place himself in this controversy? Some have argued that Plutarch 
wavers between the two ideals.84 Others see Plutarch as either reiterating or appropriating 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean in his view that passions should be moderated rather than 
eradicated.85 As we will see in Chapter 2, Plutarch draws upon both Plato’s dialogues and 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy to explicate his own view of moral virtues as mean states of the 
passions that are part of the harmony of the soul. Concerning the two ideals of moral virtue and 
intellectual virtue, Plutarch uses the division of intellectual and moral virtues to establish a 
passionless ideal for the theoretical activity of contemplation while maintaining that the practical 
life of moral virtues requires the moderation of passions.86 Contemplation does not require or 
benefit from the presence or interference of passions, while practical action and moral virtue 
require the presence and activities of the passions. 
We might still wonder what Plutarch makes of these two ideals. Is the goal of moral 
virtue subordinated to a higher goal of passionless intellection, as we find in Plotinus and 
Porphyry? Aristotle and Plato both seem to praise the pleasure and freedom of the purely 
contemplative life over the distractions and struggles of embodied moral virtue. Given this 
                                               
81 Plotinus, Enneads 1.2.2.14–18, 1.2.3.20, 1.2.6.25–7; Porphyry, Sentences 32.6–8, 29–32, 71–8, 131–6. Cf. also 
Clement, Miscellanies 6.9.74. 
82 Cf. Annas 1999, pp. 66–71; Sedley 1997 and 1999, pp. 316–28. 
83 Cf. Karamanolis 2014 (“6. Ethics and Politics”). I discuss this point further in Chapter 6. 
84 Nikolaidis 1991, pp. 169–71; Spanneut 1994, pp. 4704–11; Sorabji 2000, p. 196; Machek 2018, pp. 256–7. Cf. 
Becchi 1999, who convincingly argues that once we correctly interpret Plutarch, we see that he does not advocate 
elimination of passions per se, but elimination of excessive passion. I address this issue further in Chapters 2 and 3. 
85 Pinnoy 1973; Donini 1974, 1986; Dillon 1983. Cf. Opsomer 2012, pp. 15–17. 
86 Cf. Babut 1969b, pp. 321–33; Cf. Gill 2006, pp. 237–8. I discuss these points further in Chapters 3 and 6. 
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background, Plutarch takes a surprisingly different approach, which I explore in Chapter 6. 
Plutarch argues that the ideal of contemplation must not distract us from the active life. As the 
quotation at the beginning of the introduction stresses, the highest ideal of becoming like god 
does not mean abandoning the practical life of moral virtues and human social life, but instead 
invigorates it. We may attain a passionless state of contemplation after death, but in this life, 
becoming like god aims at perfecting and realizing one’s full embodied human nature as a 
human agent seeking to benefit others and, like Plato’s Demiurge (Timaeus 29a3), make this 
world the best that it can be.87 
 
§VI Outline of Chapters 
In the first chapter, I begin with Plutarch’s criticisms of the Stoic ideal of invulnerability. 
The passionless ideal (ἀπάθεια), intended to render one unassailable and unaffected by the 
vicissitudes of fortune, comes at the cost of genuine concern for others. Plutarch argues that the 
Stoic ideal of the passionless life amounts to calloused insensitivity; it requires the mutilation of 
our own nature, not its fulfillment. Although the Stoics argue that the passionless ideal is the 
natural end of human nature, as described in their theory of moral development of 
“appropriation,” or “identification” (οἰκείωσις), Plutarch argues that the Stoic theory ironically 
leads to alienation from our own nature, the good of friendship, and from our friends themselves. 
In Chapter 2, I argue that Plutarch’s criticisms of the Stoic goal of invulnerability appear 
to bring Plutarch into conflict with Plato’s dialogues. Contrary to the Republic’s argument that 
grief should be eradicated as far as possible, Plutarch argues that passions in general, and grief 
specifically, are natural and serve useful purposes. Plutarch’s more positive evaluation of 
                                               
87 Cf. Bonazzi 2012a, esp. pp. 150–1. 
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passions as integral to moral virtue also seems in conflict with the negative evaluation of 
passions and the ideal life of a passionless, rational soul that we find in several passages of 
Plato’s dialogues. Plutarch’s affirmation of the passionate, embodied human condition and his 
definition of moral virtue as the moderation of passions (μετριοπάθεια), additionally appears far 
more Aristotelian than Platonic. Is Plutarch pitting Aristotle against Plato? I will argue that 
Plutarch would not see it that way. He emphasizes the positive descriptions of the passions in 
Plato’s dialogues and takes Aristotle’s treatment of the passions to be part of an authentic, 
unified Platonic tradition and development of Platonic moral philosophy. 
In Chapter 3, we will explore Plutarch’s argument for the positive incitement to virtue 
that passions can provide. For Plutarch, passions serve a necessary role in the embodied life. 
Without passions, we would not be able to act, since passions provide impulses that are 
necessary for action. As part of his more positive evaluation of the passions, Plutarch also 
describes the passions as added to our nature by the gods for our benefit. Beyond being 
necessary, passions also can incite virtue and amplify virtuous action. Anger, enthusiasm, and 
the love of honor, can all ignite and intensify one’s pursuit of the virtuous life. 
Chapter 4 explores the cognitive aspect of spirited emotions in contrast with appetitive 
passions. Spirited emotions are more complex than appetites and can serve a role in evaluating 
desires and actions in terms of whether they should be viewed as honorable or shameful. These 
greater cognitive features allow for spirited passions to play an important role in the regulation of 
our own desires and actions. If we train our spirited emotions well, they help to set us on the path 
to virtue and keep us from straying from it. 
In Chapter 5, we turn to the topic of early education. Plutarch argues that training 
children to take pleasure in what is honorable and feel pain toward what is shameful is the most 
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important aspect of early education that prepares the soul for moral virtue. In his argument on 
this point, Plutarch contrasts his own position with that of Xenocrates, who considered education 
in the sciences, such as geometry, astronomy, and music, to be the most important preparatory 
education for moral progress. Habituation of passions, Plutarch argues, is more fundamental and 
more important in setting the young on the path to virtue and in keeping their progress steady on 
that path. Plutarch’s position looks quite similar to Aristotle’s, since Aristotle also argues that a 
soul that has been habituated to take pleasure and feel pain in the right ways is like a soil that has 
been prepared for further moral education. Once again, however, Plutarch is not simply pitting 
Aristotle against Plato: both Plutarch and Aristotle draw upon Plato’s Republic and Laws to 
emphasize the habituation of passions as preparation for moral progress. 
In Chapter 6, I begin with Plutarch’s use of the metaphor of plant cultivation. While bad 
desires and passions may sprout up within the soul like weeds, Plutarch argues that there are 
good passions that must be developed and promoted like fruitful crops in a garden. Unlike his 
predecessors and contemporaries, Plutarch focuses on the passions as the seeds of virtue, not 
rational principles or discourse. Plutarch also indicates through this metaphor that passions, like 
plants, provide a principle of growth and an internal trajectory towards virtue as their fruit. We 
must tend to our passions so that they develop correctly, but it is through their cultivation, not 
their suppression, that we bring about moral virtue.  
This brings us to Plutarch’s inclusion of affection for offspring as a passion which, 
among others, grows toward virtue. Plutarch draws on the image of an outward expanding 
concern for others that is described in the Stoic theory of “appropriation” or “identification” 
(οἰκείωσις), but alters its starting-point. Plutarch plants the seed of justice within our passionate 
nature. We learn to identify with others’ concerns through this passion. This passion alone is not 
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sufficient to bring about the virtue of justice in the soul, but nonetheless initiates the movement 
of expanding our concern to others outside of ourselves. 
As one progresses in moral virtue, particularly the virtue of justice, Plutarch describes the 
end-goal and fulfillment of human nature as the imitation of god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ). For 
Plutarch, becoming like god does not require the removal or absence of passions altogether. We 
are to become like god with the whole of our embodied human nature which includes our 
passions. Those who become like god in this life emulate the divine ruler and craftsman of 
Plato’s Timaeus. They do so by developing other-regarding passions, such as benevolence, so 





Emotional Vulnerability and Friendship 
 
For Plutarch, passions are central to human life. Not only are they essential components 
of human nature, but they also establish the foundations of human intimacy, aid in moral 
progress, and enrich human experience. This makes Plutarch’s philosophy and the kind of life it 
promotes both attractive and distinct. In the chapters that follow, we will explore many of 
Plutarch’s arguments and metaphors that emphasize the positive roles that passions play in 
human life, contrasting Plutarch’s positive view of emotions with his rivals and, to some extent, 
his predecessors. In this chapter, we will begin with Plutarch’s arguments for the centrality of 
passions in human friendships and his argument that passions are an ineliminable aspect of 
human nature that we would not choose to be without even if we could. 
To draw out Plutarch’s distinctive, positive evaluation of passions, I think it best to start 
with his attack on the dominant philosophical rival of his time, the Stoics, who are the strongest 
proponents of ἀπάθεια, i.e. that passions should be eliminated from our nature.1 Plutarch targets 
the goal of invulnerability in his attack on Stoic ethics and psychology. The Stoic sage, who
                                               
1 Plutarch is chiefly concerned with the doctrines that emerge from the Old Stoa, especially Chrysippus in his 
arguments against the eradication of emotion (ἀπάθεια) and the invulnerability of the sage. While views might vary 
among some later Stoics, which Plutarch shows awareness of in On Moral Virtue 440E–441B and On Stoic Self-
Contradictions 1034C–E, 1046E–1047A, 1047E–1048C, Chrysippus “established the main Stoic view on this 
question” (Sorabji 2000, pp. 206–7), which even as late as Epictetus shows dominance in the Stoic view of humanity 
and the need to eradicate emotions (pp. 181–4; cf. pp. 195–6 and 208–10). Cf. Hershbell 1992, p. 3346. On 
Plutarch’s relationship with the Stoics see Babut 1969a, 1969b, and his collection of essays in Babut 1994, 
Ingenkamp 1999, Castelnérac 2007, and Opsomer 2014. See also §V.b of the Introduction. 
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exemplifies perfected rationality and the fulfillment of human nature for the Stoics, is fully 
virtuous, fully happy, and his happiness is invulnerable to circumstances outside his control. 
Virtue, the Stoics claim, is sufficient for happiness and is entirely within our power. It is 
supremely valuable and the only good (§I). The Stoic goal of invulnerability is incompatible with 
human passion. Passions by their nature make us vulnerable, since they lead us to value things 
that are outside our control. If we value a friendship we have, for instance, and our friend dies a 
premature and painful death, we feel pain and grief at the loss. Since passions make us 
vulnerable, the Stoics argue that they must be eliminated. The sage does not form vulnerable 
relationships and is not affected by the plight of his friends (§II). 
Plutarch argues that this view of human nature and friendship is not natural and based on 
a faulty understanding of human psychology. Stoic psychology fails to account for common 
experiences of psychic conflict and misunderstands the nature of passions as non-rational. 
Passions are not diseased states but are essential components of human nature (§III). Even 
beyond this, Plutarch argues that if we could entirely rid ourselves of passions and become 
invulnerable to what is outside our control, we should not. It would come at too high a cost to 
our ability to form genuine and intimate relationships with others, which are only possible when 
we are vulnerable in our care and concern for others (§IV). Friendship is a great good for 
Plutarch. It is worth the cost of our vulnerability and is our best source of comfort in the face of 
adversity and grief (§V). 
Plutarch thus reveals that there is something deeply flawed with the Stoics’ understanding 
of human nature and the passions. The Stoic foundational theory of human development, Stoic 
“appropriation” / “identification” (οἰκείωσις) is flawed, since it leads to a false ideal of human 
fulfillment that is uninterested in the condition or plight of others. Stoic οἰκείωσις ironically 
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leads to one’s alienation from one’s friends and the passionate aspects of one’s nature.2 We 
therefore should reject the Stoic view of passions and their ideal (§VI). Finally, the goal of 
passionless invulnerability is not truly human. When we attempt to remove our passions and the 
vulnerability that they entail, we mutilate our nature. We force our soul to become callous, as it 
were, and insensitive, which is an assault on our nature, not its fulfillment. The pursuit of a 
passionless, invulnerable state in this life, then, is not only unnatural, but dangerous (§VII). 
  
§I Stoic Value and the Invulnerability of Stoic Happiness 
To understand Plutarch’s criticism of Stoic ethics, their ideal, and their view of human 
nature, we must start with the Stoics’ view of value and their notion that the virtuous are 
invulnerable to what is outside their control. For the Stoics, the sage is the perfect human being 
who has reached the end-goal (τέλος) of human nature and thus achieved its fulfillment. He 
alone is happy, since happiness (εὐδαιμονία) wholly depends on one’s virtue and the Stoics 
identify virtue and being virtuous with happiness and being happy.3 The sage’s virtue, moreover, 
is entirely within his power, since virtue is up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμίν).4 Circumstances, no matter how 
bad or good they may appear to the non-sage, are irrelevant to the sage’s happiness; the sage’s 
virtue is not affected by circumstances. Nothing outside his own choice can affect his happiness, 
since nothing can have an impact on the virtuous state of his soul apart from his own choices.5 
                                               
2 The English translations might not bring it across, but the underlying Greek terms ἀλλοτρίωσις (“alienation”) and 
οἰκείωσις (“appropriation” / “identification”) are contraries. 
3 Stob. 2.7.6a (p. 71, l. 15–p. 72, l. 6)=SVF 3.106=LS 60M; D.L. 7.89=SVF 3.39=LS 61A, 7.127–28=SVF 3.49; SVF 
3.50–67, 3.78, 3.107. Cf. Nussbaum 1994, p. 361. 
4 Epictetus, Discourses 1.1.7=LS 62K; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate 196.24–197.3=SVF 2.984=LS 61M 
and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.81–2=LS 63M. Virtue and vice are brought about by our rational choices and 
powers (D.L. 7.85–6=SVF 3.178=LS 57A; Seneca, Letters 124.13–14=LS 60H) and virtue consists in the optimal 
condition of the commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικόν, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 440E–441D=LS 61B; S.E. Against 
the Professors 11.22–6=SVF 3.75=LS 60G).  
5 Cf. Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 8.401.34–6 Kalbfleisch=SVF 3.238; Clement, Miscellanies 
4.22.627=SVF 3.240.  
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What is outside his power to control, then, makes no difference to his virtue and thus to his 
happiness.  
“Conventional goods,” such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, etc., what 
we as non-sages refer to as goods, are, as the Stoics call them, “indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα).6 They 
may be preferable (προηγμένα), both to have and to pursue, and they may also in a limited way 
be valuable in themselves,7 but whether or not we succeed in obtaining or retaining them makes 
no difference to our happiness. What matters for virtue is doing all that is within one’s power to 
obtain and use these items in the appropriate manner, at the appropriate time, etc. As explained 
in the analogy of an archer aiming at a target, aiming well is within one’s control but succeeding 
in hitting the target is not entirely within one’s control.8 One can miss the target if an unforeseen 
gust of wind blows the arrow off course or if someone moves the target. Likewise, we can be 
deprived of conventional goods or thwarted in our efforts to obtain them by forces outside our 
control. Happiness, because it depends wholly on virtue, however, is entirely within our control. 
These items, then, cannot ultimately contribute to our happiness nor take anything away from it, 
since they are not entirely within our control.9 
                                               
6 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1048A1–8=SVF 3.137=LS 58H; D.L. 7.101–3=LS 58A; Stob. 2.7.7a (p. 79, 
l. 18–p. 80, l. 13)=LS 58C; SVF 3.127–39. 
7 Stob. 2.7.7g (p. 84, l. 18–p. 85, l. 11)=SVF 3.128=LS58E. See nn. 64–5 below. 
8 Plutarch, On Common Notions 1070F–71E=LS 64C, 1072C–F=SVF 3.59=LS 64D; Cicero, On Ends 3.22=SVF 
3.18=LS 64F. For a discussion of the archer analogy as an explication of Stoic views by Antipater in response to 
Carneades see Long 1967, pp. 75–86. Cf. also Inwood 1985, p. 212; 1986; 2014, pp. 86–7. 
9 D.L. 7.104=SVF 3.104=LS 58B: Indifferents for the Stoics are “what contribute neither to happiness nor to 
unhappiness, as holds true for wealth, glory, health, strength and the like, since it is possible to be happy without 
these things” (τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὡς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα, 
ὑγίεια, ἰσχὺς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων εὐδαιμονεῖν). Cf. Cicero, On Ends 3.50; Plutarch, 
On Common Notions 1060B. Cf. also Sorabji 2000, p. 208: “The Stoic sage will not be upset if, through no fault of 
his, he ‘misses’ and fails to secure the selected indifferent. That leaves the indifferents just that—indifferent—and 
does not allow them to serve as grounds for emotional concern.” 
 
 31 
Virtue, then, is of absolute value for the Stoics. The value of conventional goods, whether 
we succeed in obtaining them or not, adds nothing to one’s virtue. To have virtue is to be 
completely happy. Nor do these items add to our virtue or happiness, since happiness and virtue 
do not come in degrees. Every sage is equally as happy as any other sage.10 Whether one is in 
possession of many conventional goods or deprived of them makes no difference to a sage’s 
happiness. Whatever value conventional goods have cannot, then, contribute to or compare with 
the absolute value of virtue, since the Stoics adhere to a notion of ordinal value.11 Virtue alone 
belongs to the class of absolute value that overrides any and all value attached to conventional 
goods, which do not add to, detract from, or compare with the value of virtue. Virtue stands in a 
class of its own.12 
This view of the Stoic sage, his virtue, and his happiness renders him invulnerable.13 That 
tenet alone is sufficient to set the Stoics on a collision course with human passion (τὸ πάθος), 
since passions by their very nature make us vulnerable. They draw us to value what is outside 
our control and to be affected (πάσχειν / παθεῖν) by what is not within our power. Love for 
friends and family, for instance, can lead to feelings of grief at their loss. Our happiness, to some 
extent, becomes a hostage to fortune and circumstances when we attach value to people and 
situations outside our control.14 
                                               
10 D.L. 7.127=LS 61I; Plutarch, On Common Notions 1061F=SVF 3.54=LS 63I, 1063A–B=SVF 3.549=LS 61T, 
1076A=LS 61J; On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1039E=SVF 3.761=LS 60Q and 1038C–D. 
11 Cf. Zimmerman 2015. 
12 Stob. 2.7.7g (p. 84, l. 18–p. 85, l. 11)=SVF 3.128=LS 58E: Preferable conventional goods are likened to the class 
of subordinates beneath the king, virtue. Cicero, On Ends 3.33–4=SVF 3.72=LS 60D: The good is supremely 
valuable, a value of a different kind, not of a different magnitude from conventional goods.  
13 Cicero, Tusculan Disputation 5.40–1=LS 63L: The virtuous man is secure (tutus), impregnable (inexpugnabilis), 
hemmed and walled in (saeptus et munitus); he is not afraid of losing anything because his happiness is invulnerable 
to what is outside his control. 
14 Cf. Knuuttila and Sihvola 1998, p. 16: “Emotional responses are actualized when contingent external things are 
found to be important and valuable. Thus, the emotions are typically connected with confronting the contingencies 
of the external world. If one regards them as constituents of the good life, as Aristotle did, one will also accept 
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§II Invulnerability and the Elimination of Passions (ἀπάθεια) 
To maintain the invulnerability of happiness, which the Stoics equate with virtue, 
passions must be eliminated. The Stoic sage’s happiness cannot be invested in anything apart 
from virtue; he must value virtue alone as absolutely valuable. Virtue is the sole good and vice 
the only bad for the Stoics.15 To value anything as good or bad apart from virtue and vice, then, is 
to have a false belief about value.16 Because they lead us to value other human beings and things 
outside our control, such as death and suffering, as though these things were good or bad, 
passions lead to false beliefs. Invulnerability and the Stoic conception of virtue, then, will require 
the absence of all passion (ἀπάθεια). 
Within the Stoic conception of nature and the order of the universe, passions must also be 
eliminable from human nature. If the end-goal and fulfillment (τέλος) of human nature is 
obtainable, it must be possible to be in a state completely lacking in passions. Happiness is, by 
one Stoic expression, living in agreement with nature (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν),17 
both with one’s own human nature and with the nature of the whole.18 Since the Stoics believe 
                                               
vulnerability as a basic human condition. Emotions thus connect us to things that are not wholly under our control.” 
Emphasis added. Cf. also Sorabji 2000, pp. 181–4. 
15 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1042A=SVF 3.55=LS 63H and On Common Notions 1061F=SVF 3.54=LS 
63I. Cf. Cicero, On Duties 3.16; On Ends 5.95. 
16 Pseudo-Andronicus, On Passions 1=SVF 3.391=LS 65B (on the spurious attribution of On Emotions to 
Andronicus of Rhodes see Glibert-Thirry 1977, pp. 30–4); Stob. 2.7.10 (p. 88, l. 22–p. 89, l. 3)=SVF 3.378=LS 65C; 
Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 4.2.1–6=SVF 3.463=LS 65D, 4.5.21–5=SVF 3.480=LS 65L, 4.7.12–
17=SVF 3.466=LS 65O; Epictetus, Handbook 5=LS 65U; and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.61, 3.68, 3.70, 3.77–
8, 4.61. Cf. Irwin 1998, pp. 221–4: “The Stoics believe that uncompromising attachment is the mark of believing 
that something is good. The Stoic is attached in this way to virtue, and so is not willing to listen to arguments that 
invite trading virtue for something else. This uncompromising attitude is characteristic of passions” (p. 224). Cf. 
also Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p. 420; Sorabji 2000, pp. 181–4.  
17 Stob. 2.7.6a (p. 75, l. 11–p. 76, l. 8)=LS 63B; cf. Stob. 2.7.5b5 (p. 63, l. 25–p. 64, l. 12)=LS 63G; 2.7.6e (p. 77, ll. 
16–27)=SVF 3.16=LS 63A; and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.81–2=LS 63M. 
18 D.L. 7.87–9=LS 63C: “The end is to live in accordance with nature, which is according to one’s own nature and 
according to the nature of the whole” (τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ 
καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, 88). “Chrysippus understands nature in terms of common and individual human nature” 
(φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, 89). 
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that the natural order of the universe makes the end of human nature possible, they also believe 
that it must be possible to remove passions entirely from that nature. 
This view, in turn, informs the Stoic conception of the human soul. Stoic psychology is 
monistic; the soul is uniform, singular, and not composed of parts. Unlike the Platonic tripartite 
soul that appears in the Republic, Timaeus, and Phaedrus, the human soul in Stoic psychology 
lacks non-rational parts that are separate from the single commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικόν) of 
the soul. For the Stoics, the essential nature of the human soul is rational,19 and to reach the 
fulfillment of human nature is to become perfected in our rationality.20 Plutarch himself reports 
as much in On Moral Virtue: 
[T1] καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει21 τοῦ  
λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν 
καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, δι’ ὅλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς 
καθ’ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν 
ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. 
 
And they [the Stoics] think that the passionate and non-rational part is not separated by 
any difference or in its nature from the rational part but is the same part of the soul, 
which they call thought and the commanding-faculty. And [they think that] this 
commanding-faculty, by turning itself and changing in its passions and in alterations 
according to its condition and disposition as a whole, becomes vice and virtue. And [they 
think that] it does not have a non-rational part in itself.   
(Plutarch, On Moral Virue 441C4–10=LS 61B) 
 
Passions on the Stoic view are instances of irrationality.22 They are errors in belief when the 
mind is altered and in a non-virtuous state. Passions are irrational in a normative sense, not 
                                               
19 Seneca, Letters 76.9–10=LS 63D; Calcidius 220=SVF 2.879=LS 53G; Aetius 4.21.1–4=SVF 2.836=LS 53H. Cf. 
Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, p. 383: The soul is “is rational through and through.” 
20 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441C1–4=LS 61B: “All of these men suppose in common that virtue is a certain 
disposition of the commanding-faculty of the soul that comes about by reason, and, moreover, that this [disposition] 
itself is reason that is in agreement, is steadfast, and unchangeable” (κοινῶς δ’ ἅπαντες οὗτοι τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ 
ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγενημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν 
ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται). Cf. Annas 1992, pp. 61–70 and 115–20. 
21 Following Hartman in the deletion of ψυχῆς after φύσει. 
22 Stob. 2.7.10 (p. 88, l. 8–p. 90, l. 6)=SVF 3.378, 389=LS 65A and LS 61B. Cf. also Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 
449D7–9: “For every passion is an error according to them [the Stoics], and everyone who feels grief or fear or 
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merely non-rational as something different from reason, as though springing from a non-rational 
part (τὸ ἄλογον) that is different from a rational part in the soul.23 
Because the Stoics hold passions to be instances of irrationality within the soul, passions 
are eliminated in the process of perfecting the soul, i.e. by perfecting one’s rationality. 
Extirpation or eradication of passions (ἀπάθεια) would not, then, be an uprooting as the 
etymologies of “eradication” and “extirpation” suggest.24 We need not cut out the source of our 
passions, as though digging out parts of the soul that issue in passions and are separable from the 
commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικόν) of the soul. The human soul is the commanding-faculty with 
no separable parts. Nor is a “pathectomy” required, as though one could remove a disease that 
inhabits the soul. Passions are diseased states of the commanding-faculty,25 and they are removed 
in the process of improving its function. Extirpation of emotion, on this view, is improvement of 
rational function. Removing error and debugging our mental faculties, as it were, will result in 
the complete elimination of passions on the Stoic account of the soul and the nature of passions. 
This view of human nature and its perfection is still grounded in the embodied state, since 
the soul is itself physical for Stoics. The commanding-faculty is a physical structure and all the 
functions of the soul, including thoughts, passions, and desires, are functions of this physical 
structure.26 In fulfilling human nature, then, the sage does not become something other than 
                                               
desire is committing an error” (πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ 
φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει); On the Cleverness of Animals 961D1–2: “They [the Stoics] are in 
agreement that all passions in general are ‘bad judgments and beliefs’” (τὰ δὲ πάθη σύμπαντα κοινῶς ‘κρίσεις 
φαύλας καὶ δόξας’ ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι). Cf. Nussbaum 1994, pp. 80–1 and 369–70; Annas 1992, pp. 106–10; 
Krentz 2008, pp. 124–6. 
23 Sellars 2006, p. 117: For Stoics, passions are “the product of mistaken judgements” that “should play no part in 
the life of a properly functioning rational being.” Cf. Nussbaum 1994, pp. 80–1, 369–70; Annas 1992, pp. 106–10. 
24 From Latin eradicare and ex(s)tirpare, “ripping up from (e-/ex-) the roots (radices / stirpes)”. 
25 Seneca, Letters 22.15, 85.3–5, 116.1=SVF 3.443; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.13–31, 61–3; SVF 3.444, 447. 
Cf. Nussbaum 1994, p. 389; Irwin 1998, p. 223. 
26 Aetius 4.21.4=SVF 2.836=LS 53H. Cf. Powers 2012, p. 257: The Stoics “ascribe to the hēgemonikon control over 
all an animals life functions.” 
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human, since the Stoics consider human nature’s perfection to be found in its rationality. Dion, 
the human sage, is equal to Zeus, the supreme god of the universe, because he is fully virtuous, 
i.e. is perfected in his rationality.27 To be like god for the Stoics is to be fully rational but to do so 
while remaining distinctively human. 
 
§III Human Nature and the Phenomena of Human Experience 
 
We will see in Chapter 6 that Plutarch also believes that the fulfillment of human nature 
is found in becoming like god while still remaining fully human. For Plutarch, however, both the 
way in which the Stoics conceive of this goal and their view of human nature are false. Passions 
cannot be entirely eliminated from human nature, even as we become like god, since they are 
essential components of our nature. As we will explore in this section, Plutarch rejects the Stoic 
view of human nature, arguing that the soul must be composed of non-rational as well as rational 
parts. Common human experience, Plutarch argues, reveals that we have both non-rational and 
rational aspects to our nature that are separate and distinct from each other. The Stoics may deny 
this reality in their monistic psychology, but it is to their own theory’s detriment. The 
phenomena of critical psychic conflict, which we will explore below, reveal that the Stoics’ 
understanding of the soul and their view on its passions are false.28 
Plutarch takes experiences of psychic conflict to be common phenomena, such as when 
we feel a desire to do something contrary to our own convictions. In cases like these, we often 
feel as though two separate forces are pulling us in different directions about the same thing. 
Now, if there really are two different motions in the soul that are acting directly against one 
another, urging us to pursue and to avoid the same thing, at the same time, and in the same 
                                               
27 Plutarch, On Common Notions 1076A=LS 61J. Cf. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1038C–D. 
28 Cf. Ingenkamp 1999; Opsomer 2012, pp. 315–17. 
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respect, then how can the soul be just one thing itself and not be either two things or have two 
things within it that are at variance with one another? Psychic conflict so described seems to be 
critical, i.e. it appears to reveal that two things that are opposed are distinct from one another.29  
This problem, which Plutarch raises against Stoic psychology, comes straight from the 
argument for soul-partition that Socrates gives in Republic 4. When we experience critical 
psychic conflict, such as when there is a motion of conviction or judgment that deems an act not-
to-be-done or an object not-to-be-taken and a contrary motion of a desire to-do or to-take 
(439c6–d2), we find that there must be two different things at work within the soul:  
[T2] δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ  
ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἄν που εὑρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι 
οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω. 
 
It is clear that the same thing will not be willing to do or suffer contraries in the same 
respect, 30 in relation to the same thing, at the same time. Thus, if ever we discover these 
things happening in the soul, we will know that it is not the same thing, but more than 
one.        (Plato, Republic 4, 436b9–c2) 
 
As explained in one of the earliest formulations of the principle of non-contradiction, one thing 
cannot be at variance with itself with regard to the same thing, at the same time, in the same 
respect, etc. Where there is a favorable attitude and its contrary in the same respect, in relation to 
the same thing, and at the same time, there will be one subject that holds the favorable attitude 
and another that holds the contrary. Whether we describe these contrary motions as desires, 
                                               
29 It is critical, as the etymology suggests, because the subjects are discerned to be separated and distinct 
(κρίνεσθαι). Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Progress 448C6–10. 
30 In the passage quoted here, I have translated κατὰ ταὐτόν γε in 436b9–10 as “in the same respect,” departing 
from the 1997 translation of Grube and Reeve (in John Cooper, Plato: Complete Works) of “in the same part of 
itself.” My reason for doing so is that the case of the spinning top that follows in 436d4–e5 represents a difference in 
movement in respect and not in part. All parts of the top move with respect to rotation, but do not move with respect 
to the axis. Additionally, my translation mirrors more closely the reformulation in 436e7–437a1: (“No such 
statement will disturb us, then, or make us believe that the same thing can be, do, or undergo opposites, at the same 
time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing,” per Grube and Reeve with emphasis added (οὐδὲν ἄρα 
ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει, οὐδὲ μᾶλλόν τι πείσει ὥς ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ 
πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἴη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειεν). 
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convictions, or attitudes, we find that when they pull us in opposing directions in a critical 
manner, they require that the two forces belong to two things that are opposed to one another. 
Call this the “Principle of Opposites.” 
As the Principle of Opposites establishes in Republic 4, we cannot have a single 
psychological subject that performs two contrary motions, the favorable attitude and its contrary, 
to the same object, at the same time, etc. This is not to say that the two subjects of the contrary 
motions cannot be parts of a common subject, but that, inasmuch as they are subjects of contrary 
motions, they must be treated as separate subjects, or separate parts. In the Republic, the example 
of the archer both pulling and pushing is apt. While the archer is, in some sense, the common 
subject that pulls and pushes, it is strictly speaking more correct to distinguish two parts of that 
archer that are the subjects of the opposing motions: one hand pushes the bow while the other 
hand pulls the string (439b8–c1). 
Given that experiences of critical psychic conflict are common and require that more than 
one psychological subject is at work, how, Plutarch asks, can the Stoics explain these 
experiences? Within the Stoics’ single-subject, monistic psychology, the same mind cannot 
allow for two different subjects of conflicting attitudes at the same time, not even as different 
parts of the same psyche, since the soul is uniform. The Stoic response to this challenge, as 
Plutarch reports, is to deny the possibility of critical psychic conflict altogether: 
[T3] ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνεταί τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιαύτης ἑτερότητος αἴσθησις καὶ διαφορᾶς  
περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥς τινος μαχομένου καὶ τἀναντία λέγοντος αὐταῖς, οὐκ 
ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἔνιοι δέ φασιν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυεῖν 
διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλ’ ἑνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς 
ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς, οὐ συνορῶντας ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ 
πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ 




It is clearly the case that some perception of discord and conflict of this kind occurs 
within the soul as it concerns one’s desires, just as though someone were fighting and 
giving commands contrary to these desires. But some [the Stoics] say that passion is not 
different from reason, and they deny that there is conflict and strife between the two. 
Instead, they claim that it [the experience of discord] is a turning of a single reason in two 
directions, which eludes us due to the swiftness and suddenness of the change, since we 
are unable to see within our limited purview that all of these activities naturally belong to 
the same aspect of the soul: desiring and changing our mind, growing angry and fearful, 
being carried off into shame because of pleasure, even as the soul is brought back to take 
hold of itself again.        (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 446E8–447A4=SVF 3.459=LS 65G) 
 
Plutarch begins here by presenting the usual psychic partition of reason and desire from Republic 
4: the someone (τις) fighting and giving commands is the rational part of the soul that opposes 
desires arising from the appetitive part of the soul. Then follows the Stoic reply, which denies the 
experience of critical psychic conflict. According to the Stoics, what people presume to be an 
experience of synchronic conflict is really just a very quick change of direction within a single 
mind. There is no critical conflict of simultaneous variance within the soul at all.  
When people feel as though they continue to have conflicting attitudes within their soul, 
they experience nothing other than a quick change of attitudes but fail to take notice of the 
changes. As in the last example, the mind has changed direction and gotten ahold of itself again 
by the time the supposed conflict is thought to occur. It merely appears that the better judgment 
was in place when the contrary shameful course was undertaken, as one was swept away by 
passion. Instead, it is something of an after-effect to feel as though the desire is still in place once 
we have changed our minds, not a concurrent experience of a desire contrary to our decision. 
Being swept away by pleasure was a failed mental state followed by a better judgment, the Stoics 
argue, not an experience of a synchronic conflict. The mind can change direction, but not be split 
in two opposing directions or against itself at the same time.31 
                                               
31 For further discussion of this passage see Gill 1983a, pp. 142–5; Dillon 1983; Campbell 1985, esp. pp. 327–31. 
See also the preceding note. 
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 This is a bad move according to Plutarch. The Stoic response is grossly inadequate to 
account for normal human experience; it is contrary to what is clear and distinct evidence and 
contrary to our normal human perceptions (παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειάν ἐστι καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, On 
Moral Virtue 447A12–B1).32 Not only is the Stoic view contrary to our experience of synchronic 
psychic discord, which Plutarch thinks we have no good reason to deny, but their explanation of 
unnoticeable changes in intention also fails to account for an enduring sense of internal conflict. 
Plutarch asks us to imagine the example of inappropriate romantic urges or feelings (On Moral 
Virtue 447B3–11). The lover in such cases suffers an experience of erotic desire that his rational 
judgment condemns as inappropriate and to-be-avoided. He nonetheless continues to feel these 
urges and emotions despite his attempts to quell them. Contrary to the Stoic explanation, he has 
not made unnoticeably quick successions back and forth between experiencing love and making 
a judgment to condemn that love. He sees this impropriety of his feelings and feels those 
passions at the same time. He senses a conflict within himself that we have no good reason to 
doubt.33 
The conclusion to be drawn from such cases, Plutarch argues, is that the soul is not a 
monistic subject as presented in Stoic psychology. Plato’s dialogues already provide a 
psychological description that accounts for such psychological phenomena: a soul composed of a 
rational part and two non-rational parts (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441F7–442B2; Platonic 
                                               
32 Plutarch’s criticism even hints that the Stoics undermine their own notion of certain self-revealing perceptions of 
the world, a correspondence theory of perception with “secure representations” (καταληπτικαὶ φαντασίαι). If 
critical psychological conflict is clear and distinct evidence (ἐνάργεια), and Stoics nonetheless deny it, then they are 
failing to meet their own standards in forming a secure representation (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) of their internal 
psychological states. For the sense of “clear and distinct evidence” in perception (ἐνάργεια) see Theophrastus’s 
philosophical definition of τὸ ἐναργές as the criterion of truth for the perception of both sensible items (αἰσθητά) 
and intelligible items (νοητά, S.E., Against the Professors 7.218). See also the Epicurean definition in Epicurus, 
Letter to Herodotus 71; PHerc. 1431(=fr. 36.22 Arrighetti) and PHerc. 1479/1417(=fr. 31.21 Arrighetti). The term 
ἐνάργεια is often a technical term for vivid description in literary analysis. On these points see Zanker 1981. 
33 Cf. Ingenkamp 1999; Gourinat 2007, pp. 215–47. 
 
 40 
Questions 9, 1008B7–10). This understanding of the soul assigns passions to non-rational aspects 
that are part of human nature and does not require that passions be errors of thought. Passions are 
non-rational, but not necessarily irrational. As functions of parts of the soul that are other than 
reason, they need not be opposed to reason, but may be in conformity and agreement with 
reason.34 
Passions, moreover, are essential components of human nature according to Plutarch. I 
will discuss the necessity of passion in greater detail in the next two chapters, but here I present a 
few points in Plutarch’s moral psychology that contrast sharply with Stoic psychology and their 
goal of eliminating passions. As I discuss further in the next chapter, passions and the non-
rational passionate parts of the soul are necessary features of embodiment for Plutarch.35 Passions 
and the non-rational parts of the soul from which they issue are not eliminable from our nature in 
this life.36 Passions are, moreover, necessary for the care of our bodies and serve certain useful 
and necessary functions for life, being teleologically oriented to certain good ends.37 Passions, 
then, are not only necessary and ineliminable, Plutarch argues, but useful and beneficial. 
 
§IV Invulnerability and the Cost of Friendship 
Plutarch believes that the Stoic view of human nature not only is false, but also comes at 
a great cost to their ethics, particularly as it concerns friendship. In this section and the two that 
follow, we will explore what I believe to be Plutarch’s most damning criticisms of Stoic ethics 
and their view of human nature. Focusing his attack on Stoic invulnerability, Plutarch reveals 
                                               
34 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 446D1–E2; 448D7–10. Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 442c9–d2; 9, 589a6–b6. 
35 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 450E6–F1, 450F6–451B5; On the Sign of Socrates 591D5–7; On the Face in the Moon 
943A6–7. 
36 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443C9–10; Consolation to Apollonius 102C5–E1=[T16]. 
37 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451D5–9. 
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that the Stoic ethical system leads to an inhumane and inhuman goal. It is an inhumane goal, 
Plutarch argues, because it comes at the cost of true friendship and genuine concern for others. 
We cannot truly care for others unless their well-being affects our own; we cannot be true friends 
unless we embrace emotional vulnerability. Even if we could eliminate passions, as the Stoics 
aim to do, Plutarch argues that we should not. Friendship is both natural and a very great good 
that enriches human life.  
The Stoic goal of invulnerability is also inhuman because invulnerability requires the 
mutilation of our nature, not its perfection. The Stoic aim of rendering the sage free from all 
passions amounts to an attempt to make the soul callous and insensitive, incapable of fulfilling 
its own natural functions. The summum bonum of virtue and the fulfillment of human nature 
exemplified by the Stoic sage, Plutarch argues, is not natural and is actually less than human. 
Let us begin with Plutarch’s attack on the Stoic conception of friendship. Most people 
consider a true friend to be one who is affected by the well-being of her friends. If I am a true 
friend, I will be distressed at my friend’s misfortunes and share in the joy of her successes. If my 
friend is treated unjustly, I will be pained at her mistreatment and angry at the perpetrators.38 On 
this view, one’s happiness is vulnerable to the well-being of one’s friends.39 Plutarch shares this 
view on friendship and happiness. This vulnerability, moreover, is itself characteristic of a good 
person for Plutarch. The good man (ὁ χρηστός), Plutarch writes, is seen 
[T4] καὶ τὸ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐ χρείαις οὐδὲ πράξεσι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ  
συναλγεῖν πταίουσι καὶ κατορθοῦσι συγχαίρειν ἐπιδεικνύμενος. 
 
displaying both his care and humaneness toward others, not only by his useful actions, 
but also by sharing in the grief of their misfortunes and sharing in the joy of their 
successes.     (Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft 823A9–B1) 
                                               
38 Cf. Nussbaum 1994, pp. 402–38, esp. 405, 425–7. Cf. also Sorabji 2000, p. 190. I discuss justified anger further in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 




The good man demonstrates his care and concern not merely by meeting obligations or by 
benefitting others through useful actions, but also by his shared vested interest in the well-being 
of others. He is affected together with them, sharing in their joy and grief. His empathy, 
moreover, is proof (ἐπίδειξις) of his care and humaneness (τὸ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ 
φιλάνθρωπον).40 As we will see below, not only is it the mark of a good person to be affected 
by the condition of others, in shared grief or joy, but it is essential to the very notion of 
friendship for Plutarch (On Moral Virtue 451E4–6=[T6]). 
The Stoics do not share this view of friendship. They try to capture many key features of 
it within their own conception of friendship, but they jettison certain aspects to maintain the 
sage’s invulnerability. As we will see, despite their attempts they often fail to do more than 
provide an appearance of friendship void of its central components, since vulnerability lies at the 
heart of genuine friendship. The Stoics claim, for instance, that the sage always benefits his 
friends.41 This claim is suspect, however, given the Stoic view of what is actually good and 
beneficial, as Plutarch himself argues: 
[T5] εἰ δὲ μὴ [οἱ θεοί, D5] δύνανται ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, οὐδ’ ὠφελεῖν δύνανται, μηδενός  
γε τῶν ἄλλων ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ μηδ’ ὠφελίμου. 
 
But if [the gods] are not able to make humans virtuous, then they are not able to benefit 
them, if there is nothing among the other things that is good or beneficial.    
    (Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1048D6–8) 
 
The Stoics deny that anyone can make anyone else good, i.e. virtuous. Virtue, the only good and 
the only good-making quality, is brought about by one’s own choices (αὐθαίρετον) and is up to 
                                               
40 On the importance of φιλανθρωπία in Plutarch’s thought see Alexiou 2008, pp. 371–2: As a concept originally 
tied to the gods’ benevolent attitudes toward humans, Plutarch seeks throughout his works to connect this attitude to 
human virtue. I will return to this connection in Chapter 6. Cf. also Martin 1961 and Fialho 2007. 




each individual (On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1048D2). Not even the gods, then, can make 
anyone virtuous. But, if the gods cannot make humans virtuous, they cannot benefit them, i.e. 
they cannot make them good or provide good to them. So, Plutarch argues, the Stoics cut their 
own feet out from under themselves when they claim that virtue is entirely within one’s own 
control while also claiming that the virtuous can benefit others. What could it mean for the gods, 
much less a sage, to benefit another if they cannot make others good, i.e. make them virtuous?42 
The Stoics also try to capture another feature of friendship by claiming that the sage 
exhibits benevolence (εὔνοια), which, by their own definition, “is a well-reasoned desire for the 
good of another for their own sake” (ἐστι βούλησις ἀγαθῶν ⟨ἑτέρῳ⟩ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν ἐκείνου).43 
This definition seems very close to Aristotle’s own formulation.44 Aristotle defines a true friend 
as one who seeks the good of his friend for their own sake (ἐκείνου ἕνεκα), and he establishes 
benevolence as a necessary component of friendship.45 The Stoics also agree with Aristotle that 
                                               
42 Boys-Stones (1996, pp. 593–4) argues that Plutarch’s point in [T5] really only applies to the ability of gods to 
benefit non-sages. While that certainly is the thrust of the argument, especially leading up to [T5] (1048C9–D6), 
Boys-Stones misses the greater impact of the argument on the Stoic notion of benefitting others, which also applies 
to the claim that those who are already virtuous benefit each other, both gods and sages. Although the Stoics claim 
that sages and gods always benefit one another, that is, the virtuous benefit the virtuous (Plutarch, On Common 
Notions 1076A), that notion of benefit is an empty conceit if it only means providing material to be used by another 
sage in his exercise of virtue. Preferred indifferents do not contribute to one’s virtue insofar as their presence or 
absence is outside one’s control. That is why the Stoics call them indifferents. Even the promotion, or 
encouragement of one’s virtue by others cannot add to or bring about virtue, since it is outside one’s own control. 
(Cf. D.L. 7.104; SVF 3.78; Stob. 2.7.11d (p. 95, ll. 6–8); Cicero, On Ends 3.33.) Nor can any of these influences  
add to one’s virtue, since virtue and happiness do not come in degrees. Plutarch thus concludes, if the gods, and by 
implication, the Stoic sage, cannot confer virtue, the Stoic concept of benefit is ultimately empty. 
43 Pseudo-Andronicus, On Passions 6.2=SVF 4.432. I follow Kreuttner in accepting Wachsmuth’s addition of 
ἑτέρῳ. Cf. Clement, The Teacher 1.8.63.1–2=SVF 2.1116=LS 60I. Cf. also Long 1996b; Engberg-Pedersen 1998; 
and Graver 2007, pp. 53–60.  
44 Note the conceptual and verbal similarities in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b31–4: “They say that one 
must desire the good of one’s friend for their own sake, and they say that those who desire good in this way are 
benevolent, even if it is not mutual and [this desire for one’s own good] does not come from the other, since friendship 
is benevolence in reciprocation” (τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ 
βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν 
ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι). On Stoic knowledge of Aristotle’s ethics and ethical works see Long 1968a; 
Sandbach 1985, pp. 24–30. 
45 Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b31–4; 8.2, 1156a3–4; 8.3, 1156b7–11; 9.5, 1167a7–10; Rhetoric 2.4, 1380b35–
1380a10; 2.4, 1381a13; Great Ethics 2.12.8–9; Eudemian Ethics 7.7, 1241a3–14. Cf. also Annas 1977, p. 534. On 
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one must not only have a benevolent attitude toward friends but also do all that is within one’s 
power (τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικόν) to benefit them.46 The sage, according to the Stoics, 
perfectly pursues all actions that are appropriate to virtue, including his obligations to friends, by 
doing his utmost to fulfill them in all situations.47 
The Stoics deny, however, that we can be affected by the conditions of our friends, since 
their successes, failures, and well-being will always be, to some extent, outside our control. Here 
they depart from our common conception of friendship, as well as Plutarch’s and Aristotle’s 
views.48 Benevolence, for the Stoics, is a species of the “good feelings” (εὐπάθειαι) that the sage 
alone has,49 but good feelings, the Stoics claim, are not like normal human passions. They do not 
render us vulnerable to anything outside our own virtue.50 Stoic joy (χαρά), and even 
benevolence (εὔνοια), are completely unaffected by circumstances outside one’s control. These 
feelings are due to the virtuous condition of the soul, which, again, in the Stoic view is 
completely within our own control and immune to changes in circumstances. With the category 
of εὐπάθεια, the Stoics attempt to save certain positive aspects of what we normally think of as 
                                               
questions of authorship of the Great Ethics see Rowe 1975 and Kenny 1978, pp. 215–39, who argue that it is not a 
genuine work by Aristotle, and Cooper 1999d, who mounts more recent arguments in defense of Aristotle’s 
authorship. 
46 Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.4, 1380b35–1380a10 (partially quoted in n. 48 below). Cf. Eudemian Ethics 7.7, 1241a3–14; 
Nicomachean Ethics 9.5, 1167a7–10. 
47 Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 5.6.10=LS 64I; Plutarch, On Common Notions 1071A=LS 64C. 
48 Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.4, 1380b35–1380a5: “Let being a friend be wishing what one supposes to be good for 
another for their own sake, not just for oneself, and being actively engaged in producing the good as far as one is 
able. A friend, moreover, is one who is friendly in reciprocation and those who suppose that they are thus disposed 
toward one another suppose that they are friends. With these conditions established, it is necessary that a friend 
shares in the pleasure of his friend’s good and shares in the grief of his pains for no other reason than on account of 
his friend.” (ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ 
δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος· οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ 
οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς 
ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐκεῖνον). 
49 D.L. 7.116=SVF 3.431=LS 65F; Marcus Aurelius 2.5.1; Pseudo-Andronicus, On Emotions 6.2=SVF 4.432; Cf. 
Graver 2007, pp. 53–60 and 175–90. 
50 Cf. Brennan 1998, pp. 35–6. 
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passions, namely, positive feelings and desires for the good of others for their own sake, without 
the vulnerability of normal human emotions.51 
Plutarch cries foul to this move. He agrees that benevolence is essential to friendship (On 
Having Many Friends 93F1–252 and On Brotherly Love 482B4–753), but finds it odd to think that 
one’s desire for the good of others can be disinterested in whether their conditions actually turn 
out to be good.54 Benevolence necessarily involves vulnerability. We cannot have “true 
benevolence” unless we are able to share in the joy and grief of our friends: 
[T6] φιλίας δὲ φιλοστοργίαν55 ἢ φιλανθρωπίας ἔλεον ἢ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν  
εὐνοίας ἀληθινῆς οὐδὲ βουλόμενος ἄν τις ἀποσπάσειεν οὐδ’ ἀποτήξειεν. 
 
Not even if someone wished could they separate off or melt away from friendship 
affection, from humaneness pity, and from genuine benevolence the sharing in joy and 
grief.        (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451E4–6)56 
 
                                               
51 Cf. Irwin 1998, pp. 225–7. 
52 Benevolence is a necessary condition for friendship: “What then is the currency for [buying] friendship? 
Benevolence and favor accompanied by virtue. There is nothing rarer that nature has than these” (τί οὖν νόμισμα 
φιλίας; εὔνοια καὶ χάρις μετ’ ἀρετῆς, ὧν οὐδὲν ἔχει σπανιώτερον ἡ φύσις).  
53 Benevolence (εὔνοια) serves as the starting-point to friendship (ἀρχὴ τῆς φιλίας). For Plutarch, brothers serve as 
an early, natural instance of friendship within one’s family (On Brotherly Love 479C9–D2). 
54 Cf. Plutarch, On Common Notions 1071B11–C3: “For, if someone were to say that an archer, in aiming, does 
everything within his power not for the sake of hitting the target, but for the sake of doing all that is within his 
power, he would seem to draw monstrous and enigma-like conclusions” (ὡς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις οὐχὶ 
πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ παρ’ αὑτὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλ’ ἕνεκα τοῦ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρ’ αὑτόν, 
αἰνίγμασιν ὅμοια καὶ τεράστια δόξειεν ἂν περαίνειν). Cf. Railton 1986, p. 14: “To have a desire is, among other 
things, to care whether or not it is satisfied.” While one might suppose that the Stoic notion that doing everything 
one can to act for the benefit others accounts for appropriate seriousness in the endeavor (cf. Irwin 1998, pp. 232–8), 
as Brennan 1998 (p. 57, n. 98) points out, seriousness about doing everything one can to fulfill virtuous actions does 
not translate into a seriousness about the objects of one’s virtuous actions: “[W]e cannot simply hand along the 
object from a nested attitude to the nesting attitude.” 
55 Cf. Babut 1969b, p. 171, who argues that φιλοστοργίαν (affection) should be altered in this passage on the 
grounds that the Stoics would not have regarded it as a passion. Contra Babut, see Becchi 1990. Considering the 
polemical nature of this passage, and that Plutarch considers φιλοστοργία to be an affection, as I argue in Chapter 6 
and in §VI below, I find Babut’s argument unconvincing. Cf. also Roskam 2011, p. 184. 
56 See also Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 483C4–7: “When their father has died, it is, in truth, right more than 
previously for the brother to cling to the benevolence of his brother, immediately sharing his affection by weeping 
together and grieving together with him (ἀποθανόντος γε μὴν πατρὸς ἐμφύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὀρθῶς 
ἔχει τῇ εὐνοίᾳ τὸν ἀδελφόν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ συνδακρύειν καὶ συνάχθεσθαι κοινούμενον τὸ φιλόστοργον). 
 
 46 
In effect, Plutarch claims that the Stoic idea of benevolence is disingenuous. It purports to 
include a necessary feature of desiring the good of another for their sake (ἕνεκεν ἐκείνου), so 
that friends are not merely instrumental to one’s own happiness,57 but this definition lacks the 
interpersonal component of having one’s own happiness invested in others. To be connected 
intimately and genuinely with those we love, Plutarch argues, we must be able to empathize with 
them and allow their well-being to affect our own. We must be able to identify with them in such 
a way that we share in their successes and failures (Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft 823A9–
B1=[T4]). 
Intimacy and empathy in genuine friendships require that we suffer together with friends 
when they are suffering. When friends are struggling, enduring hardships, and distressed, for 
instance, we join them in their struggles, hardships, and distress (τὸ συναγωνιᾶν καὶ τὸ 
συνασχολεῖσθαι καὶ συγκάμνειν, On Having Many Friends 95E11–12). When a friend buries 
someone he loved, we mourn with him (ὁ δὲ θάπτων συμπενθεῖν, On Having Many Friends 
95C10–11). Our affection is shared in weeping together and grieving together (ἐν τῷ 
συνδακρύειν καὶ συνάχθεσθαι κοινούμενον τὸ φιλόστοργον, On Brotherly Love 483C4–
7).58 The burden of shared suffering, for Plutarch, is part of the bargain of friendship, since, as we 
will see below, there are many goods that come with friendship that we would not choose to 
forfeit for the sake of invulnerability. 
The Stoics might respond to Plutarch’s critique that our understanding of what counts as 
a success or a failure, if it includes anything apart from virtue, is in error. According to their 
view, pains of the body, deprivation of conventional goods, such as wealth, health, and even 
                                               
57 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b31, and Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 536E7–F2. 
58 See n. 56 above for the quotation. 
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other friends, is not what matters for the happiness of the sage and should not matter for anyone 
else, including our friends. Virtue is the singular object of absolute value, alone brings happiness, 
and is the sole measure of success. Not even prolonging life contributes to one’s happiness, since 
death and span of life are irrelevant to virtue and happiness.59 Failure to become virtuous is the 
only failure that causes grief; all non-sages are equally vicious and equally unhappy. 
 Plutarch’s objection nevertheless cuts deeply into the Stoic notion of friendship, since the 
condition of others does not affect the sage’s own happiness. Even if we grant that virtue alone is 
all that matters, the virtue of others will, oddly enough, still have no impact on the sage’s own 
happiness. We would think that it would, since virtue is of absolute importance, and all sages are 
of equal value because of their virtue.60 Nevertheless, the friend’s state of virtue is outside the 
sage’s control and therefore is not part of his own virtue. The sage cannot enjoy his friend’s 
successes anymore than he can take joy in anything else outside his power.61 The sage’s 
happiness, moreover, just like his virtue, does not come in degrees and cannot be increased or 
                                               
59 Life seems like an odd thing to include among conventional goods that make no difference to virtue and 
happiness, since we might assume that one needs to be alive to be virtuous. Yet the Stoics assert that the duration of 
life makes no difference to its absolute value (Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1039E=SVF 3.761=LS 60Q). 
The value of virtue is not increased by the addition of time (Plutarch, On Common Notions 1061F=SVF 3.54=LS 
63I). Cf. D.L. 7.101–3=LS 58A, 7.104–5=SVF 3.119=LS 58B, 7.127=LS 61I; Stob. 2.7.7a (p. 79, l. 18–p. 80, l. 
13)=LS 58C; Marcus Aurelius 3.7. Cf. Nussbaum 1994, p. 362 and n. 14. 
60 Plutarch, On Common Notions 1076A=LS 61J. Cf. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1038C–D. 
61 Cf. Sorabji 2000, p. 51, and Graver 2007, p. 59. Sorabji proposes that one’s good-feelings might be affected by 
observing virtue in one’s friends. Here he seems to be relying on the argument of the pleasure that one feels in 
contemplating the virtue of one’s friends in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 9.9 (1169b29–1170a4). But even 
Sorabji notes that this is problematic given an objection he credits to Tad Brennan: “It may seem to create a further 
problem if sages rejoice in, and also wish for, good in other people, because that good is not under their control.” 
Graver likewise notes that the desire for another’s good seems to contradict the Stoic assertation that virtue and 
happiness are completely within our control. Graver tries to defend the view, noting that in a few passages (namely, 
Stob. 2.7.10b–c; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.72; and D.L. 7.114 and 129) a potential for virtue might be a cause 
for a genuine concern for others: “One cannot help but conclude that the rich affective life of the wise is being said 
to include some concern for other human beings that goes beyond disinterested service to the level of genuine 
affective involvement.” But, this violates the very principles that the Stoics set out, since affective involvement 
would require vulnerability, and that is exactly what is denied to Stoic good feelings (εὐπάθειαι). The good feelings 
of the sage are not affected by the conditions of other individuals, whether or not sages promote the good of others 
through their own actions. The sages’ concern for others cannot help but remain disinterested. The Stoics cannot 
have their cake and eat it too. 
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decreased by the recognition of or appreciation of another’s virtue.62 The sage’s concern for what 
happens to others, insofar as it does not affect his own happiness, remains disinterested. 
 Having friends may be good for the Stoics, but that good turns out to be qualified. Their 
view of friendship is highly revisionary. Whether we have friends or not does not affect our own 
happiness inasmuch as their presence or absence is outside our control. Their existence, 
relationship to us, and the state of their soul still ultimately make no difference to our own 
happiness. Friends categorically fall into the class of preferred indifferents, i.e. things one would 
prefer to have but which still in no way affect one’s own happiness.63 They may have intrinsic 
worth, being valuable and choice-worthy in themselves (δι’ αὑτά),64 but for the Stoics that 
makes no difference to one’s happiness, since, once again, the absolute value of virtue is 
overriding and in a class of its own.65 Only virtue counts as the real, ultimate good. Even the 
                                               
62 Cicero, On Ends 3.33–4, 3.44, 4.29, 5.7; Seneca, Letters 92.17; Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 
1039C=SVF 3.29; D.L. 7.101=SVF 3.30. 
63 Cf. Nussbaum 1994, pp. 360–3 and 416–19. Cf. also Irwin 1998, pp. 227–8. 
64 D.L. 7.107=SVF 3.135=LS 58m: “Moreover, of preferred indifferents, some are preferred on their own account 
while others on account of other things, and still others are preferred on their own account and also on account of 
other things. Good potential, moral progress, and the like are preferred on their own account. Wealth, noble birth, 
and the like are preferred on account of other things. Strength, good faculties of perception, and fittingness of body 
are preferred on their own account and on account of other things. Things that are preferred on their own account are 
so because they are in accordance with nature. Things that are preferred on account of other things are so because 
they procure not a few things that are useful” (ἔτι τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα, 
τὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα. δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν εὐφυΐα, προκοπὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δι’ ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, 
εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· δι’ αὑτὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐαισθησία, ἀρτιότης. δι’ αὑτὰ μέν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν 
ἐστί· δι’ ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας); D.L. 7.124.4–8=SVF 3.631=LS 67P: “They [the Stoics] 
claim that a friend is choice-worthy in himself and that having many friends is good” (δι’ αὑτόν θ’ αἱρετὸν τὸν 
φίλον ἀποφαίνονται καὶ τὴν πολυφιλίαν ἀγαθόν). Cf. Plutarch, On Common Notions 1068F, 1076A=SVF 
3.246=61J; Stob. 2.7.11i (p. 101, l. 21–p. 102, l. 3)=LS 60P. Pace Nussbaum 1994, p. 361, the Stoics’ denial that 
indifferents affect our happiness and their denial that friends are of absolute value does not indicate that friends 
cannot be choice-worthy in themselves and therefore of intrinsic worth. See the following note. 
65 See n. 12 above. Stoics seem to have two different notions of intrinsic value within their ordinal system that fit 
well with Bradley’s (2006) division of Moorean and Kantian notions of intrinsic value. Conventional goods, i.e. 
preferred indifferents, can be intrinsically valuable insofar as they are “to-be-chosen” for themselves (δι’ αὑτά)—
the Moorean intrinsically valuable goods, but these belong to a different order from the intrinsic, true good of virtue 
that is choice-worthy for itself (δι’ αὑτήν)—the Kantian intrinsically valuable good. Conventional goods are not 
worthy of choice unconditionally even though they are of intrinsic value, whereas virtue is unconditionally choice-
worthy. Consider the good of health that is intrinsically good, but which we would choose not to have if virtue 
required that we act in such a way that sacrifices health. Health is intrinsically good, but not unconditionally so. 
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good of friendship is, then, preferable and intrinsically valuable, but ultimately still an 
“indifferent.” If a friend dies, we simply find another; there is nothing peculiar to any friend that 
their loss should affect our happiness.66 If circumstances deprive us of friends, they are 
dispensable. They cannot contribute to our happiness any more than they can depreciate it. 
 
§V Intimacy and the Good of Friendship 
For Plutarch, the Stoics empty friendship of all the good that it adds to our lives when 
they remove passions from friendship. Yes, Plutarch concedes, friendship comes at the cost of 
vulnerability, since it leaves us open to the vicissitudes of fortune as we invest our happiness in 
others. Friendship is a good that is subject to fortune (ὧν ἔτυχεν ἀγαθῶν, On Tranquility of 
Mind 469D8–E1).67 Nevertheless, Plutarch argues, it is worth the price. Friendship for Plutarch, 
as we will see below, is a great good that makes no small difference to our happiness. It is worth 
the risk of jeopardizing our own insulation from circumstances to avoid cutting ourselves off 
from true intimacy and shared joy with others. It is also healthy and rewarding to have 
interpersonal relationships with others, since it is natural and part of the fulfillment of our human 
nature. 
                                               
   On the Epicurean notion that friendship is choice-worthy in itself, though not itself a virtue (Epicurus, Vatican 
Sayings 23), see Armstrong 2011. 
66 Seneca, Letters 9.5; D.L. 7.32–3=LS 67B, 7.121–2=LS 67M, 7.124=SVF 3.631=LS 67P. Sages do not form 
attachments to particular individuals based on their own personal qualities. If a sage were to form a personal 
attachment to another individual due to something peculiar to that individual, it could jeopardize his invulnerability. 
Cf. Lesses 1993, p. 73–5: “Sages do not value someone’s unique personal attributes. What they do value is the same 
in each person capable of friendship. Accordingly, genuine friends are relatively interchangeable….For the Stoics, 
because true friends are replaceable, it is quite literally meant.” 
67 Cf. Plutarch, Solon 7.1–8. Cf. also Hertzoff 2008. 
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First, Plutarch holds that our happiness requires virtue, but, unlike the Stoics, he does not 
believe that our happiness is invulnerable to what is outside our control.68 Virtue alone is not 
sufficient to insulate us from misfortunes that impinge upon our happiness nor to account for all 
of the goods of this life. There are goods besides virtue that, in the right conditions, can 
contribute to our happiness. 
In On Virtue and Vice, Plutarch plays off of Zeno’s formula that “character is the spring 
of life from which particular actions flow forth” (ἦθός ἐστι πηγὴ βίου, ἀφ’ ἧς αἱ κατὰ μέρος 
πράξεις ῥέουσι, Stob. 2.7.1 (p. 38, ll. 16–17)=SVF 1.203). From Plutarch’s partial quotation 
flows out a conclusion to which Zeno would object: 
[T7] τὸ δ’ ἡδέως ζῆν καὶ ἱλαρῶς οὐκ ἔξωθέν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῖς  
περὶ αὑτὸν πράγμασιν ἡδονὴν καὶ χάριν ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ ἤθους προστίθησιν. 
 
 To live pleasantly and with mirth is not derived from what is outside, but, on the  
contrary, a human adds pleasure and delight to the affairs that surround him, as though 
from the spring of his character.   (Plutarch, On Virtue and Vice 100C9–12) 
 
Plutarch takes the notion that one’s actions and happiness flow from one’s character in a 
decidedly un-Stoic direction. Plutarch agrees that happiness cannot simply come from fortune, 
from outside our actions and state of soul (ἔξωθεν). Happiness depends on virtue of character 
for Plutarch. Virtue is necessary for happiness. We cannot be called happy no matter what good 
fortunes and circumstances we have, if we are rotten and vicious in soul (Plutarch, Whether Vice 
is Sufficient for Unhappiness).69 We will use our good fortune badly.70 For Plutarch, however, 
                                               
68 I suspect that this argument against the sufficiency thesis may have played a central role in Plutarch’s lost work, 
Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς τοὺς Στωικούς (On What is Up to Us, Against the Stoics), no. 154 in the Lamprias 
Catalogue. 
69 The entirety of this work of Plutarch argues that vice, no matter how great one’s good fortunes may be, is 
sufficient to make one entirely miserable. 
70 Cf. Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1048C9–D1. 
 
 51 
virtue of character adds (προστίθησιν) pleasure and delight to the other parts of one’s life.71 
Virtue enhances and makes other objects worthy of enjoyment and increases the degree to which 
one delights in life and is happy. 
Goods apart from one’s own virtue, then, can be valuable for one’s happiness as part of 
the virtuous life.72 Other aspects of one’s life can be made good in such a way that they 
contribute and add to one’s happiness. Chief among goods that contribute to happiness is 
friendship, since it is not just a good but is a marvelously great good: 
[T8] τόν γε παρὰ τῷ Μενάνδρῳ νεανίσκον ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινοῦμεν εἰπόντα θαυμαστὸν  
ὅσον νομίζειν 
ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστον, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκιάν.73 
 
We have overwhelming praise for the young man in Menander’s play for saying how 
marvelous a good  
each individual considers it if he has even the shadow of a friend. 
(Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 93C5–7) 
 
Everyone, each individual (ἕκαστος) in the quotation from Menander, Plutarch thinks, considers 
friendship important to one’s own life and something that is good-making for life. The hyperbole 
that even the shadow of a friend is marvelously good gives that sense. The Stoics may fight this 
intuition, but we all know that a friend is a good that makes no small difference to our own 
happiness. Friendship is, for Plutarch, “the most pleasant good of all” (πάντων ἥδιστον) and 
“nothing else brings more delight to us” (οὐδὲν ἄλλο μᾶλλον εὐφραίνει, How to Tell a 
Flatterer from a Friend 50F12–51A1). The delight of friendship, moreover, is like a blossom 
                                               
71 Instead of drawing the conclusion that items in our life that can be used for bad as well as good cannot be good 
(Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1048C9–D1), Plutarch holds that if used by a virtuous person, they can be 
good. In this, he is not far from the argument in Plato’s Euthydemus that what makes one happy is an art that is able 
to make things both useful and good for oneself, though these can also be made bad for oneself (292a4–11). 
72 Cicero attributes this view to Aristotle, Polemo, the Old Academy, and Peripatetics in On Ends 2.34, arguing that 
goods that are not completely within our control, such as the soundness of our bodily parts, senses, and health, are 
part of the good life when they are enjoyed with virtue. Cf. Cicero, Lucullus 131; Stob. 2.7.3b; Hippolytus, 
Refutation of All Heresies 1.20.5–6. Cf. also Sharples 2010, pp. 165–8. 
73 Fr. 3 of Menander’s Epiclerus in Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta Kock. 
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that grows between friends (τὸ εὐφραῖνον ὥσπερ ἐπανθοῦν, 54F1–3),74 and “the benevolence 
of being loved and loving…is to be preserved above all else” (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν 
εὔνοιαν…παντὸς μᾶλλον διασῴζειν ἀναγκαῖον, Consolation to Apollonius 102C10–D2). 
Friendship is such a great good for Plutarch that he even describes it as though it were a 
god-given gift that has been blended into human life: 
[T9] τῷ βίῳ μείξας τὴν φιλίαν ὁ θεὸς ἅπαντα φαιδρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ προσφιλῆ ταύτης  
παρούσης καὶ συναπολαυούσης ἐποίησεν. 
 
By mixing friendship into life, god made everything bright, sweet, and lovely when 
friendship is present and shares in its enjoyment. 
(Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 50A2–5) 
 
Here, Plutarch says much more than that friendship is good in itself to have. Not only does 
friendship add value to life, since its presence increases our happiness and is productive of other 
goods,75 but it permeates the whole of life, making the other parts of one’s life better. The effect 
of friendship is not only a greater degree of happiness, but an enhancement of one’s life as 
whole. 
 Again, none of these goods of friendship are available to us unless we are open to sharing 
our lives with our friends, since shared feeling and vulnerability are central to true friendship. 
Plutarch writes that the greatest source of joy in friendship is intimacy: 
[T10] καὶ μὴν ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστιν ἡ συνήθεια τῆς φιλίας, καὶ τὸ ἥδιστον ἐν τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ  
συνδιημερεύειν. 
 
And certainly, intimacy is the enjoyment of friendship and the greatest pleasure is found 
in living together and spending one’s days together.  
(Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 94F8–10) 
 
                                               
74 Cf. O’Neill 1997, p. 119. 
75 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.6, 1362b19–20: Among the goods listed are “a friend and friendship: since a friend is 
choice-worthy in itself and is productive of many goods” (φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος 
καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν). 
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Friends enjoy spending time together and being in the presence of one another’s company, but 
Plutarch pushes the notion of intimate communion much further.  
The communion of friendship seeks to make a union between friends. Plutarch draws on 
several metaphors to describe this deep intimacy. “Friendship,” he writes, “desires to make 
friends a unity and mixture that solidifies” (ἡ φιλία βούλεται ποιεῖν ἑνότητα καὶ σύμπηξιν, 
On Having Many Friends 95B1–2). This view has some overlap with Aristotle’s notion that 
friends become like one another in their shared interests, thoughts, virtue, and passions 
(ὁμοιοπάθεια, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 51B9–C3; ζητοῦσι συνεξομοιοῦν τὰ 
πάθη, On Having Many Friends 97A1–3).76 But, more than just becoming similar to one another 
in these respects, friends become so closely connected in their sentiments that they form, as it 
were, one individual. Being put together, they become affixed to one another and harden 
(συμπήγνυσθαι) into a single combined entity. 
Drawing on Aristotle’s formula that a friend is “another self” (ἄλλος / ἕτερος αὐτός),77 
Plutarch describes friendships as measured in units of combination: 
[T11] τὸ ἄλλον αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν φίλον καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἑταῖρον ὡς ἕτερον, οὐδέν  
ἐστιν ἢ μέτρῳ φιλίας τῇ δυάδι χρωμένων. 
 
To think of a friend as another self and to refer to a friend as one’s other [of a pair]78 is 
nothing other than what is characteristic of those who use a pair as the measure of 
friendship.     (Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 93E9–12) 
 
Friends are, as it were, put together under a common yoke of friendship (ζεῦγος φιλίας, On 
Having Many Friends 93E5). This brings out one sense of friendship for Plutarch. We identify 
with a friend and the good we desire for ourselves is the same good that we desire for them. We 
                                               
76 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.3; Rhetoric 2.4. 
77 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a31–2: ἄλλος αὐτός; 9.9, 1170b6–7: ἕτερος αὐτὸς; Eudemian Ethics 
7.12, 1245a30: ἄλλος αὐτός. 
78 ἕτερος often indicates one of a party of two. 
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are not to think of a friend’s good as coming at the expense of our own, but rather as accruing to 
our own sense of good and well-being. 
 But, Plutarch also envisions this union to be much deeper. Metaphorical descriptions of 
union are not meant just to frame our thinking so that we are concerned for the good of others for 
their own sake, just as we are concerned for our own good. Like Aristotle,79 Plutarch also 
describes friendship as forming a union between individuals “as though one soul were divided 
among multiple bodies” (ὥσπερ μιᾶς ψυχῆς ἐν πλείοσι διῃρημένης σώμασι, On Having 
Many Friends 96F3–4). We become deeply invested in one another to the point that we become 
nearly indistinguishable and inseparable in our sense of shared identity. We might say that two 
separate individuals are reckoned to be one thing because relationships not only are something 
that is shared, but they take on a life of their own. 
Aristotle uses this provocative metaphor of a shared soul, but then draws back from it, 
arguing that even though it is as though friends share a soul and see one another as another self, 
“no less does a friend desire to be, as it were, a separate self” (ἀλλ’ οὐθέν τε ἧττον βούλεται 
ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος, Eudemian Ethics 7.12, 1245a34–5). In the Politics (2.4, 
1262b11–14), Aristotle argues that if we take the metaphor of fusing souls together (συμφῦναι) 
and union too seriously, as it is presented in Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium (192d2–
e9), then both or at least one of the two individuals would be obliterated by the union.80 
Becoming something unified would require losing oneself or one’s friend in the process. 
Plutarch, however, is not so concerned with the problem of lost individuation. 
Throughout his remarks on intimacy in one’s relationship, he presses into the metaphor to bring 
                                               
79 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b7–8; Eudemian Ethics 7.1, 1240b3. 
80 Cf. Price 1989, p. 110. 
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out the deep connections that are created through shared feelings between friends and lovers.81 
The blending and gluing together of benevolence (ἡ κρᾶσις καὶ κόλλησις εὐνοίας), “occurs in 
the intimacy that is poured around and then solidifies” (ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ περιχυθείσῃ καὶ 
παγείσῃ γενέσθαι, On Having Many Friends 95B4–6).82 We become both encompassed and 
cemented to one another through shared emotions. Friendship bonds us together: 
[T12] ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνάγει καὶ συνίστησι καὶ συνέχει καταπυκνοῦσα ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ  
φιλοφροσύναις. 
 
For [friendship] brings together, unites, and holds [friends] together, consolidating them 
through their communion and their friendliness [toward one another]. 
(Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 95A5–7) 
 
This, for Plutarch, is a good thing. We gain access to benefits beyond our own capacity as an 
individual, and as we saw above, Plutarch holds that friendship enhances our life, making other 
aspects of it better (Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 50A2–5=[T9]). 
In his descriptions of intimacy within a special kind of friendship, that which develops 
between spouses, Plutarch also argues that intimacy is better (βελτίων) when affections are 
shared (Sandbach fr. 167).83 A good marriage seeks totally blending (δι’ ὅλων κρᾶσις, Dialogue 
on Love 766F3–5) so that, like two liquids that become indistinguishable as everything becomes 
shared, lovers also becomes wholly unified (Advice to Bride and Groom 142F8–143A6).84 
Drawing on the imagery of the Symposium, the goal is “unification and shared nature” 
(ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυής, Advice to Bride and Groom 142E12–F8), “fusing souls together” 
                                               
81 I do not mean to imply that Plutarch takes the metaphor to indicate that souls become metaphysically 
indistinguishable and their own individual instances become completely obliterated. Instead, Plutarch emphasizes 
the extent to which we approximate union in our shared interests and passions. 
82 Cf. On Having Many Friends 94E2–3. 
83 From the Letter On Friendliness=Stob. 4.12.11.  
84 I discuss these passages further in Chapter 3. Cf. On the Obsolescence of Oracles 426A=SVF 2.367, where 
Plutarch goes through the different types of conjunction, union, and fusion that are attributed to Chrysippus. 
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(τὰς ψυχὰς συντήκουσι, Dialogue on Love 767D5–E2). And, as with other forms of friendship, 
this deep connection is achieved through genuine benevolence that involves sharing in one 
another’s passions, both in joys at successes, and distress and grief at failures and setbacks.85 
This intimacy is not available to the Stoics.86 As Plutarch reveals, the Stoics ironically 
debar themselves from the great goods of the shared human life in their attempt to harbor and 
protect happiness. Although the Stoics desire invulnerability to render the happy sage 
unassailable (inexpugnabilis), secure (tutus), protected by a fence (saeptus) and fortified by walls 
(munitus),87 Plutarch shows that the Stoic sage only fences himself in, cutting himself off from 
the goods of human intimacy and the blessings of the shared life of deep connections with others. 
He walls himself off not only from his own passions, but in so doing, he also cuts himself off 
from genuine concern for others and the rich emotional life that exists in vulnerable human 
relationships. He cuts himself off from the many goods of friendship. 
For Plutarch, we should not guard against vulnerability in friendship, but instead embrace 
it as the greatest refuge from the troubles we face in this life: 
[T13] οὔτε ναῦς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσούτους ἕλκεται χειμῶνας εἰς θάλατταν, οὔτε χωρίοις  
θριγχοὺς καὶ λιμέσι προβάλλουσιν ἕρκη καὶ χώματα τηλικούτους προσδεχόμενοι 
κινδύνους καὶ τοσούτους, ὅσων ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλία καταφυγὴν καὶ βοήθειαν, 
ὀρθῶς καὶ βεβαίως ἐξετασθεῖσα. 
 
 For no ship is drawn into the sea against storms so great, nor do men put up bulwarks on  
land and walls and embankments for harbors in expectation of dangers so vast and so 
numerable as those for which friendship, surely and securely proven by testing, offers 
refuge and safety.    (Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 94C8–D3) 
                                               
85 On Moral Virtue 451E4–6=[T6]; Precepts of Statecraft 823A9–B1=[T4]; On Brotherly Love 483C4–7 (quoted in 
n. 56 above). Cf. Dialogue on Love 751C–D; Musielak 2011, p. 259. 
86 Stoic authors do not always agree in their views on the role of ἔρως in marriage. Seneca (fragment of On 
Marriage in Haase) denounces erotic passion in marriage and holds that marriage should be strictly for reproduction, 
while Musonius Rufinus (“On the Goal of Marriage” and “Is Marriage an Impediment to Philosophy?” in Hense), 
like Plutarch, advocates shared life together (συμβίωσις), but his view is an outlier from the mainline view that 
passions, insofar as they are errors in belief, excessive impulses, and render one vulnerable, are not part of the 
virtuous life. Cf. Nussbaum 1994, p. 441, n. 3. 
87 Cicero, Tusculan Disputation 5.40–1=LS 63L. 
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Far from being merely a source of further potential pain and disappointment, friendship provides 
the best source of comfort and shelter to the hardships of life. Friends even lessen our grief in 
times of trouble: 
[T14] [ἡ φιλία, 49F1] οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσα καὶ χάριν ἢ τῶν  
κακῶν ἀφαιροῦσα τὰς λύπας καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας παρέπεται. 
 
[Friendship] attends to us, adding pleasure and grace to the good in our lives no less than  
it takes away grief and helplessness from the bad.  
(Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 49F6–8) 
 
We cannot fully escape troubles and disturbances, since, contrary to the Stoic’s claims, we are 
affected by what happens outside our control. True friends, however, help us weather the storms 
of life and provide a proven stronghold, the best, in fact, that is available to us. 
 
§VI Friendship, Human Nature, and the Stoic Theory of οἰκείωσις 
As we will explore in this section, Plutarch sees the defects of Stoic friendship as 
symptomatic of a larger problem in the Stoic view of human nature. We need other people to be 
happy. We also need other people to be fully human. The Stoic view of human nature, insofar as 
it fails to capture the necessity of friendship and the goods of friendship, is defective. Their view 
of friendship is, as Plutarch argues, contrary to nature. 
As in Aristotle’s account, Plutarch believes that we are social and political animals. We 
would not choose to live alone with all other goods, since it is in our nature to be in communion 
with other human beings.88 With this view of the social and political aspects of our nature, 
Plutarch frames the naturalness of friendship in terms of human need: 
[T15] αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ προσδεχομένη καὶ ζητοῦσα φιλίαν καὶ ὁμιλίαν χρεία διδάσκει τὸ  
                                               
88 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, 1155a5–6; 9.9, 1169b17–19; Politics 1.2, 1253a2–9; 3.6, 1278b19; 
Eudemian Ethics 7.10, 1242a22–8. Cf. also Nicomachean Ethics 8.5, 1157b19–23. How necessary friendships are 
for the happy and good life in Aristotle’s view is the subject of much debate. See n. 90 below. 
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συγγενὲς τιμᾶν καὶ περιέπειν καὶ διαφυλάττειν, ὡς ἀφίλους καὶ ἀμίκτους καὶ 
μονοτρόπους ζῆν μὴ δυναμένους μηδὲ πεφυκότας. 
 
Our need itself, which welcomes and seeks friendship and companionship, teaches us to 
honor our relatives and to guard and take care of them, since we are not able and it is not 
natural for us to live without friends, without communion with others, all alone.  
(Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 479C1–4) 
 
For Plutarch, we need to be in relationships with others. In fact, Plutarch indicates that it is 
impossible and unnatural to live without human friendship. He does not mean that we could not 
survive apart from other human beings, living a solitary life as a hermit apart from all human 
contact or as a child raised by wolves. Rather, what he indicates is that such a life would fail to 
be a truly human life. It would lack the very qualities that make humans what they are. 
Sociability is built into our very make-up and demanded by human nature. 
Throughout much of the discussion of friendship so far, Plutarch’s view of friendship 
aligns well on many points with Aristotle’s and appears greatly influenced by it.89 The question 
of whether friendship is necessary for happiness in Aristotle’s view, however, has been the 
subject of much debate.90 Regardless of Aristotle’s own position on that question, the message is 
clear from Plutarch. Friendship is not only a very great good, but also an essential component of 
                                               
89 On the prevalence of Aristotle’s views on friendship in Plutarch’s thought see O’Neill 1997, pp. 112–13. 
90 The question depends on how the following are related to one another and to the notion of self-sufficiency: 
intellectual virtues, moral virtues, and external goods and friends, whose presence allows for the exercise of moral 
virtues (Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1199a31–b4; 7.13, 1154a4; 9.9, 1169b10, 1170a4-11). We also need to consider 
the extent to which we need friends so that we can contemplate their virtues to understand our own (9.9, 1169b29–
1170a4). Adkins 1963 (pp. 44–5) believes that the self-sufficiency of contemplative virtue is impossible and that we 
will need friends for the good life (cf. Sorabji 2000, pp. 190–1, who holds the same view). Long 1968a sees 
happiness as dependent on friends for virtuous action. The presence of friendships, moreover, increases the degree to 
which one is happy. For Annas 1977 (p. 550), our life would be lacking if we could not contemplate the virtues of a 
friend. Ackrill 1980 argues that Aristotle makes conflicting claims: (A) friends are intrinsic goods that are necessary 
constituents of happiness and (B) happiness of contemplation is self-sufficient. In response to Ackrill, Kraut 1989 
(esp. pp. 267–311) argues that the exercise of intellectual virtues constitutes a higher happiness as opposed to the 
inclusion of friendship in the exercise of moral virtues, which is a second-best kind of happiness. Sherman 1987 (pp. 
592–5) argues that happiness must include friends as part of one’s extended self. Nussbaum 1994 (pp. 93–6) and 
Oele 2012 (pp. 53–5) hold that happiness for Aristotle is vulnerable to the loss of external goods, including loved 
ones and friends, while Mansini 1998 (p. 416) believes that friendship for Aristotle is a “sort of surplus, a natural 
grace and enhancement relative to the possession of happiness.” 
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humanity that enhances life and is not something we would choose to live without.91 Friendship 
enriches life when it is present.92 
The Stoics nod in the direction of the naturalness of human friendship with their 
foundational account of natural “appropriation” / “identification” (οἰκείωσις).93 The Stoic theory 
of οἰκείωσις purports to explain an ever-expanding consciousness of one’s place in the universe 
and the forging of relationships, leading up to justice in society.94 How well the Stoics succeed in 
rooting human relationships and our concern for others in their account of our earliest and 
developing natural impulses, however, is questionable.95 
                                               
91 Cf. Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 95D1–2. This seems to be the position staked out in Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, 1155a5–6; 9.9, 1169b17–19, but the matter is complicated by other points in Aristotle’s 
corpus, for which see the previous note. 
92 This brings Plutarch’s position in close alignment with Mansini’s (1998, p. 416) view of Aristotelian friendship: 
“[T]here is a sort of addition to one’s excellence and happiness, and one that increases the enjoyment thereof” (a 
continuation of the quotation in n. 90 above). 
93 In its etymology, the term is built off of οἰκειόω, bringing with it connotations associated with what belongs in 
one’s household (οἶκος), what belongs to oneself (οἰκεῖον), or even the intimacy (οἰκειότης) found in friendship or 
marriage. The terminology reflects both a sense of ownership and affective disposition, a favorable attitude toward 
what is one’s own (οἰκεῖον). Cf. Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1, pp. 350–5; Blundell 1990, p. 221; Sorabji 1993, p. 
122ff; id. 2006, p. 104. Long and Sedley prefer the translation of “appropriation,” and Inwood, “orientation” (1985, 
pp. 184–5). I prefer the translation of “identification,” as it is used in Boys-Stones 2014, since I think it captures 
more than a sense of ownership or orientation in how we view and relate to other individuals, which the Stoic 
account purports to capture.  
   As a note on οἰκειότης, I do not intend to make a connection between Stoic οἰκείωσις and Theophrastus’s use of 
the concept of οἰκειότης (for a discussion on this topic see Brink 1955 and Pembroke 1971, pp. 132–7). I merely 
intend to show the range of connotations we should have in mind for οἰκείωσις. I hope that the connotations of 
“intimacy” will help bring out the ironic consequence of the theory based on Plutarch’s criticisms of the impersonal 
nature of Stoic οἰκείωσις. 
94 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1038B5–10=SVF 3.179 and 2.724=LS 57E; id. On the Great Fortune or 
Virtue of Alexander 1, 329A–B=SVF 1.262=LS 67A; Cicero, On Ends 3.66–8; Stob. 4.27.23 (p. 671, l. 7–p. 673, 
l.11). Stoic sources often speak of justice as a virtue peculiar to distribution toward other people (Plutarch, On Moral 
Virtue 440E–441D=LS61B; id., On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1034C–E=LS 61C; cf. Stob. 2.7.5b5 (p. 63, ll.6–
24)=SVF 3.280=LS 61D). I suggest that we understand by this something akin to Aristotle’s justice in the expanded 
sense (Nicomachean Ethics 5.1), which ranges over all our relations toward other people. Cf. Taylor and Wolfram 
1968; Sorabji 1993, p. 118; Sellars 2006, p. 131. 
95 The foundational account of Stoic οἰκείωσις is a type of cradle argument that draws on observable behavior of 
children in particular, and often on the behavior of non-human animals also, to explain natural impulses of human 
nature that fit with one’s own view of human nature and lead to one’s own theory of ethics. For a detailed discussion 
on cradle arguments, their purports as foundational accounts, and their shortcomings, see Brunschwig 1986. Cf. also 
Annas 1993, pp. 133–220: arguments from nature were used in all ancient ethical arguments. Cf. also Klein 2016. 
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According to the account of Stoic οἰκείωσις presented in Cicero’s On Ends (3.63), for 
instance, human community is natural. We feel kinship and belonging to one another, motivated 
by a natural drive to associate and identify with actions and items that are appropriate to our 
nature, including our friends.96 Plutarch himself describes an expansion of affection 
(φιλοστοργία) for others that begins with parental love for offspring. This account of expanding 
identification is often taken to be part of the Stoic account of οἰκείωσις and to describe a natural 
progression of identification that begins from social bonds between parents and offspring and 
eventually includes other individuals in ever-expanding spheres of concern.97 Hierocles’ account 
of οἰκείωσις gives some credence to this view, since it describes parents’ affectionate 
identification with their offspring (στερκτικῶς οἰκειοῦσθαι) as an example of other-regarding 
concern,98 and similarly draws expanding circles of concern for others around the individual.99 
How this account of social bonding, which seems to be derived from affectionate 
impulses in human nature, fits together with another account of Stoic οἰκείωσις has been the 
subject of considerable attention and debate.100 On the face of it, the other account, as found in 
what Brad Inwood calls the “Basic Text” (D.L. 7.85–6),101 appear to describe one’s self-
                                               
96 Cf. Cicero, On Ends 1.12, 3.62–8=LS 57F. Cf. also D.L. 7.85=SVF 3.178=LS 57A; Cicero, On Ends 3.16–17. 
97 On Affection for Offspring 495C, On the Cleverness of Animals 962A–B. I discuss these passages in Chapter 6. 
98 Elements of Ethics 9.3–10; 11.14–18=LS 57D. The text of Elements of Ethics is unfortunately fragmentary, the 
first three-hundred lines or so surviving in a papyrus fragment (which was edited by von Arnim and printed in 
Hierokles, Ethische Elementarlehre (Papyrus 9780): Nebst den bei Stobäus erhaltenen ethischen Exzerpten aus 
Hierokles, Berlin: Weidmann, 1906; Bastianini and Long 1992a is a newer critical edition and Bastianini and Long 
1992b provides corrections and further discussion to the 1992a edition) with other quotations from the text 
preserved in Stobaeus. Cf. Inwood 1984, who has an extended discussion on the Hierocles papyrus, and Ramelli 
2009. 
99 Stob. 4.27.23 (p. 671, l. 7–p. 673, l.11), which is an extended quotation from later portions of Hierocles’ Elements 
of Ethics. 
100 See nn. 104–6 below. 
101 Cf. Inwood 1985, pp. 186–215. 
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regarding motivations and activities from birth, not one’s concern for others.102 It is unclear how 
friendship and human relationships follow from human nature in the Basic Text’s account of 
οἰκείωσις.103 
This has led one camp of modern interpreters to suppose that the Stoics proposed two 
different, but complementary, forms of οἰκείωσις.104 One form, presented in the Basic Text, 
accounts for self-regarding interests. Interpreters often refer to this as “personal οἰκείωσις.” A 
second form, which relies on the descriptions of social bonding and affection, accounts for other-
regarding interests and concerns and helps to explain the sociability of human nature. This 
second form is called “social οἰκείωσις.”105  
Another camp of interpreters believes that there is only one account of Stoic οἰκείωσις.106 
They see within it, however, a radical break between pre-rational development and the formation 
of ethical concerns at the advent of reason in humans. On this view, the other-regarding concerns 
                                               
102 The Basic Text is corroborated with slight variation in Origen, On Principles 3.1.2–3=SVF 2.988=LS 53A; 
Cicero, On ends 3.16–17; Hierocles, Elements of Ethics 1.5–33, 2.1–3, 4.38–53=LS 53B, 4.43–5, 6.50–53; Seneca, 
Letters 121.6–15=LS 57B. 
103 Hierocles attests to affection in parts of his account of οἰκείωσις. In some ways, Hierocles seems to combine 
elements of the Basic Text with what I call the “Affection Account” that we have from Cicero and Plutarch. 
Unfortunately, as Inwood (1983, p. 197; 1984, pp. 180–3) notes, if Hierocles explained the logical connections 
between these different accounts, we are missing it in the fragmentary remains of his work 
104 See Brink 1955; Pembroke 1971; Striker 1983; Görgemanns 1983; Inwood 1983, 1985; Blundell 1990; Frede 
1999. For more on the history of this interpretation see Klein 2016, p. 157. 
105 This distinction of two forms of οἰκείωσις is not present in our sources, nor are the labels of “personal 
οἰκείωσις” and “social οἰκείωσις.” 
106 See White 1979; Striker 1983; Long 1996a, pp. 172–7; Frede 1999; Radice 2000, p. 206; Doyle 2012; Reydams-
Schils 2017, pp. 145–6; For more on the history of this interpretation see Klein 2016, pp. 156 and 158. For the 
notion that other-regarding motivations must be rooted in reason cf. Korsgaard 1998, p. 54: “If you follow the 
tendency of self-love unreflectively, not asking yourself why it matters that you should get what you want, your 
state tends to degenerate into the state Kant calls ‘self-conceit,’ in which you act as if it mattered that you get what 
you want just because you are you. But if you identify yourself with your humanity or power of rational choice, the 
principle of treating humanity in your own person and that of any other as an end in itself more or less directly 
follows.” Something along these lines seems to be assumed within the radical break interpretation. 
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of human social life are derived from the rational nature of humans, but this rational nature 
develops over time.107 
My own view is that the recent work by Jacob Klein provides the most charitable 
interpretation of Stoic οἰκείωσις to date, but that Plutarch’s criticisms of the Stoic view of 
human nature and its failure to lead to genuine friendship still apply. On Klein’s view, only one 
form of οἰκείωσις is required to explain motivations and activities from life’s inception through 
to the perfection of human nature with human relationships. The Basic Text is that account, but it 
often is misunderstood as describing self-preservation as the primary motivation of creatures.108 
Once we understand that it describes the goal of being consistent with one’s own nature and the 
impulse to perfect it, the social aspects of human obligations and concern flow from human 
natural impulses that are present from birth.109 There is no radical break in the way that natural 
impulses operate and govern human behavior from pre-rational to rational life.110 
                                               
107 Aetius 4.11.1–4=SVF 2.83=LS 39E; D.L. 7.55–6=LS 33H. Cf. Sorabji 1993, pp. 115–16. 
108 Cf. Inwood 1985, p. 184: “The starting-point of all value is the desire of all animals, including humans, for self-
preservation.” Cf. also Görgemanns 1983, p. 165. Cf. also Railton 1984, p. 168: “Distracted by the picture of a 
hypothetical, presocial individual, philosophers have found it very easy to assume, wrongly, that in the actual world 
concern for oneself and one’s goals is quite automatic, needing no outside support, while a direct concern for others 
is inevitably problematic, needing some further rationale.” Interpreters of Stoic οἰκείωσις often assume some form 
of pre-social individual that automatically issues in a concern for self and believe they find confirmation of this view 
in their construal of the primary impulse of an animal as aimed at self-preservation. 
109 Cf. Klein 2016. In short, Klein’s argument is that the primary identification of a creature to itself is its 
identification with its own constitution, which is the condition of a creature’s commanding-faculty (Seneca, Letters 
121.10=SVF 3.184=LS 29F; Iamblichus, On the Soul (Stob. 1.49.33 (p. 368, ll. 12–20))=LS 53K; Philo, Allegories 
of the Laws 1.30=SVF 2.844=LS 53P). Creatures regulate their activity and motivations in accordance with what 
befits their own constitution and nature, i.e. according to what it means for them to be the kind of creatures they are 
at their stage of development (D.L. 7.107=SVF 3.493=LS 59C; cf. Stob. 2.7.8 (p. 85, l. 13–p. 86, l. 4)=SVF 
3.494=LS 59B; D.L. 7.107–9=SVF 3.494, 3.495=LS 59C and 59E; Seneca, Letters 121.6–15=LS 57B). These 
activities include not only self-regarding acts that are aimed at self-preservation, but also acts that are self-sacrificing 
and other-regarding that may be appropriate in certain circumstances and according to certain relationships (D.L. 
7.107–8=SVF 3.494=LS 59C; D.L. 7.109=SVF 3.496=LS 59E; Stob. 2.7.8 (p. 85, l. 13–p. 86, l. 4)=SVF 3.494=LS 
59B; cf. Engberg-Pedersen 1986, pp. 180–2). 
110 Cf. Klein 2016, p. 159: “To hold that human motivation undergoes a radical shift in the ideal course of 
development seems to undercut the dialectical point of the οἰκείωσις account.” 
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This interpretation accounts for how human relationships develop from the natural 
impulses of human nature; we form social bonds with others and have obligations to others based 
on what is appropriate to human nature. So, Plutarch might grant to the Stoics that friendship 
appears to be natural to humans in their theory, since it is natural for humans to seek out 
friendships and join human communities according to their view. These relationships, as with the 
Stoics’ friends themselves, may even have value as items that it is preferable for one to pursue 
and try to maintain according to nature. Nevertheless, the Stoic conception of human sociability 
still only accounts for the appearance of friendships and a disingenuous form of concern for 
others, since it lacks vulnerability and the intimacy of a shared emotional life. The sage can act 
to fulfill natural obligations to friends and family, but he cannot be affected by their well-being. 
Plutarch’s criticisms reveal that there is something fundamentally wrong with the Stoics’ 
view of human nature and their theory of ethical development. Their theory of οἰκείωσις leads to 
an ironic outcome. The sage becomes alienated from his friends and his own passionate nature as 
a consequence of a theory that purports to describe his appropriation (οἰκείωσις) of all aspects 
of his life, including his relationships with others.111 The Stoic sage must remove himself from 
the very passions that would enable him to identify with others in intimacy (οἰκειότης). He can 
only imitate the actions that are natural to friendship without feeling genuine benevolence and 
concern for others in his orientation to other human beings. 
The Stoic account also fails to count friendships and human social life as necessary 
constituents of one’s happiness. In the Stoic view, the sage can be just as human without human 
                                               
111 See n. 2 above. Cf. Cicero, On Ends 3.63: “From this [impulse to identify with what is one’s own] is born a 
shared attraction of humans among other humans, so that a human, insofar as he is human, ought not to appear 
alienated from another” (ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut 
oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit non alienum videri). 
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society as with it.112 As we have already seen above, the absence of friends and other human 
relations altogether, if it is caused by anything outside one’s control, will make no difference to 
the sage’s virtue and happiness. The solitary hermit can be just as happy as the sage in the city of 
the virtuous.113 
 One might object that I have left out affection, which seems to be the starting-point for 
human relationships in the account of οἰκείωσις presented by Plutarch and in parts of Cicero’s 
On Ends.114 Affection would seem to admit some intimacy and passionate concern for others in 
the Stoic account. So, does that not address and answer Plutarch’s criticisms? 
This brings us back to a question I raised earlier: How does the account that begins with 
affection fit with the account represented by the Basic Text? My answer is that it does not. Since 
passions are instances of irrationality for the Stoics and because passions do not fit with the Stoic 
goal of invulnerability, I doubt that this “Affection Account” is an original formulation of the 
Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις.115 My position would require a much longer argument, which is 
outside the scope of this chapter.116 Let it suffice for me to point out that Klein’s interpretation, 
                                               
112 Seneca, Letters 9.2–5. 
113 Cf. Seneca, On Leisure 4.1=LS 67K; Arius Didymus (Eusebius, Evangelical Preparation 15.15.3–5=SVF 
2.528=LS 67L; cf. Plutarch, On Common Notions 1068F). 
114 This particular section of Cicero’s On Ends 3 (62–8=LS 57F), which many have drawn upon for evidence of 
social οἰκείωσις, is quite different from the other descriptions we have elsewhere in the book, such as 3.16–22, 
which are more in keeping with the Basic Text account. On Cicero’s distortions in his presentation of Stoic 
οἰκείωσις compared to the Basic Text and other sources see Inwood 1985, pp. 218–23. 
115 There is some evidence that the Stoics would consider affection a good feeling (εὐπάθεια) and therefore not a 
passion, since φιλοστοργία is closely tied to, if not identical with, εὐμενία (“continuing benevolence”), a species 
of benevolence (εὔνοια) according to Pseudo-Andronicus, On Emotions 6.2=SVF 4.432. See Engberg-Pedersen 
1998, p. 332 with citations ad loc. Yet, if that is the case, φιλοστοργία cannot belong to non-sages and cannot be 
foundational to social bonding from the beginning of life, since only the sage, who is perfected in his nature, can 
have εὐπάθειαι (see n. 50 above). Nor can it be the starting-point for affection between non-human animals. If 
affection is a passion, as it seems to be in Epictetus (Discourses 1.23.5), then, it is once again objectionable to think 
that it fits into the pattern of ethical development. Cf. Sorabji 1993, pp. 122–3; 2000, pp. 183–4. 
116 My own view is that the Affection Account arose due to perceived deficiencies of the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις. 
While the interpretation of Klein 2016 leaves the search for a supplementary or secondary account of Stoic 
οἰκείωσις unmotivated, I take it that many interpreters of the theory nonetheless found the connection between self-
regarding and other-regarding motivations difficult to discern in the theory. Ancient critics of the Stoics, just like 
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though he does not himself note it, reveals that this Affection Account adds nothing essential to 
the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις. The Basic Text, which does not incorporate passions or affection 
felt between parents and offspring as a foundation for social behavior, already sufficiently 
explains how self-regarding and other-regarding motivations and actions in the Stoic theory of 
ethics flow from the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις. That account, moreover, is consistent with the 
Stoic end of passionless invulnerability. 
As I will argue in Chapter 6, the Affection Account that we find in Plutarch’s works fits 
more with his own view of human nature and with his idea that passions can serve as seeds 
(σπέρματα) and starting-points (ἀρχαί) for virtues. Affection in particular establishes a pattern 
of ever-expanding social bonds that lead to up to the fruit of justice. Plutarch, then, appropriates, 
as it were, a form of οἰκείωσις theory, but modifies it so that it incorporates genuine concern for 
others through shared emotional vulnerability and intimacy. 
 
§VII Stoic Invulnerability and Self-Mutilation  
Plutarch thinks that the Stoics have a deeply flawed understanding of human nature. The 
goal of Stoic invulnerability requires the sacrifice of genuine interpersonal relationships, which, 
for Plutarch are necessary for the fulfillment of human nature. In addition to the toll that the 
Stoic goal takes on friendship, Plutarch argues that even attempting to achieve Stoic 
invulnerability comes at a cost to our own nature: 
                                               
modern interpreters, felt that the Stoics must have had some argument for the foundations of human sociability apart 
from what appears to be the impulse toward self-preservation. Looking at the many examples of other-regarding 
behavior that Chrysippus drew upon, such as mutual relations between the pea-crab and pinna-mollusk, which 
features in every book of Chrysippus, apparently (Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 980A–B), and 
Chrysippus’ use of examples of parental protection and nurturing of offspring (Plutarch, On Stoic Self-
Contradictions 1038B5–10=SVF 3.179 and 2.724=LS 57E), ancient authors mistook these examples as evidence 
that the foundation of other-regarding concerns begins with a natural affection for offspring. A new form of 
οἰκείωσις emerged, which was not in keeping with the original theory, but seemed to provide some foundation for 
other-regarding concerns and behavior. 
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[T16] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀλγεῖν καὶ δάκνεσθαι τελευτήσαντος υἱοῦ φυσικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς  
λύπης, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς ὑμνοῦσι τὴν ἄγριον καὶ 
σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν...τὸ γὰρ 
ἀνώδυνον τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίγνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθηριῶσθαι 
γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχήν.  
 
Therefore, to feel pain and the gnawing bites of pain when one’s son dies has a source of 
grief that is natural and outside our control. For I, for my own part, cannot agree with 
those [the Stoics] who sing hymns of praise to that cruel and callous lack of feeling, 
which is both outside the realm of possibility and not beneficial…. For this insensitivity 
to pain comes about in a human only at a great expense; for it is the body, in the former 
case, which has been brutalized, but in the latter case, the soul.  
(Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102C5–E1)117 
 
Becoming entirely void of passions is not possible for Plutarch (ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ).118 As he 
writes here and elsewhere, it also would not be beneficial (ἔξω…τοῦ συμφέροντος).119 We 
already have seen some of the benefits of human intimacy made possible through passionate 
connections with others. But even more alarming is Plutarch’s remark that even attempting to 
render ourselves free from passions is dangerous. We run the risk of harming our own nature. 
Contrary to the Stoic view, invulnerability is not brought about by a natural process of pursing 
the end-goal of perfect rationality. It is an ascetic ideal brought about by lacerating and marring 
our human sensibilities. It requires a process of self-mutilation.120 
Beyond the self-denial we see in the Stoic approach to friendship, where the sage holds 
back from investing his own sense of happiness in the well-being of others, fortifying himself 
from contingent circumstances and what is outside his control, Plutarch argues that a passionless 
                                               
117 I follow Hani 2003, pp. 3–12, and Babbitt 1928, who lays out his argument in the introduction to the Loeb edition 
of Consolation to Apollonius (pp. 105–7), in considering this a genuine work of Plutarch. For discussion of scholarly 
positions on the authenticity of this work see Hani 2003, pp. 3–4, n. 1. Cf. Babut 1975. Cf. also Fitzgerald 2008a, p. 
20, n. 43. 
118 See the following note. 
119 Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443C9–10: The project of completely eradicating passions is impossible and not 
better than having them (τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν…οὔτε δυνατόν οὔτ᾿ ἄμεινον). 
120 Cf. Striker 1991, p. 71: “[W]e ought to reject [the Stoics’] ‘freedom from emotion’ on the ground that it makes us 
indifferent to things we ought to appreciate. Far from being a necessary condition of virtue, Stoic apatheia actually 
seems to be incompatible with it.” 
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state (ἀπάθεια) of invulnerability would not exemplify the perfection of human nature, but 
would be proof of its perversion. If invulnerability is the Stoic goal, Plutarch believes that it 
comes at too high a price. It demands not only our persons, but also our personhood. 
 Lactantius, writing over two centuries later, comes to much the same conclusion. He 
believes that the Stoic goal of invulnerability amounts to madness and, as it were, the castration 
of our nature: 
[T17] falsae virtutis specie capti misericordiam de homine sustulerunt et dum volunt sanare  
vitia, auxerunt. et cum idem plerumque fateantur societatis humanae communionem esse 
retinendam, ab ea plane se ipsos inhumanae virtutis suae rigore dissociant…. Stoici ergo 
furiosi, qui ea non temperant, sed abscidunt rebus que natura insitis castrare hominem 
quodammodo volunt. 
 
Deceived by the appearance of false virtue, they [the Stoics] removed sympathy from 
human nature; while they desired to heal vices, they caused them to increase; and 
although these same people often claim that being part of human society is something we 
should maintain, they clearly dissociate themselves from it because of the severity of 
their inhuman virtue…. The Stoics therefore are insane since they do not moderate these 
[passions] but amputate them and desire somehow to castrate a human being, removing 
things that are implanted within his nature.  
(Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.10.11 and 6.15.2)121 
  
The forfeiture of genuine friendship due to, as Lactantius calls it, inhuman virtue (inhumana 
virtus) is only brought about by self-mutilation. With the vivid metaphor of castration, Lactantius 
indicates that we cut off not only part of ourselves, but the part that is itself productive. The 
emasculation of virtue, with perhaps an ironic twist on the etymological root of virtus, 
“manliness,” hinders the goods of human nature, including friendship and community, from 
proceeding from our nature. 
Interestingly, this angle of attack on Stoic ethics is rare among the ancients. Plutarch 
stands out in the ancient world in his sensitivity to this kind of concern in his criticism of Stoic 
                                               
121 Cf. Irwin 1998, p. 220. 
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value and ethics. More than others of his time, he focuses on the loss of interpersonal 
relationships.122 From the evidence we have, Academic critics and Theophrastus tended to focus 
on problems of personal happiness as it concerns Stoic invulnerability. They might ask, 
“Wouldn’t the sage being tortured on the rack be at least a little happier if he weren’t on the 
rack?”123 Given the Stoic view that virtue and happiness do not come in degrees, they deny that 
the sage’s happiness would be affected in any way by circumstances outside his control, 
including torture.124  
Plutarch, followed later by Lactantius, strikes a deeper blow on a central question of 
ethics, both ancient and modern: how are we to account for and capture genuine care for others 
in our ethics?125 For Plutarch, passions are the key. Benevolence and shared emotions are 
necessary components of friendship. They are proof of friends’ concern for each other. They also 
draw us together into a union that is part of the fulfillment of human nature and a great part of 
the good life. 
The Stoics might argue that the sage will give the appearance of concern for others, 
shuddering and growing pale at the loss of a child, having the initial bites of passion without 
                                               
122 Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.71, who briefly mentions the problem, but does not exploit the issue as 
Plutarch does. 
123 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.23-5; 73–83. Cf. D.L. 10.118; Cicero, Academica 1.33. 
124 SVF 3.586; D.L. 10.118=LS 22Q. 
125 The problem of having virtue as a goal within an objective ethical system is that it seems to be in tension with our 
subjective perspectives and sentiments. Our own subjective views and concerns for others nonetheless appear highly 
relevant to our conception of genuine concern for others as a human individual. As Kolodny 2003 argues, ethics as 
an objective enterprise risks losing sight and focus on personal qualities that we, in our own relationships, consider 
important to our motivations and concern for other individuals. The focus on being virtuous, or doing what is 
ethical, threatens to subordinate our actions and attitudes toward others to the goal of being virtuous and ethical. Cf. 
also Railton 1984, p. 165: “Morality may be conceived of as in essence selfless, impartial, impersonal. To act 
morally is to subordinate the self and all contingencies concerning the self’s relations with others or the world to a 
set of imperatives binding on us solely as rational beings” and ibid, p. 149: “Doesn’t the insistence that there is an 




assenting to them.126 They might also argue that the sage is serious in his endeavor to perform all 
of his actions for others as if they were of ultimate value.127 He always does all that is in his 
power to act appropriately in every situation, including those that involve other people. This is 
the kind of defense we find in both ancient and modern apologists for the Stoics.128  
This defense, however, fails to hold up against Plutarch’s criticisms. Even if the sage has 
the appearance of passions, the bites and physical symptoms, he cannot assent to them. His 
emotions and appearance of shared interest and concern are no less disingenuous. His goal is, in 
fact, to achieve invulnerability and no longer experience any of the symptoms of passions.  
Giving merely the appearance of passions, moreover, is characteristic of deception and is 
the mark of a flatterer, Plutarch argues, not of a friend: 
                                               
126 Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 19.1.17–18; Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102C5–E1=[T16]; Augustine, City 
of God 9.4; Cf. Irwin, 1998, pp. 226–38. 
127 I am supposing that a Stoic might draw this point from Chrysippus’ defense of the sage’s serious endeavor in 
other appropriate actions: “And Chrysippus, again, in his work on Rhetoric writes that the wise man will so speak in 
public discourse and so engage in politics as if wealth, public reputation, and health were good things” (Χρύσιππος 
δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων οὕτω ῥητορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ 
πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας, Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1034B=SVF 
3.698=LS 66B). The sage will act virtuously, and that will involve a seriousness in performing the actions fitting for 
him in his public service, treating the ends of his endeavors as if they are good things, though they really are 
indifferent to virtue, happiness, and absolute value. In the same way, the sage will act as if the health and life of his 
friend are good things, and as if his friend’s well-being were important to his own happiness, though it is not. Cf. 
Sorabji 2000, p. 185: “The talk of indifference and reservation is not an advocacy of being slack, but of eschewing 
disappointment if you fail.” 
128 Irwin (1998, pp. 226–38) makes this very defense, except that he does not bring up the treatment of others or 
indifferent items as if they were of value as I do in the preceding note. Cf. Dillon 1983 and Karamanolis 2006 (pp. 
119–20), who argue that εὐπάθειαι bring the Stoic view close to Aristotle’s notion of moderating passions and 
argue that Plutarch is thus wrong in his criticisms of Stoic ἀπάθεια. Cf. also Inwood 1985, pp. 178 and 180. Graver 
(2007, pp. 182–4) defends Stoic friendship by arguing that we ought to align ourselves with their theory of value. 
She also draws upon Seneca, Letters 9, where the Stoic sage will be oriented toward a friend as he is toward his own 
limbs: “[I]t is as intimate as one’s attachment to one’s own body” (p. 183), but, as she notes on the previous page, 
one’s own limbs are merely preferable but not necessary for one’s happiness (Seneca, Letters 9.4). For a defense of 
the appreciation of friends in the sage’s εὐπάθειαι, as argued for by Sorabji (2000, p. 51), see the discussion in n. 
61 above. Sorabji, however, thinks that the Stoic rejection of emotion and the value of the class of indifferents 
“belong to the less acceptable side of Stoicism” (p. 181). Having and experiencing emotions, for Sorabji, are part of 
what it means to be human (p. 189).  
   For the ancient argument see Augustine, City of God 9.4–5: So long as the Stoic sage experiences the bites and 
physical symptoms of emotions, what difference does it make if they call them indifferents, so long as they value 
them in the same way? As we have seen above, the Stoics do not value them in the same way. Cf. also Cicero, 
Tusculan Disputations 2.30, 5.32, 5.120; On Ends 3.41, 4.20, 5.16–20.  
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[T18] ὄψεται γὰρ αὐτὸν… οὐδ’ ἴδιον οὐδ’ οἰκείῳ πάθει φιλοῦντα καὶ μισοῦντα καὶ  
χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενον, ἀλλὰ δίκην κατόπτρου παθῶν ὀθνείων καὶ βίων καὶ 
κινημάτων εἰκόνας ἀναδεχόμενον. 
 
For one will observe that he [the flatterer]…does not belong to himself, nor does he love, 
hate, feel joy, or grief with his own passion, but instead, like a mirror he takes upon 
himself the images of passions, ways of life, and motions that are alien to him.  
(Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 53A1–5) 
 
Such a person is alien to himself (οὐδ’ ἴδιον) and alienated from his own passions and cannot 
identify with them; his passion is not his own (οὐ οἰκεῖον πάθος). He cannot be a friend to 
others, since he is not even in ownership of himself. He has lost not only the possibility of true 
friendship but has lost himself somehow in the process. 
 Against Plutarch’s criticisms of Stoic invulnerability, the sage fares no better. 
Considering equality with god within his grasp and trying to imitate divine invulnerability, the 
sage becomes something less than human. His friendships become a mere imitation of human 
concern as though others really mattered to his own happiness, but for him, they do not. 
*** 
 Plutarch believes that the Stoics sacrifice too much in their pursuit of the impossible. We 
cannot rid ourselves entirely of passions, since they are essential features of our nature. We 
cannot give up vulnerability in our relationships, since friendship is a constituent of the full 
human life. Nor should we. Instead of fighting against human nature and the human condition, 
Plutarch believes that we should fully embrace all of the good aspects of our passions and the 
emotional intimacy that they make possible. But, we will need a better understanding of human 




Grief and Moderating Passions: Plutarch Against Plato? 
 
 In the last chapter we explored Plutarch’s criticisms against Stoic invulnerability. As we 
will explore in this chapter, Plato’s Republic seems to fall into the cross-hairs of Plutarch’s attack 
on invulnerability, especially with the argument that grief should be suppressed as far as is 
possible; grief, Socrates argues, is not useful and is a hindrance to our rational life (§I). Plutarch 
does not agree with this approach to grief. As is the case for many other passions, it is natural to 
feel grief and, in fact, sometimes useful (§II). 
 Certain passages in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic, and Phaedo also seem to present the 
presence of passions as part of a non-ideal condition of the human soul. Human nature, 
according to these passages, is essentially rational, and the passions and passionate parts of the 
soul are necessary evils due to embodiment. They are sources of pollution and error, and we 
should try to nullify their influence in our lives as far as we are able. Other passages in Plato’s 
dialogues, however, seem to present a more positive evaluation of passions and their role in the 
moral life. The message on what we ought do with our passions is thus somewhat ambiguous in 
Plato’s dialogues (§III). 
 In contrast with the passionless ideal of an essentially rational nature, Plutarch affirms the 
embodied condition of human nature and the positive contributions that passions make to the 
virtuous life. Passions are natural and can, in fact, be useful (§IV). Their usefulness is evident 
especially as constituents of moral virtue. Plutarch defines moral virtue as a harmonious blending 
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of passions and reason, which brings passions into moderate states between excess and 
deficiency (§V). He also draws upon the medical analogy of bodily humors to argue that 
passions, like humors, are not in themselves excessive diseases of the soul, but when they are 
imbalanced and immoderate, they are part of a diseased state of the soul (§VI).  
The formulation and conception of moral virtue that Plutarch presents harmonizes both 
Platonic and Aristotelian notions of virtue. Some have thought, however, that Plutarch is 
essentially Aristotelian in his ethical philosophy. As I argue in the final section (§VII), Plutarch 
would not see his own view as a departure from Platonic philosophy to Aristotelianism, but 
instead as an explication of Platonic moral philosophy that is part of a unified and living Platonic 
tradition, which includes Aristotle as a member. Further, Plutarch argues that one’s own theory 
must fit reality; we cannot force reality to fit our theories, suppositions, or the dogmas passed 
down through tradition, no matter their provenance. Generally, Plato came to the best views, but 
even Aristotle in his more systematic formulation of moral virtue may present a better 
explication of the view that fits best with Plato’s philosophy overall and, more importantly, with 
reality itself. 
 
§I Plato on Eliminating Grief  
In a handful of passages throughout the Republic, based on terminology if nothing else, it 
appears that Plato anticipates Aristotle’s view that moral virtue involves the moderation of 
passions, not their elimination.1 Socrates, for instance, remarks that desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) that are 
moderate (μετρίαι) “are directed with thought and correct belief by reason” (μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ 
δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῷ ἄγονται, Republic 4, 431c5–7). Here, some think that Plato anticipates 
                                               
1 See §V.b.–§V.c. in the Introduction for a brief history of the view that passions should be moderated 
(μετριοπάθεια) rather than eliminated (ἀπάθεια). 
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the Aristotelian notion that passions that are neither in excess nor in deficiency are best directed 
to appropriate ends, in the right manner, at the right time, with all of the necessary qualifications 
of moral virtue in place.2 Further evidence is thought to be found in the notion that being well 
educated (εὖ παιδευόμενοι) leads to the development of moderate individuals (μέτριοι ἄνδρες, 
4, 423e5–6). The language of moderation also seems to crop up in Socrates’ remarks near the 
end of the Myth of Er as he reflects on how one is to make the best choice of one’s next life 
before reincarnation. A human becomes happiest (εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος), 
Socrates concludes, if one  
[T19] γνῷ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίον αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα  
ἑκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα. 
 
knows how to choose the mean always in such things and to flee from excesses in either 
direction as much as is possible in this life and in every one thereafter.  
(Plato, Republic 10, 619a5–b1) 
 
“Excess in either direction” seems to denote both excess and deficiency, the two extremes on 
either side of the mean. But, is this really the same notion that we find in Aristotle and does it 
establish that passions must be moderated for the happy life in Plato’s Republic? I will return to 
these passages below, but first let us take the clearest case that reveals the verbal similarities to 
the later tradition of μετριοπάθεια to be misleading when one tries to read them back into 
Plato’s Republic. Let us turn to the case of grief.  
At first glance, as in the passages above, it appears that Socrates is interested in the 
moderation of passions (μετριοπάθεια), not their elimination (ἀπάθεια), when he discusses 
                                               
2 See Alcinous, Handbook 184.24–8, which I discuss below. Cf. Gronau 1914, p. 254, and Lilla 1971, p. 99 and n. 4, 
who cite these passages from the Republic (4, 423e4–5, 431c5–7; 10, 619a5–b1) as a possible anticipation of 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. Cf. also Kinneavy 1986. For Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean see Nicomachean 
Ethics 2.5; 2.6, 1106a26–8, 1106b21–3, 1107a8–15; 2.7; 2.9, 1109a26–9; Eudemian Ethics 2.3, 1221b11–17; 2.10, 
1227b6–12. Cf. Woods 1982 for notes on the passages in the Eudemian Ethics; Sorabji 2000, pp. 194–5. 
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situations in which one feels grief. In Republic 10, Socrates asks whether the virtuous man will 
feel nothing at the loss of his son, which would amount to insensitivity and lack of feeling, or if 
he will moderate (μετριάζειν) his feelings of grief: 
[T20] νῦν δέ γε τόδ’ ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον,  
μετριάσει δέ πως πρὸς λύπην. 
 
Now, let us look into this, whether he will feel no grief at all, or, if that is impossible, 
whether he will somehow moderate his grief.  (Plato, Republic 10, 603e8–9)  
 
Socrates and Glaucon agree that the answer falls to the latter option. From this brief exchange, it 
looks as though Socrates has moderation of passions in mind as the goal, especially since he 
speaks of somehow moderating (μετριάζειν πως) grief. Alcinous, in the later tradition, takes 
Plato’s Republic as teaching just that: in contrast with the one who feels no grief and lacks 
feeling (ἀπαθής), the one who grieves suffers the loss moderately (μετρίως δὲ τοῦτο πάσχων) 
and is moderate in his passions (μετριοπαθής).3  
Yet in the context of this discussion in the Republic, that option is chosen only because 
the other course of feeling no grief at all is probably impossible. The discussion that precedes 
and follows [T20] reveals that Socrates and Glaucon both think that it would be preferable to be 
entirely without passion, if it were possible.4 The virtuous man not only attempts to render his 
conduct as least conducive to the outward appearance of being distressed when his equals see 
him (10, 604a1–7), but he will also fight to suppress the experiences of grief within himself, 
since these passions are inappropriate motions of his inferior nature that his rational side must 
quell (10, 604a1–b5).5 In maintaining an outward and inward composure, the virtuous man, 
                                               
3 Handbook 184.24–8. 
4 Cf. Dillon 1993, p. 188. See the similarity to the Stoic position in Seneca, Letters 99, esp. 99.15. 
5 It is very brief, but Socrates draws upon the argument for critical psychic conflict in the case of grief. The better 
choice endorsed by reason opposes the inappropriate course of giving in to the feelings of grief. 
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Socrates and Glaucon agree, will take the death of a loved one with the greatest of ease (ὅτι 
ῥᾷστα) compared to normal people (10, 603e4–6). The virtuous man will be as close as he can 
to the ideal of passionless and griefless bearing of trials and loss. As stated in the parallel passage 
of Republic 3, he will lament his loss the least (ἥκιστα ὀδύρεσθαι) and bear the death of a son 
or brother as mildly as is possible (ὡς πραότατα, 3, 387d11–e8). With each superlative, we get 
the sense that the virtuous man comes as close to feeling no pangs of despair at the loss of 
friends and loved ones as any human can. He is on an asymptotic approach to ἀπάθεια, coming 
as close to the limit of lacking any feeling as is possible, though the ultimate eradication of the 
source of his passions is not itself possible. He will never reach the goal, but it no less seems to 
be the ideal worth pursuing. 
 Even though he cannot completely remove the potential to feel grief, the virtuous man 
will attempt to deaden his feelings. Socrates even gives a number of rational arguments to help in 
this task (10, 604a1–b5). Socrates argues that there is no reason to think grief profitable or 
warranted, even at the loss of what most people think most dear to them, their own child. First, 
we do not know whether their death will turn out to be a good or bad thing.6 Secondly, it is of no 
profit to our future for us to bear the loss badly. Thirdly, “nothing in human affairs is worth 
much serious consideration” (οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὄν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, 604 b10–
c1).7 Finally, grief hinders our ability to think clearly and to deliberate well (604b7–c4). Socrates 
concludes the discussion, arguing that entertaining our feelings of grief is as senseless as a child 
holding on to where it hurts; we must avoid grief like a diseased state that we need to heal and 
                                               
6 Cf. Plato, Apology 29a7–b1. 
7 Cf. Plato, Laws 7, 803b3–5: “In point of fact, the affairs of humans are not worthy of much seriousness, but it is 
necessary to treat them as serious at any rate” (ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν 
σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν). 
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move past (10, 604c5–d1).8 As Socrates stresses here, grief is not useful, but instead is a 
hindrance to our rational capacities and a potential disruption in the virtuous life. 
 In the discussion of grief in the Republic, Socrates proposes that we attempt to achieve 
internal serenity that is immune from circumstances and states of affairs outside our control. That 
goal is not far removed from the insensitivity of the Stoic ideal, which we saw Plutarch rejecting 
as inhuman in the last chapter. Even more troubling is the similar motivation that Socrates 
presents for avoiding grief as far as we are able, namely, the ideal of invulnerability.9 In support 
of the thesis that the virtuous man will be least likely to grieve a loved one’s death, Socrates 
notes that the virtuous human will be most self-sufficient and least in need of friends: 
[T21] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὑτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ  
εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται. 
 
But surely we also say this, that such a person will be most self-sufficient for living well 
and, far beyond others, will least be in need of another person. 
(Plato, Republic 3, 387d4–6) 
 
The blessed life consists in virtue, which is immune to the vicissitudes of chance and the 
conditions of external goods or evils. External items apparently also include other people, the 
other individual (ἕτερος) that the virtuous person can do just as well without.10 This is in line 
                                               
8 Cf. Phaedo 83b. 
9 For further discussion on this point and the next three passages see Nussbaum 1986, p. 20; 1994, pp. 92–3. See 
also Williams 1976, p. 115; Carone 2002, pp. 339–40. 
10 Cf. Plato, Gorgias 470e9–11; Republic 1, 354a1–9. The virtuous person is said to be happy because of her 
virtuous state, not because of any external goods. Cf. Carone 2002 passim. In Laws 3, 693c2–5, however, self-
control, practical wisdom, and friendship (φιλία) are all the same goal of harmonious wisdom. Friendship, then, 
seems to be entailed by virtue. In Laws 5, 730c1–d2, the man who would be blessed and happy will abide in 
honesty, but the fool has no friends and becomes an isolated and miserable individual later in life. Friendship, again, 
seems to be a sign of virtue. In both of these cases, however, friendship is not said to be a necessary part of the good 
life. The virtuous may be the best friends one could have, but they do not need friends if virtue is sufficient for 
happiness. In a paper presented at the University of Michigan, “The Real Challenge of the Republic” (January 23, 
2015), Rusty Jones, rightly, I think, argues that many fail to notice the distinction between instrumental / final goods 
and conditional / unconditional goods in Republic 2, which one might suppose allows for friendship to be a 
conditional instrumental or conditional final good for one’s happiness. Even if that is the case, friends do not appear 
to be necessary for one’s happiness, if virtue is sufficient for happiness. See also nn. 62–3 in Chapter 1. 
 
 77 
with the evaluation of external goods and relationships we saw above in Republic 3 and 10: 
“nothing in human affairs is worth much serious consideration” (οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων 
ἄξιον ὄν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, 10, 604 b10–c1), life, death, and suffering included (3, 387d4–6).11 
In the Apology, we find a parallel devaluation of all items external to one’s virtuous state, 
including death (30c7–d6; 41c8–d3). There Socrates argues that a good man cannot be harmed, 
even if disenfranchised or killed. 
Yet, there is something more disturbing in the passages on grief in the Republic than the 
thoughts expressed on disvaluing one’s own suffering and death. Even if we consider our own 
deaths nothing to be feared, we might still think that our evaluation of the loss of other 
individuals should count for something in our own well-being, as we saw Plutarch arguing in the 
last chapter. Our concern for others seems disingenuous if it is disconnected from their well-
being. As with the Stoic notion of invulnerability, the passages on grief in the Republic teach us 
that we ultimately must be rather insensitive, cut off from concern for the physical situation or 
feelings of others, in order to maintain self-sufficiency and to avoid indulgence in our passionate 
nature. Friends may be good to have, but the good they bring does not seem to make any 
difference to our own happiness if we are like the virtuous man of the Republic. Although we 
might have thought that the argument moves toward a more neutral vision of moderating 
passions, signaled by Socrates’ use of μετριάζειν in [T20], the moderation of passions 
(μετριοπάθεια) that the Republic advises, like the Stoic ideal, amounts to more of a mutilation 
                                               
11 Cf. also Vlastos 1991, pp. 200–32. There are indications in Plato’s works that certain states of suffering render 
embodied life not worth living, despite what appears to be a strong thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness 
elsewhere. See Plato, Gorgias 512a; Crito 47d–e. Even in the Republic, there are certain cases in which it would be 
best to let one die a natural death rather than prolong a state of suffering that is unnecessary and not useful (3, 
407d4–410a4). Cf. Cooper 1989, Section II for further discussion. 
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of the non-rational side of human nature. The Republic’s teaching on moderation is really a 
lesson in emotional suppression with the ideal of the passionless state as the goal (ἀπάθεια).12 
 
§II Plutarch on the Naturalness and Usefulness of Grief 
 We will see that this approach to passions in Plato’s dialogues is not peculiar to grief in 
§III, but first we will start with the strongest case Plutarch makes for the moderation of passions 
in his defense of grief. For Plutarch there is no virtue of grief, but neither is it a vice to feel grief. 
Grief nevertheless is important. Plutarch holds it to be so fundamental to our attachment and 
concern for other people that we cannot be rid of it entirely and still be fully human.13 
As we saw in the last chapter, Plutarch argues that it is natural to feel grief in appropriate 
situations. He does not mean that it is natural in a derogatory sense of a human nature that we 
must overcome, but natural as part of the human nature we ought to develop.14 It would be 
unnatural, less than human, not to feel grief at the death of one’s son. I repeat here a quotation 
from the previous chapter for the reader’s convenience: 
[T16] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀλγεῖν καὶ δάκνεσθαι τελευτήσαντος υἱοῦ φυσικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς  
λύπης, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς ὑμνοῦσι τὴν ἄγριον καὶ 
σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν...τὸ γὰρ 
ἀνώδυνον τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίγνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθηριῶσθαι 
γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχήν.  
 
Therefore, to feel pain and the gnawing bites of pain when one’s son dies has a source of 
grief that is natural and outside our control. For I, for my own part, cannot agree with 
those [the Stoics] who sing hymns of praise to that cruel and callous lack of feeling, 
which is both outside the realm of possibility and not beneficial…. For this insensitivity 
                                               
12 Cf. Laks (forthcoming), esp. pp. 30–2. Laks’ discussion concerns Presocratic philosophers, but his point on the 
dangers of reading concepts back into earlier authors based on verbal similarities is well taken, especially in 
doxographic approaches to ancient philosophers. 
13 See Chapter 1, §IV–§V. 
14 Contrary to Cicero, Plutarch affirms the naturalness of such experiences of grief. Cicero argues that the experience 
of grief may be human, but that does not weigh in its favor. Instead, he believes that we ought to aim beyond our 
nature and therefore sides more closely with the Stoic goal of eradicating grief (Tusculan Disputations 3.12–13; cf. 
also 3.71). See Graver 2002, pp. xxv and 187–94; Gill 2006, p. 173, n. 207. 
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to pain comes about in a human only at a great expense; for it is the body, in the former 
case, which has been brutalized, but in the latter case, the soul.  
 (Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102C5–E1)15 
The unnatural state of immunity to grief in such situations is the sign of a hardened heart. Such a 
lack of passion (ἀπάθεια) should be deemed harmful (βλαβερόν) and a trait associated with a 
worthless person (φαῦλον, Cons. Ap. 103D4–7).16 Ironically, though Socrates, like the Stoics, 
considers grief a diseased state of the soul, insensitivity and rejection of passion are the true 
diseases of the soul (νοσήματα ψυχῆς, On Affection for Offspring 497C9–D8). The inability to 
feel passions is not only unnatural, it is also unhealthy. But, Plutarch also interestingly says 
more. Such a condition would not even be beneficial (σύμφερον) if it were possible.  
Plutarch now is engaged not only with the Stoic arguments against grief, but with the 
thrust of Socrates’s arguments in Republic 3 and 10. For Socrates, as we saw above, grief only 
provides a stumbling block to clear thinking and useful actions; it is in no way profitable to give 
in to feeling grief (10, 604 b10–c1). Instead, fighting and resisting the feeling as much as one is 
able is more beneficial (604a1–b5) since it would be better if we could not feel it at all. Plutarch, 
to the contrary, considers the passionless state, which Socrates puts forward as the goal, to be 
unbeneficial. In the final lines of [T16], Plutarch writes that one must count the cost of the 
passionless state.  
The price for attaining such a state or getting as close as we are able to that goal is great 
(μεγάλων μισθῶν). In the section I elided in [T16], Plutarch argues that we forfeit the good 
passions if we eliminate the possibility of experiencing painful ones: 
 
                                               
15 I consider this a genuine work of Plutarch. On the authenticity of this work see n. 117 in Chapter 1. 
16 “Therefore we must also leave this [ἀπάθεια] well enough alone as something harmful and associated with a 
worthless person and least befitting virtuous men” (διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐατέον ὡς βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον καὶ 
σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον). 
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[T22] ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη [ἀπάθεια] τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὔνοιαν,  
ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασῴζειν ἀναγκαῖον. 
 
For, this [lack of feeling] will deprive us of the benevolence that comes from loving and 
being loved, which it is necessary to protect above all else.  
(Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102C10–D2)17 
 
The passionless state is callous and cruel not only in disregarding the misfortunes of others as of 
no real concern, but also because it leads to a state of insensitivity that robs us of the experiences 
of joy and love we find in friendship. As we saw in Chapter 1, benevolence involves not only 
sharing in grief, but also joy (τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν, On Moral Virtue 451E4–5).18 It 
also derives from true friendship and love for one another; hence the use of both active and 
passive forms of love involved in the benevolence experienced between friends (ἡ ἐκ τοῦ 
φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὔνοια, Consolation to Apollonius 102C10–D1). We stand to lose genuine 
benevolence, joy, love, friendship, and affection if we pursue a passionless state that is 
invulnerable to emotional pain. As we saw in Chapter 1, Plutarch considers these to be important 
aspects of the good life. Since we lose positive features of our emotional life and relationships, 
deadening our sensitivities is not beneficial.19 
 Plutarch pushes further against the proposed suppression of grief than Crantor, his 
Academic predecessor. Plutarch quotes Crantor in his argument that it is far better to endure 
painful emotions such as grief rather than to render ourselves incapable of positive emotions: 
[T23] “μὴ γὰρ νοσοῖμεν” φησὶν ὁ ἀκαδημαϊκὸς Κράντωρ, “νοσήσασι δὲ παρείη τις  
αἴσθησις, εἴτ’ οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων εἴτ’ ἀποσπῷτο.”  
 
                                               
17 Cf. Plutarch, On Compliancy 529A–D: We must be careful in attempting to remove negative aspects of our 
emotional life lest we mar our sensitivity and lose the source of positive aspects, such as a sense of shame, together 
with it. I take up this point further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
18 =[T6] in Chapter 1. 
19 Stoics will deny that we must forfeit good feelings in removing our passionate states, but Plutarch’s argument still 
holds in terms of genuine care and concern, as I argued in Chapter 1 (§IV). Cf. Annas 1992, pp. 113–15. 
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“For let us not be sick,” Crantor the Academic says, “but let there be some feeling for us 
if we are sick, if indeed some part of ours should be cut out or removed!”  
(Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102D7–10)20 
 
We would prefer not to be sick, Crantor argues, but it would not be worth the cost of not feeling 
sick to lose sensation altogether. Likewise, the ability to feel painful emotions, though it is 
generally undesirable, should be endured so that we will also be able to experience good 
emotions. There are parts, i.e. emotions, that we do not want cut out of us.21 Beyond losing the 
capacity for good emotions ourselves, Plutarch, argues that the greatest danger comes in cutting 
us off from genuine friendships and intimacy. As we saw in Chapter 1, we must be able to 
experience grief if we are to be emotionally sensitive and share our lives in deep and intimate 
ways with others.22 This unnatural and unhealthy state also deadens our relationships. 
 Plutarch pushes against Socrates’ criticism in Republic 4 further. Contrary to the claims 
in the Republic, not only is the passionless state unbeneficial, but the experience of grief can 
itself be beneficial and useful.23 Plutarch argues that sharing passions, even painful emotions of 
                                               
20 The quotation is from Crantor’s lost work, On Grief. Cf. Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 104C1–15. 
21 Cicero provides similar quotations of Crantor’s On Grief (see Tusculan Disputations 3.6.12. and n. 23 below). Cf. 
also Jerome, Letter 60.5; Pliny, Natural History Praef. 22. For further discussion see Graver 2002, “Appendix A: 
Crantor and the Consolatory Tradition,” pp. 187–94. Cicero, however, rejects Crantor’s position in favor of the Stoic 
doctrine of ἀπάθεια. See n. 14 above. Cf. also Sorabji 2000, pp. 182–3. 
22 See Chapter 1, §IV–§VI. Cf. also Precepts of Statecraft 824B2–6: To be insensitive and incapable of feeling grief 
when one’s own state is in distress (οὐ μὴν ἀναίσθητον οὐδ’ ἀνάλγητον ἐν στάσει) does not befit a good person. 
23 Cf. Consolation to Apollonius 105B13–D5, in which Iliad 24.522–33 is quoted to demonstrate the profitlessness 
in giving oneself over to grief. Pace Graver 2002, pp. 190–1, I do not believe that Plutarch presents this passage to 
suggest that giving in to grief is always profitless. Instead, in quoting Achilles’ speech to Priam, Plutarch 
emphasizes that being carried away to excess in grief, as in cruel wailing (κρυερὸς γόος) is not a useful indulgence. 
The same can be said of Consolation to Apollonius 102A12–B5, where Plutarch speaks of profitless mourning 
(μάταιοι ὀδυρμοί) as excessive expressions after the appropriate measure of time has passed.  
   Crantor, Cicero relates, also argues that passions are natural and useful. Cf. Academica 2.135: “Those Old 
Academy members used to approve of moderation of passions, and they desired that there be a certain natural 
measure in every emotion. We have all read On Grief by the Old Academic Crantor…And certainly the Old 
Academy used to say that emotions were given to our souls by nature for use, fear for the sake of being cautious, 
pity and distress for the sake of mercy; they even used to say that anger was, as it were, the whetstone of bravery” 
(Mediocritates illi probabant, et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. Legimus omnes 
Crantoris veteris Academici De Luctu…Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis 
nostris datas, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis 
quasi cotem esse dicebant). 
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grief and distress, can help in persuading those we love to avoid error and to do what is best. 
Shared grief gives opportunity for influence. In On Brotherly Love, Plutarch describes a situation 
in which reproof of error is required. When one’s brother has acted foolishly, 
[T24] πρὸς ἐκεῖνον δεῖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ καθάπτεσθαι σφοδρότερον, τὸ ἁμάρτημα καὶ τὸ  
ἔλλειμμα μετὰ παρρησίας ἐνδεικνύμενον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐφιέναι δεῖ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς οὔτ’ 
αὖ πάλιν ἐπεμβαίνειν ἁμαρτάνουσιν αὐτοῖς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιχαίροντός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο 
δὲ συνεξαμαρτάνοντος), ἀλλὰ κηδομένῳ καὶ συναχθομένῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ 
νουθετοῦντι. 
 
one ought to turn to him and rebuke him intensely, pointing out his fault and shortcoming 
with frankness. For one ought not to give license to brothers nor, on the other hand, step 
all over them when they err (since the latter is characteristic of one who gloats and the 
former of one who shares in the fault), but in his admonishment of his brother he ought to 
treat him as one he cares about and with whom he shares in his grief.  
      (On Brotherly Love 483A8–B3) 
 
Shared grief provides evidence of genuine concern and vested interest in another’s well-being. It 
establishes a connection and position of influence one might not otherwise have, since our 
friends and loved ones recognize that we identify with their desires and interests.24 With an 
established foundation of genuine concern and shared interest, one can admonish and rebuke 
with greater force in frankness,25 appealing to that shared sense of suffering and concern, and 
steer one’s brother away from future errors.26 Emotions such as grief, then, are not wholly 
negative, even if they are inherently painful experiences, since shared grief is useful in our 
influence on others. 
                                               
24 Cf. Plutarch, On Love (Sandbach fr. 137=Stob. 4.20.69). 
25 Plutarch holds that frankness (παρρησία) is possible only between those who are φίλοι. Cf. How to Tell a 
Flatterer from a Friend 73C–D, 74C–D; On Listening to Lectures 47A–B. Cf. also O’Neill 1997, pp. 116–17, and 
Konstan 1997, pp. 113–14. On the use of shared grief and emotion in the persuasion of others see also more modern 
psychological studies such as Scheff 1998, esp. pp. 104–107 and 112. 
26 When we identify with the misfortunes and concerns of others, they tend to be more open to our criticism, 
especially if we identify with the faults they have committed and when we give advice from our own experience. Cf. 
Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 72A6–8: “For those who seem to have committed the same faults 
and to correct their friends as they do themselves have their goodwill and trust” (καὶ γὰρ εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν 
ἔχουσιν οἱ ταὐτὰ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς φίλους ὥσπερ αὑτοὺς δοκοῦντες). 
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 Plutarch even encourages the sharing in grief with one another when appropriate. 
Plutarch emphasizes that true intimacy and shared concerns call for shared suffering: 
[T25] ἀποθανόντος γε μὴν πατρὸς ἐμφύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὀρθῶς ἔχει τῇ εὐνοίᾳ  
τὸν ἀδελφόν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ συνδακρύειν καὶ συνάχθεσθαι κοινούμενον τὸ 
φιλόστοργον. 
 
 When their father has died, it is, in truth, right more than previously for the brother to 
cling to the benevolence of his brother, immediately sharing his affection by weeping 
together and grieving together with him. (Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 483C4–7) 
 
Grief is often experienced in common with others who share our loss. There are cases in which 
shared grief can become all the more painful as we reflect not only on our own feeling of loss, 
but also on the suffering of our loved ones who grieve with us. Yet, in some instances, our grief 
can itself be alleviated by sharing it with others (How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 49F6–
8).27 
In his Consolation to His Wife, Plutarch gives us insight into his own experience.28 At the 
loss of his daughter he struggles to keep his own grief within bounds as he writes to his wife, 
admitting that his struggle will be all the greater if he finds her grieved beyond measure 
(Consolation to His Wife 608B10–C1). He shares with his wife an intimately united set of 
passions, inclinations, and concerns as though they are of one mind, as is the natural manner for 
parents in their love of children (On Affection for Offspring 494A3–4). He and his wife must 
work together to experience their grief without letting it take a dangerous and excessive hold 
                                               
27 =[T14] in Chapter 1. 
28 Cf. Baltussen 2009, pp. 79–84. Baltussen argues that Plutarch’s Consolation to his Wife is not an example of 
public posturing, as though merely following a tradition of consolatory letters and genre requirements, but instead 
expresses genuine grief and gives us rare insight into the emotional life and intimacy of a figure in Plutarch’s period. 
Though the letter is highly stylized, as it is written shortly after Plutarch has become a prominent figure as a priest of 
Apollo at Delphi (cf. Pomeroy 1999, pp. 75–8), “[t]he degree of intimacy in this letter is quite unusual compared to 
many other extant consolations” (Baltussen 2009, p. 67). That Plutarch’s daughter is the subject of this letter, given 
how young she is at around 2 years of age is unusual in letters of this kind (cf. Hawley 1999, p. 125; King 2000, p. 
145), as is the fact that the letter is addressed to his wife (cf. Wilcox 2006, p. 75). For a brief synopsis of consolatory 
letters and literature, cf. Baltussen 2009, pp. 70–6. 
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within their souls (Consolation to His Wife 609F8–610A6). This, however, also means that they 
do not suffer alone in isolation without the help of another. They are able to give one another 
strength and encouragement through trying times (On Having Many Friends 94C8–D3).29 They 
must share in the pains of their loss together just as they shared in their love for their daughter 
and in their love for one another. Joy and love come at a cost, but the price of grief is not too 
high to pay. The price of completely avoiding grief, however, is too much. We should not choose 
to protect ourselves against the death of children by being childless (δεῖ πεφράχθαι…μήτ᾿ 
ἀπαιδίᾳ πρὸς τέκνων θάνατον), nor guard against the loss of friends by being friendless 
(ἀφιλίᾳ πρὸς φίλων ἀποβολήν, Plutarch, Solon 7.3–4).30 
In allowing for grief, Plutarch does not advocate the other extreme of excessive weeping 
and wailing, dirges, and the beating of breasts, which he thinks are embarrassing displays of an 
unbridled and shameful nature,31 but rather the admittance of grief that is not beyond the bounds 
of propriety or good character (Consolation to Apollonius 102D2), but within its proper limits. 
He describes his own position as a “moderation of passion” (μετριοπάθεια), in which “we ought 
not reject a moderate experience of grief” (τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμαστέον, 
Consolation to Apollonius 102D6–7).32  
Here, the notion of moderating grief, unlike what we find in the Republic, is what it 
appears to be. We experience a certain amount of grief that is natural and appropriate. We should 
not exceed the upper limit of what is appropriate, but neither should we fall below the lower limit 
of how much grief one ought to feel, which would include feeling nothing at all: 
                                               
29 =[T13] in Chapter 1. 
30 Cf. Hertzoff 2008, pp. 347–8. 
31 Consolation to His Wife 609A4–C6, 609E1–F2; Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse Than Those of the 
Body 501C12–D6. 
32 I will discuss Plutarch’s more general formula and argument for the moderation of passions in §V–§VII. 
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[T26] οὔτ’ οὖν ἀπαθεῖς ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων συμφορῶν ὁ λόγος ἀξιοῖ γίγνεσθαι τοὺς εὖ  
φρονοῦντας οὔτε δυσπαθεῖς…εὐλόγιστος δ’ ὁ τὸν οἰκεῖον ὅρον ἔχων καὶ 
δυνάμενος φέρειν δεξιῶς τά τε προσηνῆ καὶ τὰ λυπηρὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ 
συμβαινόντων. 
 
 Reason demands that those who are prudent not be devoid of passion in such misfortunes  
[as losing one’s child] nor excessive in their passions…but the reasonable person is the 
one who holds to the appropriate limit and is able to bear rightly both the pleasant and 
painful things that happen to him in life.  
(Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius 102E2–8) 
 
In contrast with Socrates’ advice, we cannot and should not suppress grief as far as is humanly 
possible, since we will be deficient in the passion. The passionless bearers of misfortune 
(ἀπαθεῖς) are not prudent. Their fault lies on the opposite side from those who are excessive 
(δυσπαθεῖς), but their actions are nonetheless also irrational and foolish. 
Plutarch’s position is consistent with the suppressed expression of grief in public, but not 
the complete suppression of its expression within the soul.33 In his biographical works, for 
instance, he praises Phocion for bearing a passionless countenance (ἀπάθεια) as a sign of high-
mindedness (μεγαλοψυχία) when he and his men are shamefully led to prison to await their 
unjustly pursued execution. Despite false accusations of treachery, Phocion stands as an example 
in contrast with those who gave themselves to shameful public display of wailing and crying out 
in dirges (ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ καταθρηνοῦντες, Phocion 36.1).34  
                                               
33 Cf. Dillon 2016, pp. 12–15, who argues that Plutarch has a less technical use of ἀπάθεια in his biographical 
works, which leads to somewhat ambiguous statements that seem to praise the ἀπάθεια of significant individuals in 
the Lives. I think that the case is less ambiguous than Dillon seems to indicate, since, as Becchi (1999, esp. pp. 38–
43; 2005; 2014, pp. 78–85) argues Plutarch sometimes indicates through the description of a character as ἀπαθής 
not the ideal of being completely without passions or entirely suppressing passions, but as one who is in control of 
one’s passions and not led astray by passions or overcome by bad passions. These individuals are moderate in their 
passions. Cf. Alexander 4.8; On the Great Fortune or Virtue of Alexander 2, 338E, 339A–B; Pelopidas 26.8; 
Coriolanus 15.4; Cato Minor 14.4; Artaxerxes 12.1; Becchi 2014, p. 85). 
34 Cf. Plutarch, Solon 7: Some people disgrace themselves by indulging excessively in grief over the death of a horse 




Plutarch also shows a high opinion of Cleomenes for maintaining his composure at the 
death of his wife, not allowing himself to be overcome with sorrow while he still is required to 
lead his troops with a clear head and a bearing that inspires confidence: 
[T27] οὐ μὴν κατῄσχυνεν οὐδὲ προήκατο τῷ πάθει τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς  
ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ φωνὴν καὶ σχῆμα καὶ μορφὴν ἐν ᾧ πρότερον εἶχεν ἤθει 
διαφυλάττων τά τε προστάγματα τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ἐδίδου καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀσφαλείας 
τῶν Τεγεατῶν ἐφρόντιζεν. 
 
 He certainly did not bring himself dishonor nor deliver his proud spirit and the greatness 
of his soul up to the passion of grief, but he maintained his voice, appearance, and 
composure in the manner as before, and he gave orders to his commanders and continued 
to take thought for the safety of Tegea.  (Plutarch, Agis and Cleomenes 43.2.3–3.1) 
 
Although deeply affected, Cleomenes does not give in to his feelings of sorrow and grief while 
his post of leadership requires him to be decisive. He defers the experience until he returns home 
to his family. There he mourns his loss with his mother and children before returning to his post 
once more (43.3.1–4).35 
In praising such acts of deferred grief, Plutarch nonetheless emphasizes the naturalness 
and reasonableness of feeling grief, especially in Cleomenes’ case: 
[T28] καὶ ἀπαγαγόντι τὴν δύναμιν, ἑσπέρας ἤδη περὶ Τεγέαν ἀφίκοντό τινες ἐκ  
Λακεδαίμονος οὐκ ἐλάττονα τῆς ἐν χερσὶ δυστυχίαν ἀπαγγέλλοντες, τεθνάναι 
τὴν γυναῖκα, δι’ ἣν οὐδὲ ταῖς πάνυ κατορθουμέναις ἐκεῖνος ἐνεκαρτέρει 
στρατείαις, ἀλλὰ συχνῶς κατέβαινεν εἰς Σπάρτην, ἐρῶν τῆς Ἀγιάτιδος καὶ περὶ 
πλείστου ποιούμενος ἐκείνην. ἐπλήγη μὲν οὖν καὶ ἤλγησεν, ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν νέον 
ἄνδρα καλλίστης καὶ σωφρονεστάτης ἀφῃρημένον γυναικός. 
 
And as he was leading his force back home, around Tegea certain men came from 
Lacedaimon when it was already evening and reported a calamity no less severe than the 
one at hand: his wife had died. She was the reason he could not bear to remain even in 
very successful expeditions, but constantly went back to Sparta; he loved Agiatis and 
valued her more than anything else. Therefore, he was struck with pain and grief, as was 
reasonable for a man just recently robbed of a most beautiful and prudent wife. 
(Plutarch, Agis and Cleomenes 43.1.2–2.3) 
 
                                               
35 Cf. Plutarch, Demosthenes 22.2–4, where Plutarch likewise praises Demosthenes for putting the concerns of the 
commonwealth, when he was needed to attend to the city’s affairs, above his own need for grief. 
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Far from faulting Cleomenes for feeling grief and being struck with pain, Plutarch acknowledges 
that such an emotional response was fitting and reasonable in the situation (ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν), 
especially considering the intense love Cleomenes felt for his wife.  
Nor does Plutarch give the sense that Cleomenes over-valued his wife’s importance to his 
life. Plutarch emphasizes the high esteem in which Cleomenes held his wife and the deep 
intimacy of their relationship as warranting the experience of grief. Plutarch appears to admire 
Cleomenes all the more for acting prudently and controlling himself in service to his men 
because of the deep love and loss of his wife that he feels. Contrary to Socrates’ argument in the 
Republic that we do not know whether our loved one’s deaths or misfortunes might turn out to be 
a good thing (10, 604b8–9)36 and the argument that nothing in human life is worth much 
seriousness (604b10–c1),37 Plutarch takes the loss of one’s loved ones to be a serious matter 
worthy of our grief. 
Plutarch’s view is a significant departure from the treatment of grief in Plato’s Republic. 
Is Plutarch directly confronting what he takes to be Plato’s position on this point or does he think 
that he is in line with the best view that Plato himself would endorse? I will argue below in §VII 
that Plutarch would not consider his own view to be in conflict with the philosophy of Plato’s 
Academy, which includes Crantor as a member. Plutarch to some extent follows Crantor in his 
view that even the passion of grief is natural and that it would be unhealthy to eliminate the 
capacity to feel it. But, Plutarch emphasizes the interpersonal nature of passions far more in his 
defense on the moderate approach to grief than we find in Crantor’s extant arguments. 
                                               
36 Cf. Plato, Apology 29a7–b1. 
37 Cf. Plato, Laws 7, 803b3–5. 
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 More than that, Plutarch draws upon passages from Plato’s Republic to defend his 
position that grief should be moderated, not eliminated. Plutarch’s description of sharing pain 
(συναλγεῖν) seems to refer to a passage in Republic 5, which Plutarch quotes a few times to 
demonstrate the sense of shared identity that is possible between those who have shared passions 
(Advice to Bride and Groom 140D11–F12, On Brotherly Love 484B6–10, Dialogue on Love 
767D5–E2). In Republic 5, the best city is likened to a body that shares in the pain of its parts 
(συναλγεῖν, 462c9–d5). Its citizens are affected together with one another, and the city “as a 
whole shares in pleasure or pain together” (ἢ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται 462d6–
e2). So, it appears that Plutarch emphasizes these notions from Republic 5 against the advocation 
of suppressing grief as far as is possible in Republic 4, but I defer for now a longer discussion of 
Plutarch’s view of what it means to be part of the Platonic tradition until §VII. 
 
§III Plato and the Negative Evaluation of Passions 
 
 Now, I would like to turn to the question of whether Plato’s dialogues appear to advocate 
the moderation of passions or their complete suppression. We have already seen the case for an 
asymptotic approach to ἀπάθεια with regard to grief: we should suppress this emotion as far as 
humanly possible, coming as close to the complete absence of this passion as we are able. We 
might hope that grief is merely a particularly bad kind of passion that admits of no good or 
acceptable moderate state in the Republic. Perhaps other passions fare better in Plato’s moral 
psychology and should be enjoyed and moderated rather than entirely suppressed to the point of 
near annihilation. Certain passions in Aristotle’s moral psychology, after all, are not to be 
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moderated but instead opposed to the greatest extent possible. While most passions admit of a 
moderate and mean state for Aristotle, envy and Schadenfreude are altogether bad.38  
As we will see below, however, the general trend we find in Plato’s dialogues is that we 
would be better off without passions than with them. Even if we cannot entirely remove our 
capacity to feel passions in this life, we should nonetheless try to nullify their troublesome 
influence over our lives as much as we are able. Passions appear to be nothing more than 
necessary evils due to embodiment, while our true nature, what makes us human, is our 
rationality. Even passions that appear to be useful and helpful in this life, we will see, are not 
part of the ideal life of pure rationality. Spirited passions such as courage, anger, and a sense of 
shame look to be useful only insofar as they help to suppress even worse passions; they would 
serve no purpose if we were free from passions altogether. It even looks as though the passion of 
ἔρως, which is valorized and praised throughout the Symposium and Phaedrus, should be 
diverted toward rational pursuits, converted from passionate desires to purely rational desires. 
That is one way of taking the evidence from Plato’s dialogues, which we will explore 
below, not least because it seems to have influenced the very first followers of Plato in their view 
that passions should be eradicated. I should note up front, however, that it is not the only way of 
reading the treatment and evaluation of the passions in Plato’s dialogues. After exploring the 
negative interpretation, I will return to passages that seem to point to a more positive evaluation 
of the emotions before arguing that the case is not clear-cut but instead ambiguous. 
Let us begin with the problem of embodiment and the non-ideal state with passions. In 
Plato’s Timaeus (41d4–42d2), we are given a likely story (ὁ εἰκὼς μῦθος, 29d2, 59c6, 68d2, 
                                               
38 Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a8–15. Cf. Sorabji 2000, p. 195. 
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and 72d7) of the creation of human souls and their implantation into physical bodies. Because of 
embodiment and the life of passions that results from embodiment, humans must struggle to 
overcome their passions and master (κρατεῖν) them to live justly. Otherwise, they will be 
conquered (κρατεῖσθαι) and live a life of injustice (ἀδικία, 42a3–b2). Only by constraining and 
subduing the turbulent (θορυβῶδες), non-rational (ἄλογον) aspect of our nature through the 
course of one’s life, or through several cycles of reincarnation, will a human return to the form of 
her original constitution, the original state of virtue (42d1–2),39 i.e. the state that souls enjoyed 
before embodiment. Before embodiment, there was only the immortal soul, not compounded 
with the mortal aspects of the soul, the non-rational passionate parts: 
[T29] οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν  
σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνευσαν ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδοσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ 
ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον.  
 
And imitating [the Demiurge], they [the gods] took the immortal principle of the soul and 
thereupon spread round it a mortal body and provided the entire body as a vehicle. They 
also framed a different mortal form of soul inside it, having dreadful and necessary 
passions within it.       (Plato, Timaeus 69c5–d1) 
 
The only part worthy to be called truly human was the divine part of the soul, its rationality 
(42a1–3). The gods only polluted this divine part of the soul (μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον) as much as was 
required for embodiment (69d4–7).40  
Passions in this picture are necessary aspects of embodiment that we must conquer and 
constrain as potential hindrances in our pursuit of the better, original constitution and its virtuous 
condition. They appear to be little more than necessary evils due to incarnation, and their 
usefulness consists entirely in their attendance to the body (69d4–72d3).41 Whatever positive use 
                                               
39 τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως. 
40 Pace Johansen 2000, pp. 88–104, I have highlighted the negative descriptions of emotions in the Timaeus. 




they serve, however, is outweighed by the further problems that they bring with them. Moral 
virtue in this life, moreover, consists not in moderating these passions but in keeping them from 
causing disturbance and becoming unruly; it consists in suppressing passions. In the course of 
time, the aim is to become purified, as it were, having subdued and removed the influence of 
passions so that we eventually become entirely free not only from experiencing passions, but 
also from their sources, the non-rational parts of the soul themselves (90b1–d7). 
This negative portrayal of passions is not unique to the Timaeus. Nor is the passionless 
ideal of the purely rational soul peculiar to that dialogue. In Republic 10, the soul in its truest 
nature (τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει) is rational, its ancient nature before it was beset by union with 
the body and other evils (ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, 611a10–
611c1). Embodiment here is explicitly listed as one among several evils (κακά). So too are the 
passions. The passage continues with a vivid analogy. The non-rational passions are mere 
accretions, like the oyster shells, rocks, and seaweed attached to the sea-god Glaucus, whose 
original nature has become obscured through entanglement with the seabed. In the human soul’s 
case, its nature has been shrouded in confusion through its continued conjunction with the body 
and the passions that result from that union. Passions thus are foreign to the original, rational 
nature of the soul, which is its true nature. They are among the myriad of evils (μυρίων κακῶν) 
that have brought the embodied soul into its present, marred condition (611c1–d6), and the 
passionate portions of the soul are a result of the rational soul’s plunge into the depths of 
physical incarnation (611d7–612a6).42 
                                               
42 Cf. Woolf 2012, esp. pp. 170–1. 
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In another passage from the Republic, the non-rational parts of the soul and the passions 
that arise from them are likened to a lion and many-headed beast that the “inner human” (ὁ 
ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος) of the soul must subdue and make tame (Republic 9, 588b6–589b6). Even 
though one is encouraged to make the passionate parts of the soul obedient and friendly (φιλά) 
with the rational part of the soul, the embodied condition and the presence of the non-rational 
parts of the soul appear far from ideal and more of a denigration of the divine nature of the 
rational part of soul in its mixture with the nonsense (φλυαρία) and corrupting force of the body 
(ἀνάπλεως σάρξ, Symposium 211e2–3; Phaedo 66c2–443).  
First, in this image non-rational passions are so alien to human nature that it warrants the 
representation of the rational part as our true human nature, the inner human as opposed to the 
monstrous and bestial passionate parts of the soul.44 Secondly, when we look more closely at the 
friendliness that one ought to pursue between the passions and reason, it turns out to be little 
more than an agreed submission and enslavement of the passionate parts to the rational part of 
the soul (Republic 9, 589c6–590d6).45 Passions must be overcome. They are more easily 
                                               
43 The body “fills us with urges, desires, fears, all sorts of images, and a great deal of gibberish” (ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ 
ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς). The appetitive and 
spirited parts of the soul in Republic 4, 436a–b and 9, 580d–e are the subjects of such desires and passions. 
44 Cf. Kamtekar 2006, p. 185, who argues that the agent-like descriptions of the soul’s parts, especially in the 
analogy of the inner human, lion, and many-headed beast, are meant to draw us to identify more with the rational 
element within, since it is described as most human in form. Cf. also Singpurwalla 2013, p. 54: “It is reasonable to 
suppose that Socrates likens reason to the human being because it is our reason that makes us human, and thus 
distinguishes us from other animals. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that Socrates, like Aristotle, considers the 
human function, purpose, or goal to consist in rational activity, including reasoning about what to do and living in 
accordance with those determinations.” Cf. Timaeus 42a1–3: Only the rational part of the soul should be called our 
human nature. 
45 At first, the descriptions of enslavement only go in one direction: enslaving the best part of oneself to the worst 
part (καταδουλοῦται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ, 589d7–e1), i.e. enslaving the rational part to the 
non-rational parts in the unjust state of the soul. But later, the subordination of the passionate parts of the soul also 
adopts the language of enslavement; those who have inferior intellects and cannot control their passions “ought to be 
the slaves of the one who is best, with the divine ruler [of reason] within himself” (δοῦλον αὐτόν…δεῖν εἶναι 
ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον), and in this way they become friends (φίλοι, 9, 
590c7–d6). The model of friendship envisioned for the passions as well as these individuals is enslavement. 
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overcome, moreover, if we do not feed them and make them grow strong, but instead starve them 
to make them weak.46 Their presence can be tolerated if they provide no disturbances to reason. 
The negative evaluation of emotions and the non-rational parts of the human soul 
encourages the notion that we would be better off without them. Passages from Plato’s Phaedo 
further encourage complete suppression of our passions as far as we are able in this life. So far, 
we have seen in both the Timaeus and Republic that there is some hope that we might one day be 
free of passions in death, even if it takes several cycles of embodiment to achieve this freedom. 
For now, we do the best we can to suppress them. Plato’s Phaedo takes the notion that we desire 
the death of our passionate nature a step further and advises one not just to suppress passions to 
tolerable levels, but to deaden our passions so that we escape the prison of the body while we are 
still in this life (62b2–6). Philosophy aimed at achieving the good life, Socrates argues, is itself a 
practice of death: 
[T30] κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς  
ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.  
 
For, it is likely that other people will not notice that all those who actually take hold of 
philosophy correctly do nothing other than practice dying and being dead.  
(Plato, Phaedo 64a4–6) 
 
Philosophers deaden themselves in a way (ῇ θανατῶσι) that escapes the notice of most 
observers (Phaedo 64b7–c1), namely, by deadening their association with passions and bodily 
concerns that hinder rational reflection.47 Rational reflection requires “using pure rational thought 
by itself” (αὐτῇ καθ’ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος, 66a1–2). To attain our highest 
                                               
46 As the inner lion and many-headed beasts are fed and strengthened, the inner human is starved and weakened 
(588e4–589a4). Though Socrates describes caring for the non-rational parts of the soul like a farmer (ὥσπερ 
γεωργός), his chief concern must be to weaken these parts to maintain control (589a6–b6). See the previous note. 
Cf. Laws 9, 934d4–935a7. 
47 I do not mean to imply that Plato’s Phaedo or other dialogues advocate suicide. For further discussion on this 
topic see Cooper 1989; Warren 2001, pp. 91–106, esp. pp. 100–5; and Murray 2001, pp. 247–55. 
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goal, rational reflection, it looks as though we need to nullify the influence of our passions as 
much as possible by deadening our passionate nature (64c10–67b5). We bide our time with the 
necessary evils of embodied existence, the non-rational parts of the soul, exercising our rational 
capacity with the least distraction from passions until we reach the disembodied state and are, in 
all good hope, able to achieve complete eradication of the accretions of our non-rational, 
passionate nature. Until then, our best life here and now is found in pursuing the suppression and 
elimination of passions (ἀπάθεια) as far as it is possible for us.48 
With this general picture in mind, when we look back at what appears to be the 
foreshadowing of Aristotle’s view that passions should be moderated (Republic 4, 423e5–6, 
431c5–7; 10, 619a5–b1), we see that the similarity is merely verbal. The condition of desires that 
are simple and moderate (ἁπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας) occur when moderation (σωφροσύνη) within 
the soul is achieved, but moderation is defined not as a virtuous condition of the passions, but 
rather as the condition of the whole soul when reason is in power and is not challenged by the 
passions (4, 431c9–432b1).49 Moderation of the whole soul only requires that the passions not 
interfere with the direction that reason provides, but there is no indication here that passions are 
best when in a moderate condition themselves as a mean between the deficiency of passion and 
its excess. This definition of moderation in the Republic does not incorporate the notion that 
passions can be deficient, since it could be achieved by the union of the rational part of the soul 
with passionate parts that are completely inactive. The absence of passion, in fact, appears more 
                                               
48 Cf. Gill 2006, pp. 237–8: “In Plato’s Phaedo…dualism between psyche and body is linked with an ideal which is 
close to that of apatheia. The philosopher’s liberation of the psyche from the body is seen as bringing with it a 
liberation from the emotions and desires which are derivative from the body” (p. 237). 
49 “Consequently, we would be most correct to say that this unanimity is moderation, an agreement between what is 
worse and what is better by nature about which of the two should rule in the city and in each individual” (ὥστε 
ὀρθότατ’ ἂν φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν 
συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ). 
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ideal, since the situation of the soul is more secure if the unruly passions provide no potential 
resistance to the rule of reason within the soul. “Moderation” of the passions, by the Republic’s 
definition thus looks compatible with the absence of passions (ἀπάθεια). 
The other two instances that seem to describe moderation in the Republic also fit this 
pattern. The moderate individuals (μέτριοι ἄνδρες) that result from good education are, again, 
moderate in the sense that they are not controlled by passions but instead by reason (4, 423e5–6). 
Even the argument that one should choose the mean in life does not mention choosing a mean 
state of passions in life, between deficiency and excess, but merely argues that we should avoid 
extreme kinds of lives like that of the tyrant and the pauper (10, 619a5–6). These passages, then, 
do not provide adequate evidence that the Republic foreshadows the Aristotelian view of 
μετριοπάθεια. Instead, they seem to fit with the overall picture that passions should be 
eliminated in this life as much as possible and that we should stifle the interference of passions in 
our attempt to be rational, since they are disturbances due to embodiment that hinder us from 
experiencing the purely rational life that is our true human nature. 
Spirited passions are also included in this negative evaluation. Although spirited 
emotions and the spirited part of the soul are described as useful because they serve reason to 
suppress other errant passions (Republic 4, 439e8–440b7), their usefulness would no longer be 
needed if the passions were altogether removed. They serve no further, positive role apart from 
suppressing even worse passions of the body.50 For this reason, the usefulness of spirited 
                                               
50 Cf. Brennan 2012: Brennan in several places describes the existence of the spirited part of the soul in Plato’s 
dialogues as due to the worse passions of appetite that need to be suppressed. He writes, for instance, that “spirit is a 
necessary response to something worse than spirit, namely appetite” (p. 102); “a fully accurate picture of spirit 
requires you to see it exactly as a response to the dangers and excesses inherent in appetite” (p. 104); and “spirit’s 
value is relational, and lies solely in opposing appetite” (p. 112). 
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emotions in the Republic and Timaeus appear to exist solely for the purpose of suppressing the 
worst passions in those whose reason is too weak to suppress these passions by itself.51 
Even love or erotic desire (ἔρως), which plays a prominent role in both the Symposium 
and Phaedrus appears non-ideal as a non-rational passion. It should be channeled and directed 
toward rational activities and in pursuit of rational ends. In the Symposium, our passionate desire 
for beautiful bodies, beautiful souls, and the beauty we find in noble pursuits should lead us to 
move past all of these objects to pursue the Form of Beauty itself. We climb past these objects, 
as though on a ladder, directing our desire toward a rational end, no longer experiencing a non-
rational passion for physical objects and all of the nonsense of embodied life (209e5–212a7), but 
instead we convert this desire into a rational desire to contemplate and be united with the 
ultimate reality of the Forms (210b7–212a7).52 The Phaedrus likewise sets the goal of beholding 
the Forms as the greatest pursuit of the soul in its erotic desire (Phaedrus 247c3–248a6), though 
in the Phaedrus this pursuit also looks to the benefit of beloveds who are also on the journey to 
the Forms.53 
                                               
51 Timaeus 69e3–70e7; Republic 4, 437b1–4, 439e5–441a3, 441e4–5, 442a5–6, 442b7–8, 442c1–4; 9, 571b2–572b6, 
588d2–3, 589b3–4. Cf. Phaedrus 253e5–254b1. 
52 The similarity to Freud’s sublimation theory has not gone unnoticed. See Cornford 1950; Teloh 1976; Kahn 1987, 
p. 21; Santas 1988, pp. 77–9. Cf. Sassi 2011, pp. 256–7, for discussion of the previous author’s positions and the 
history of scholarship on the connection. 
53 Pace Vlastos 1981, who argues that Plato’s Lysis, Symposium, and Phaedrus treat others as vehicles for one’s own 
fulfillment toward egoistically driven desire (pp. 8–10 and 20–33; cf. also Reshotko 2006, “Socratic Egoism,” pp. 
57–73), Plato’s Phaedrus describes the more advanced lover ascending to the Forms through philosophy as a 
benevolent and beneficent agent, who tries to make his beloved as much like god as he can (ὁμοιότατον τῷ 
σφετέρῳ θεῷ, 253a7–b1). He attempts to improve the boy, acting as a god with no envy or lack of generosity (οὐ 
φθόνῳ οὐδ’ ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμενείᾳ χρώμενοι, 253b7–8). His benevolence and beneficence naturally follow 
from the true ascent of a lover with the result that Socrates deems this “the desire and completion of those who truly 
love” (προθυμία μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, 253c2–3). This desire to improve the beloved is 
not self-interested for one’s own self-improvement or progress. Contra Price (1989, pp. 96–102), neither is this 
desire aimed at one’s own self-fulfillment in becoming immortalized through another, for which see also Ferrari 
1991 (pp. 180–2). But, this occurs after the more advanced lover has made significant progress to the Forms himself. 
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The image of channeling desires in the Republic fits well with this notion. The more one 
is inclined toward non-rational ends, such as appetites or the desires that belong to the spirited 
part, the less one is inclined toward rational pursuits, and vice versa (Plato, Republic 6, 485d6–
e1).54 The motivational streams of the non-rational passions, which are associated with bodily 
pleasures,55 can be diverted toward learning, which is an activity peculiar to the rational part of 
the soul (Republic 9, 581b6–11).56 The fluidity of certain expressions of rational desire in the 
Republic strengthens the notion, since one can have an erotic desire for knowledge, such as when 
“a true love for true philosophy strikes” (ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ, 6, 
499c1), one can be affectionately disposed to wisdom (στέργειν, 7, 485c3–10), and one can be 
an ardent desirer of wisdom as a whole (σοφίας ἐπιθυμητής, 5, 475b8–9).57 With greater force 
added to the desire for learning, passionate desires are weakened. Moderation, as it is defined in 
the Republic, becomes easier to obtain: bodily desires are more easily subdued once weakened 
(Republic 6, 485e2–486b8), which means they are more easily controlled by reason.58 
                                               
54 “Yet, truly, I suppose we know that by as much as desires incline strongly toward one thing, by that amount they 
are weaker toward other things, just like a stream channeled in a different direction…. So, when desires flow toward 
learning and everything of that kind, I suppose they would be concerned with the pleasure of the soul itself by itself, 
while they abandon the pleasures that come through the body, if one is truly a philosopher and not pretending to be 
one” (ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἄλλα τούτῳ 
ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον…. ᾧ δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον 
ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ’ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος 
ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ’ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός τις εἴη). 
55 Republic 4, 435e2–36b6; cf. ibid. 4, 442a4–b3; 9, 584c3–5; 10, 611a10–612a6; Phaedo 66c2–4, 94b7–c1. 
56 Cf. Cornford 1950, p. 70; Teloh 1976; Sassi 2011, who draw upon a generic sense of ἔρως to explain the shifting 
motivational streams in the Republic. Cf. also Cooper 2008, p. 32, n. 26, who also sees the account of changing 
objects of desire in the Symposium as lending support to the account of the Republic. 
57 In this last instance, rational desire takes on terminology that is usually applied to the lowest part of the soul, the 
appetitive part (ἐπιθυμητικόν): “Won’t we say that the philosopher also is a desirer of wisdom, not just of this part, 
but not another part, but of the whole of wisdom?”(οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν 
εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάσης). Cf. also the common usage of ἔρως for higher and lower objects of 
desire in Plato, Gorgias 481c–d. On this passage, cf. Carone 2004, p. 70. 
58 See also Republic 4, 442c4–7; 9, 586d4–587a2. Cf. Singpurwalla 2006, p. 270: “Socrates thinks that the 
individual who is ruled by reason will have all of her desires channeled toward the acquisition of knowledge, with 
the result that she simply will not have the sorts of unruly appetitive or spirited desires that motivate unjust acts.” 
Emphasis added. Cf. also Penner 1991, p. 52; Carone 2004, pp. 70–1. 
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 Each of these images and arguments is not only compatible with the attempt to 
completely suppress passions, but actually looks supportive of that position. The “moderation” of 
the Republic is defined as keeping the passions from interfering with reason and under its 
control, not obtaining a certain amount of good passion. The overall negative evaluation of 
passions as necessary evils of embodiment also indicates that we would be better off in a purely 
rational state, or in the closest approximation we can make to it. All of these images come in 
support of the overall view that the best life we can live even now is the one that attempts to take 
hold of the purely rational, disembodied ideal of passionless existence. 
 I am not arguing that this ideal is purely egoistic. In the Apology, Socrates risks his own 
life in his attempt to help others, i.e. by encouraging them to become virtuous. In the Republic, 
the philosopher-kings must seek to care for the citizens under their rule (7, 519c8–520e3). In the 
Timaeus, the paradigm of the Demiurge urges one to make the world the best one can (29e3). My 
contention is that this ideal appears to be one in which passions should be absent or nearly 
absent, even when one’s actions are aimed at the good of others. 
 As I noted at the outset of the section, however, that is not the only way of interpreting 
the treatment of passion in Plato’s dialogues. The Phaedrus’ description of the soul as a 
charioteer and a team of horses presents a challenge to the view that the true nature of the soul is 
purely rational. In the mythical representation of the soul in the Phaedrus, the non-rational 
passionate parts of the soul appear to be present in the pre-embodied state of the soul and are 
represented as two horses which pull the rational part of the soul, the charioteer, around and 
allow him to see the Forms (246a2–257a2). If this is the true nature of the soul, it shifts the ideal 
away from the purely rational, disembodied soul. It also renders the passions themselves useful 
outside of their attendance to the body, since they contribute both to the rational desire to 
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contemplate the Forms and to the cultivation of virtues. The higher aloft the horses are able to 
carry the charioteer in this myth, the better the soul is able to see the Forms of Justice and 
Moderation and thereafter cultivate their corresponding virtues (Phaedrus 247c3–248a6). Once 
embodied, ἔρως helps the wings of the soul to regrow so that one can recollect the Forms 
(250c7–257a2).  
The same would be true of ἔρως in the Symposium, which initiates the soul’s pursuit of 
the Form of Beauty itself. The non-rational nature of this passion might even be a necessary 
condition in the Symposium, if one cannot ascend to Beauty itself except by the use of the steps 
on the ladder of love. The non-rational passionate nature of ἔρως, directed at the different 
objects on the way to the Forms, would not be inappropriate merely because this ἔρως is 
passionate, but only if one never moved on to the Forms themselves and remained stuck on a 
lower rung, as it were, and never realized that this desire should become focused on attaining the 
ultimate object of desire, the Forms themselves. So, it is possible to take a different message 
away from Plato’s dialogues on the ideal condition of the soul and on the positive or negative 
evaluation of the passions in Plato’s moral psychology and ethics.59 
Following this ambiguity, Aristotle pits his own view of moderating emotions as a critical 
response to the goal of suppressing passions entirely, which he claims is pervasive among the 
earliest members of Plato’s Academy.60 Upon closer analysis, it is not hard to see why the early 
Academy might come to such a view and attribute it to Plato himself. The tradition within the 
                                               
59 I discuss Plutarch’s use of more positive descriptions of passions and their benefits in Chapter 3. I should note that 
I am not assuming a developmentalist or a unitarian view of Plato’s dialogues or Plato’s thought expressed in his 
dialogues, since Plutarch does not himself appear to take a stance between those two ways of reading Plato’s 
dialogues and thought. Instead, I have approached differences among Plato’s dialogues as points that Plutarch 
himself takes into consideration in developing his own view. 
60 See also §V.b–§V.c. and nn. 71–2 in the Introduction. 
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Academy may change direction after Aristotle, as Crantor gives evidence to, but the earliest 
followers of Plato held a generally negative view of the passions as sources of error that we 
would prefer not to have altogether and which we hope one day to escape.61 
 
§IV Plutarch on the Naturalness and Usefulness of Passions 
 
 In contrast with the negative evaluation of passions as necessary evils attached to our 
essentially rational human nature, Plutarch defends embodied human nature and argues that 
passions are both natural and can be useful. First, we will look at Plutarch’s affirmation of the 
embodied condition of human nature and the naturalness of passions. We will then turn to 
Plutarch’s arguments that passions are useful and have natural purposes. In the next section, we 
will look at Plutarch’s view that moral virtue requires the presence of passions in moderate 
states, which then serve important functions in the moral life. 
Just as in Plato’s dialogues, Plutarch holds that passions are part of embodied human 
nature and result from the soul’s first encounter and blending with the body.62 The passionate 
part of the soul, i.e. the non-rational aspect, “has its generation from right within the body” (On 
Moral Virtue 450E6–F1),63 “as though the passionate faculty grows from the root of the flesh” 
                                               
61 See also Becchi 1999, 2005, and 2014, who takes the notion to be mostly selective and aimed at negative and bad 
passions. I take it that such a selective view, which Becchi argues is compatible with the moderation of passions, 
might develop after Aristotle, but is not likely to be prevalent in the Academy before him, as Aristotle himself seems 
to indicate. See the previous note. 
62 See Timaeus 69c5–d1=[T29]. 
63 “For, it is appropriate by nature for the rational, since it is divine, to lead and rule over the non-rational, which has 
its generation from right within the body. The non-rational part of the soul is naturally like the body and shares in its 
affections and is affected by them, after it has sunk into it and commingled with it. This is clear from the impulses 
that rise up and are moved toward corporeal objects, receiving their intensity and abatement with the changes of the 
body” (φύσει γὰρ προσήκει θεῖον ὄντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τὴν γένεσιν αὐτόθεν ἔχοντος 
ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ᾧ καὶ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν παθῶν καὶ ἀναπίμπλασθαι πέφυκεν, ἐνδεδυκὸς 
αὐτῷ καὶ καταμεμιγμένον, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὰ σωματικὰ κινούμεναι καὶ ἱστάμεναι καὶ 
σφοδρότητας ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολαῖς καὶ ἀνέσεις λαμβάνουσαι). 
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(451A7–8).64 It is by blending with the body that the soul becomes a compound of rational and 
non-rational parts. This point is brought out most explicitly in On the Sign of Socrates, where 
Plutarch describes the mixture of soul with body: 
[T31] ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς [ψυχῆς] σαρκὶ μιχθῇ καὶ πάθεσιν, ἀλλοιούμενον τρέπεται  
καθ’ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας εἰς τὸ ἄλογον. 
 
However much of it [the soul] mixes with flesh and its affections, that much of it  
changes into the non-rational part, altered according to the pleasures and pains of the  
flesh.     (Plutarch, On the Sign of Socrates 591D5–7) 
 
Only part of the soul mixes with the body, and from that mixture the passionate parts of the soul 
arise.65 The part of the soul that does not mix with the body remains distinct from the non-
rational parts as the rational part of the soul.66 This much is generally in line with the picture we 
found in Plato’s Timaeus and Republic.  
Plutarch also holds that after death or before embodiment the rational part of the soul can 
be completely free of the presence and influence passions.67 Where Plutarch departs from the 
                                               
64 ὥσπερ ἐκ ῥίζης τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναβλαστάνοντος. 
65 The passionate faculty (τὸ παθητικόν) can more strictly specify what we would call the spirited part of the soul, 
and the non-rational (τὸ ἄλογον), the appetitive (Platonic Questions 9, 1008C2–11), but in [T29] and [T30], as is 
often the case in Plutarch’s works, the two terms are co-referential for both the spirited and appetitive parts of the 
soul taken together and referred to as the non-rational part of the soul (τὸ ἄλογον, On Moral Virtue 442A1–4). The 
co-referential use of these terms is often marked by a hendiadys formulation: “the passionate, non-rational part” (τὸ 
παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον). Cf. On Moral Virtue 441C–D, 442B, 450B; On Isis and Osiris 371B; On Moral Progress 
61D; On the Obsolescence of Oracles 417B. 
66 A passage in On the Face in the Moon describes two mixtures of the soul, one with the body, the other with 
intellect (νοῦς): “But the ⟨mixture⟩ of soul ⟨and body⟩ produces ⟨the non-rational and passionate faculty,⟩ the 
conjunction ⟨of intellect and soul,⟩ reason” (ποιεῖ δ’ ἡ μὲν ψυχῆς ⟨καὶ σώματος μ⟨ε⟩ῖξις τὸ ἄλογον καὶ 
παθητικὸν ἡ δὲ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς⟩ σύνοδος λόγον, 943A6–7). The non-rational (τὸ ἄλογον) affective capacity 
(παθητικόν) has its source in the soul’s union with the body, since the mixture produces this part of soul, but then 
the rational part, reason (λόγος), is also the product of the soul’s union with intellect (νοῦς). Immediately before 
this, we are told something similar, namely that every soul partakes in intellect (ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετέσχεν, 591D4). 
I follow the emendation of Bernadakis in On the Face in the Moon 943A6–7, who draws upon Amyot in correcting 
the text: “et fait ceste composition de l’ame avec l’entendement la raison, et avec le corps la passion…,” except that 
I have chosen to print “τὸ ἄλογον καὶ παθητικὸν” instead of “τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν” by comparison with 
the earlier passage of On Moral Virtue 442A3–4: “τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον.” For further discussion of νοῦς and 
its relation to the human soul see Dillon 2001b, pp. 37–40, and Karamanolis 2006, pp. 109–12. Cf. also Jones 1916, 
pp. 27–40; Babut 1969a, pp. 470–2; O’Brien 2015, pp. 83–116. 
67 On Moral Progress 83E6; On the Sign of Socrates 593D2–8; On the Face in the Moon 944E4–F5; On Tranquility 
of Mind 476A10–C2; On the Obsolescence of Oracles 417B4–9; That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 
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negative view of passions in the Platonic picture I painted above is in his refusal to denigrate the 
embodied state of passions. Instead, he affirms it. Embodied human nature, with its passions, is 
no less human.68 In a fragment from his lost work, In Defense of Beauty, Plutarch asks, “Is not 
the nature of humans a compound of body and soul?” (οὐ σύνθετον φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἐκ 
σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς; Plutarch, In Defense of Beauty=Sandbach fr. 144).69 He goes on to argue 
in that fragment that it is such a compound; human nature is the compound of body and soul. 
Plutarch makes much the same point in On the Face in the Moon (943A1) and in On Moral 
Virtue (441D4–6), arguing that human nature is correctly understood to be composed of body 
and soul, and that the soul is itself a compound of rational and non-rational aspects. More 
emphatically, human nature is best understood as embodied.70 This seemingly small point is quite 
revolutionary. It runs counter to the claims we have seen in the Timaeus, Republic, and Phaedo, 
in which the essence of human nature is captured by the rational part of the soul alone before 
embodiment or at disembodiment. What is truly and essentially human nature, according to those 
works, is the original, unembodied form of the soul; passions merely result from embodiment but 
                                               
1105C1–D10. Cf. On Isis and Osiris 382F. Cf. Jones 1916, pp. 27–40; Dillon 1977, pp. 219–24, and 2001b, pp. 37–
40; O’Brien 2015, pp. 83–116. I return to these passages and this notion in Chapter 6.  
   Plutarch usually describes the rational part as free from error without interference, but in the afterlife myth of On 
the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 567B, some individuals are flayed and opened up to reveal that they have vice 
in their rational and ruling part of the soul (ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ καὶ κυρίῳ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἔχοντας). As in the 
Phaedo (81d), it appears that vicious passions have become attached to the soul and remain bound with the rational 
part after death. 
68 Pace Dillon 2016, pp. 11–12, I take it that in On Moral Progress 83E6, Plutarch is not setting out a passionless 
ideal for the one who is progressing in virtue. The hypothetical scenario of being free of passions in this life is used 
in Plutarch’s dialectical argument against the Stoic denial of perceptible moral progress (83B8–C6). Elsewhere, 
Plutarch consistently argues that the passionless state is impossible while embodied: it is not possible to remove 
passion entirely (τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν…οὔτε δυνατόν, On Moral Virtue 443C8–9). 
69 =Stob. 4.21.12. 
70 Cf. On Isis and Osiris 382F. Cf. also Dillon 1977, p. 197: The body “is an essential component of man.” 
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are not part of our true or truest human nature.71 While embodied, our true, rational nature 
becomes obscured and polluted (Timaeus 42a1–3, 69d4–7; Republic 10, 611c1–612a6). 
Plutarch does not treat embodiment itself as a cause of shame or embarrassment for the 
human soul. It is the human condition with which we are most familiar. Our life here and now is 
important, moreover, as are the lives of others we encounter. This point already came out as part 
of Plutarch’s defense of grief: grief is warranted when we consider this life and the lives of our 
friends important and worth grieving over when lost or when they suffer misfortunes, contrary to 
the assessment that this life is not worthy of much serious consideration (Plato, Republic 10, 
604b10–c1; Laws 7, 803b3–5). 
As we will see in Chapter 6, this point is also supported by Plutarch’s emphatic denial 
that the Platonic goal of becoming like god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ)72 should be understood as calling 
merely for contemplation, leaving this world behind together with the human life of passions and 
embodiment.73 This life not only is important for Plutarch, but our imitation of god is also to take 
place with passions in this life, since the embodied state with passions is an authentic form of 
human nature. We are to imitate god, Plutarch argues, by benefitting others in this life, emulating 
divine benevolence and beneficence with our whole person, which includes our other-regarding 
                                               
71 Plutarch’s notion that human nature is best understood as embodied also goes beyond the image of the tripartite, 
disembodied soul in the Phaedrus, since Plutarch more explicitly identifies the embodied condition as an authentic 
form of human nature. In this, he surely follows Aristotle. 
72 Plato, Theaetetus 176a5–b2. On the importance of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ as the goal among Platonists see Alcinous, 
Handbook 152.30–153.24, 181.19–182.14; Arius Didymus (Stob. 2.7.3f (p. 49, l. 8–p. 50, l. 2)); D.L. 3.78; Philo of 
Alexandria, On Flight and Finding 63; Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 5.14, 95.1–96.2. Cf. Armstrong 2004, 
p. 172: “Ever since ancient Platonists such as Eudorus, Philo, and Alcinous, Plato’s notion of ‘becoming like god’ 
(ὁμοιώσις θεῷ), or ‘following god’ (ἀκόλουθος θεῷ) has been understood to be a flight from this world to a 
higher one.” For references see Armstrong 2004, p. 172, n. 2. Cf. also Dillon 1977, pp. 71 and 121. On Alcinous and 
becoming like god see also Whittaker 1990, p. 137, n. 451, and Sedley 2012. I discuss these points further in 
Chapter 6.  
73 See Plotinus, Enneads 1.2. Cf. Festugière 1950, Merki 1952, Sedley 1997 and 1999, Annas 1999 (pp. 54–71). 
Plutarch also rejects the idea of god as self-centered and only contemplating his own nature in On the Obsolescence 
of Oracles 426C1–D8, which he attributes to Aristotle, arguing that the supreme deity takes delight in watching over 
this world and the creatures therein. On this point see Chapter 6, n. 111. 
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passions.74 Though passions may result from embodiment, they are not to be dispensed with or 
nullified as though they were foreign to human nature, not even as we attempt to become like 
god.  
For Plutarch, passions are essential components of human nature that we should develop, 
not attempt to remove or suppress as far as possible. In On Moral Virtue, Plutarch argues that 
passions are not merely in some way necessary (ἀνάγκῃ τινί) due to embodiment but are also 
natural (φύσει) features of the soul in the embodied state (441D9–E1). Later in the same work, 
he denies that passions are introduced from outside the soul, as though foreign to it:  
[T32] μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ [τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, B11] καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ  
πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν, οὐδ’ ἀναιρετέαν 
παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην. 
 
A human being has participation in the non-rational and has the source of passion as 
something natural, not as added [from outside], but as necessary, which should not be 
removed entirely but which needs cultivation and education.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451C2–5) 
 
Passions must be developed, Plutarch argues, because they serve useful, natural purposes in this 
life and are part of the fulfillment of this life.75 
Plutarch likens passions, generally, to beasts of burden and domesticated dogs that aid 
our tasks and are functionally serviceable to the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὑπηρετικόν, On Moral 
Virtue 451D6–8). Quoting Pindar,76 he writes that the horse belongs under the yoke of the 
chariot, the ox is fit for the plow, and dogs aid our hunt for boars (On Moral Virtue 451D6–8).77 
                                               
74 Philosophers and Men in Power 776C8–D3; On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 550A1–10, C12–E5, D1–3; 
To an Uneducated Ruler 780B8–792A5; On Tranquility of Mind 472A11–C5, 473A7–8; Aristides 6.3–5. Cf. On 
Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics 796C8–797A4. Plutarch is very much concerned with human virtue 
(ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετή, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 550D1–3), which is both moral and intellectual. See 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102a7–1103a10. 
75 We will explore Plutarch’s metaphor of cultivating passions like plants in §I of Chapter 6. 
76 Fr. 234 Maehler. 
77 Cf. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.37: “For Chrysippus cleverly says that as the shield cover exists for the 
sake of the sword, while the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything except for the cosmos has been 
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Just as each of these animals has a purpose fit to aid a human task in agriculture or the hunt, the 
passions have roles to play in our actions: passions serve reason not only functionally, as 
instruments (ὀργανικά, 444D4–5),78 but are also teleologically oriented to determined ends of 
service. Passions serve useful purposes. As Crantor is said to have argued, nature has given the 
passions to our souls for use, not in vain (Cicero, Academica 2.135).79 
Plutarch emphasizes the usefulness of passions further, writing that while service animals 
are of great use, “the brood-like group of passions are far more useful” (πολὺ χρησιμώτερα τὰ 
τῶν παθῶν θρέμματα, 451D9). As we will explore in Chapter 3, Plutarch argues that passions 
are additions to our nature that aid our rational part and intensify virtues (τῷ λογισμῷ 
συμπαρόντα καὶ συνεντείνοντα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, On Moral Virtue 452C5–6). They contribute to 
our moral life. More than that, as we will explore in Chapter 3, passions cannot be eliminated 
from our nature (τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν…οὔτε δυνατόν), and even if they could, our 
lives would not be better for it (οὔτ’ ἄμεινον, 443C8–10). Passions enhance our lives. 
 
§V The Moderation of Passions (μετριοπάθεια) and Moral Virtue in Plutarch 
 
Finally, let us turn to the most important defense of the passions that Plutarch provides in 
his theory of moral virtue. For Plutarch, passions are useful and natural not merely for the care of 
                                               
generated for the sake of something else. For example, the crops and fruits that the earth produces [were generated] 
for the sake of animals, while animals for the sake of humans, as the horse was generated for the sake of 
transportation, the ox for the sake of plowing, and the dog for guarding. But man was created in order to 
contemplate and imitate the cosmos” (Scite enim Chrysippus, ut clipei causa involucrum vaginam autem gladii, sic 
praeter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges atque fructus quos terra gignit 
animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut ecum vehendi causa arandi bovem venandi et custodiendi canem; 
ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum). The argument in Cicero’s work here, unlike 
that in Plutarch’s On Moral Virtue, represents a Stoic argument for the intelligence of the cosmos as the end or 
τέλος in a hierarchy of creation. On the Stoic argument’s use as part of the proof for the cosmos’ intelligence see 
Salles (forthcoming). 
78 Moral virtue (ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή) “needs the passionate for instrumental service to a practical end” (δεομένη τῆς 
παθητικῆς ὥσπερ ὀργανικῆς ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν). 
79 utiliter a natura…permotiones istas animis nostris datas. See n. 23 above. 
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the body, but also as constituents of moral virtue and part of the fulfillment of our nature as 
moral agents. As we will see below, Plutarch holds not only that the passionate parts of the soul 
must be controlled by reason, as is the case in the definition of moderation in Plato’s Republic, 
but passions themselves must also be in a moderate condition between deficiency and excess. 
There are proper limits to passions, both higher and lower, in Plutarch’s conception of moral 
virtue. 
 To draw out the point, I would like to focus on Plutarch’s metaphor of virtue as a kind of 
harmony between the different parts of the soul. This is not the only metaphor that Plutarch uses 
to elucidate the important contributions of passions and their ineliminable nature in his 
conception of moral virtue. We will explore several other metaphors in the chapters that follow. 
The metaphor of harmonious blending and fine-tuning of the passions, however, brings out an 
interesting adaptation on Plutarch’s part of both Platonic and Aristotelian descriptions of moral 
virtue, an adaption that serves as an example of Plutarch’s own creative interpretation in the 
realm of ethical philosophy. At the same time, it also serves as an example that illustrates how 
Plutarch sees his own view as part of the unified Academy and as a faithful adaptation in line 
with Platonic philosophy, which I will discuss below in §VII. 
 In both On Moral Virtue and Platonic Questions 9, Plutarch appeals to the metaphor of 
musical harmony to explain his conception of moral virtue in the soul. The definition of virtue 
that Plutarch formulates with this metaphor is not limited to those works; it recurs throughout his 
Moralia and informs his discussion of virtues in the Lives.80 As to the view itself, the description 
                                               
80 Plutarch’s view of moral virtue as a mean state of passions occurs throughout his works. I discuss notable 
descriptions of this conception below in quotations from On Moral Virtue, Platonic Questions 9, On Moral 
Progress, and Beasts are Rational. The same formula for moderating emotions also occurs for  passions that do not 
qualify as virtues, such as shame (On Compliancy 529A7–9). For a similar argument that shame must be moderated 
in Aristotle’s works, though it is not a proper virtue when moderate see Raymond 2017. On Plutarch’s description of 
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of virtue as a harmonious state strikes some accord with the Stoic notion of virtue as an 
appropriate tension (τόνος) of soul.81 Unlike the Stoics, however, Plutarch argues that the 
harmony of virtue exists between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul; it is not the 
tension of a monistic, uniform soul.82 Plutarch’s theory of virtue is not monotone, as it were, but 
instead is more in tune with Plato’s view of justice as a form of harmonized inner dynamics 
among the different parts of the soul. 
Note Plutarch’s allusions to the mean of internal harmony between the rational and non-
rational parts of the soul in the Republic’s description of justice: 
[T33] γίνεται δὲ μεσότης καὶ λέγεται μάλιστα τῇ περὶ φθόγγους καὶ ἁρμονίας ὁμοίως·  
ἐκείνη τε γὰρ ἐμμελὴς οὖσα φωνὴ καθάπερ ἡ νήτη καὶ ὑπάτη τῆς μὲν τὴν ὀξύτητα 
τῆς δὲ τὴν βαρύτητα τὴν ἄγαν διαπέφευγεν· αὕτη τε κίνησις οὖσα καὶ δύναμις 
περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, τὰς ἐκλύσεις καὶ τὰς ἐπιτάσεις καὶ ὅλως τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον 
ἐξαιρεῖ τῆς ὁρμῆς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καθιστᾶσα τῶν παθῶν 
ἕκαστον. 
 
The mean comes about and is especially said to be a mean because it is like the mean in 
music and harmony. For the mean in harmony, being a musical sound in tune, like the 
highest and the lowest sounds,83 avoids the excessive sharpness of the high notes and the 
excessive lowness of the low notes. Likewise, virtue, being itself a movement and power 
concerned with the non-rational, removes the weaknesses and over-exertions and the 
                                               
moral virtue and the harmony within the political community in the Lives see Numa 3.6–7; Timoleon 3.5; Dion 52.6; 
Brutus 1.3;  Marius 2.1; Coriolanus 15.4; Lycurgus 7.1, 7.5; Lycurgus and Numa 4.15; Pericles 3.2, 15.1–2; 
Aemilius 4.4; Philopoemon 8.3; Pelopidas 19.2; Galba 1.3. For discussion of these passages in the Lives see Duff 
1999, pp. 89–94. 
81 Philo, Allegories of the Laws 2.22–3=SVF 2.458=LS 47P; Origen, On Principles 3.1.2–3=SVF 2.988=LS 53A. 
See Gill 2006, pp. 230–8. 
82 Drawing on Phaedo 92a6–95a3, Plutarch argues that the soul is not itself a harmony, but its constituents are 
disposed harmonically (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1013C6–D4). 
83 The “lowest string” (νήτη) is highest in pitch, while the “highest string” (ὑπάτη) is lowest in sound. Cf. Plutarch 
On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1021A1–7: “It is possible even now to prove the truth [of the 
preceding conclusions about the octave] by attaching unequal weights to two strings or making one of two auloi 
pipes, which are equal in their hollowed cavities, twice as long as the other. For, of the two auloi pipes, the longer 
one will make a lower sound as the ‘highest’ (ὑπάτη) to the ‘lowest’ (νήτη), and of the strings, the one stretched by 
twice the weight of the other will will make a higher sound as the ‘lowest’ (νήτη) to the ‘highest’ (ὑπάτη)” (ἔξεστι 
δὲ καὶ νῦν βασανίσαι τὸ ἀληθές, ἢ βάρη δυεῖν ἄνισα χορδῶν ἐξαρτήσαντας ἢ δυεῖν ἰσοκοίλων αὐλῶν τὸν 
ἕτερον μήκει διπλάσιον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιήσαντας· τῶν μὲν γὰρ αὐλῶν ὁ μείζων βαρύτερον φθέγξεται ὡς 




excesses and deficiencies of impulse altogether, bringing each of the passions into a 
moderate and unerring state.   (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444E9–445A2)84 
 
[T34] συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ  
ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα 
συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ 
ἡρμοσμένον. 
 
 [The just person] brings the internal parts of the soul that are three in number together in 
harmony, just as though they were simply three limits of harmony in a scale, the lowest, 
highest, and middle, and, if there are really other parts between these, he binds all of them 
together to become from many parts wholly one, both moderate and harmonious.     
(Plato, Republic 4, 443d5–e2)85 
 
In Plutarch’s descriptions, as in this passage and the definition of moderation (σωφροσύνη) in 
the Republic (4, 431c9–432b1), virtue occurs when the non-rational and rational functions are 
harmoniously related.86 Unlike the musical metaphor in the Republic, Plutarch’s analysis extends 
deeper, making the very passions of the non-rational parts of the soul, as it were, strings whose 
melodious tune depends on getting the correct measure and tension, neither excessive in length, 
nor too short (On Moral Progress 84A5–10; Platonic Questions 9, 1008E3–1009B2).87 Plutarch 
brings the discussion closer now to the doctrine of the mean in Aristotle’s ethical philosophy.88 
In moving beyond the internal dynamics between the parts of the soul to the very 
functions of the non-rational parts themselves, Plutarch applies the concept of an appropriate 
                                               
84 Cf. Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1007E6–9: “Concerning the capacities of the soul in Plato’s Republic (namely, 
[T33]), where Plato likens the harmonious joining of the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts in an excellent way to 
the harmonious joining of the middle, highest, and lowest sounds…” (περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ἐν Πολιτείᾳ 
Πλάτωνος τὴν τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ θυμοειδοῦς καὶ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ συμφωνίαν ἁρμονίᾳ μέσης καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ 
νήτης εἰκάσαντος ἄριστα…). 
85 Cf. Republic 4, 430c8–432b6. On harmony in Plato’s Republic see Gill 1985, pp. 12–15 and 21–4. 
86 Cf. Timaeus 89e3–90a2: “Just as we have often said, three types of soul are housed in us in three regions, and 
each has its own motions…we must take care that they have motions that harmonize with one another” (καθάπερ 
εἴπομεν πολλάκις, ὅτι τρία τριχῇ ψυχῆς ἐν ἡμῖν εἴδη κατῴκισται, τυγχάνει δὲ ἕκαστον κινήσεις 
ἔχον…φυλακτέον, ὅπως ἂν ἔχωσι τὰς κινήσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμέτρους). 
87 Cf. On Moral Virtue 449F2–4. 
88 See n. 2 above. Cf. Babut 1969a, pp. 72–80 and 153–6, nn. 100–20; Opsomer 2004, pp. 150–2; 2012, p. 326–8. 
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amount of passion that is itself moderate, not just part of a moderate and harmonious structure of 
the soul. Each passion must be contained within certain limits: 
[T35] οὕτως δ’ [ὁ πρακτικὸς λόγος, B10] ὁρίζων τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν ἐμποιεῖ τὰς  
ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητας οὔσας.  
 
In this way, [practical reason, i.e. the rational part of the soul] imposing limits upon the 
movement of the affective faculty, produces the moral virtues in the non-rational part of 
the soul, which are mean states between deficiency and excess.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444C6–9) 
 
In giving appropriate boundaries to the passions, the rational part of the soul brings the non-
rational passions into their own normative states. Plutarch calls these states stable dispositions 
(ἕξεις), using Aristotelian terminology,89 which are included within the overall stable disposition 
of a virtuous soul (On Moral Virtue 443D1–10). 
Now, suppressing passions as far as possible might be the goal if our non-rational 
passions were inactive or defunct and if the optimal relation of the non-rational parts of soul to 
reason consisted in a neutralized state of passions with reason solely operative. But, Plutarch’s 
image of harmony indicates that passions and the passionate parts of the soul contribute to the 
harmony of the soul, like the different notes that comprise a harmonious symphony of sound. 
The notion that the non-rational parts of the soul contribute to the harmonious blending in the 
Republic may be implied, but Plutarch’s adaptation is far more explicit.90 
                                               
89 Nicomachean Ethics 2.4–6; 3.5; 5.1, 1130a10–13; 6.1–7.1; 8.5, 1157b5–6; 10.6, 1176b26–7. Cf. Eudemian Ethics 
2.1–5; 3.10, 1227b5–11; 7.13, 1246b32–6. Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics Δ 20, 1022b10–14: “A stable disposition 
is said to be a disposition according to which what is disposed is either well or badly disposed, also either according 
to itself or in relation to something else, just as health is a kind of stable disposition. For a disposition is that kind of 
thing. Moreover, it is called a stable disposition if it is a part of such a disposition. For this reason, the excellence of 
parts is a kind of stable disposition” (ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ’ ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ 
ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις· διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη. ἔτι ἕξις λέγεται ἂν ᾖ μόριον 
διαθέσεως τοιαύτης· διὸ καὶ ἡ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἕξις τίς ἐστιν). Cf. also Rodrigo 2011, p. 8 for further 
discussion of this passage. Cf. also Oele 2012, p. 351, n. 2. 
90 Each part of the soul may contribute, as each class of the City of Speech, by doing its own part and not interfering 
with the tasks of the other parts (4, 432e4–436b4). However, it might still be possible for the rational part of the soul 
to exert its influence so that it micromanages the rest of the soul. We could imagine the harmony among the parts to 
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Following through with the Aristotelian understanding of moral virtue,91 moreover, 
Plutarch argues that moral virtues require that passions be in the right amount: 
[T36] [τοῦ λόγου] ἀλλ’ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ [τῷ πάθει] καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς  
ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, 
ἐμποιοῦντος. 
 
But [reason] imposes a certain limit and arrangement upon [passion] and produces within 
it the moral virtues, which are not devoid of passion, but are mean, harmonious states of 
the passions.      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443C10–D1) 
 
Taking [T36] together with [T35], the mean, harmonious states of passions are not devoid of 
passion (οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας, 443C11), because they are not deficient in passion, admitting the 
correct amount between the extremes of deficiency and excess (ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς 
μεσότητας οὔσας, 444C8–9). There is a proper amount of passion required in moral virtue. 
Here Plutarch also more explicitly expresses that passions, not merely the passionate parts of the 
soul, are a sine qua non for moral virtue. The rational part of the soul produces moral virtue in 
the passions, not when passions are defunct or suppressed as far as possible, but rather in a 
moderate state that is not without passion. The goal is not the neutralization of passions, as 
though the non-rational movements of our passions must be inert for the appropriate means of 
moral virtues to obtain. 
When our passions are too weak, in fact, the rational part of the soul must incite and 
rekindle them to bring them back to their appropriate level of activity: 
[T37] τοῦτ’ οὖν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ λόγου κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰς ἀμετρίας  
τῶν παθῶν καὶ πλημμελείας. ὅπου μὲν γὰρ ὑπ’ ἀρρωστίας καὶ μαλακίας ἢ δέους 
                                               
be an agreement that the rational part of the soul will pull all of the strings, as it were, in the passionate parts of the 
soul, commandeering and working on its own to meet all of the body’s needs. The rational part of the soul might 
itself produce the harmonious sound of the soul, like a ventriloquist projecting from the passions as though they 
were its own puppets. I explore these notions further in Chapters 3, 4, and the Appendix to Chapter 4. For the 
puppeteer metaphor see Plato, Phaedo 94b4–e6 and Laws 1, 644d7–645b1. 
91 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b36–1107a3. I will discuss Plutarch’s nearly identical formulation of moral 
virtue as a mean below in §VII. 
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καὶ ὄκνου προενδίδωσιν ἡ ὁρμὴ καὶ προαπολείπει τὸ καλόν, ἐνταῦθα πάρεστιν 
ἐξεγείρων καὶ ἀναρριπίζων· ὅπου δὲ πάλιν ἐκφέρεται ῥυεῖσα πολλὴ καὶ ἄτακτος, 
ἐκεῖ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἵστησιν.  
 
This, then, is the natural function of practical reason, namely, to remove immoderate and 
disharmonious states of the passions. For, where the impulse gives up too early and falls 
short with respect to what is virtuous due to weakness and softness or fear and hesitancy, 
there practical reason is present, inciting and rekindling the impulses of our passions, 
while where, in turn, the impulse of passion is borne along in a mighty and disorderly 
deluge, there practical reason removes the excess and brings it to a halt.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444B10–C6) 
 
It is not the case, then, that non-rational parts of the soul must merely be present and brought into 
accord with reason for moral virtue. The harmony that Plutarch envisions is not solely concerned 
with the proper relations of rule and guidance between the rational and non-rational parts of the 
soul. The non-rational parts of the soul and their passions must be contained within proper limits 
so that they contribute to the overall harmonious activity of the soul.  
In turning an eye to the states of passion within the harmonious soul, then, Plutarch alters 
the requirements and idealization of moral virtues from the Platonic picture we saw developing 
in §I and §III. Contrary to advice to suppress grief as far as possible in the Republic, and possibly 
all passions, based on what appears to be a negative evaluation of emotions in Plato’s Timaeus, 
Republic, and Phaedo, the doctrine of the mean applied to individual passions requires the right 
amount of emotional response, even for painful emotions such as grief (Consolation to 
Apollonius 102D6–7).92 
                                               
92 Again, I am not claiming here that Plutarch holds that there is a virtue of grief, but as with other passions, 
excluding those that are excessive or entirely inappropriate, it should be moderated. See nn. 38 and 80 above and n. 
109 below. On the moderation of appetites see also Table-Talk 663D5–7: “You could say that a healthy diet is not 
an avoidance nor an escape from pleasure, but instead is a moderation and arrangement that uses obedient desire for 
what is beneficial” (φαίης ἂν οὐ φυγὴν οὐδ’ ἀπόδρασιν ἡδονῆς εἶναι τὴν ὑγιεινὴν δίαιταν, ἀλλὰ περὶ 
ἡδονὰς μετριότητα καὶ τάξιν ὑπηκόῳ χρωμένην ὀρέξει τοῦ συμφέροντος). 
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Having the right among of passion, moreover, means feeling passions to the right extent 
in appropriate situations. The state (ἕξις) of passion involved in moral virtue incorporates the 
movement of the passions (τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν), which are the activities of the non-rational 
parts of the soul and what we typically refer to as passions (τὰ πάθη), such as the passion of 
anger (ὀργή, 443D6–7). Our passions are brought into order, within their own limits, and made 
to fit within the optimal order of the psychic parts in the soul, but they are not halted as proper 
activities of our non-rational parts. The non-rational movements of passions (κινουμένων 
ἀλόγως τῶν παθῶν) are preserved in the state of moral virtue (Platonic Questions 9, 1009B5–
8);93 they are harnessed, as it were, to fitting ends (On Moral Virtue 450E6–F1).94 Moral virtue, 
in fact, requires that the capacities to feel passions and the movements of the passions (αἱ 
παθητικαὶ δυνάμεις καὶ κινήσεις) be brought into proper limits (On Moral Virtue 451F5–
452A1). 
Plutarch goes so far as to say that the end-product of moral virtue is impulse with 
passion: 
[T38] τὴν δ’ ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὁρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία  
παρῇ καὶ μήθ’ ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτ’ ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρόν. 
 
                                               
93 “The faculty of reason, taking hold of the passions that move non-rationally and fitting them together about itself 
into a moderate proportion between deficiency and excess, establishes the mean” (ἡ τοῦ λόγου δύναμις 
ἀντιλαμβανομένη κινουμένων ἀλόγως τῶν παθῶν καὶ συναρμόττουσα περὶ αὑτὴν εἰς τὸ μέτριον 
ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητα καθίστησι). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 1107a33; Stob. 2.7.20. 
For the co-occurrence and often synonymous use of measure and mean see pseudo-Platonic Definitions 415a4–6: 
“‘moderate’: what is between excess and deficiency and suffices according to skill. ‘measure’: what is between 
excess and deficiency’” (μέτριον τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως καὶ κατὰ τέχνην ἀρκοῦν. μέτρον τὸ 
μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως); Cf. also Roskam 2011, p. 184. Pace Boys-Stones 2013, pp. 129–33, I take 
Plutarch’s doctrine of moderation in the Consolation to Apollonius as moving away from the picture of the Phaedo 
and the goal of purging our passions. Cf. Becchi 1999. 
94 See n. 63 above for the quotation. 
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Moral virtue95 produces impulse with passion. This impulse needs reason to give it 
boundaries, so that the impulse may be present to the right degree, not going to excess 
nor failing in deficiency for the critical moment.      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444B1–4) 
 
As we will discuss further in Chapter 3, the rational part of the soul cannot create passion of its 
own accord and dispense with the non-rational parts of the soul. Instead, reason harnesses the 
non-rational activity of our passions that arise from the non-rational parts of soul and brings 
them into their optimal, moderate states, preserving their activity and guiding it. 
 
§VI Moral Virtue and the Harmony of Bodily Humors 
In addition to musical harmony, Plutarch also draws upon the notion of the harmonious 
state of health in the body to describe moral virtue.96 Plutarch conceives of the healthy state of 
the soul as analogous to the healthy state of the body. In a kind of harmonious relationship, the 
different bodily humors must be in correct proportions relative to one another. When they 
become disproportionate, the body enters a diseased condition: 
[T39] οἷον γὰρ ἐν φθόγγοις μουσικὴ τὸ ἐμμελὲς οὐκ ἀναιρέσει βαρύτητος καὶ ὀξύτητος,  
ἐν δὲ σώμασιν ἰατρικὴ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ φθορᾷ θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος, ἀλλὰ 
συμμετρίαις καὶ ποσότησι κραθεισῶν ἀπεργάζεται, τοιοῦτον ἐν ψυχῇ τὸ ἠθικὸν97 
ἐγγενομένης ὑπὸ λόγου ταῖς παθητικαῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν ἐπιεικείας καὶ 
μετριότητος. οἰδοῦντι γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι σώματι τὸ περιαλγοῦν καὶ 
περιχαρὲς καὶ περίφοβον τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ τὸ χαῖρον οὐδὲ τὸ λυπούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ 
φοβούμενον.  
 
Just as the musical art produces harmony that is in tune, not by the removal of low and 
high notes in sound, and the medical art produces a healthy state of being, not by the 
cessation of heat and cold but by the harmonious proportions and quantities of heat and 
cold mixed together in bodies, likewise moral virtue in the soul [is produced] when a 
                                               
95 I have not provided the context leading up to this passage here, but Plutarch has just distinguished intellectual 
from moral virtues and now discusses the latter. I take up this passage and the division of virtues in more detail in 
Chapter 3, §I. 
96 On the use of the theory of bodily humors in Plutarch’s conception of harmony see Duff 1999, pp. 89–94, esp. p. 
93. On Plutarch’s understanding of medical theories see Tsekourakis 1989 and Boulogne 1996. On the medical 
theory used to describe the moderation of passions see Ingenkamp 1971, pp. 90–8. Cf also Van Hoof 2010, pp. 211–
54. 
97 Following Camerarius’ reading here, which is confirmed by MS G and makes sense of the passage as a return to 
moral virtue with the analogy. 
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suitable and moderate condition comes about in the passionate capacities and activities 
due to reason. For excessive pain, excessive joy, and excessive fear of the soul are like a 
body that is swollen and inflamed, but not [simply] feeling joy, feeling pain, and feeling 
fear.      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451F2–452A3).98 
 
Through the metaphor of the harmony of bodily humors, Plutarch again indicates that passion 
cannot be removed entirely but must be blended into a correct mixture with other passions by 
reason, like the balanced internal fluids of the body that constitute the health of the body.  
This understanding of health and disease of the soul is directly opposed to the Stoic 
thought that passions are themselves diseased states of the soul. Unlike the Stoics, Plutarch does 
not hold all passions to be states of excess. Plutarch even contrasts his own position on 
passionate impulses with the Stoic definition of passion as an excessive impulse (ὁρμὴ 
πλεονάζουσα),99 by arguing that although passionate impulses can be excessive and deficient 
(On Moral Virtue 444E7–9),100 moral virtue comes about when the impulse of passion is present 
in a suitable and moderate condition (ὁρμὴ μετρία, 444B1–4=[Τ37]). 
 With this view of harmony, health, and the moderation of the passions in mind, I want to 
address a point of confusion in Plutarchean studies before we move on to the question of how 
Plutarch understands his own view as part of the unified Academic tradition (§VII). Some have 
worried that Plutarch wavers between the ideal of ἀπάθεια and that of μετριοπάθεια in his 
moral philosophy, taking Plutarch’s not infrequent descriptions of passions as diseases within the 
soul as evidence for the ideal of ἀπάθεια.101 Plutarch’s phrase of “passions and diseases” (πάθη 
                                               
98 Cf. On Brotherly Love 478F7–479B5; Advice on Keeping Well 129B–C; Table-Talk 685C. 
99 For the Stoic notion that every passion is an impulse that is excessive (ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα) see Stob. 2.7.10 
=SVF 3.378=LS 65A; Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441C10–D3, 449C3–7. On passions as in themselves diseased 
states for the Stoics see Seneca, Letters 85.3–5, 116.1; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.13–31, 61–3; SVF 3.444 and 
3.447. Cf. Frede 1986; Nussbaum 1994, p. 389; Irwin 1998, p. 223; and Sorabji 2000, pp. 207–9. 
100 Moral virtue as a mean “is not entirely devoid of passionate impulses, among which is excess and deficiency” 
(οὔτ’ ἀπήλλακται παντάπασι τῶν παθητικῶν ὁρμῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττόν ἐστι). 
101 Cf. Dillon 1983 and 2016; Nikolaidis 1991, pp. 169–70; Spanneut 1994, pp. 4704–11. Cf. also Machek 2018 and 
n. 105 below. 
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καὶ νοσήματα / νόσοι) recurs in numerous passages and has led some to form the view that 
Plutarch changes his mind or never really made up his mind on whether passions are in 
themselves negative and to be suppressed or more neutral and in need of moderation.102  
Admittedly, when Plutarch discusses vices and the unhealthy condition of the soul, he 
often does not explicitly state that these diseased states of the passions are diseased insofar as 
they are excessive. Nevertheless, it is my contention that these passages should be read with the 
view of health described in [T39]; the metaphor of the harmonious bodily humors disambiguates 
what some have taken to be either contradictory remarks,103 or inconsistencies of thought.104 And 
so, although Plutarch often does not further qualify that by the phrase “passion and disease,” he 
means immoderate passion, Plutarch’s critical remarks about passions consistently describe 
immoderate, excessive passions as diseased states, not passions wholesale, as Francesco Becchi 
has demonstrated.105 To the evidence that Becchi provides, I would add that Plutarch also 
                                               
102 On Listening to Lectures 38C4–D6, 43D5–8; How to Tell a Friend from a Flatterer 60D5–E6, 71A8–B1; On 
Moral Progress 76A3–7; On Virtue and Vice 101A10–B2, 101C3–9; On Superstition 165A7–B3, C8–11; On the 
Obsolescence of Oracles 413B6–9; On the Control of Anger 455B4–8; On Tranquility of Mind 468B8–C1; On 
Affection for Offspring 497C9–D8; Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse Than Those of the Body 500D5–8, 
501C5–D6, 504E11–F2; On Compliancy 532C9–D5; On Envy and Hate 536E2–6, 537E2–7; On the Delays of the 
Divine Vengeance 561C11–D9; Table-Talk 717D10–E2, 731B10–11, 731C6–D4; Whether “Live Unknown” is a 
Wise Precept 1128D–E; Dion 11.3; Aemilius Paullus 8.10; Sulla 13.2; Aratus 52.4. Cf. On Love=Sandbach frr. 134–
36 (Stob. 4.20.34 and 4.20.68). On the medical analogy applied to excessive passions or toward passions viewed as 
diseases from Plato’s works, among different Hellenistic schools, and through to Neoplatonic writers, see Annas 
1992, pp. 19–36; Nussbaum 1994, passim; Becchi 1999; Sorabji 2000, pp. 17–28; White 2008, pp. 292–6, esp. nn. 
50–2; Malherbe 2014, esp. pp. 123–34 and n. 13. Cf. also Fitzgerald 2008a (pp. 11–12), who discusses Galen’s, 
Maximus of Tyre’s, and Plutarch’s discussion of passions as diseases; Ingenkamp 1971, who focuses on Plutarch’s 
therapeutics for disorderly passions; Van Hoof 2007, who focuses on different therapeutic strategies in Seneca’s and 
Plutarch’s works. 
103 Nikolaidis 1991, pp. 169–70. 
104 Spanneut 1994, pp. 4701–11. Cf. Sorabji 2000 (p. 196), who follows Spanneut’s argument and accordingly 
categorizes Plutarch as one who wavers between ἀπάθεια and μετριοπάθεια. 
105 Becchi 1999 (esp. pp. 38–43), 2005, 2014 (pp. 78–85). Cf. Boys-Stones 2017, p. 486. See, for instance, Plutarch, 
On Rage=Sandbach fr. 148=Stob. 3.20.70: “Those who apply anger as the ally of virtue ⟨are most successful⟩, 
taking as much advantage of it as they can in war and, by Zeus, in politics, ⟨while being eager⟩ to remove and cast 
out from the soul the greater part of it and its excess, which is called wrath, bitterness, and short-temperedness, 
diseases least appropriate for courageous souls” (⟨κατορθοῦσι δὲ μάλιστα⟩ οἱ παραδεξάμενοι τὸν θυμὸν ὡς 
σύμμαχον ἀρετῆς, ἀπολαύοντες ὅσον αὐτοῦ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἔν τε πολέμῳ καὶ νὴ Δί’ ἐν πολιτείαις, τὸ πολὺ 
δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐπιπολάζον ⟨σπουδάζοντες⟩ ἐκκρίνειν καὶ ἐκβάλλειν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ὀργή τε καὶ πικρία 
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consistently describes the remediation from diseased states of the soul as a return to moderate 
passions, not the removal or complete suppression of passions in toto.106 This is not to say that 
every passion is to be moderated. Like Aristotle,107 Plutarch recognizes that passions such as 
envy (φθόνος) have no part in the virtuous life (On Listening to Lectures 39D8–10).108 They are 
themselves diseased extremes of other passions that admit of moderate states. These diseased 
forms, as it were, sprout off on their own like weeds (39E8–11).109 
                                               
καὶ ὀξυθυμία λέγεται, νοσήματα ἥκιστα ταῖς ἀνδρείαις ψυχαῖς πρέποντα, accepting Sandbach’s emendations, 
which are marked in angle brackets). Becchi’s argument also disambiguates passages in which Plutarch seems to 
praise the lack of passion in certain individuals. These individuals have moderated their passions. Their lack of 
excessive passions is what is being praised, not a complete absence of passions. See n. 32 above. Machek 2018, 
whose article I have come across only recently, has renewed the argument that passions appear at times to be bad in 
themselves. Machek believes that Plutarch may be inconsistent or uncritical in his own views. I think that the 
arguments I explore here show that Plutarch is consistent in his view that passions are not bad in themselves. 
106 See, for instance, On Moral Progress 84A1–12: “For just as the diversions of diseases into less important parts of 
the body are not a bad sign, so even the vice of those who are making progress seems, by transforming into more 
suitable passions, to be blotted out little by little. The ephors [at Sparta] asked Phrynis, after he stretched two strings 
next to the seven [of the lyre], whether he desired to allow them to cut off those at the top or the bottom. But ours 
require a lopping off around the top and the bottom [of the passions] if we intend to settle into the mean and 
moderate position. And progress remits the excesses and sharpness of passions first” (καθάπερ γὰρ αἱ τῶν νόσων 
εἰς τὰ μὴ κύρια μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἐκτροπαὶ σημεῖόν εἰσιν οὐ φαῦλον, οὕτως ἡ κακία τῶν προκοπτόντων 
ἔοικεν εἰς ἐπιεικέστερα πάθη μεθισταμένη κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαλείφεσθαι. Φρῦνιν μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἔφοροι ταῖς ἑπτὰ 
χορδαῖς δύο παρεντεινάμενον ἠρώτων πότερον τὰς ἄνωθεν ἢ τὰς κάτωθεν ἐκτεμεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐθέλει 
παρασχεῖν· ἡμῶν δὲ δεῖται μέν πως τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω περικοπῆς, εἰ μέλλομεν εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστασθαι 
καὶ μέτριον· ἡ δὲ προκοπὴ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς πρότερον καὶ τὰς ὀξύτητας τῶν παθῶν ἀνίησι); On Listening to 
Lectures 46E1–47A10: Young men must receive criticism correctly, lest they harbor diseased passions like a sick 
patient who flees from a doctor (φεύγων τὸν ἰατρὸν, 46E11) and the words of warning that wound begin a process 
of healing (ὁ τρώσας λόγος ἰᾶται, 47A2); On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 551D4–8: The noble part (τὸ 
γενναῖον) of souls can give bloom to vice that is contrary to nature when corrupted, but “if this nobility in some is 
well attended to medically, it takes back its fitting stable disposition” (θεραπευθὲν ἐνίοις καλῶς ἀπολαμβάνει 
τὴν προσήκουσαν ἕξιν). Cf. On Being a Busybody 520D3–7. 
107 Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a8–15. 
108 “Envy combined with malignity and enmity” (φθόνος τοίνυν μετὰ βασκανίας καὶ δυσμενείας) “when it is 
present, is not a good thing for any deed, but rather is an impediment to everything noble” (οὐδενὶ μὲν ἔργῳ 
παρὼν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐμπόδιος τοῖς καλοῖς). Cf. Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 537C7–8: Envy never arises 
justly against anyone (τὸ μὲν φθονεῖν πρὸς οὐδένα γίνεται δικαίως). 
109 Envy (φθόνος) results from an inappropriate desire for repute and unjust desire for honor (ἐκ φιλοδοξίας 
ἀκαίρου καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἀδίκου). The desire for honor (φιλοτιμία), however, is a passion that should itself be 
moderated (Precepts of Statecraft 820A2–B1; Alexander 17.1–2; Coriolanus 1.5; cf. Duff 1999, pp. 83–7 and 2008, 
p. 14). In On Love, Sandbach frr. 134–6 (Stob. 4.20.34 and 4.20.68), Plutarch also recognizes that perverted forms 
of ἔρως must be suppressed if not entirely removed. Again, this does not indicate that every instance of ἔρως is bad 
or diseased. Plutarch goes on to say that some are very good, such as the ἔρως that underlies friendship (φιλία, 
Sandbach fr. 135). Cf. also Plutarch’s descriptions of unnecessary desires, which draw upon Republic 9 (571b2–
572b6): On Virtue and Vice 100F9–101B, On Moral Progress 83A4–B8, On the Sign of Socrates 584D9–F4.  
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§VII Plutarch, Aristotle, and the Unified Academy  
 Many have noticed that Plutarch’s conception of moral virtue looks heavily inspired by 
Aristotle.110 Plutarch’s general formula of moral virtue as a mean is highly reminiscent of what 
we find in the Nicomachean Ethics, where the mean is given its boundaries or limits by reason 
(ὡρισμένη λόγῳ) and is a “mean between two vices, one according to excess, the other 
according to deficiency” (μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ 
ἔλλειψιν, 2.6, 1106b36–1107a3). Plutarch even uses the same qualification in how we speak of 
virtue as both a mean and an extreme (ἀκρότης). Virtue, Plutarch writes, 
[T40] ἀκρότης μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσότης γίνεται τὸ  
ὑπερβάλλον ἐξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. 
 
is an extreme in its power and quality, but it becomes a mean in quantity, removing what 
is excessive and what is deficient.  (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444D7–9) 
 
Though Plutarch does not quote Aristotle verbatim, this qualification nevertheless looks as 
though it has been pulled straight from Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (2.6, 1107a6–8).111 
Note also the similarities between Plutarch’s definitions of courage (ἀνδρεία), the 
moderation of desires (σωφροσύνη), and liberality (ἐλευθεριότης) and those given succinctly 
in a single passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (2.7, 1107a33–b10). Like Aristotle, 
Plutarch, after describing moral virtue as a mean, begins with the example of courage: 
 
                                               
110 Babut 1969a, esp. pp. 72–80 and 153–6, nn. 100–20; Dillon 1977, pp. 193–6; Gill 2006, pp. 233–8; Ferrari 2008, 
pp. 154–7. Cf. Beneker 2012: The ethical system in Plutarch’s On Moral Virtue “is fundamentally the same as that 
described by Aristotle” (p. 16). 
111 “According to its substances and the account of what it is said to be essentially, virtue is a mean, but according to 
what is best and is good, it is an extreme” (κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα 
μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης). Plutarch also seems to allude to Aristotle 
(Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b27–9) in his remark that we can err in many ways to vice but achieve success in 
virtue in only one way (On Moral Virtue 444B6–10). 
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[T41] αὐτίκα τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν μεσότητά φασιν εἶναι δειλίας καὶ θρασύτητος, ὧν ἡ μὲν 
ἔλλειψις ἡ δ’ ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ἐστιν. 
For example, they say that courage is a mean between cowardice and over-boldness. The 
former of these is a deficiency and the latter an excess of the spirited part of the soul.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 445A2–5).112  
 
[T42] περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ’ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν  
τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ’ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων 
θρασύς, ὁ δ’ ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. 
 
Therefore, courage is the mean concerned with fear and confidence. Of those who are 
excessive, the one who exceeds in fearlessness does not have a name (and many are 
without names) while the one who exceeds in confidence is bold, and the one who 
exceeds in feeling fear and is deficient in confidence is a coward.  
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 1107a33–b4)113 
 
Again, Plutarch is not quoting Aristotle, but the definition of the moderate state is not only 
verbally similar but also looks conceptually derivative. Plutarch’s example of liberality 
(ἐλευθεριότης) as the mean between stinginess (μικρολογία) and wastefulness (ἀσωτία, On 
Moral Virtue 445A4–5) also looks directly drawn from this same passage, which lists the 
extremes of wastefulness and stinginess (ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 
1107b8–10).114 The term for stinginess is different, but the definition is essentially the same. The 
same is true for the moderation of desires (σωφροσύνη), which is “always bringing the desires 
into a moderate state between insensitivity (ἀναισθησία) and lack of restraint (ἀκολασία)” 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 445A8–10).115 For this virtue, the mean and two diametrically 
                                               
112 Cf. On Tranquility of Mind 474C–D. 
113 Cf. ibid. 2.8, 1109a8–10; 3.5–9; Eudemian Ethics 2.3, 1220b39, 1221a17–19; 3.1, 1228a30–b3. 
114 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 4.1; Eudemian Ethics 2.3, 1221a5. 
115 εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀεὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καθιστᾶσαν. Accepting Pohlenz’s deletion of 
ἀπαθείας after μέσον. Cf. Plutarch, Beasts are Rational 989B5–8: “Moderation (ἡ σωφροσύνη), then, is a certain 
narrowness and arrangement of desires, removing those that are introduced from without and excessive and 
arranging those that are necessary at the critical moment and in a mean state” (ἡ μὲν οὖν σωφροσύνη βραχύτης 
τίς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τάξις, ἀναιροῦσα μὲν τὰς ἐπεισάκτους καὶ περιττὰς καιρῷ δὲ καὶ μετριότητι 
κοσμοῦσα τὰς ἀναγκαίας). 
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opposed vices are given the same names by Plutarch as we find in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics 2.7 (1107b4–8).116 
Given these similarities, we might wonder whether Plutarch appropriates or merely 
copies parts of Aristotle’s ethical theory and sets it to the tune of the Platonic image of bringing 
the soul’s parts into harmony.117 Since even Aristotle writes that the appetitive element of a 
moderate individual should be in harmony with reason (δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν 
συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, 3.11, 1119b15–16), should we classify Plutarch as essentially Aristotelian 
in his view of moral virtue, even if he fits more with Platonic views in his metaphysics and 
epistemology?118 
As I noted in the Introduction,119 Plutarch would not view himself as Aristotelian here and 
Platonic there. He sees his view as part of the living tradition of the Platonic Academy. This 
living tradition includes Aristotle as a member and his works as part of Platonic philosophy. 
Plutarch believes that Aristotle’s followers departed further from the core tenets of the Platonic 
Academy than Aristotle ever did.120 He also believes that Aristotle is by and large a faithful and 
                                               
116 Moderation of desires (σωφροσύνη) is the mean concerned with pleasures and pains. The excess is lack of 
restraint (ἀκολασία) and those who are deficient are called insensitive (ἀναίσθητοι). Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 
3.10–11, 1117b23–1119b21 and 7.4, 1147b20–1148b14. 
117 Pinnoy 1973; Donini 1974, esp. pp. 64–5, 80–1; 1986, esp. p. 216; Becchi 1975, p. 180; 1978, pp. 193–8; 1981, 
pp. 279–80; 1990, p. 33; 2014; Dillon 1983; and Beneker 2012, p. 16. Becchi argues that Plutarch appropriates the 
Aristotelian notion of virtue to use against his Stoic opponents, calling this “functional Aristotelianism” 
(Aristotelismo funzionale). For further discussion of these types of views and for further citations see Opsomer 1994, 
pp. 33–6; 2012, pp. 15–17; and Gill 2006, p. 230. 
118 Cf. On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus, Platonic Questions 1, On the Principle of Cold 995C, and 
Reply to Colotes 1122A–1124B, where Plutarch claims that his own views are derived from Plato’s and the Platonic 
Academy’s metaphysics and epistemology. Plutarch also makes clear that he believes Aristotle to have departed too 
far from aspects of Plato’s metaphysics, for which see n. 122 below. On Plutarch’s epistemology see Opsomer 1998, 
pp. 190–212; Brittain 2001, pp. 225–36. 
119 See §IV–§V in the Introduction. 
120 Reply to Colotes 1115B–C. Cf. Karamanolis 2006, p. 97. See also n. 40 of the Introduction. 
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good interpreter of Platonic philosophy,121 even if he at times is incorrect in his own views.122 In 
certain cases, however, Aristotle is taken to be more systematic in his explication of the best 
views that Platonism has to offer.123 
When we look more closely at the elements Plutarch blends together in his description of 
moral virtue as a harmonious mean, we find that Plutarch is not simply copying Aristotle’s 
model. Even in the specific virtues of courage, moderation of desires, and liberality, which look 
very similar to the definitions in Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, Plutarch seems to have specific 
passages from Plato’s Republic in mind. In the Republic’s image of the inner human, lion, and 
many-headed beast, when the lion, which represents the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) 
is strengthened beyond its limits: 
[T43] ἡ δ’ αὐθαδία καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδές τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες
 αὔξηται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως; 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
τρυφὴ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, 
ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ; 
 
Are not stubbornness and peevishness censured whenever they increase and strain the 
parts that are like a lion and a snake out of tune? 
 Very much so. 
And are not daintiness and weakness censured for the relaxing and slackening of this very 
part, whenever it produces cowardice in it?  (Plato, Republic 9, 590a10–b4) 
 
                                               
121 Karamanolis 2006 goes so far as to say that Plutarch “considered Aristotle to be in a way a preserver of Platonic 
doctrines,” (p. 87) and that Aristotle’s arguments often were “representative of Plato’s own doctrines” (p. 89). 
122 Plutarch notes that Aristotle rejected Plato’s Theory of Forms and Plato’s view on the composition of the world 
(Reply to Colotes 1114F–1115C; cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096a11–1097a14; Metaphysics Α 9, N 1–
9;  On the Heavens 280a28–32, 283a4–284a2, 300b16–19). Plutarch is also careful to distinguish Aristotle’s views 
from Platonic tenets when his Epicurean or Stoic opponents lump them together (Reply to Colotes 1114F–1115C; 
That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1086E–F; On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1040D–E, 1041A). Cf. 
Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–126, esp. pp. 88, 92–100. 
123 Plutarch often draws upon Aristotle for his more scientific arguments in natural philosophy, such as in On the 




Daniel Babut suggests that Plutarch draws on this passage in his description of courage because 
Plutarch assigns courage to the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές).124 The point is not 
systematized or formulated as the doctrine of the mean that Aristotle presents, but it expresses 
two extremes of excess and deficiency, naming the state of cowardice as the deficiency, though 
stubbornness (αὐθαδία) stands in place of Aristotle and Plutarch’s boldness (θρασύτης) and 
bold individual (θρασύς). It is also possible that Plutarch has the Republic in mind in his 
definition of liberality, wherein the two extremes to be avoided in one’s liberality, are described 
as stinginess (ἀνελευθερία) and wastefulness (ἀσωτία, Republic 8, 560c6–561a4).125 
 The virtue of moderating desires (σωφροσύνη), however, is far more Aristotelian in 
formulation. As we have already seen, moderation in Plato’s Republic is not itself applied to 
produce a mean state among the desires of the appetitive part of the soul, but instead describes 
the correct relationship of the appetitive part in being subdued and under the power of the 
rational part of the soul (4, 431c9–432b1). Nevertheless, even here it is likely that Plutarch 
believes that Aristotle has come to the best view on moderation too. A view that he would 
describe as part of the Platonic tradition. 
 Plutarch expresses his own allegiance to truth rather than dogma in several places,126 but 
nowhere so pointedly as in his attack on Stoic ethics: 
[T44] ἀλλ’ ὀρθῶς μὲν εἴρηται τὸ  
                              πρὸς στάθμῃ  
   πέτρον τίθεσθαι, μή τι πρὸς πέτρῳ στάθμην.127 
                                               
124 Cf. Babut 1969a, p. 154, n. 104. Cf. Etheridge 1961, p. 143. 
125 Cf. Babut 1969a, p. 154, n. 105. 
126 Cf. Platonic Questions 1. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 91b–c; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096a11–15. 
127 For the proverbial expression, cf. Arsenius, Sayings (88a) in Leutsch and Schneidewin, Corpus 




οἱ δὲ μὴ τιθέμενοι τὰ δόγματα πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα πρὸς τὰς 
ἑαυτῶν ὑποθέσεις ὁμολογεῖν μὴ πεφυκότα καταβιαζόμενοι πολλῶν ἀποριῶν 
ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. 
 
 But correctly has it been said, 
   “Place the stone 
  Straight with the measuring line, not the measuring line with the stone.” 
But those who do not align their teachings with the facts but instead try to force the facts 
unnaturally to agree with their own assumptions have filled philosophy with many 
puzzles.     (Plutarch, On Moral Progress 75F4–9) 
 
Plutarch rails against the Stoics, whom he views as the greatest transgressors in this regard 
(75F9–76B6), but his remarks also reveal a self-conscious attempt on his own part to confront 
areas in which interpretations of reality and ethics, even if these interpretations are held to be 
core tenets or dogmas of Platonic philosophy, must align with reality and not just tradition. 
 This point is brought out in Plutarch’s arguments on grief, which we explored in §II 
above. Although I was not very explicit on the point earlier, Plutarch need not conceive of his 
own position as incompatible with Plato’s overall view or the Platonic tradition itself, even when 
his own arguments on moderating grief are in direct opposition to the arguments in Plato’s 
Republic. Instead, Plutarch seems to think that his predecessor in the Platonic Academy, Crantor, 
got the essential Platonic idea right, unlike the view that seems to have prevailed among the 
earliest members of the Academy, which Aristotle opposed with his doctrine of moderating the 
passions. We might say that, for Plutarch, Crantor got the Platonic view right because he saw the 
position that was most compatible with reality itself and with Plato’s philosophy overall. 
Plutarch’s approach to the moderation of passions in general follows the same pattern.128 As I 
                                               
128 Although I do not have space to discuss it here, Plutarch also implicitly argues against the criticisms of poetry in 
Republic 2–3 and 10, in his How a Young Man Should Read Poetry, arguing that poetry is useful and helpful for 
moral progress. I discuss this point briefly in Chapter 5, §IV, but the topic deserves a longer exploration in a project 
to follow. In brief, my own view is that Plutarch’s defense of poetry against the psychological criticisms of Republic 
10, where Socrates argues that poetry feeds the lower parts of the soul and makes them unruly against the rational 
part of the soul, follows from Plutarch’s view that moral virtue is a harmony between moderated passions and 
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note in the Introduction, Plutarch sees Aristotle as part of the Platonic tradition. In the field of 
ethics and psychology, Plutarch draws heavily upon Aristotelian ideas to explicate what he 
believes to be the correct view of the role that passions play in moral virtue.129 
 Even when Plutarch’s own arguments directly oppose what we find in the Republic, he 
can still appeal to other passages in Plato’s dialogues to support what he believes to be the better 
view. I noted above that a few more positive interpretations within Plato’s dialogues are possible, 
especially in the view of the passionate parts of the soul and their positive contribution to moral 
progress and intellectual development in the Phaedrus. I also noted that Plutarch seems to appeal 
to the image of shared identity through shared feelings in Republic 5. As we will see in Chapter 
3, Plutarch draws on the Phaedrus’ Myth of the Charioteer frequently and interprets the more 
positive evaluation of the passions as in line with this strand of Platonic philosophy. Together 
with Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, this more positive view of the incitement and motivation of 
the passions for virtue informs his view on the moderation of the passions. 
Plutarch’s tendency to read Plato’s discussions on passions more positively is evident 
also in his use of the metaphor of musical harmony and the harmony among bodily humors. In 
the metaphor of musical harmony, Plutarch highlights the notion that each of the lower parts of 
the soul contributes to virtue as each tone contributes to and is part of the harmony in music. The 
same notion that passions contribute to the virtue of justice can be inferred from the definition of 
justice in the Republic, where each part does its own job, not meddling with the other parts, just 
as the different individuals in the three classes of the city do their own jobs and do not interfere 
                                               
reason, not a mastery of passion that requires passions to be relatively weak, and Plutarch’s view that students can 
learn to discriminate and keep their own passions from becoming inordinate. Cf. Neumayr 1963 and 1964; 
Zadorojnyi 2002; and Blank 2011. 
129 Cf. On Moral Virtue 442B–C. 
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with the work of the others (4, 432e4–436b4). But again, the idea that the passions contribute to 
virtue in a positive sense, beyond being mastered and subdued is not very explicit in the 
Republic. Reading Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean into the metaphor of musical and bodily 
harmony, however, Plutarch argues that each of the parts of the soul contribute to moral virtue, 
and he holds Aristotle’s view to be compatible with the Platonic view of moral virtue. 
And so, although Plutarch draws heavily upon Aristotle in explaining his own view that 
passions must be moderated for moral virtue, he still considers his own interpretation to be 
rooted in a Platonic tradition that extends back to Plato and is perhaps even foreshadowed by 
Pythagoras.130 This becomes more apparent when we pay attention to how Plutarch frames his 
own view, beginning with the overall division of the soul into its parts. Concerning the basic 
division between the rational and non-rational parts of our soul, 
[T45] εἰκὸς μέν ἐστι μηδὲ Πυθαγόραν ἀγνοῆσαι, τεκμαιρομένοις τῇ περὶ μουσικὴν  
σπουδῇ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἣν ἐπηγάγετο τῇ ψυχῇ κηλήσεως ἕνεκα καὶ παραμυθίας, ὡς 
οὐ πᾶν ἐχούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητὸν ἐκ 
κακίας, ἀλλά τινος ἑτέρας πειθοῦς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσεως καὶ τιθασεύσεως 
δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι μέλλοι φιλοσοφίᾳ δυσμεταχείριστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθές· 
ἐμφανῶς μέντοι καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως Πλάτων συνεῖδεν, ὅτι τούτου τε 
τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἔμψυχον οὐχ ἁπλοῦν οὐδ’ ἀσύνθετον οὐδὲ μονοειδές ἐστιν…ἥ τ’ 
ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ μέρος ἢ μίμημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα καὶ συνηρμοσμένη κατὰ 
λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἐοικότας ἐκείνοις οὐχ ἁπλῆ τίς ἐστιν οὐδ’ ὁμοιοπαθής, ἀλλ’ 
ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, ᾧ κρατεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν 
καὶ ἄρχειν προσῆκόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ πολυπλανὲς 
καὶ ἄτακτον ἐξεταστοῦ δεόμενον. 
 
it is likely that not even Pythagoras was unaware [of this], if we judge by the sign of the 
man’s zeal for music, which he applied to the soul for the sake of bewitching and 
assuaging it,131 on the grounds that not all of the soul is subject to teaching and lessons 
nor changeable from vice through reason, but that part of it needs some other helpful 
persuasion and molding and taming, if it is not going to be entirely hard-to-manage and 
disobedient to philosophy. Plato, however, clearly, firmly, and without a hint of doubt 
comprehended that the ensouled part of this universe is not simple, nor is it without 
                                               
130 See nn. 134 and 140–2 below. 
131 Cf. Plato, Euthydemus 290a. 
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composition, nor singular in form132…and the soul of man, which is a part and imitation 
of the whole and is fitted together according to proportions and fitting numbers with 
those [of the universe],133 is not something simple nor alike in its affections, but has one 
part, intelligible and rational, which naturally is fit to rule over and lead the human 
individual, but it has another part, the passionate and non-rational, which is prone to 
wander and to disorder and needs an overseer.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441E1–442A5) 
 
Plutarch takes the adumbrations of Pythagoras as signs that he was coming to the right view 
about the composition of the soul and how moral virtue comes about through the proper 
moderation and management of the soul. Plutarch, however, thinks that Plato is far clearer in his 
understanding, since he comprehends the nature of the soul “clearly, firmly, and without a hint of 
doubt” (ἐμφανῶς καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως). Here we get a hint of Plutarch’s notion that 
Plato improved upon and more clearly understood the truth of the view that was, as it were, 
seminally contained within the Pythagorean notion of musical harmony between the different 
parts of the soul.134 
The same trend continues also with what prima facie seems to be a rather odd 
appropriation of Aristotle’s hylomorphism in the relationship between the rational and non-
rational parts of the soul. In the opening remarks of On Moral Virtue, Plutarch formulates moral 
virtue (ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή) as having passion as its matter and reason as its form (τὸ μὲν πάθος 
ὕλην ἔχειν τὸν δὲ λόγον εἶδος, 440D2–3). This looks to be an adaptation of the notion that the 
soul and passions form a kind of hylomorphic substance.135 
                                               
132 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 35a–37c. 
133 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 69c–72d. 
134 Cf. Bellanti 2003 and 2007, who argues that Plutarch blends the Platonic and Pythagorean notions of musical 
harmony with the doctrine of the mean in Aristotle. 
135 On Aristotle’s hylomorphic formulation as explaining the relationship between form, matter, and change, cf. 
Physics 195a6-8; Metaphysics Η 6, 1045a26–9. On soul-body hylomorphism see On the Soul 2.1, 412a20, b5–7, 
413a1–3; 2.2, 413a20–21, 414a3–9, 15–18. Cf. Witt 1989; Johnstone 2006. 
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When we look more closely at how Plutarch frames his discussion of moral virtue with 
the relationship between reason and the passions, however, we find that Plutarch situates this 
formula within an essentially Platonic system. As both Jan Opsomer and Daniel Babut have 
convincingly argued,136 Plutarch’s notion that the soul is the form that inheres in the passions 
draws upon Plutarch’s larger schema in which the function of the rational part of the soul that 
brings limit and arrangement to the passionate part of the soul is patterned on the imposition of 
limitation and form in the cosmic soul,137 which Plutarch sees at work in Plato’s Timaeus 35a2–3 
and Laws 896d5–898c8.138 The human soul is a microcosm and imitation of the world-soul.139 
Plutarch also takes this to be foreshadowed by Pythagoras (On Isis and Osiris 370D3–371A4),140 
even if it is more likely to be of pseudo- or neo-Pythagorean origin,141 or more a part of the 
Platonic tradition attributed to Pythagoras.142 
                                               
136 Babut 1969a, pp. 69 and 129, n. 1; 1969b, pp. 298–301, 316–17, 321–33; Opsomer 1994, pp. 44–9; 2005, p. 181–
2, 190; 2012, pp. 325–30. Cf. Dillon 1977, pp. 192–6; Dirlmeier 1983, pp. 292–4. Cf. also Gill 2006, p. 230, 234; 
Ferrari 2008, pp. 14–53. Cf. On Moral Virtue 446D–E.  
137 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444B10–C6=[T37], 443C10–D1=[T36], 444B1–4=[T38], 444C6–9=[T34], 446D, and 
449B. Cf. On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1013A, 1014C, 1025A. 
138 Plutarch mentions both the Timaeus and the Laws in this connection in On the Generation of the Soul in the 
Timaeus 1014D, 1015A. Plutarch also alludes to Phaedrus 245c5–246a2 in 1015A. Cf. Opsomer 2012, p. 327: 
Plutarch “does not really regard moral virtue as some kind of hylomorphic substance or structure in the Aristotelian 
sense. If anything, we have hylomorphism in a Platonic fashion, in which a superior principle imparts form upon an 
underlying matter…being the faithful Platonist he is, Plutarch will certainly have understood his hylomorphist 
remark as being in perfect agreement with the moral psychology of the Timaeus and Republic.” On Plutarch’s view 
that the application of “limit” to passion is of Platonic and Pythagorean origin, drawing on Plato’s Philebus 24a–
30b, see Dillon 1977, pp. 2–4 and 196; Opsomer 2004, pp. 150–2. Cf. Opsomer 1994, pp. 44–5. 
  See also Plutarch’s allusion to Aristotle’s Categories as in line with the overall division of soul in the cosmos as 
well as in a human being (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1023E). 
139 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441E8–442A5; On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1023D10–E7, 1025A–
D, 1026D; On the Face in the Moon 943A6–7; cf. Plato, Timaeus 69c5–d1=[T29]. Cf. also Baltes 2000, pp. 257–8, 
and 2005, p. 88; Dillon 2001b, pp. 37–40; Opsomer 2012, pp. 311–15. 
140 Plutarch situates both Plato and Aristotle in a tradition on the nature of the soul that goes back to Pythagoras. Cf. 
Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 4.11, who claims that Plutarch found Pythagorean teachings in Aristotle’s works. Cf. 
also Karamanolis 2006, p. 87, n. 9. 
141 See, for instance, Metopus, On Virtue 117.5–14, 117.28–118.6, 119.8, 17–18 Thesleff; Theages, On Virtue 
190.8–26 Thesleff. Cf. Dillon 1977, pp. 117–21, 126–9, 341–83; Centrone 1990, p. 197; Bellanti 2007, p. 230. 
142 Cf. Jones 1916, pp. 14–16; Donini 1974, pp. 92–105; 1999; 2011; Centrone 1990, pp. 204–5; 2000, esp. pp. 560, 
567–75; Opsomer 2005, pp. 188–99; 2012, p. 326; Ferrari 2008; Dillon 2010b. On Plutarch’s presentation of Numa 
as influenced by Pythagoreanism see Liebert 2016, pp. 175–84. As both Burkert 1972 and Centrone 1990 and 2000 
well demonstrate, it is unclear to what extent “Pythagorean” doctrines stem from a Pythagorean tradition and are not 
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 For Plutarch, the core tenets of Plato’s Academy, whether they stretch back to the 
Pythagorean tradition or are best formulated in Aristotle’s works, are subject to reinterpretation 
and modification if they fail to fit with reality. In Platonic Questions 1, Plutarch, drawing on the 
metaphor of Socrates’ midwifery in the Theaetetus (150b6–151a5), argues that we cannot be so 
attached to our own ideas that we fail to see their inadequacies. In Reply to Colotes, Plutarch also 
advises caution in forming attachments to beliefs that could turn out to be false (1121E8–
1122F5).143 Plutarch believes that a strand of healthy skepticism runs throughout the entire 
history of Plato’s Academy, from Socrates up to his own time, and is an integral part of the 
Platonic approach to truth, even in Aristotle’s dialectical method.144 Built into the Platonic 
tradition, then, is a kind of skeptical corrective meant to guard against dogmatically holding to 
false beliefs. The plumb-line by which one’s view is judged is not Plato, his dialogues, or so-
called dogmas that many have thought dominate Middle Platonic thinkers, but truth. Plutarch just 
happens to think that Plato generally got things right, or at least set us on the right path, with the 
right method, to find the truth, or at least our best approximation of it. 
                                               
themselves Platonic. Burkert argues that Pythagoras himself was likely more a guru than a philosopher, though Plato 
and the Platonic tradition tended to attribute their own views to Pythagoras. Cf. Boys-Stones 2001, pp. 118–20. On 
Plutarch’s association with Pythagoreans see Hershbell 1984. On Plutarch’s view that Pythagoras foreshadowed 
Platonic views of the soul and virtue see Opsomer 2012, p. 320, n. 50. Cf. also Horky 2013; Laks and Most 2016, 
“Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, and Pythagoreanism: Reception” in their Loeb edn. of Early Greek Philosophy. Vol. IV: 
Western Greek Thinkers, Part 1, pp. 336–8 and pp. 372–91 (R28–R34). 
143 See Opsomer 1998, pp. 127–62, for an extended and detailed account of Plutarch’s defense of Socrates and the 
caution of the aporetic tradition used in the search for truth. Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–9; Kechagia 2011, pp. 
305–11. 
144 See §IV in the Introduction and the accompanying notes. Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 85–6: “Plutarch forcefully 
argues that the sceptical interpretation of Plato, far from being a distortion of Plato’s philosophy…does justice to the 
aporetic spirit of this philosophy. For Plutarch, though, this aporetic spirit remains compatible with Plato’s doctrinal 
aspect. This is because for him scepticism amounts to a way of searching out the truth, that is, the dialectical 
methodology of arguing on either side of a question in order to adduce without prejudices where the truth lies. This 
neither amounts to a dogmatic denial of the possibility to know, nor does it mean that no conclusion can be reached 
in this process. Rather, Plutarch believed that Plato had often reached such conclusions and held specific 
doctrines.…There is evidence to suggest that Plutarch perceived Aristotle’s accord with Plato’s philosophy partially 




 Plutarch defends the naturalness and usefulness of grief against the arguments we find in 
Plato’s Republic, but he would not see his own position as inconsistent with the Platonic 
Academy’s ethical philosophy. In his defense of moderate passions as essential to moral virtue, 
Plutarch draws upon Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, but blends it with other metaphorical 
descriptions of virtue in Platonic cosmology and psychology. In his defense of the passions, 
Plutarch argues not only that passions must be moderated (μετριοπάθεια), but also that they are 









“He works with passion, zeal, and enthusiasm!” Unless one’s actions and passions are 
grossly misdirected, we tend to think of acting with passion as a good thing. We work harder and 
feel a greater sense of accomplishment and pride if we are passionate about our work. As in the 
Republic’s definition of courage (4, 442b10–c2), passion can provide strong motive force in our 
actions, so strong that at times it helps us endure hardships and pains in pursuit of noble ends. 
It emerged from the last chapter that certain passages from Plato’s Timaeus, Republic, 
and Phaedo can be read as giving a rather low estimation of our passions and our passionate 
nature. Passions are frequent sources of error and look to be little more than a pollution of the 
rational part of our soul, our true human nature. But that is not the only picture we find in Plato’s 
dialogues, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, nor is it the picture that Plutarch draws upon to establish 
his own more positive view of passions in the moral and good life. In this chapter, we will 
explore several positive contributions that passions can make to life, some of which Plutarch 
draws from Plato’s dialogues and expands upon in developing his own view that passions are not 
only necessary aspects of the embodied life, but also enhance it. 
In the first part of this chapter (§I), we will look at the necessity of passion for action and 
Plutarch’s division of intellectual and moral virtues. For Plutarch, the rational part of the soul is 
in itself inert and incapable of initiating practical actions on its own. Reason’s own peculiar 
activity of contemplation concerns intellectual objects that are eternal and unchangeable, and the 
 
 130 
virtue of contemplation is intellectual, not moral. If we are to act in the world, however, we can 
only do so if the non-rational passionate parts of the soul are involved, since they provide 
impulse as a necessary ingredient for initiating practical action. Moral virtue involves a 
partnership between the rational and the passionate parts of the soul (§I) 
To illustrate the contribution of passions for motivation, Plutarch depicts passions as the 
“Wind in Our Sails.” As in the Phaedrus’ Myth of the Charioteer, the rational part of the soul 
guides our actions, while the passions provide propulsion (§II). In the final sections of this 
chapter we will explore several aspects of life that Plutarch believes are improved by the 
presence and development of our passions. Passions enhance certain activities. Drawing on 
Plato’s Timaeus, Plutarch writes that the gods have added passions to human nature to provide it 
with its own source of motivation (§III). Passions also aid in our pursuit of moral progress. They 
can intensify virtuous actions (IV). They additionally can provide an incitement to virtue 
(ὑπέκκαυμα τῆς ἀρετῆς) through the desire for honor and engender a longing for virtue. Most 
emphatically, Plutarch argues that we would not choose to be without passions even if we could. 
Passions make life better (§VII). 
 
§I Passion, Practical Action, and The Division of Virtues 
As we saw in the previous chapter, passions are necessary as an ingredient of moral 
virtue. One must cultivate dispositions to act and to feel in the right way and in the right amount 
if one is to be morally virtuous. As we will explore in this section, Plutarch argues that our need 
for passions is even deeper. Passions provide impetus for practical action in the embodied life. 
We need them not only for virtuous actions, but also for any action that we are to undertake in 
our current earthly condition. Passions are necessary for all practical action in this life and 
without them we cannot act. 
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First, I should note that Plutarch does not hold the view that no activity of the soul is 
possible without the passions. In On Moral Virtue, Plutarch describes purely rational activities, 
such as the activity of contemplation, which do not involve passions and are free from their 
influence: 
[T46] ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ἀπροσδεὴς τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ περὶ τὸν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ νοῦν  
συνισταμένη σοφία1 αὐτοτελής τίς ἐστιν ἀκρότης τοῦ λόγου καὶ δύναμις, ᾗ τὸ 
θειότατον ἐγγίνεται τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ μακαριώτατον. 
 
But one kind of virtue, wisdom, arising without need of the non-rational and being 
concerned with pure intellect free from passion, is a kind of self-sufficient excellence and 
capacity of reason in which the most divine and most blessed of knowledge comes to be. 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444C10–D3) 
The intellectual virtue of wisdom (σοφία) is an activity of pure intellect that is free from the 
influence of passions (νοῦς καθαρὸς καὶ ἀπαθής, On the Sign of Socrates 588D9–10).2 It also, 
as in Aristotle’s division, is distinguished from moral virtues that involve passion, and this 
division can be understood in terms of the different types of objects one cognizes.3 The 
                                                        
1 I follow Helmbold in deleting καὶ φρόνησις after σοφία. It makes little sense to think that practical wisdom is 
impractical and purely theoretical as the passage would read if καὶ φρόνησις were retained, especially considering 
what Plutarch has to say in 444A3–B1=[T47]. See also Babut 1969a, p. 152, n. 92. 
2 In On the Sign of Socrates, Plutarch lauds the flawless intellectual virtue of Socrates based on the fact that his 
intellect is free of passions (νοῦς καθαρὸς ὢν καὶ ἀπαθής, 588D9–10). Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Progress 83E–
84B. I take it that this kind of virtue is what Plutarch proleptically mentions at the beginning of On Moral Virtue 
when he writes, “For I suppose that it is clear that virtue can come about and persist entirely without matter and 
unmixed with it” (ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δύναται καὶ ἀρετὴ γεγονέναι καὶ μένειν παντάπασιν ἄυλος καὶ ἄκρατος, οἶμαι 
δῆλον εἶναι, 440D9–E1). As we saw in the last chapter, moral virtue requires passions, which come about in 
embodiment. As we will see shortly, intellectual virtue does not require passions, nor does it require embodiment for 
Plutarch. 
3 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.1, 1139a6–15: “Let there be two parts that have reason, one with which we 
contemplate the sort of entities whose principles are not able to be otherwise, another by which we contemplate 
things that can be otherwise. For of the parts of the soul, one naturally differs in kind from another in relation to the 
objects that differ in kind, if indeed knowledge belongs to things according to likeness and kinship. Let one of these 
be called scientific, the other, calculative, since to deliberate is the same as to calculate and no one deliberates about 
things that are not able to be otherwise. Consequently, the calculative is one part of what has reason” (καὶ 
ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται 
ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει 
τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ’ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ 
τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ 
βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον 
ἔχοντος). I translate δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα as “two parts that have reason” based on the division of parts of the soul 
μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς of contemplative and deliberative reason in a9–10. Cf. also Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1103a1–
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intellectual virtue of wisdom turns its gaze only toward objects that are eternal and cannot be 
otherwise than they are; it is not concerned with items that can be otherwise, i.e. are not stable 
and admit of change or are subject to chance: 
[T47] ὁ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς περὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μόνιμα καὶ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα μὴ  
δεχομένην μεταβολὰς ἐνεργῶν ἀπήλλακται τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι. 
Theoretical intellect has its activity free from deliberation and concerns first principles 
that are stable and have an eternal nature not admitting of changes.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444A3–6) 
 
Like Aristotle,4 Plutarch calls this form of contemplation scientific and theoretical 
(ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ θεωρητικόν) when we cognize only things that are absolute, eternal, and 
unchanging in nature and do not take into consideration things that can be otherwise (On Moral 
Virtue 443E6–7).5 
 When we think about things that do admit of change and can be related to us in different 
ways,6 however, we use what Plutarch calls, in alignment with Aristotle again, deliberative and 
practical reason: 
[T48] τὸ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς βουλευτικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν· ἀρετὴ δὲ τούτου  
μὲν ἡ φρόνησις ἐκείνου δ’ ἡ σοφία. διαφέρει δὲ σοφίας φρόνησις, ᾗ τοῦ 
θεωρητικοῦ πρὸς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ σχέσεώς τινος 
γενομένης ὑφίσταται κατὰ λόγον ἡ φρόνησις. 
 
[When considering] things that are in a certain relation to us, it is deliberative and 
practical. The virtue of the latter is practical wisdom while [the virtue] of the former 
[which considers things that are absolute, eternal, and unchanging (E6–7)] is wisdom. 
Practical wisdom differs from wisdom insofar as practical wisdom subsists according to 
reason when a turn and certain relation of contemplative reason to practical action and 
passion occurs.    (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443E8–F2) 
 
                                                        
10; 3.3, 1112a21–6, b1; 6.1, 1139a6–14; 6.5, 1140a31–3; 6.8, 1142a11–13; 10.7, 1177b3–3, 10.8, 1178b8–33, 
1179a22–32; Politics 7.14, 1333a24–5. Cf. Babut 1969a, p. 152, n. 93. 
4 See the preceding note. 
5 Reason when cognizing “only things that hold absolutely is scientific and contemplative” (τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς 
ἔχοντα μόνον ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ θεωρητικόν ἐστι). 
6 On the similarity of Plutarch’s terminology to Stoic terminology here see Babut 1969a, pp. 12–13. As Babut notes 
(pp. 48–9), Plutarch’s formulation is also in line with the terminology of both Xenocrates and Andronicus. 
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Now we are introduced to reason’s interaction with passion. While the intellectual virtue of 
wisdom (σοφία) is not concerned with passions or the objects that we deliberate about, practical 
reason, and its excellence, practical wisdom (φρόνησις), turn their attention toward them.7 
 Plutarch writes that practical reason descends, as it were, to the level of contingent 
affairs,8 and it must interact with both the practical and non-rational aspects of our nature to 
produce practical action:  
[T49] τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν εἰς πράγματα πλάνης μεστὰ καὶ ταραχῆς καθιεῖσαν  
ἐπιμ⟨ε⟩ίγνυσθαι τοῖς τυχηροῖς πολλάκις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ τῷ βουλευτικῷ 
χρῆσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδηλοτέρων, τῷ δὲ πρακτικῷ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐκδεχομένην 
ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου συμπαρόντος καὶ συνεφελκομένου ταῖς κρίσεσιν. 
ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται· τὴν δ’ ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος. 
 
Practical wisdom often enters into practical affairs that are full of error and confusion and 
deals with elements of chance out of necessity; it makes use of the deliberative faculty 
concerning matters that are not clear; and then, taking up where the deliberation ends, it 
must operate with the practical faculty in its judgments, with the non-rational part also 
giving its aid and being drawn along together with it. For impulse is needed, and moral 
virtue produces impulse with passion.  (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444A6–B1) 
 
Here we see that practical reason uses deliberation to determine a course and set an appropriate 
end for action. Reason alone, however, even in its deliberative capacity, is insufficient to initiate 
action. In order for practical action to begin, reason calls upon the powers of the practical faculty 
to issue a judgment and passion to aid and join together in (συμπαρεῖναι καὶ συνεφέλκεσθαι) 
the production of action. What does passion provide? An impulse to act (ὁρμή). 
The final line in this quotation indicates that it is with passion that moral virtue produces 
an impulse. By this, Plutarch means that it is by means of passion that impulse comes in to 
initiate action.9 As indicated here and in Reply to Colotes, impulse is necessary for practical 
                                                        
7 On the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις in Aristotle see Nicomachean Ethics 6.5–8, 1140a24–1142a30. 
8 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 27d5–28a6 and 52a4–7. 
9 Cf. Babut 1969a, p. 151, n. 87, who also takes this to be an instrumental dative, which is supported by the 
instrumental service attributed to passions in On Moral Virtue 444D4–7=[T51]. 
 
 134 
action and is the movement and conveyance of the soul (ἡ ὁρμή, κίνησις οὖσα καὶ φορὰ τῆς 
ψυχῆς, 1122C9–D1).10 If we are to move our bodies at all, these movements must be initiated by 
impulse (On the Sign of Socrates 588F7–589A10).11 But, the rational part of the soul does not 
produce impulse without passion.  
When we reason about contingent affairs, such as what end we are to pursue and what 
course of action we are to take, the matter may be decided upon by a purely rational procedure 
(On Moral Virtue 447F1–4). At the end of deliberation and planning, however, something more 
than thought alone is required to put an action into motion.12 Practical actions require impulse 
(ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται, 444B1), which the passionate part of our nature provides. Passions and the 
non-rational parts of the soul, in fact, provide impulse to action even without planning and 
deliberation, as is evident among non-rational animals (On Moral Virtue 450F1–451B1). 
In a passage near the end of On Moral Virtue, Plutarch writes that impulses to action, 
which concern corporeal objects (πρὸς τὰ σωματικά) and practical actions, arise due to the 
formation of the passionate parts of the soul when the soul mixes with the body (450E7–F1).13 
The rational part of the soul, however, which remains separate and distinct from the passionate 
                                                        
10 “For practical action needs two things, the representation of what is fitting and impulse toward what is apparently 
fitting, neither of which is in conflict with suspension [of belief and assent]” (ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις δυοῖν δεῖται, 
φαντασίας τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὲν οἰκεῖον ὁρμῆς, ὧν οὐδέτερον τῇ ἐποχῇ μάχεται). 
11 Plutarch draws upon the image of the puppeteer from Plato’s Phaedo (94b4–e6) and Laws 1 (644d7–645b1) in 
this passage. What reason decides upon gains an impulse to action by touching the strings, as it were, of the 
passionate part of the soul in its connection with the body. Cf. also Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 163E–F. 
12 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10, 433a22–3: “Intellect evidently does not initiate motion without desire” (ὁ μὲν 
νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως); Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a29–34. See also n. 22 below. 
13 “The non-rational part of the soul is naturally like the body and shares in its affections and is influenced by them, 
after it has sunk into it and commingled with it. This is clear from the impulses that rise up and are moved toward 
corporeal objects, receiving their intensity and abatement with the changes of the body” (τοῦ ἀλόγου τοῦ τὴν 
γένεσιν αὐτόθεν ἔχοντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ᾧ καὶ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν παθῶν καὶ 
ἀναπίμπλασθαι πέφυκεν, ἐνδεδυκὸς αὐτῷ καὶ καταμεμιγμένον, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὰ σωματικὰ 
κινούμεναι καὶ ἱστάμεναι καὶ σφοδρότητας ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολαῖς καὶ ἀνέσεις λαμβάνουσαι). 
Most of the MSS have καί after τοῦ ἀλόγου, but I follow MS Φ in printing τοῦ, along with Dumortier and 
Defradas in the Budé edition and Helmbold in the Loeb edition. 
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part of the soul,14 does not affect the body or initiate any action unless passion and the passionate 
parts of the soul are involved: 
[T50] ὅταν δὲ μὴ μετὰ πάθους ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ κινῆται τὸ διανοητικόν, ἡσυχίαν  
ἄγει τὸ σῶμα καὶ καθέστηκεν οὔτε κοινωνοῦν οὔτε μετέχον αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας 
τοῦ φρονοῦντος, εἰ τοῦ παθητικοῦ μὴ συνεφάπτοιτο μηδὲ συμπαραλαμβάνοι τὸ 
ἄλογον. 
 
Whenever the faculty of thought is active, not with passion but by itself, the body is in a 
state of calm and stands still, provided that it [the body] does not take hold of the 
passionate faculty nor bring in the non-rational part, since it [the body] does not itself 
share in nor participate in the activity of the thinking part.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451B1–5) 
 
The rational part does not affect the body unless passion is involved, because it cannot.15 Without 
passions, we cannot initiate action in our embodied state. The point is not explicit here in [T50], 
but if we turn back to a passage shortly before this, which follows directly from [T46], Plutarch 
argues that the passionate part of the soul is instrumental and necessary for the production of 
action: 
[T51] ἡ δ’ ἀναγκαία διὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ δεομένη τῆς παθητικῆς ὥσπερ ὀργανικῆς  
ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, οὐκ οὖσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδ’ 
ἀναίρεσις ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις. 
 
But the other kind of virtue [moral virtue], which is necessary because of the body and is 
in need of the service of the passionate instrument of the soul for practical action, is not 
the destruction of the non-rational part of the soul nor its removal but is the arrangement 
and ordering of the non-rational part.  (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444D4–7) 
 
Passions serve as instruments for practical action (ὥσπερ ὀργανικῆς ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τὸ 
πρακτικόν), so much so that the perfection of our passionate nature, moral virtue, is necessary 
because of the body and its concerns (ἀναγκαία διὰ τὸ σῶμα). Passions, then, are instrumental 
and necessary for practical action (ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν), since reason alone, even the reason that 
                                                        
14 Plutarch, On the Sign of Socrates 591D5–7=[T31] in Chapter 2; On the Face in the Moon 943A6–7. 
15 Cf. Plutarch, On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1024A8–10. 
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ranges over contingent affairs and deliberates about courses of action, cannot initiate actions 
without passions.16 
This follows from Plutarch’s conception of impulses and the role that Plutarch assigns to 
practical reason in the production of action. As Plutarch argues in Whether the Affections of the 
Soul are Worse Than Those of the Body, impulse (ὁρμή) is the source (ἀρχή) of practical action 
(πρᾶξις), and passions (τὰ πάθη) are impulses (501C12–D1).17 Elsewhere, Plutarch writes that 
no passion is lacking in an impulse that leads to action (δραστηρίου ὁρμῆς οὐδὲν 
ἀπεστέρηται, On Superstition 165C8–11). The task of practical reason is, in addition to 
determining the correct ends and means of action, to bring our passions into moderate states so 
that they produce moderate and appropriate impulses to action, which are neither too vehement 
nor too weak. Continuing from [T49], I repeat a quotation from the previous chapter: 
[T38] τὴν δ’ ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὁρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία  
παρῇ καὶ μήθ’ ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτ’ ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρόν. 
Moral virtue produces impulse with passion. This impulse needs reason to give it 
boundaries so that the impulse may be present to the right degree, not going to excess nor 
failing in deficiency for the critical moment.         (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444B1–4) 
 
The rational part of the soul harnesses and makes use of passions to produce action, shaping 
passions and their impulses, making each one present to the right degree (μετρία) to produce 
                                                        
16 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178a14–16: “Some [moral actions] seem to happen due to the body, and 
moral virtue seems to be closely tied to the passions in many ways” (ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος 
δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή). Cf. also 1178a19–20. Aristotle does not hold 
the view that action without passion is impossible, but he does hold that theoretical intellect does not initiate action. 
See n. 22 below. 
17 “For impulse is the source of practical action, and passions are the vehemence of impulse” (αἱ γὰρ ὁρμαὶ τῶν 
πράξεων ἀρχαί, τὰ δὲ πάθη σφοδρότητες ὁρμῶν). In the context of the passage, Plutarch discusses excessive 
diseased states of the passions (νοσῶν…ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς πάθεσιν, 501C5–D6), but I take the notion of passionate 
involvement in impulse to be generalizable to cases in which passion is moderate and leads to action, as is evidenced 
by the instances in which passionate impulses can be moderate (On Moral Virtue 444B1–4=[T38] in Chapter 2). Cf. 
also On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 548D6–7. On excessive passions as diseased states (νοσήματα) in 




 When our passions are too weak, practical reason (ὁ πρακτικὸς λόγος) must incite 
(ἐξεγείρειν) and rekindle (ἀναρριπίζειν) the impulses of our passions (Plutarch, On Moral 
Virtue 444B10–C6).19 Yet even here, reason is not creating impulses of its own. Reason does not 
bypass the non-rational passions and bring about action by itself, but instead must stoke the 
flames of our non-rational passions to produce an appropriate impulse.  
Through his division of intellectual and moral virtues, Plutarch assigns an essential role 
to passions and the passionate part of the soul that we cannot do without if we are to engage in 
practical actions. The care for our bodies and their well-being requires the activity of the 
passions; we would be inert and doomed to inaction (ἀπραξία) without them.20 The division 
between intellectual and moral virtues based on the types of objects they cognize may appear 
largely indebted to Aristotle, as I note above, but even here, Plutarch’s apparent reliance on an 
Aristotelian division can be traced back to a Platonic tradition.21 Where Plutarch distinguishes his 
own psychology is in assigning all impulses that lead to action to the passionate part of the soul. 
Unlike Aristotle, for whom there are rational desires that seem to fuse a rational activity with a 
desiderative state that leads to action,22 Plutarch describes every instance of practical action as 
                                                        
18 Cf. Beneker 2012, p. 11: “[R]eason constrains the passions but also relies on them to provide impulse (ὁρμή) to 
action.” Cf. also Opsomer 2012, p. 316. 
19 =[T37] in Chapter 2. Cf. Plutarch, Table-Talk 663D7–E4 and Advice on Keeping Well 128F1–4 in n. 37 below. 
20 Plutarch’s view that passions are necessary for action can be formulated as an ἀπραξία type of argument, though 
Plutarch does not himself present it this way: Without passions, we are incapable of practical action, i.e. we are in a 
state of being unable to act in practical affairs (ἀπραξία). It is impossible to live life without action (see Cicero, 
Academica 2.31, 2.99; D.L. 9.104). We, therefore, cannot live life without passions. For Plutarch’s defense of 
Academic skepticism against an ἀπραξία argument see Plutarch, Reply to Colotes 1122A–D. For other accounts of 
the ἀπραξία argument leveled against Academics see Cicero, Academica 2.37–8, 2.61–2, 2.104; D.L. 9.107; S.E., 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.23–4, 1.26; Against the Professors 7.30. Cf. Kechagia 2011, pp. 308–10. For a discussion 
on the origins of the ἀπραξία argument against Academic skepticism see Vander Waerdt 1989, pp. 244–7. 
21 Cf. Republic 5, 477d. See also Gauthier and Jolif’s commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics, vol. 2, pp. 440–1, and 
Babut 1969a, p. 149, n. 76. 
22 For Aristotle, desire (ὄρεξις) can be rational as well as non-rational, where βούλησις is sometimes a form of 
rational desire. See Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 2.10, 1226b2–5, 1227a3–5: προαίρεσις has its desiderative 
component (βούλησις), which is “a desire belonging to reason itself, and not to any non-rational desire.” See also 
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the product of a partnership between the rational part of the soul and the non-rational passionate 
parts.23 Passions in Plutarch’s view are a sine qua non for action, and the passionate parts of the 
soul must be present to contribute their part to action. 
Plutarch thus presents different normative goals for the two classes of virtue: the 
intellectual virtues are to be free of passions, having ἀπάθεια as the goal in that domain,24 but 
the moral virtues necessarily involve an appropriate measure of passion (μετριοπάθεια), the 
arrangement and ordering of the non-rational part of the soul (τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις) for the 
necessities of our bodies and for the sake of practical action (ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, On Moral 
Virtue 444D4–7=[T51]).25 Both the intellectual and moral virtues require the rational part of the 
soul, but only moral virtue requires the passionate part for the sake of practical action.26 
                                                        
On the Soul 3.9, 432b5. Yet βούλησις can also be a form of non-rational desire (Politics 7.15, 1334b6–28) and 
desires and impulses belong to both our rational and non-rational aspects (On the Soul 3.9, 432b6–7). Cf. 
Fortenbaugh 2006, pp. 55–60; Sherman 1989, p. 170. See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a31–1139b5: 
προαίρεσις is the starting-point and source for action (πράξεως ἀρχή) and requires both intellect and character to 
perform good action (εὐπραξία), since intellect does not initiate motion by itself. Good action is something at 
which desire (ὄρεξις) aims. Therefore, προαίρεσις is desiderative intellect or intellectual desire (διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς 
νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική). Cf. Kraut 2012, p. 533: “[T]hought that is undertaken for the sake of 
achieving some goal that is desired is the kind of thought that moves us. For Aristotle says, in the portion of VI 2 
that leads to this statement, that it is desire and thought working and fused together that leads to action.” 
23 Cf. Opsomer 2012, p. 325 and n. 76. That reason itself is inert is often taken to be a view put forward by David 
Hume. See Hume 2000, 3.1.1.3–15, esp. 3.1.1.5–12 and 2.3.3.1ff. In 3.1.1.5, Hume argues that reason concerns the 
truth and falsity of claims but is practically inert and inactive: “An active principle can never be founded on an 
inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself 
in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings…. 
[R]eason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection” (3.1.1.7–8). Cf. Sayre-
McCord 2008: While Hume has often been taken to assign inactivity to all rational faculties, “The (Now) Standard 
Reading of Hume” as Sayre-McCord 2008 puts it (pp. 301–2), that reading does not do justice to Hume’s actual 
arguments (pp. 302–11): “There is a common mistake in interpreting Hume’s position that consists in thinking that 
Hume assumes—or is in some way committed to thinking—that reason alone cannot cause action, period. This is a 
more sweeping claim than he accepts and than his argument requires (though he does sometimes write as if he 
accepts this sweeping claim)” (p. 304). See also Singpurwalla 2010, p. 880: “Many philosophers today approach 
important psychological phenomena, such as weakness of the will and moral motivation, using a broadly Humean 
distinction between beliefs, which aim to represent the world, and desires, which aim to change the world. On this 
picture, desires provide the ends or goals of action, while beliefs simply tell us how to achieve those ends.” 
24 See On Moral Virtue 444C10–D3=[T46] and On the Sign of Socrates 588D9–10. 
25 Cf. Babut 1969b, pp. 321–33; Gill 2006, pp. 237–8; Karamanolis 2013, p. 228. Cf. also Dillon 1977 and Roskam 
2005, pp. 312–20. See also §V.d of the Introduction. 
26 I will discuss how Plutarch envisions the intellectual and moral virtues as related to each other and as parts of the 
moral life in Chapter 6, §IV. 
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 This view bears a resemblance to the presentation of passions as the source of action and 
motivation in Plato’s Phaedrus, which Plutarch exploits throughout Platonic Questions 9 
(1008A1–5, C5–D6; 1009B2–8).27 The Palinode section of the Phaedrus presents the image of a 
pre-incarnate soul in which the non-rational passionate parts are likened to a yoked pair of horses 
that pull a charioteer, who represents the rational part of the soul. The charioteer guides while the 
horses provide pulling-power (Phaedrus 247c3–248a6). In this picture, movement appears to be 
initiated by passions and correct action results when these motions are coordinated with reason.  
 Plato’s Republic, however, may present a different picture in which passions are not 
needed for action. In the Republic, reason by itself appears to be capable of initiating practical 
actions without involving passions or the passionate parts of the soul.28 The rational part of the 
soul in the Republic governs the non-rational parts and orients their desires to correct ends in the 
right way (Republic 4, 441e3–5, 442c4–7; 9, 586d4–587a2).29 Beyond countermanding particular 
desires in cases of critical psychic conflict,30 the rational part of the soul also appears to be 
capable of providing reasons for action apart from the non-rational desires themselves, since (i) it 
is capable of evaluating what objects and courses of action are worthwhile from rational 
principles, and (ii) those reasons for action are practically motivating.31 While the non-rational 
                                                        
27 I take up these points further in Chapter 4. 
28 I follow Cooper 1999b in the argument for practical rationality that follows. 
29 Republic 4, 441e3–5: “Therefore is it fitting for the rational part to rule, since it is wise and has foresight on behalf 
of the whole soul” (οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς 
ψυχῆς προμήθειαν); 442c4–7: One is “wise by that small part which rules and gives commands to these [non-
rational parts], since it in fact has, once again, knowledge within itself of what is beneficial to each part of the soul 
and to the whole that is common to the three parts of the soul” (σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἦρχέν 
τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑκάστῳ τε 
καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων). See also Watson 1975, esp. p. 212; Irwin 1977; and Nussbaum 
1986, p. 138. 
30 Cf. Republic 4, 439a1–d8, for the example of the rational part effectively countering the appetitive part of the 
soul’s desire for a drink and halting this desire from issuing in action. 
31 See Cooper 1999b, pp. 122–6 and 124–5, n. 9; 1999c, p. 240. Cooper also argues that this sense of practical 
motivation is presupposed in Plato’s Meno and Protagoras. Cf. Teloh 1976, p. 346. Cf. also Cooper 1999b, p. 119, 
n. 2, where he argues that Aristotle also has a similar notion of practical rationality expressed in Eudemian Ethics 
2.10, 1226b2–5, 1227a3–5. See n. 15 above. 
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passions, especially the appetitive part of the soul, are concerned with meeting the needs of 
bodily existence, the rational part of the soul is (i) capable of determining what is most fitting for 
each of the needs of the body, and, furthermore, is better at determining what is appropriate than 
the general desires of the appetitive part.32 The rational part can, then, (i) determine what is 
needed and (ii) motivate actions without recourse to desires arising from other parts of the soul 
and do so in a way that is better determined than if one were to follow the influence of the non-
rational passions.33 
 So, perhaps Plato’s dialogues are not clear on whether passions are necessary for the 
production of practical action. Nevertheless, for Plutarch, passions issue from the passionate 
parts of the soul and these parts remain distinct from reason, just as the horses remain distinct 
from the charioteer in the Phaedrus, and, unlike what may be the position in the Republic, they 
are necessary for practical action. Reason by itself is inert (On Moral Virtue 451B1–5=[T50]). 
 
§II Passions as the Wind in Our Sails 
 Beyond assigning a necessary role to passions in action, Plutarch claims that passions do 
much more. As we will explore in this section and those that follow, passions can also contribute 
                                                        
32 See especially the remarks on the generic quality of appetitive desires in Republic 4, 437d1–438a5, where the 
desire is not for good drink, or any particular drink, but just drink, and also 9, 586d4–587a2, where Socrates 
explains that non-rational desires are best and most truly fulfilled when the rational part of the soul determines their 
objects and appropriate measures: “Could we confidently say that out of all the desires that concern both the profit-
loving part [of the soul] and the victory-loving part [of the soul], those that follow knowledge and reason and with 
knowledge and reason pursue and take hold of the pleasures that the thinking part of the soul prescribes, these 
desires will take to themselves the most true pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to take true pleasures, since 
they follow truth, that is, pleasures that are their own, if what is best for each part is in fact most its own?” 
(θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, αἳ μὲν ἂν τῇ 
ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, 
λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθείᾳ ἑπομένων, καὶ 
τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον;) Cf. Plutarch, On the Sign of Socrates 
584D–E. 
33 See also Kamtekar 2010, p. 134, who argues that the non-rational parts of the soul could be said to contribute only 
insofar as they free the rational part of the soul to do what is peculiar to itself, namely contemplate. The rational part 
of the soul, however, would still do a better job of meeting the needs of the body. 
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by enhancing and intensifying virtuous action and inciting a greater enthusiasm and desire to 
become virtuous. They make life better.  
First, we will begin with Plutarch’s depiction of passions as the “Wind in Our Sails” that 
help move the ship of soul. As in the Myth of the Charioteer of Plato’s Phaedrus, passions 
provide motive force that can be harnessed and guided to good ends, but motive force is not a 
positive attribute per se; we can be propelled into error and blown off course by excessive 
passions.34 Nevertheless, Plutarch writes that most people need passions to get moving at all: 
[T52] τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς  
ἀργότερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλείποντος. 
 
But even if35 it were possible for the passions to be entirely removed, in many people 
reason is too indolent and too blunted,36 like a pilot when the wind fails to blow.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 452B1–4)37 
                                                        
34 Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 247b1–c2: If the passions are harnessed correctly, they can add motivational force, but often 
the passions have the opposite effect, causing distraction and befuddling the rational part of the soul’s ability to 
correctly steer the soul through life, as seen in the chaos experienced by charioteers who fail to gain the upper hand 
over their passions. Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444B1–10, the cables that keep us from inordinate and shameful 
actions can be broken by the powerful gust of passions (εἶθ’ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος πολλοῦ ῥηγνυμένας τοῦ 
πάθους), leaving one to be swept along with full sails (πλησίστιος) toward pleasures, or cause one to shipwreck on 
the shameful shoals (περιπίπτει περὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν); Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse Than Those of the 
Body 501D–E: Plutarch describes the stormy conditions of soul that disturb reason (λογισμός), which results in the 
lack of a pilot (ἀκυβέρνητος), as the soul is tossed about to shipwreck. Cf. also To an Uneducated Ruler 782D–E; 
Timoleon 6.1–5; On the Control of Anger 460A10–B10. 
35 For the rendering of εἰ καί as “even if,” see the parallels in Smyth §2378: “εἰ (ἐὰν) καί not infrequently means 
even if in prose as well as poetry.” Examples cited include passages from Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, 
Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Isocrates. For a parallel in Plato’s Republic see 551c2–4: “For consider the case if 
someone should thus choose captains based on wealth and would not hand the position over to a poor man, even if 
he should be more of a captain” (ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας, ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ 
πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι). The counter-factual reading I have given here is also 
supported by the  earlier passage at 443C2–5 in On Moral Virtue, which I turn to below. Cf. also Babut 1969a, p. 
124, and Beneker 2012, p. 56–7, for a similar counterfactual reading here. 
36 For the translation of the comparative adjectives as denoting excess see Smyth §1083c. 
37 Cf. Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1008A1–4: “Justly has nature given to the greatest part of the soul the place 
that is above, establishing in the head the rational part of the soul like a pilot” (καὶ δικαίως τῷ κρατίστῳ 
ἀποδέδωκε τὴν ἄνω χώραν ἡ φύσις, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτην ἐνιδρύσασα τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸν λογισμόν). Cf. also 
Plutarch, Table-Talk 663D7–E4: “As pilots withdraw from a violent wind, but no one is able to rekindle and stir it 
back up again after is has ceased and died down, in the same way it is no great fear to resist a desire and curtail its 
excess, but it altogether hard and difficult to intensify and rekindle it [desire] when it has been worn down before its 
season, is relaxed, and has lost what is proper to itself” (ὡς δὲ λάβρον πνεῦμα κυβερνῆται πολλαῖς μηχαναῖς 
ὑποφεύγουσιν, παυσάμενον δὲ καὶ μαρανθὲν οὐδεὶς πάλιν ἐκριπίσαι καὶ διασεῖσαι δυνατός ἐστιν, οὕτως 
πρὸς ὄρεξιν ἐνστῆναι μὲν καὶ κολοῦσαι τὸ πλεονάζον αὐτῆς οὐ μέγ’ ἔργον, ἤδη δὲ κάμνουσαν πρὸ καιροῦ 
καὶ μαλθακιζομένην καὶ ἀπολείπουσαν τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐντεῖναι καὶ ἀναζωπυρῆσαι παγχάλεπον, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ 




In this image, reason stands at the helm, like a pilot guiding and steering the ship, while the 
passions initiate movement and provide continued propulsion to act.38 In this image, Plutarch 
affirms the notion adumbrated in the Phaedrus’s Myth of the Charioteer: guidance is the pilot’s 
bailiwick, not the jolt that sets the vehicle in motion nor the force that keeps it going. 
Yet in this passage, Plutarch seems to entertain an option which in the last section we saw 
him deny. In the Wind in Our Sails passage, it looks as though the majority of people (οἱ 
πολλοί) need passions to provide motivation, but a few individuals might still be able to act 
through reason alone, without any involvement of the passions. If this is Plutarch’s position, then 
it contradicts his arguments on why passions are necessary for practical action, which we 
surveyed in §I. Long before we get to the metaphor of passions as the wind in our sails, Plutarch 
also denies the possibility that we can be entirely rid of passions in this life. Non-rational 
passions are inextricable from the incarnate life: “To remove non-rational passion completely” 
(τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν), he writes, “is not possible” (οὔτε δυνατόν, On Moral Virtue 
443C9).39 If passions can be entirely removed, then Plutarch would have to reverse his position 
on this point as well. 
 Though Plutarch appears to concede that one might, after all, be able to act without 
passions, he is not actually stepping back from the claims we saw him making in the previous 
section. Passions and the non-rational passionate parts of the soul are indeed necessary for 
practical action. Instead, Plutarch presents a dialectical argument for his opponents, the Stoics, 
                                                        
in hard when the weather is fair nor use it in a careless and negligent manner when he is in a state of suspicion [that 
something may be wrong]” (δεῖ δ’ ὥσπερ ἱστίον τὸ σῶμα μήτε συστέλλειν εὐδίας οὔσης καὶ πιέζειν σφόδρα, 
μήτ’ ἀνειμένως χρῆσθαί τε καὶ καταφρονεῖν ἐν ὑποψίᾳ γενόμενον). Cf. Babut 1969b, p. 329, n. 3. 
38 On the frequent use of wind as a metaphor for passions see Nussbaum 1994, ch. 12, and Lutz 1988. See also n. 34 
above. 
39 Cf. also On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1025D, discussed below. 
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whose position he addresses in 452C6–D1, shortly after the Wind in Our Sails passage. The 
Stoics deny the usefulness of passions in motivating action, since they believe that all passions 
are excessive impulses.40 In the Wind in Our Sails passage, Plutarch presents a hypothetical 
scenario in which it might be possible for action to be initiated without passions, as the Stoics 
believe to be the case for rational impulses (λογικαὶ ὁρμαί).41 Even if that were possible, 
Plutarch argues in the Wind in Our Sails passage, the Stoics must admit that most people would 
be too weak and indolent in their capacities to do anything worthwhile and perhaps anything at 
all without passions.42 The rational part of the soul would not pull out the oars, as it were, when 
the sea and air are placid, to begin a second-sailing (δεύτερος πλοῦς).43 Most people would 
simply fail to move or do anything useful. The Stoics should take this point into consideration in 
their view that passions provide excessive impulses, Plutarch argues, since it seems entirely 
plausible to think that most people would be deficient in their impulses and motivations without 
passions. The problem of motivation and impulse, then, lies not only in excessive impulses of 
passions, but also in a lack of motivational drive in the absence of passions. 
 In the argument against the Stoics that follows (452C6–D1), Plutarch pushes the point 
further and accuses the Stoics of self-delusion or outright hypocrisy on this point. The Stoics, 
just as much as anyone else, Plutarch argues, recognize the usefulness of passions in motivating 
                                                        
40 Stob. 2.7.10=SVF 3.378=LS 65A; Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 441C10–D3 and 449C3–7. 
41 Stob. 2.7.9 (p. 86, l. 17–p. 87, l. 6)=SVF 3.169=LS 53Q. 
42 They are too indolent (ἀργότεροι), that is, lazy and inefficacious (ἀεργός / ἀργός), to motivate action. For the 
sense of inefficacy see Plato, Euthydemus 272a6: the battle is unaccomplished (μάχη ἀργός). They also seem to 
lack proper vision to see what is required, since being too blunted (ἀμβλύτερος) contrasts with having sharp vision 
and foresight, which would be excellent qualities characteristic of the good captain of a ship and of the rational part 
of the soul in a virtuous soul (cf. Plato, Republic 4, 442c4–7; 9, 586d4–587a2). On the contrast between being blunt 
and being sharp, note that nine out of ten of the uses of ἀμβλύς in Plato’s dialogues, the term is contrasted with 
“sharp” (ὀξύς) in terms of visual or auditory acuity: Theaetetus 174e7, Sophist 232e8, Parmenides 165c1, 
Euthydemus 281d1, Republic 10, 596a, Laws 4, 715d8; as a general antithesis: Lysis 215e7; or in terms of angles of 
a triangle, obtuse vs. acute: Timaeus 55a1 
43 Cf. Phaedo 99c–d. I mean by this allusion nothing more than to draw out the sense of a second-best alternative, 
failing the first option.  
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action and instilling a desire to become virtuous, since they also use these emotions to motivate 
action and encourage a desire for virtue in others. Implicitly, they must already agree that most 
people are somehow deficient in their impulses toward virtue without these passions, otherwise 
they would not themselves be using them.44 Their actions belie their own avowed assertions. And 
so, Plutarch argues, even if it were possible to motivate action without passions, passions would 
still be useful, since most people need passions to motivate them to act and to become virtuous. 
 
§III Enhancing Action and Divine Aid 
Immediately following the Wind in Our Sails passage, Plutarch launches into examples in 
which passions enhance action, such as passionate inspiration, god-breathed battle-fury, and 
courage (452B4–C4). Drawing on passages from Homer’s Iliad, Plutarch writes that the 
passionate and inspired element of the soul (τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιῶδες)45 can render one 
impossible to resist and unconquerable, just as the gods breathed great might into Agamemnon 
(ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα, Homer, Iliad 15.262) and empowered Diomedes’ battle-rage (μαίνεται, 
Homer, Iliad 5.185).46 In the aristeia passages from Homer, the gods bestow a kind of battle-fury 
and ensure success through special intervention into human affairs. In the context of these 
passages, other heroes quickly recognize the role of divine aid and realize that the fight is not 
equal-handed in such periods of divine succor; they must await the end of divine favor bestowed 
upon their enemy before they have a chance to defeat them. God-breathed battle-rage bestows a 
                                                        
44 I will take up this argument further in Chapter 5, §IV, where I discuss Plutarch’s arguments on the role of shame 
in moral progress, but here I give the argument in brief in order to contextualize Plutarch’s Wind in Our Sails 
passage. 
45 While the majority of manuscripts have τὸ before ἐνθουσιῶδες, I read τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιῶδες as a 
hendiadys, “the passionate, enthusiastic part,” which indicates a single part of the soul. As a parallel see Plutarch’s 
use of hendiadys with “the passionate, non-rational part” (τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον) nn. 65–6 in Chapter 2. As 
should become clear below, Plutarch indicates that the capacity or part by which we experience inspiration is the 
non-rational passionate part of the soul. 
46 Quoted in Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 452C3 and C4 respectively. 
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mantle of increased power and success, an enhancement of activity through passionate 
empowerment.  
Passions here provide more than a low or adequate impulse to action; they give a forceful 
boost. Passions can be experienced as inspiration and enthusiasm (ἐνθουσιασμός), true to their 
etymologies, as though a god or aiding spirit is within (ἐν-θεός). Plutarch continues by writing 
that Homer describes the gods (οἱ θεοί, 452C1) as inspiring heroes in Iliad 15.262 and 5.185: 
[T53] καθάπερ ὅρμημα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ὄχημα τὸ πάθος προστιθέντας. 
 
just as though they [the gods] have added passion as a driving-force and vehicle to 
reason.      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 452C5–6) 
 
Here, Plutarch does not keep the notion restricted to rage or might (μένος) through courage, but 
instead leads with a general description of “passion” (τὸ πάθος), which leaves open the 
possibility that all or any number of kinds of passion have been added to reason by the gods, 
whether passions of the spirited part or appetitive part of the soul. This is our first hint that 
Plutarch intends for us to understand more in [T53] than is implied in the narrowed description 
of enhanced battle-rage given in the Homeric examples above (452C3–4). In a passage from the 
Dialogue on Love, Plutarch includes passion in friendship as aided by god: one is, “as it were, 
borne along on a wave of passion with god’s help into friendship” (καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν 
φιλίαν…καθάπερ ἐπὶ κύματος τοῦ πάθους ἅμα θεῷ φερομένη, 759D3–4). From these 
passages, we see that passions, not limited just to battle-rage, exhibit a touch of the divine. 
 Moreover, in addition to including more than just a single class of non-rational passions, 
such as those belonging exclusively to the spirited part of the soul or limited to instances of rage 
and fury, Plutarch additionally is not limiting his discussion of passionate enhancement to one-
off experiences of passions in [T53]. Even though [T53] follows two examples of temporary 
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inspiration,47 it alludes to passages in both the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, which, as we will see, 
make clear that Plutarch has in mind a description of the structure of the soul in [T53], not 
merely particular instances of passionate enhancement. The gods have given the passionate parts 
to the human soul as a gift for self-motivated action in addition to providing particular moments 
of inspiration. 
 First, in describing passions as the vehicle (ὄχημα) and incitement (ὅρμημα) to reason, 
we are brought back to the charioteer image in which the rational part of the soul is joined to the 
horse-power of the non-rational parts in chariots (ὀχήματα, Phaedrus 247b2).48 In that image, 
the non-rational passions are not so much the vehicle itself as much as they are the impetus and 
pulling force of the vehicle; the passions are more of a consistent driving force (ὅρμημα).49 But, 
                                                        
47 Cf. Frazier 2008, p. 126: Frazier sees the momentary inspiration of passion as an instance of μανία drawn from 
Plato’s Phaedrus, contrasting battle-fury inspiration, which ceases at the end of one’s aristeia, with the persistence 
of the nagging passion of ἔρως, which does not cease after a quick bout of expression and cathartic release. I take 
Plutarch’s discussion here to connect more with the passage we see in Plato’s Timaeus (discussed below), as 
indicating sources of passion within the soul, not just instances of inspiration that may have different durations. 
48 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 41d8–e2 and Philo, On the Cheribum 24: The Demiurge assigns souls to board stars as 
vehicles that they drive round the heavens; Cf. also Pseudo-Plato, Epinomis 986a8–b8. For discussion of the 
developing notion of the ethereal body, the ὄχημα-πνεῦμα, or the increasingly physically entangled vehicle of soul 
in Neoplatonism and early Christianity of Late Antiquity, see Finamore 1985; Sorabji 2005, pp. 221–41; and Dillon 
2013. For a very different take on the vehicle of soul in a late Christian author cf. Gregory of Nyssa On Virginity 12, 
who describes the Holy Spirit as the vehicle of the soul. 
49 The only usage of ὅρμημα in Plutarch’s extant corpus occurs in [T53]. In addition to being a bit of paronomasia 
with ὄχημα, it also brings to mind its near homophone, ἅρμα, the war-chariot. More than this, Plutarch might also 
have in mind the first extant usages of ὅρμημα in Homer’s Iliad, given his familiarity with Homer as attested by his 
many quotations. In passages from the second book of the Iliad, heroes of the Greek and allied forces who are set on 
sacking Troy seek “to avenge the longings and groans for Helen” (τίσασθαι δ’ Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς 
τε, 2.356, repeated in 2.590). Some interpreters have taken the longings and groans as issuing from Helen herself, 
making Ἑλένης the genitive possessor or source rather than the genitive object of ὁρμήματα and στοναχάς. Since 
the Greek army and its allies are set on punishing Troy, more specifically Paris and his father Priam, for the rapine 
of Helen and her subsequent detention within the Trojan walls, it makes little sense to think of “the longings and 
groans” as issuing forth from Helen as their subject. That would imply that the Greeks desire to avenge Helen’s 
misconduct, not Paris’. I follow Aristarchus’ interpretation in seeing Helen as the object of longings and groans (see 
H. Erbse ed. (1969), Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (scholia vetera), 2.356a–356b). Aristarchus connects the 
ὁρμήματα of this line with the worries or cares (μεριμνήματα) attendant upon Helen’s capture. See the LSJ entry 
of ὅρμημα for a brief discussion of its history and etymology from ὁρμαίνω, “to long for,” supported by 
Aristarchus in this passage. Whether the Greek army is intent on avenging Paris for his inappropriate longings for 
Helen or to avenge the suffering of Menelaus’ longings for his absent wife, this first extant use of the term signifies 
a deep-seated passionate longing. It is not a mere stimulus, but an enduring passion strong enough to set disaster 
rolling for an entire generation of Greeks, Trojans, and their allies. 
 
 147 
that image is not one of a temporary experience of passion, such as a burst of anger, a fleeting 
moment of euphoria, or a momentary exhilaration in battle, as we might have expected following 
upon the Homeric examples before [T53]. Passions are a more enduring feature of the human 
psyche, since the non-rational parts of the soul, like the horses in the Myth of the Charioteer, are 
distinct elements that are sources of motivation. 
The other passage to which Plutarch appears to allude confirms that we are on the right 
track. Plato’s Timaeus similarly describes the non-rational passions as additions to the rational 
part of human souls. In the “likely account” (ὁ εἰκὼς μυθός)50 of creation in that dialogue, the 
lesser gods fashion the human soul by adding passions to its rational nature: 
[T29] οἱ δὲ μιμούμενοι, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν  
σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνευσαν ὄχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδοσαν ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ 
ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν, δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον.  
 
And imitating [the Demiurge], they took the immortal principle of the soul and thereupon  
spread around it a mortal body and provided the entire body as a vehicle. They also 
framed a different mortal form of soul inside it, having dreadful and necessary passions 
within it.        (Plato, Timaeus 69c5–d1) 
 
Compare [T53] now with this passage, which is [T29] in Chapter 2. In both instances, the gods 
add passions (τὸ πάθος / τὰ παθήματα) to the rational part of the soul, described as reason 
(λογισμός) in [T53], and the divine, immortal principle of the soul (ἀρχὴ ψυχῆς ἀθάνατος) in 
[T29]. Plutarch’s mention of the gods’ addition of a vehicle (ὄχημα) also draws close to the 
description in the Timaeus. Plutarch departs from this passage in the Timaeus, however, by 
putting emphasis not on the physical vessel (ὄχημα) of the body, but instead on the passions that 
accompany the creation of the body.51 With this passage from the Timaeus in the background, we 
                                                        
50 Timaeus 29d2, 59c6, 68d2, and 72d7. 
51 Cf. On Moral Virtue 450F6–7: Plutarch seems to indicate that the passionate element is closely tied to the body 
and decreases in strength together with the body (τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῷ σώματι συναπομαραινομένου) as one ages. 
In the Republic (328D) Cephalus describes certain passions as decreasing due to senescence. The same notion is 
present in Plato’s Laws (1, 645d1–e3; 2, 671b8–c2), where the decline in good emotions can be countered through 
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see that [T53] describes psychic composition, not merely instances or movements of passion in 
the soul. 
Plutarch also puts a more positive interpretation on the addition than we find in [T53]. 
While the vehicular notion in the Timaeus provides the sense of physical locomotion, such that 
the soul moves together with the body that it inhabits, Plutarch’s vehicle of the soul focuses on 
the motivational force of the passions. The implication from [T53] is that gods have added non-
rational passion in order to aid humans, namely as a driving force and vehicle. They are not 
merely necessary, dreadful additions (Timaeus 69c8–d1). The gods have granted passions to 
humans to aid the intellectual part of their souls.  
Given this addition to the soul, the wind in our sails need not always come from outside 
ourselves, as though we depend invariably on external sources of motivation, like the captain of 
a ship who must wait on a favorable breeze. The gods inspire our actions not only by providing 
an extra boost on occasion, as though blowing a gust of air into the sails, but also by giving us 
internal sources of motivation to act. Like the Aeolian bag of wind given to Odysseus (Odyssey 
10.19–24), the gods have given us our own source of wind, as it were, for self-propulsion. 
 
§IV Attached Passions and Intensifying Virtue 
 
 Plutarch also indicates that particular passions can come to the aid of reason to push us on 
the right course and to intensify virtuous actions. As to the first, Plutarch argues that it is 
appropriate for certain passions, such as anger, to call us to action in particular situations. While 
passions may interfere with our deliberations and oppose our better judgment, as though passions 
are attached to one side of a balance-beam (ζυγόν) as we weigh out what we ought to do (On 
                                                        
alcoholic consumption, since many passions are reawakened and reinvigorated while one is inebriated. Cf. Belfiore 
1986, who believes that the Laws’ treatment of the passions through inebriation may have influenced Aristotle’s 
theory of catharsis. 
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Moral Virtue 447D6–F4), sometimes, Plutarch writes, they help tip the scale in the right 
direction: 
[T54] ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν αἴσθησις ἔστιν,  
οὕτως ἐνταῦθα πειθοῦς καὶ ἀκολουθίας, οἷον ἐπιρρέποντος καὶ συνεπιδιδόντος. 
 
Just as in the one case [of growing angry unjustifiably against one’s family members] 
there is a perception of fighting and conflict of passion against reasoning, likewise in the 
other case [of growing angry justifiably against enemies] there is a perception of 
obedience and conformity, that, as it were, tips the scale in its favor and increases the 
force of its decision.    (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 448D7–10) 
 
In the second instance here, Plutarch imagines a situation in which one acts justly (δικαίως) on 
behalf of one’s children and other family members. Instead of finding a passion attached to the 
balance beam on the opposite side from a better judgment, Plutarch here describes a case in 
which passions help one make the right decision and pursue the correct course of action. They 
weigh in favor of the right judgment, as though the weight of passion helps pull one headlong to 
the just action that reason determines to be the right course, without hesitation. Here, passion 
contributes to a just action (συνεπιδιδόντος, 448D10) and adds force to our rational judgment 
(ταῖς προστιθεμένου τοῦ πάθους κρίσεσι, 449C2–3). At the critical moment (τῷ καιρῷ), 
passion helps set us in motion.52 
 Anger is not always a good counselor nor should we heed its goads hastily in every 
situation. In On the Control of Anger, those who have a temper and tend to overreact in anger are 
advised to keep their deliberations dispassionate when considering how they will react to 
perceived slights and injustices (On the Control of Anger 460A5–10, 459C3–E4; On the Delays 
of the Divine Vengeance 550E2–F4).53 If they were to reflect upon their past faults, they would 
realize that their reactions are often premature and overly zealous. While angry, their reasoning 
                                                        
52 Cf. 444B1–4=[T38] in Chapter 2 and repeated above. See also Table-Talk 663D7–E4 in n. 37 above and Beasts 
are Rational 989B5–8, quoted in n. 115 of Chapter 2. 
53 Cf. also On the Control of Anger 459A8–B2. 
 
 150 
is tossed about by the gale-storm winds of their anger. Like those who row their boats out into a 
storm, they are poised for disaster (On the Control of Anger 460A10–B10). While anger may 
help bring an injustice to their attention, they should wait and deliberate when in a calmed 
temperament, lest they act in a way that they will later come to regret or begin to develop an 
unhealthy desire to punish others and take pleasure in it (On the Control of Anger 460C1–754; On 
the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 550F4–551A355). 
 Yet in certain situations, perhaps even for those who are prone to excess, anger can be 
appropriate in its call to action. In On the Control of Anger, it is conceded that though we often 
give hatred of evil as a pretext for our angry reactions there still is an appropriate place for 
righteous anger (μισοπονηρία) in the moral life (463B7–C1, E1–6).56 As we see in [T54], when 
our friends and family are in peril or are unjustly treated, our hatred of injustice and our desire to 
fight against it properly rouses us to action to the right end and in agreement with a correct 
judgment, helping us get straightway and forcefully to action. 
 In addition to inciting action, spirited passions such as anger can also intensify virtuous 
action. While beasts of burden are useful to humans for both agriculture and hunting, as the horse 
belongs under the yoke of the chariot, the ox is fit for the plow, and dogs serve to aid our hunt 
                                                        
54 “We should avoid being carried off to pleasure and rejoicing in vengeance, as though from a desire to take 
enjoyment in punishing” (οὐ…πρὸς ἡδονὴν δεῖ καθάπερ ἀπολαύσματος ὀρέξει τῆς τιμωρίας ἐμφορεῖσθαι 
καὶ χαίρειν κολάζοντας). 
55 “For to encounter turbid water and use it because of a lack of self-control is less evil, as Socrates used to say, than 
for our reason, muddied with passion and brim-full of anger and rage to glut oneself with punishment of our kith and 
kin, the human race” (ὕδατι γὰρ τεταραγμένῳ προσπεσόντα χρῆσθαι δι’ ἀκρασίαν ἧττόν ἐστι κακόν, ὡς 
Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, ἢ θολερὸν ὄντα καὶ διάπλεω τὸν λογισμὸν ὀργῆς καὶ μανίας, πρὶν ἢ καταστῆναι καὶ 
γενέσθαι καθαρόν, ἐμφορεῖσθαι τιμωρίας συγγενοῦς καὶ ὁμοφύλου σώματος). Cf. LSJ s.v. ὁμόφυλος, which 
it taken to be wider in extension than ὁμοεθνής, “of the same people group / race,” and to be more inclusive in 
describing an entire species. 
56 Cf. Ingenkamp 2000, pp. 263–4, and Van Hoof 2005, p. 502. Plutarch writes more explicitly in On Envy and Hate 
that “many people are hated justly, whom we call worthy-of-hate” (μισοῦνται δὲ πολλοὶ δικαίως, οὓς 
ἀξιομισήτους καλοῦμεν, 537C9–10) and “righteous anger is in the class of things we praise” (ἡ μισοπονηρία τῶν 
ἐπαινουμένων ἐστί, D3). 
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for boars (On Moral Virtue 451D6–8),57 Plutarch writes that “the brood-like group of passions 
are far more useful” (πολὺ χρησιμώτερα τὰ τῶν παθῶν θρέμματα, 451D9),  
[T55] τῷ λογισμῷ συμπαρόντα καὶ συνεντείνοντα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, ὁ θυμὸς τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ,  
μέτριος ὤν, ἡ μισοπονηρία τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἡ νέμεσις ἐπὶ τοὺς παρ’ ἀξίαν 
εὐτυχοῦντας, ὅταν ἅμ’ ἀνοίᾳ καὶ ὕβρει φλεγόμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπισχέσεως 
δέωνται. 
  
 because they come to the aid of the rational part and they intensify virtues: anger, when it 
is moderate, [aids and intensifies] courage; righteous anger [aids and intensifies] justice; 
and indignation [aids and intensifies] one’s opposition to those who fair well 
undeservedly whenever they burn with foolishness and insolence in their souls and need 
to be stopped.     (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451D9–E4) 
 
In each of these instances, anger adds something to the execution of action, and not just any 
action, be it good or bad, but to virtuous actions. The first example of an anger (ὁ θυμός) that 
aids and intensifies courage also notes that this emotion is moderate (μέτριος ὤν). While we 
might expect that only excessive anger would give stronger force to courage, Plutarch 
emphasizes that the emotions that intensify and aid in virtuous action are correctly oriented and 
moderated.58 These emotions provide an intensifying force to action without going to excess. 
 
§V Incitement to Virtue, Enthusiasm, and Non-Rational Longing for Virtue 
 In addition to weighing in on our decision and intensifying the execution of virtuous 
actions, passions can also aid us in the pursuit of becoming virtuous. In his biographical work on 
the Spartan king Agesilaus, Plutarch writes that certain spirited emotions, such as the love of 
honor and of competition (τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόνεικον) and rivalry among citizens (ζῆλος) 
can serve as an incentive to virtue (ὑπέκκαυμα τῆς ἀρετῆς, Agesilaus 5.3–459; On Moral Virtue 
                                                        
57 Plutarch quotes Pindar (fr. 234 Maehler) in this passage.  
58 Cf. Wright 2008, p. 140: “Provided that reason molds and controls the passions, they can serve as powerful 
catalysts stimulating virtuous behavior. Furthermore, when held in moderation, the passions can assist reason by 
intensifying virtues.” 
59 Plutarch first draws upon natural philosophers (οἱ φυσικοί) who believe that quarreling and strife (νεῖκος καὶ 
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452B4–660). Like horses under the yoke of a chariot that run harder when paired together than 
when apart, so men because of rivalry with one another are more eager in their pursuit of a 
common good deed (Pelopidas 19.4).61 These passions light a fire under someone (ὑπεκκαίειν), 
as it were, kindling the flames of their drive for self-worth and self-fulfillment. 
 These emotions need not even involve comparison and competition with others to be 
useful for moral progress. As in the case of Julius Caesar, one may enter into rivalry with oneself 
(ζῆλος αὑτοῦ) for the purposes of self-improvement, ever trying to outdo one’s own past deeds 
(Caesar 58.4).62 For Caesar, this rivalry with himself was not necessarily motivated by a desire 
for moral improvement so much as by a desire for greater glory, but Plutarch takes the notion in 
a decidedly moral direction, encouraging us to remind one another in times of error of our better 
selves and actions of the past so that we may imitate our projected better selves for the purposes 
of ethical improvement. The rebuke of another  
[T56] ζῆλον ἐμποιεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν αἰδουμένῳ τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομνήσει καὶ  
παράδειγμα ποιουμένῳ τῶν βελτιόνων ἑαυτόν. 
 
produces rivalry against oneself, because one feels shame over one’s disgraceful deeds by 
the memory of [one’s past] noble deeds, and one sets oneself as a model of better ones. 
    (Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 72D2–4).  
                                                        
ἔρις) are necessary for the universe to be put into motion. He compares this cosmic view with those, like the Spartan 
lawgiver (ὁ Λακωνικὸς νομοθέτης), who believe that the love of honor and competition must be present for 
people to pursue virtue (Agis and Cleomenes 5.3). Plutarch, however, has some reservation and writes that one 
should not accept these principles simply put, since in their excess they are harsh to the citizens and present great 
dangers (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν οὕτως τις ἁπλῶς συγχωρήσειεν· αἱ γὰρ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν φιλονεικιῶν χαλεπαὶ 
ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους ἔχουσι). He nevertheless does support the general idea that some rivalry can 
be good to spur people to an edifying competition in the pursuit of virtue. See Duff 1999, pp. 83–7, and 2008, p. 14, 
for further discussion of these examples from Plutarch’s Lives and those that follow in this section. 
60 Plutarch seems to have the same lawgivers (οἱ νομοθέται), such as the Spartans, in mind as in Agesilaus 5.3–7 
(see the previous note), who “implant into their citizens the love of honor and rivalry with one another” 
(ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους). 
61 On other positive aspects of the love of honor see also Themistocles 3.4–5 and On Moral Progress 84B–C, which 
relate that admiration (θαυμάζειν) and praise (ἐπαινεῖν) led Themistocles to imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) and emulate 
(ζηλοῦν) good examples, and Theseus 6.8–9, 25.5, which describes Theseus as driven to emulate great deeds to 
good ends by the example of Hercules. 
62 Caesar’s “passion was nothing other than a rivalry with himself as though with another person, and [it was] a kind 
of competition for future actions compared to those already complete” (τὸ μὲν πάθος οὐδὲν ἦν ἕτερον ἢ ζῆλος 




This form of rivalry avoids the dangers of competition with others that can rouse a love of strife 
that belongs to vice (τὸ φιλόνεικον τῆς κακίας, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 72D5–
7). It aims purely at self-improvement, attempting to emulate the best parts of one’s own actions 
and character, drawing on past memory to excite a desire to improve upon one’s current state of 
soul. 
 To some extent, this positive aspect of the love of honor is anticipated in Plato’s 
Symposium. If a true lover progresses correctly in his ascent on the ladder of love (211c2–d1), 
one rung, as it were, along the way concerns noble pursuits and endeavors (210c6–d7, 211c5–7). 
Those who are pregnant in soul will desire to give birth to virtue and wisdom and to leave behind 
enviable offspring in the form of poetry, laws, and in their own glorious reputations (208e1–
209e4). In addition to being motivated by the erotic drive that pervades all of their endeavors,63 
from the pursuit of beautiful bodies to the desire for the Form of Beauty itself, they are driven at 
this stage by a desire for honor (φιλοτιμία, 208c3) and a feeling of rivalry (ζῆλος, 209d2). This 
rivalrous passion is channeled and put to good use. Instead of fighting over lovers or objects that 
distract from the upward course, these passions help lovers to continue to advance in an 
innocuous competition toward virtue, knowledge, and fulfillment.64 
                                                        
63 See especially Symposium 210e5–6: “It was for the sake of this [Beauty itself] that one had all the preceding toils, 
Socrates” (τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθεν πάντες πόνοι ἦσαν). See also Republic 
6, 505e1–5: “That which every soul seeks and for the sake of which it does all things, divining that it is, but being at 
a loss and not able to grasp sufficiently what it is nor to make use a stable conviction as it does about other things, 
for which reason it fails to gain any benefit from the other things” (ὅ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου 
ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν 
οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος 
ἦν). 
64 Cf. Shiffman 2010, pp. 249–10. As Shiffman points out, Plutarch draws upon this passage in Platonic Questions 
1, 999E, where he describes the perverse misdirection of this desire in sophists who aim at glory apart from moral 
improvement and honors divorced from a genuine desire for knowledge and truth. 
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 In addition to these spirited emotions, Plutarch also draws upon the notion in the 
Symposium that erotic desires provide a natural pull toward virtue. Beauty’s magnetic power of 
attraction in the Symposium, which draws us to itself as the ultimate object of our affections and 
desires (210e2–212c3) seems to lie in the background to Plutarch’s description of powerful 
affective desires toward virtue (δεινοὶ ἔρωτες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, On Listening to Lectures 
47C5–6). In line with this, Plutarch also describes the stretching of desire toward virtue as a 
longing (πόθος) for philosophy and moral progress: 
[T57] καθάπερ οὖν ἔρωτος ἀρχομένου σημεῖόν ἐστιν οὐ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ καλῷ παρόντι  
(τοῦτο γὰρ κοινόν) ἀλλὰ τὸ δάκνεσθαι καὶ ἀλγεῖν ἀποσπώμενον, οὕτως…. 
μέτριος μὲν ἄν σοι φανείη καὶ πρᾶος ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ συμφιλοσοφεῖν ὅταν δ’ 
ἀποσπασθῇ καὶ χωρὶς γένηται, θεῶ φλεγόμενον καὶ ἀδημονοῦντα καὶ 
δυσκολαίνοντα πᾶσι πράγμασι καὶ ἀσχολίαις, μνήμην δὲ φιλῶν ὥσπερ ἄλογος 
ἐλαύνεται πόθῳ τῷ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. 
 
 Just as the sign of a love that is beginning is not found in rejoicing in one’s beautiful 
[beloved] when he is present (since that is normal), but in feeling gnawing bites of pain 
and distress when separated [from him], similarly…someone would seem to you 
moderate and gentle while present and taking part in philosophical discourse, but 
whenever he is separated and is apart from it, observe him burning, in anguish, and 
annoyed with all matters and engagements, cherishing the memory of it, like a non-
rational animal driven by a longing for philosophy.  
(Plutarch, On Moral Progress 77B5–C6)  
 
Interestingly, Plutarch notes that it is in a non-rational state (ἄλογος) that one feels this internal 
urging to pursue philosophical advancement, perhaps similar to the longing and urging attributed 
to non-rational animals in the Symposium (207a8–9).65 The itch for philosophy is not just a 
rational curiosity or a certain cold calculation in pursuit of the appropriate end of life.66 It is a 
                                                        
65 While the point is not made explicit in the Symposium, there seems to be a connection between the desire for 
reproduction that all wild, non-rational beasts feel (τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας…ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα 
τὰ θηρία ἐπειδὰν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ, 207a8–9) and the longing for beauty and virtue that those who are truly 
pregnant have for engaging in discourse (208e1–209e4). 
66 Cf. Republic 9, 580d6–e3, 581b6–11; Phaedo 65c9, 66b6–7; 67b4, 67d7–68c2. Cf. also Philebus 51e7–52b8. 
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passionate pining for philosophy (πόθῳ τῷ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν On Moral Progress 77C6). We 
yearn for it when it is absent with a persistent, non-rational craving. 67 
In reverse order from what we saw before, instead of moving from rivalry with others to 
self-improvement, the desire for moral progress itself moves us to emulate those we see to be 
exemplary in their virtue. Plutarch later writes that this passion leads to the emulation of virtuous 
men because of yearning (διὰ πόθον), being full of an impulse that does not rest (μεστὸς ὢν 
ὁρμῆς οὐκ ἠρεμούσης) in longing to all but become one in nature with the good man (τῷ 
ἀγαθῷ μονονουχὶ συμφῦναι γλιχόμενος, 84D1–E1). We desire to be like the virtuous man, 
not to surpass him. True lovers of philosophy also “experience something like a kind of hunger 
and thirst in periods of separation” (πείνῃ τινὶ καὶ δίψῃ πάθος ὅμοιον ἐν τοῖς ἀποσπασμοῖς 
πάσχοντας, 77C8–10).68 This desire seeks satisfaction in virtue, like an appetite. 
Without this passionate longing, many will not follow through with an earnest pursuit of 
the virtuous life (76F1–77B2). When faced with trials and difficulties they eventually grow 
weary and give up (τελευτῶντες ἐξέκαμον καὶ ἀπηγόρευσαν, 77B2), as their initial eagerness 
                                                        
67 Plutarch no doubt has the philosophic madness described in the Phaedrus in mind here (244a–45c). He is hesitant, 
however, to call this love a madness, since he reserves that term for love that is excessive beyond what is 
appropriate for a given object. Cf. Sandbach fr. 135 (from Plutarch’s lost work, On Love)=Stob., 4.20.67: Some 
consider love a disease, others a madness, still others something divine; “Rightly some have thought that it is a 
desire when it begins, is a madness in excess, is friendship when reciprocated, is a weakness when lowly and is 
enthusiasm when it is prosperous” (ὀρθῶς ἐνίοις ἔδοξε τὸ μὲν ἀρχόμενον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι τὸ δ’ ὑπερβάλλον 
μανίαν τὸ δ’ ἀντίστροφον φιλίαν τὸ δὲ ταπεινότερον ἀρρωστίαν τὸ δ’ εὐημεροῦν ἐνθουσιασμόν). Contra 
Wright 2008, pp. 140–1, I do not take Plutarch’s description of a non-rational longing for philosophy to be an 
example of an ill-formed disposition. The passage and surrounding context do not lend themselves to that 
interpretation. It also would seem odd for Plutarch to claim that we could have an excessive desire for virtues or for 
philosophy. If we were to ask Plutarch if one’s love for virtue and philosophy could be excessive, I suspect he would 
tell us that the demands of the object of love in these cases cannot be exceeded by human capacity. One cannot 
desire virtue or philosophy too much.  
68 Note that Plato’s Republic sometimes uses the language of non-rational, appetitive desires for philosophy and 
virtue too: a true love for philosophy can strike one (ἔρως, 6, 499c1), one can become an ardent desirer of wisdom 
(σοφίας ἐπιθυμητής, 5, 475b8–9), as though with a desire belonging to the appetitive part of the soul (τὸ 
ἐπιθυμητικόν), and one can feel affection for wisdom (στέργειν, 7, 485c3–10). 
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withers away (τῆς προθυμίας οἷον ἀπομαραινομένης, 76F6–7).69 Plutarch even advises that 
we take stock of our dispositions as we progress in virtue (ποιητέον ἐπίσκεψιν καὶ κρίσιν τῆς 
περὶ αὑτὸν διαθέσεως) to see whether we still have an enthusiasm for virtue and what is noble 
(ἀναλογιζόμενον…εἰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐνθουσιασμός, On Listening to Lectures 
42A8–B2). 
We might have expected Plutarch to appeal to a spirited emotion to help one weather 
difficulties and press on in pursuit of virtue. In Plato’s Republic, the passion of courage helps one 
to stand fast and firm against adversities, enduring hardships to continue in the pursuit of what is 
noble (4, 442b10–c7).70 But in [T57], the erotic desire for philosophy and virtue is more like the 
bestial drive of hunger that sends a lion through wind and rain in pursuit of flocks, even into the 
sheepfold where he faces potential danger (Homer, Odyssey 6.130–4).71 The descriptions of 
passionate longing, hunger, and thirst for philosophy are typical of desires belonging to the 
appetitive part of the soul, not the spirited part.72 These too, Plutarch indicates, can draw one in 
pursuit of moral progress and can even sustain one’s pursuit in the face of difficulties. 
 
§VI That Life is Better with Passions Than Without Them 
 Given the usefulness of passions for action, their ability to enhance actions, and their role 
in inciting and sustaining a desire for moral improvement, Plutarch argues that not only is it 
impossible to remove passions entirely from our lives, but also that life without passions would 
                                                        
69 Cf. Wright 2008, pp. 141–2: “It is not only the case, though, that passions may assist in progressing toward 
virtue….Plutarch warns that absence or loss of passions for philosophy may lead to a person giving up the 
philosophical pursuit altogether.” 
70 “And I suppose that we call each individual courageous in virtue of this part of the soul, whenever his spirited part 
preserves through pleasures and pains the command given by reason on what one should shrink back from or not” 
(καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασῴζῃ διά τε 
λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή, 442b10–c2). 
71 Cf. Fortenbaugh 1975, p. 34: Desire seems to be able to take the form of appetitive as well as more cognitive, 
spirited emotions. 
72 Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 437d1–438a5. 
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not be better (οὔτ᾿ ἄμεινον). The rational part of the soul would not choose the elimination of 
passions to accomplish virtuous acts nor to escape interaction with the non-rational parts of the 
soul:  
[T58] τοῦ λόγου…οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν  
οὔτ᾿ ἄμεινον)  
  
 Reason…does not desire to completely remove passion, since that is not possible and is  
 not better.      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443C8–10) 
 
We should not desire to suppress our passions because human life and moral virtue are better 
with passions, nor should one attempt to remove the source of passions from the soul (τὴν τοῦ 
πάθους ἀρχήν…ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν, On Moral Virtue 451C2–5).73 The non-rational 
parts of the soul are inextricable from the embodied life and belong to it as natural additions to 
our rational nature, which are also serviceable, fitting, and beneficial. 
 As we saw in both Chapters 1 and 2, Plutarch believes that we forfeit good emotions if 
we try to void ourselves from the possibility of feeling painful passions entirely. The good 
outweighs the bad, and emotions such as love, joy, and benevolence must be protected and 
preserved above all else (παντὸς μᾶλλον διασῴζειν ἀναγκαῖον, Letter of Consolation to 
Apollonius 102C10–D2).74 Further, these passions make life better in the value we attach to our 
shared emotional lives, as we already explored to some extent in Chapter 1. In his Letter on 
Friendliness, Plutarch writes that marriage is better with passion: 
[T59] γάμος γὰρ ἀπὸ μὲν φιλίας διττῆς κράσεως βελτίων, ἑτέρως δὲ σφαλερός. 
 
A marriage is better if it comes from the mixing of affection from both sides; otherwise, 
it is on shaky ground.      (Sandbach fr. 167=Stob. 4.28.8) 
 
From this, Plutarch could mean little more than that marriage is better when it is mutual and 
                                                        
73 =[T32] in Chapter 2. 
74 =[T22] in Chapter 2 
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when affection is not one-sided. If that were the case, then two equally disinterested persons 
might mutually agree to fulfill their marital duties to one another for the sake of utility and put 
their marriage on solid ground just as well as two lovers who equally share in their affection for 
one another. Dutiful execution would not be a completely passionless affair, since passions are 
necessary for action (§I), but it would not be motivated from affection, but perhaps from a desire 
to act appropriately toward one another.  
 Plutarch, however, has more than just mutual levels of (dis)interest in mind. In On Moral 
Virtue, Plutarch remarks that marriages conducted from a sense of duty, where the parties merely 
perform actions for one another in fitting and appropriate manners (καθηκόντως), often lead to 
something greater, an additional care and intimacy that grows into love and affection (τὸ φιλεῖν 
καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν, 448D10–F2).75 The development is a positive addition. Emotional intimacy 
enhances our relationships. We are drawn together through love (ἔρως) and divinely inspired 
friendship (ἔνθεος φιλία, 452C–D), without which marriage is unstable.76 This intimacy, 
moreover, is made possible by the addition of a passionate nature to our rational nature, which 
we might rightly call a gift from the gods that has been blended into our lives to make our shared 
life better (cf. Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 50A2–5).77 
 Plutarch also stresses the point in Advice to Bride and Groom. Only through mutual love 
and affection is a couple able to become an intimate union, not merely a conjunction of discrete 
and separate individuals: 
                                                        
75 Plutarch writes that marriages that do not produce children are no less improved and solidified by mutual affection 
than those that do (Solon 20.3). Cf. Håland 2011. 
   In Nicomachean Ethics 8.12, 1162a24–7, Aristotle writes that marriages, which seem to be based on utility and 
pleasure, may also advance to become friendships based on virtue (cf. Gould 1963, p. 145). Plutarch, interestingly, 
stresses the enhancement of marriage as a form of friendship, but its progression is to deeper intimacy and passion. 
Cf. Beneker 2012, pp. 23–4. 
76 Cf. Beneker 2012, pp. 7–39, esp. 31–9. 
77 =[T9] in Chapter 1. 
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[T60] τῶν σωμάτων οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰ μὲν ἐκ διεστώτων λέγουσιν εἶναι καθάπερ στόλον  
καὶ στρατόπεδον, τὰ δ’ ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς οἰκίαν καὶ ναῦν, τὰ δ’ ἡνωμένα καὶ 
συμφυῆ καθάπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον. σχεδὸν οὖν καὶ γάμος ὁ μὲν τῶν 
ἐρώντων ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυής ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν διὰ προῖκας ἢ τέκνα γαμούντων 
ἐκ συναπτομένων, ὁ δὲ τῶν συγκαθευδόντων ἐκ διεστώτων, οὓς συνοικεῖν ἄν τις 
ἀλλήλοις οὐ συμβιοῦν νομίσειε.  
Philosophers say of bodies that some consist of separate objects, just like an army or 
encampment, while others consist of objects fastened together, like a house or a ship, and 
still others are united and naturally close-knit, just as is each animal. And then in nearly 
the same way, the marriage of those who are in love is united and naturally close-knit, but 
the marriage of those who wed for the sake of dowries or children consists of two parties 
fastened together, and the marriage of those who sleep together consists of separate 
individuals who live together with one another, one would think, but do not share their 
life together.     (Plutarch, Advice to Bride and Groom 142E12–F8) 
 
With these analogies of physical degrees of cohesion and unity,78 Plutarch goes on to compare 
marriages founded on love and mutual affection with liquids whose distinct elements become 
indistinguishable as everything becomes shared in common (142F8–143A6). Passions complete 
our attempts to unify and share our lives with others beyond execution of duties we owe to one 
another, so that we may become a perfect union (δι’ ὅλων κρᾶσις, Dialogue on Love 766F3– 
5).79 
*** 
 Plutarch argues that passions and our passionate nature are necessary for action in this 
life, but that they are not necessary evils of embodiment. The gods have added passions to our 
nature so that we can motivate our own actions and as aids in the pursuit of the moral life. 
                                                        
78 Cf. the similar list of types of conjunction and union attributed to Chrysippus (Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of 
Oracles 426A=SVF 2.367). Cf. also Plutarch, On Common Notions 1078B–E=LS 48B and 48E; D.L. 7.151=LS 
48A=SVF 2.479; Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture 216.14–218.6=LS 48C=SVF 2.473; Stob. 1.17.4 (p. 155, ll. 
5–11)=LS 48D=SVF 2.471. 
79 On the importance of ἔρως and affection in friendship, filial relations, and marriage in Plutarch’s works see Brenk 
1988 and 2000, and especially Beneker 2008 and 2012, pp. 7–56. I take up these points further in Chapter 6, §IV. 
For discussion of marriage in terms of gender roles and equality between husband and wife in Plutarch’s works see 
Nikoleidis 1997; Moxnes 1997, pp. 280–2; Pomeroy 1999; Walcot 1999; McInerney 2003; Håland 2011. On 
Plutarch’s representation of women in general see Le Corsu 1981. See also Badnall 2009, who argues that virtue is 
the offspring between men in Plutarch’s Dialogue on Love and ironically not between husband and wife. Contra this 
view, I agree with Brenk 1988 and Crawford 1999, who defend Plutarch’s praise of marriage as part of one’s ascent 
to union with the divine. 
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Passions add impetus to action, intensify virtue, and can be used to encourage self-improvement 
through healthy rivalry and emulation. They can even serve as a driving force, like a hunger and 
thirst, that pushes us to endure difficulties on the path to virtue. All in all, Plutarch writes, it is 
not possible to live without passions. Even if we could, we would not want to, since passions 









 As we explored in the last chapter, passions can contribute to moral progress. They do 
not, however, always help us on the path to virtue. They can also lead us astray. In this chapter, 
we will look at a further contribution that certain passions can play in moral development by 
suppressing other passions that are misaligned. As we will explore in the first section, when 
strong errant passions arise in the soul, other passions, such as shame and anger, can provide a 
strong countering force to restrain them. In cases where we find desires and appetites at odds 
with our rational intentions, this positive role is particularly beneficial as a source of added force 
in correcting errant desires. It is not readily apparent in either Plato’s or Plutarch’s descriptions 
of shame and anger, however, whether the spirited part of the soul, to which these emotions 
belong, is responsible for the evaluation of errant appetitive desires as shameful and wrong. 
 In the second section of this chapter, I present evidence that the spirited part of the soul is 
capable of retaining evaluative standards to judge errant desires and that it can use these 
standards independently of the rational part of the soul. Plutarch’s view of psychological 
development, which follows Plato’s Republic and Laws, holds that the spirited part of the soul is 
active before the advent of reason in children and that it is the target of early education, a point 
that I explore in greater detail in Chapter 5. During sleep, spirited passions can also help to 
restrain errant desires even when the rational part of the soul is inactive and, as it were, also 
asleep. Plutarch describes the spirited part of the soul as capable of guiding the soul as a whole 
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without reason, like beasts whose leader lets loose the reins, who continue along the path initially 
set by their leader, i.e. the rational part of the soul, without further instruction. 
 In the third section of this chapter, I provide a short synopsis on the Platonic background 
of the evaluative capacities of non-rational passions such as shame. (A more fully developed 
analysis is provided in the appendix to this chapter.) Though there are a few hints that the non-
rational parts of the soul themselves may have the capacity to form beliefs and evaluate actions 
and desires, it will emerge from this quick excursus that Plato’s dialogues seem to present a 
strong case that all evaluation and judgment is conducted by the rational part of the soul and that 
non-rational passions are purely reactive. I call this a “top-down” view, where all information, 
including what is gathered from sense-perception, is passed down to the non-rational parts of the 
soul from the rational part of the soul. Spirited and appetitive passions are responsive to 
particular types of content, but they do not appear to be able to form beliefs nor to evaluate other 
passions in the absence of commands coming down from the citadel, as it were, of the rational 
part of the soul (Timaeus 70a2–b5).  
 In the fourth section, we will look at how Plutarch adapts certain aspects of Platonic 
psychology together with Aristotle’s argument that the non-rational part of the soul participates 
in reason in a way (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13). For Plutarch, the spirited and appetitive parts of 
the soul are non-rational insofar as they are distinct from the rational part of the soul, but they are 
not wholly non-rational, since they are capable of listening to and obeying reason. The nutritive / 
vegetative and sense-perceptive parts of the soul, in contrast, are wholly non-rational for 
Plutarch. 
 Unlike Aristotle, Plutarch distinguishes the spirited part of the soul from the appetitive 
part by the degree to which it participates in reason, which I discuss in the fifth section. Spirited 
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emotions are capable of responding to and internalizing more complex cognitive content, which 
includes evaluative standards of honor and shame. The appetitive part of the soul may have 
representations of objects that are intentional, but it does not evaluate actions or desires in terms 
of what is noble or shameful. Nor does it respond to these features. 
 The sixth section focuses on examples of emotions to draw out different features of the 
representational content involved in spirited emotions. The desire for honor and the emotion of 
shame involve representations of others as an audience or an ideal image of what is honorable. 
Emotions such as anger, hate, and envy involve the evaluation of actions or character in terms of 
what is honorable or shameful. 
 In the final section I return to Plutarch’s examples of early education and the suppression 
of errant desires by the spirited part of the soul when the rational part of the soul is inactive and 
asleep. I first explore the spirited part of the soul’s internalization of standards of honor and 
shame. Plutarch describes the training of the non-rational part of the soul as a form of 
habituation, but this habituation, as in the Republic, involves the inculcation of certain beliefs 
that govern one’s behavior, evaluating actions in terms of whether they are honorable or 
shameful. In the analogy of the beasts that pull a cart when the leader lets loose the reins, spirited 
passions, like this team of animals, continue to evaluate desires within the soul during sleep and 
to apply internalized standards to judge appetitive desires, approving of what is appropriate while 
restraining what is not. The spirited part of the soul has a capacity not only to retain and 
internalize standards of evaluation or instructions, but also a capacity to evaluate desires and 






§I Rational Restraint and Passionate Restraint of Errant Desires 
 In this section, we will look at the positive feature of passionate correction in both Plato’s 
dialogues and Plutarch’s psychology. First, we will analyze the rational part of the soul’s 
correction of errant appetitive desires, which provides a basic model that correction of desires 
through other passions follows. The spirited part of the soul, like the rational part, restrains and 
suppresses appetitive desires when they are deemed inappropriate. Since the rational part of the 
soul is the weakest part in most humans compared to the strength of appetitive desires, spirited 
passions serve an important function in adding greater force to restrain inappropriate desires. 
In both Plato’s and Plutarch’s works, the rational part of the soul constrains and counters 
errant desires when they are set against its own better, rational intention and judgment (παρὰ 
τὸν λογισμόν, Plato, Republic 4, 440b1; παρὰ γνώμην, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 447D7–8).1 
Aristotle likewise recognizes this opposition in his discussion of psychic conflict: within the soul 
there is “something apart from reason, opposing and resisting it” (τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, 
ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b24–5), and this part 
“fights and opposes reason” (μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ, b16–18). Plutarch describes this 
experience with the balance-beam metaphor: reason must counterbalance the forceful weight 
exerted by one of the passionate parts of soul when critical psychic conflict occurs (On Moral 
Virtue 447D6–9).2 This image is reminiscent of the opposing forces of reason and passion seen in 
Republic 4’s Principle of Opposites passage.3 There, in the first example used to distinguish the 
rational part of the soul from the appetitive part, the rational part of the soul provides an internal 
counter-motion against the motivations of the appetitive part of the soul, halting the desire from 
                                               
1 Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 436b9–439d8. 
2 See §IV in Chapter 3. 
3 See §III in Chapter 1. 
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issuing in action (Republic 4, 436b9–439d8). 
Plutarch, following Platonic precedent, also describes the countervailing action of the 
rational part of the soul in terms of restraint and constraint of appetitive desires: 
[T61] ἐκπονεῖν χρὴ καὶ ἀποκόπτειν αὐτὰς [τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, 584E7] ἀνείρξεσι καὶ κατοχαῖς 
ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κολαζομένας. δίψαν ἐκβιάζεται καὶ πεῖναν ἡ πρὸς τροφὴν καὶ 
ποτὸν ἀντίβασις τοῦ λογισμοῦ. 
 
One ought to wear out and remove desires, constrained by reason through acts of restraint 
and repression. Resistance of the rational part against nourishment and drink constrains 
thirst and hunger.   (Plutarch, On the Sign of Socrates 584E8–F1) 
 
Reason (λόγος), or the rational part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν), constrains the appetitive desires 
by holding them down (κατέχειν) and forcing them back (ἀνείργειν).4 It must continue this 
activity until the desires of the appetitive part cease to present strong opposition, being, as it 
were, exhausted. Failing their exhaustion, the rational part will overcome the desires of the other 
parts of the soul, dragging them (ἐφέλκειν) while they continue to resist (Plutarch, On Moral 
Virtue 448B3–55; cf. Plato, Republic 4, 439b3–56).  
By removal (ἀποκόπτειν), Plutarch seems to mean (i) suppressing errant passions until 
they cease to present opposition, (ii) diverting them toward different objects, (iii) removing some 
excess from them to make them moderate, or (iv) transforming them into different passions. For 
Plutarch, there is a great deal of overlap between (ii)–(iv). Certain errant passions are 
transformed into more innocuous passions because the errant passions are themselves excessive 
                                               
4 While for Plutarch the rational part of the soul cannot motivate practical actions without the impulse of non-
rational passions (See §I in Chapter 3), it does not lack psychic force to oppose desires and impulses and stop them 
from issuing in practical actions. 
5 “For if, in fact, one [part of the soul] overcomes the other, it does not destroy the other part, but [what is overcome] 
is dragged, being constrained although still presenting opposition” (καὶ γὰρ ἂν περιγένηται θάτερον, οὐκ 
ἀνῄρηκε θάτερον, ἀλλ᾿ ἐφέλκεται καταβιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον). 
6 “Would it not be the case that if ever something draws the soul itself in the opposite direction when it is thirsty, 
that what draws away is something different within the soul from the part that is thirsty and leads the soul like a 
beast to drink?” (οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος 
καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν;) 
 
 166 
forms of passions that admit of moderate states. Envy (φθόνος), for instance, has no place in the 
moral life (On Listening to Lectures 39D8–10) and is an excessive and misdirected form of the 
desire for honor (φιλοτιμία), which can be moderate (39E8–11; Precepts of Statecraft 820A2–
B1).7 Envy must be curbed and pruned back. This curbing of excess coincides with the 
redirection of a misplaced desire for praise and reputation to a correct sense of honor tied to 
virtue (Alcibiades 1.1; Agis and Cleomenes 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2).8 Curbing excess and redirecting 
passions in this way can amount to the transformation of errant passions into more suitable, 
moderate passions (εἰς ἐπιεικέστερα πάθη μεθισταμένη, On Moral Progress 84A1–12). If 
correctly redirected and curbed, for instance, envy can be transformed back into a desire for 
honor.9 
 Sometimes reason is not strong enough to suppress passions opposed to our better 
judgment and cannot divert or convert them. An appetitive desire, for example, can pull us away 
from the correct course determined by reason, as though weighing down one side of a scale in 
Plutarch’s balance-beam metaphor (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 447F1–4). Plutarch, following 
Plato’s Republic, considers experiences of this kind to be common. The appetitive part of the 
soul, which is largest in most individuals (Plato, Republic 4, 442a5–6), is generally stronger 
compared to the rational part, which is smallest in most individuals (Plato, Republic 4, 442c4; 9, 
588d2–3).10 Given this general condition of the human psyche, many of us have strong appetites 
that challenge our self-mastery and rational resolve. Plutarch goes so far as to say that most of us 
                                               
7 See §VI and nn. 108–9 of Chapter 2 for more citations and discussion of these passages. 
8 The misdirection also occurs in the inappropriate desire for reputation and a desire for honor that is itself unjust 
(φιλοδοξία ἄκαιρος καὶ φιλοτιμία ἄδικος, On Listening to Lectures 39E8–11). I take up many of these points in 
§I.a. of Chapter 6. See also Plutarch, How to Profit by One’s Enemies 92A3–B10 and On Listening to Lectures 
38C10–D7, quoted and discussed in §I.b. of Chapter 6. 
9 See §VI and nn. 106–9 in Chapter 2. 
10 Cf. Plutarch, Platonic Questions 3, 1002B2–7. 
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struggle to deliberate well due to the interference of passions (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 448A9–
B2).11 
 Fortunately, one is not stranded and inevitably forced to act contrary to rational judgment 
if the rational part of one’s soul is too weak to oppose the desire effectively: the weight and force 
of another non-rational passion can be used to tip the scales in the better direction. More 
specifically, the “spirited part of the soul” (τὸ θυμοειδές) can aid our rational decisions in 
“providing strength and power to the rational part of the soul against the appetitive part of the 
soul” (τῷ λογισμῷ παρέχον ἰσχὺν ἐπὶ τοῦτο [τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, 442A7] καὶ δύναμιν, On 
Moral Virtue 442A8–9). Spirited passions can thus be used to counterbalance the force and 
strength of errant appetitive passions, i.e. can join in adding force to our rational judgments (cf. 
On Moral Virtue 449C2–3).12  
 Plutarch, following Plato’s dialogues,13 characterizes the spirited part of the soul (τὸ 
θυμοειδές) and its passions as naturally allied (σύμμαχον) to the rational part of the soul 
(Platonic Questions 9, 1008C5–11=[T63] below; Sandbach fr. 14814). The spirited part of the 
soul is the ally of our rational nature according to Plutarch, helping to chastise errant appetitive 
desires: 
 
                                               
11 “For most people, their practical deliberations, judgments, and ways of doing things, because they are in a state of 
passion, provide impediment and difficulty for reason, which is hindered and disturbed by the non-rational that, 
together with some pleasure, fear, pain, or desire, opposes reason” (αἱ δὲ πραγματικαὶ βουλαὶ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ 
δίαιται τῶν πολλῶν ἐμπαθεῖς οὖσαι δυσοδίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχουσι καὶ δυσκολίαν, ἐνισχομένῳ καὶ 
ταραττομένῳ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἀνταῖρον αὐτῷ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς τινος ἢ δέους ἢ λύπης ἢ ἐπιθυμίας). For Plutarch, 
as in Plato’s dialogues, anger and appetites can obstruct deliberation because they can focus our attention on details 
that are salient to the representational content of that particular emotion or desire to the exclusion of other 
considerations that are important to that deliberation (cf. Bobonich 2002, p. 345). See §A.IV. in the Appendix. 
Passions do not always obstruct our decisions, as we saw in §IV of Chapter 3, where certain passions, including 
instances of anger, increase the force of a decision together with rational inclination (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 
448D7–10=[T54]). As I argue in the next chapter, passions may also help draw our attention to faults so that we can 
reflect on them with the rational part of the soul and correct them (§IV of Chapter 5). 
12 This passage is quoted and translated as part of [T65] below. 
13 Republic 4, 439e5–441a3, 441e4–5, 442b7–8, 442c1–2; 9, 589b3–4; cf. Timaeus 70e2–7. 
14 From Plutarch’s lost work On Rage=Stob. 3.20.70. 
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[T62] τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ τὸ ἄρχειν τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν κατὰ 
φύσιν ἐστίν, ὑπηκόῳ μὲν ὄντι τοῦ λογισμοῦ κρατοῦντι δὲ καὶ κολάζοντι τὴν 
ἐπιθυμίαν ὅταν ἀπειθῇ τῷ λογισμῷ. 
 
It is natural for the rational part to rule and for the spirited part to be ruled and to rule in 
turn, since it is obedient to the rational part and masters and chastises the appetitive part 
of the soul whenever it disobeys the rational part.  
(Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1008B7–10)  
 
The spirited part stands in an intermediate position of being ruled and ruling and has this favored 
position over the appetitive part in virtue of its more obedient nature toward reason. The term 
that Plutarch uses to describe its obedience, ὑπήκοον, is one that carries with it the sense that 
one subjects oneself and takes a position under another (ὑπό-) to take heed and listen (ἀκούειν) 
to the dictates of a superior. The obedient nature of the spirited part thus seems to be connected 
not only with the fact that it goes along with what the rational part of the soul is doing, but also 
with its receptiveness to the commands issued from the rational part.15 
We gather more on the sense of the spirited part’s receptivity to commands in another 
passage in Plutarch’s Platonic Questions. Drawing upon the Phaedrus’ Myth of the Charioteer, 
Plutarch writes: 
[T63] καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς εἰκάσας συμφύτῳ ζεύγει καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, 
ἡνίοχον μέν, ὡς παντὶ δῆλον, ἀπέφηνε τὸ λογιστικόν· τῶν δ’ ἵππων τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰς 
ἐπιθυμίας ἀπειθὲς καὶ ἀνάγωγον παντάπασι “περὶ ὦτα λάσιον, κωφόν, μάστιγι 
μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπεῖκον,” τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς εὐήνιον τὰ πολλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ 
σύμμαχον.16  
 
And Plato himself, likening the form of the soul to a pair of horses yoked together and a 
charioteer [Phaedrus 246a6–7],17 represented the rational part of the soul in the guise of 
the charioteer, as is clear to everyone, while of the two horses he made the one “shaggy 
around the ears, deaf, and hardly yielding to the whip with goads” [Phaedrus 253e4–5]18 
                                               
15 Plutarch also appears to draw upon Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, for this view and uses similar 
terminology. I discuss these points further in §IV. 
16 I have deleted what appears to be an extraneous comma after ψυχῆς in Hubert’s edition of the text, since I take it 
that εἶδος is the noun modified by τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.  
17 “Let it [the soul] be like the combined force of a yoked team of winged horses and a charioteer” (ἐοικέτω δὴ 
συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου). 
18 Plutarch has modified the case of the adjectives and participle from nominate to accusative. Otherwise, the 
quotation is verbatim. 
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the disobedient and entirely unmanageable part concerned with appetites, but the spirited 
part he represented as the one that for the most part easily yields to the reins of the 
rational part and is his ally.   (Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1008C5–11) 
 
While appetites are more unruly and disobedient to reason, which leads to instances in which 
appetitive desires counter our better rational judgment, the non-rational spirited part is far more 
obedient and amenable to the commands of our rational aspect. The spirited horse, as the spirited 
part of the soul, for the most part yields, or is obedient to the direction it received through the 
reins (εὐήνιον). It has a greater capacity not only to give way (ὑπείκειν) to reason, responding 
quickly when being reined in, but also seems more naturally attentive to the directions it 
receives, taking heed and responding quickly to indications that the rational part wants to change 
direction with a pull of the reins this way or that. The spirited part of the soul also seems, once 
again, to listen to the commands of the rational part of the soul, in contradistinction to the nearly 
deaf (κωφόν) nature of the appetitive part of the soul,19 which is too shaggy around the ears to 
listen to the commands of reason, so much so that it often requires more forceful measures, such 
as a whip with stinging goads (μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων) to bring it in line with the rational part of 
the soul’s intentions.20 
 Plutarch does not indicate, however, that the non-rational appetitive part of soul always 
disobeys the rational part of the soul. In [T63] the spirited part masters and chastises the 
appetitive part of the soul whenever (ὅταν) it is disobedient to the rational part, but that need not 
always be the case.21 As in the Republic’s metaphor of the inner man (representing the rational 
                                               
19 In the contrast between listening and being deaf to reason, Plutarch, again, seems to draw upon Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, but Plutarch uses the distinction differently from what we find in that passage, which I 
discuss in §IV below. 
20 See Yunis 2011 on Plato, Phaedrus 254e5: “[T]he beast is tamed, physical pain…being the only language it 
understands.” 
21 Note also that in Timaeus 70a2–7 (which is part of [A13]), Socrates remarks that the spirited part of the soul is 
obedient and holds the common objective of suppressing the desires of the appetitive part whenever (ὁπότ’) they are 
unwilling to obey reason: “Therefore the part that has a share of courage and anger, since it is victory-loving, they 
[the gods] made to dwell closer to the head between the midriff and neck [than the worse part of the mortal kind of 
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part of the soul), the inner lion (representing the spirited part) and the many-headed beast 
(representing the appetitive part, Republic 9, 589a6–b6), the end-goal to be achieved is 
friendship among the parts of the soul working in harmony (φίλα, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 
446D1–E2).22 
 While in the virtuous state of the soul appetitive desires are obedient and subservient to 
the rational part of the soul, even contributing in practical judgments as fellow-workers 
(συνεργά ταῖς πρακτικαῖς προαιρέσεσιν, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 446D1–E2),23 neither 
                                               
soul] in order that, since it is obedient to reason, it might suppress with a forcefulness together with reason the group 
of desires whenever they are entirely unwilling, as far as they are concerned, to obey any of the commands from the 
central governance of the soul and reason” (τὸ μετέχον οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ θυμοῦ, φιλόνικον ὄν, 
κατῴκισαν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς κεφαλῆς μεταξὺ τῶν φρενῶν τε καὶ αὐχένος, ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον ὂν κοινῇ 
μετ’ ἐκείνου βίᾳ τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κατέχοι γένος, ὁπότ’ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ τ’ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ 
μηδαμῇ πείθεσθαι ἑκὸν ἐθέλοι). 
22 “Upon seeing the entirely even-tempered, calm, and sound condition of the moderate person’s soul [in contrast to 
the continent man’s agitation], through which the non-rational part of the soul has been brought into harmony and 
friendly communion with the rational part, since the non-rational part has been arranged in ready obedience and with 
a gentleness to be marveled at, upon seeing that you would say, ‘Then, indeed, the gust didst cease, and a windless 
calm there was, and a divine spirit put to rest the waves,’ [Homer, Odyssey 12.168] once the rational part of the soul 
had quelled the violent, insane, and frantic disturbances of the desires and made these desires, which nature required 
of necessity, sympathetic, obedient, friendly, and cooperative with the practical intentions of reason. Consequently, 
these desires did not run past reason, falter, rebel due to a lack of discipline, or disobey, but every impulse was 
easily led ‘as a weaned calf runs alongside the mare’ [Semonides fr. 5=Stob. 5.50.19 (p. 1024, l. 10)]” (τῆς δὲ 
σώφρονος ψυχῆς τὸ πανταχόθεν ὁμαλὲς καὶ ἄσφυκτον καὶ ὑγιαῖνον, ᾧ συνήρμοσται καὶ συγκέκραται τὸ 
ἄλογον πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν εὐπειθείᾳ καὶ πραότητι θαυμαστῇ κεκοσμημένον, εἴποις ἂν ἐπιβλέψας ‘δὴ τότ’ 
ἔπειτ’ ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο, ἡ δὲ γαλήνη ἔπλετο νηνεμίη, κοίμησε δὲ κύματα δαίμων’, τὰ σφοδρὰ καὶ 
περιμανῆ καὶ οἰστρώδη κινήματα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τοῦ λόγου κατασβέσαντος, ὧν δ’ ἡ φύσις ἀναγκαίως 
δεῖται, ταῦθ’ ὁμοπαθῆ καὶ ὑπήκοα καὶ φίλα καὶ συνεργὰ πεποιημένου ταῖς πρακτικαῖς προαιρέσεσιν, ὥστε 
μὴ προεκθεῖν τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδ’ ὑπενδιδόναι μηδ’ ἀτακτεῖν μηδ’ ἀπειθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν εὐάγωγον 
οὖσαν ‘ἄθηλον ἵππῳ πῶλον ὣς ἅμα τρέχειν’). In the virtuous state of soul, non-rational passions, both spirited 
and appetitive, are obedient, friendly, and fellow-workers in agreement with decisions of the rational part of the 
soul. While in an immoderate condition the appetitive part of the soul is entirely unmanageable (ἀνάγωγος 
παντάπασι, Platonic Questions 9, 1008C8 in [T63]), in the virtuous state, even it is easily led (εὐάγωγος, 446E1) 
and arranged in ready obedience (εὐπειθείᾳ 446D3) to the rational part of the soul. Cf. On Moral Virtue 448D7–
10=[T54] in Chapter 3.  
   Pace Duff 1999, p. 73, I take it that Plutarch is not deviating too far from his Platonic sources in thinking that the 
appetitive part of the soul is also capable of obeying and becoming friendly with the rational part of the soul. Duff 
(1999, p. 73) claims that in Plato’s works, the appetitive part of the soul is completely irrational in the sense of non-
compliant with the rational part of the soul: “For Plato, the ‘appetitive’ is the purely irrational part of the soul and 
capable only of responding to bodily instincts. The ‘spirited’ part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές), or the ‘spirit’ (θυμός), 
is for Plato that part which reacts emotionally to a sense of right and wrong….” It is not clear to me that Duff is right 
to emphasize the stubborn nature of the appetitive part of the soul to such an extreme, since in Republic 9, we get the 
picture of a morally virtuous soul in which the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul have become friends (φιλά) 
with the rational part of the soul (589a6–b6). 
23 See the preceding note. 
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Plutarch nor Plato’s dialogues refer to the appetitive part as an ally to the rational part of the 
soul. The alliance of the spirited part of the soul is reserved for situations in which appetitive 
desires disobey or neglect the dictates of reason. In those instances, conflict arises, and the 
alliance of the spirited part exists to help quell the desires and passions pulling off course. This is 
not to say that the spirited part is always in agreement with the rational part of the soul, but even 
when conflict occurs between those two, we get no indication that the appetitive part of the soul 
joins forces with the rational part of the soul against our spirited passions.24 The spirited part of 
the soul has a special place in Plutarch’s and Plato’s moral psychology in contrast with the 
appetitive part of the soul. Appetite would not come to the aid of reason if our spirited emotions 
were excessive, misdirected, or in any other way errant. Only the spirited part is able to listen to 
reason and contribute to its efforts to steer the soul in the right direction.25 
 
§II Spirited Passions in Lieu of Reason 
 Plutarch indicates that spirited emotions play an important role in moral development 
before the advent of reason in children. He does not suggest that children entirely lack the 
                                               
24 In On Moral Virtue 442A7–8, Plutarch notes that the spirited part of the soul sometimes allies itself to the 
appetitive part of the soul, though in Plato’s Republic (4, 440ba6–b6), Socrates and Glaucon agree that they have not 
observed instances in which the spirited part allies itself with the appetitive part against the rational part in 
themselves nor have they seen this occurring in other individuals. Pace Opsomer 2012, p. 322, and Vander Waerdt 
1985a, p. 380, who believe that Plutarch deviates from Plato’s Republic on this point, note that in 4, 440e1–5, 
Socrates and Glaucon agree that although they at first considered the spirited part to be something appetitive 
(ἐπιθυμητικόν τι), they now agree that “in the civil strife of the soul, it fights on the side of reason far more often” 
(πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν, e3–4). This does not 
preclude the possibility that the spirited part of the soul sometimes allies itself with the appetitive part, if we read 
πολὺ μᾶλλον as indicating frequency, as I have taken it to mean “far more often.” It, in fact, implies that spirit does 
sometimes ally itself with appetite. It just is far more often the case that the spirited part is allied with the rational 
part. This seems to me the correct reading, since alliance is bivalent in nature and does not come in degrees, though 
one could be inconsistent, reluctant, or unreliable in giving aid as an ally. Nevertheless, one allies oneself with one 
side or another at a given time. As expressed here more literally, one “takes up arms for” one side at any point in 
time. For the interpretation of μᾶλλον as indicating frequency (or probability) instead of degree see Dik 2014. 
25 As I explore below in §V, this is partly explained by the greater ability of the spirited part of the soul to 
understand the dictates of reason. The rational part of the soul is best able to see what is fitting for each part of the 
soul and the soul as a whole (Republic 4, 441e3–4; 9, 586d4–587a2), and the spirited part, following and heeding its 
commands, has some ability to understand what is better for the appetites, namely, in terms of whether they are 
shameful, whereas appetites are concerned with satisfaction. See also n. 32 in Chapter 3. 
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rational part of the soul for it to suddenly appear at some point in their development. Instead, 
certain rational capacities develop over time and are nascent but inactive in our earliest years of 
development.26 The rational part of the soul is essential to the human embodied condition from 
birth,27 but many of its powers aimed at deliberation and contemplation are not active from the 
inception of life and only develop much later. Plutarch, drawing upon Plato’s view of rational 
development, holds that spirited emotions, unlike reason, are strong from birth.28 
 Early education, aimed at guiding one’s habits and behavior, shapes spirited passions, 
which in turn have a strong grip and guiding force on the direction one’s character will take, 
points that I explore in detail in Chapter 5.29 For now, I want to note that educators use emotions 
such as shame and the desire for honor to shape the way that children act, not only steering them 
this way or that when they correct particular actions, but also so that they can self-regulate their 
own actions and desires. Children internalize standards of what is appropriate and inappropriate 
and what is shameful and honorable so that they are able to feel shame toward inappropriate 
desires, and guide their own behavior even when their parents or instructors are not giving 
                                               
26 On Being a Busybody 520D3–7; Lycurgus and Numa 4.4–5. We are not born with fully functional rational 
capacities (cf. Plato, Republic 4, 441a7–b1 and Laws 7, 808d1–e4), but instead develop our abilities to understand 
instruction, calculate, reason, and determine our own courses of action as we mature (Plutarch, On Listening to 
Lectures 37D11–E3). Cf. Aristotle, Politics 7.15, 1334b17–28. On the Stoic view cf. Aetius 4.11.1–4=SVF 2.83=LS 
39E; Epictetus, Discourses 1.6.12–22=LS 63E.  
27 Plutarch, On the Sign of Socrates 591D5–7=[T31] in Chapter 2; On the Face in the Moon 943A6–7; Sandbach fr. 
144; On Moral Virtue 441D4–6; On Isis and Osiris 382F. See also §IV of Chapter 2. 
28 See Plato, Laws 2, 653a5–c4 and 659c9–e5. In the Republic, Socrates notes that certain individuals may never 
fully mature in rational capacities. Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 441a7–b1 and 9, 590c8–d6. Cf. also Aristotle, Politics 1.13, 
1260a12–14: “For, the slave does not have the deliberative element of the soul at all, but the female has it, though 
not properly, while the child has it, but only as incomplete” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, 
τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ’ ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ’ ἀτελές) and Politics 1.13, 1260a34, b3–8; 
Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1111a25–6; 3.2, b8–9; 6.13, 1144b8; 7.3, 1147b5 and Eudemian Ethics 2.8, 1224a25–30, 
and 7.6, 1240b31–4. Cf. Sherman 1989, pp. 160–1: Sherman argues that the denial of reason to children should not 
be taken without qualification, since Aristotle does have in mind that children develop these capacities. Thus, he 
writes that children have these capacities to some extent, but in an incomplete form, as we see in Politics 1.13, 
1260a34–6. Cf. Fortenbaugh 1975, pp. 45–53. 
29 See Plutarch, Can Virtue be Taught 439F2–5, On Moral Virtue 452D7–8. Cf. Plato, Republic 2, 377c3–6. 
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particular commands, praise, or reprimands.30 
 These evaluative activities are cognitive in nature. They involve representations of 
actions and desires as honorable or shameful, appropriate or inappropriate, and they guide our 
responses and future actions. We learn to self-regulate our actions even as our educators let loose 
the reins, as it were, and before our own rational part takes them up. Since they occur, operate, 
and are formed before the advent of reason and our rational powers, they do not belong to the 
rational part of the soul. They belong to the spirited part of the soul which concerns itself with 
honor and shame and is very strong in children from their birth before reason. I will address 
more on how this occurs in the soul for Plutarch in §VII. Here, I want to set out the evidence for 
these capacities as features of the non-rational spirited part of the soul. 
 A second important piece of evidence is found in Plutarch’s remarks on how spirited 
emotions regulate desires in one’s sleep, when the rational part of the soul is not giving 
commands to the passionate parts since it is itself asleep. With a metaphor of a trained team of 
horses, Plutarch writes that the non-rational parts of the soul, if properly trained and obedient, 
hold fast to the beliefs about what is permissible and what is shameful during periods in which 
the rational part of the soul is inactive. 
 Drawing on a passage from Plato’s Republic (9, 571b2–572b6), Plutarch describes the 
indulgence in lawless desires of the tyrannical soul’s non-rational part during sleep (τῆς φύσει 
τυραννικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἄλογον κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, On Moral Progress 83A3–4), but notes that 
properly trained non-rational passions can guard against such desires even in one’s dreams.31 
                                               
30 I explore these points in §II of Chapter 5. 
31 See also Plutarch’s On Virtue and Vice 100F9–101B: “And thus envy and fear and anger and lack of restraint 
dispose one [to be miserable in dreams]. For, during the day, looking out and making one resemble others in 
appearance, vice is shy and hides its passions, and does not entirely give itself up to impulses but opposes and often 
struggles against them, but then in sleep, fleeing from the opinions of others and the laws and being very far 
removed from feeling fear and a sense of shame, it stirs up every desire and awakens wickedness and licentiousness. 
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The non-rational part of the tyrant’s soul 
[T64] “μητρί τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖ μίγνυσθαι” καὶ περὶ βρώσεις ὁρμᾷ παντοδαπάς, 
παρανομοῦν καὶ χρώμενον ἑαυτοῦ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις οἷον λελυμέναις, ἃς μεθ’ 
ἡμέραν ὁ νόμος αἰσχύνῃ καὶ φόβῳ καθείργνυσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν τὰ πεπαιδευμένα 
καλῶς τῶν ὑποζυγίων, οὐδ’ ἂν ἀφῇ τὰς ἡνίας ὁ ἄρχων, ἐπιχειρεῖ παρατρέπεσθαι 
καὶ ἀπολείπειν τὴν ὁδόν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴθισται πρόεισιν ἐν τάξει, διαφυλάττοντα 
τὴν πορείαν ἄπταιστον, οὕτως οἷς ἂν εὐπειθὲς τὸ ἄλογον ἤδη καὶ πρᾶον ᾖ 
γεγονὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ κεκολασμένον, οὔτε καθ’ ὕπνους οὔθ’ ὑπὸ νόσων ἔτι 
ῥᾳδίως ἐξυβρίζειν ἢ παρανομεῖν ἐθέλει ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ἀλλὰ τηρεῖ καὶ 
διαμνημονεύει τὸν ἐθισμόν, ἰσχὺν ἐμποιοῦντα τῇ προσοχῇ καὶ τόνον. 
 
 “attempts to have sex with his mother” [Republic 9, 571d1] and rushes after every kind 
of food, transgressing laws and enjoying, as it were, its unrestrained desires, which the 
law prohibits through shame and fear under the light of day. Therefore, just as beasts of 
burden that have been well trained do not attempt to turn aside or abandon the path if 
their leader lets loose the reins, but instead proceed in order just as they have become 
accustomed to do, maintaining the course without error, in the same way, whoever has 
had their non-rational part of soul already made tame and disciplined by reason, it [their 
non-rational part of soul] is not readily willing in sleep nor still in the throes of illness to 
act insolently or lawlessly due to desires, but it carefully guards and holds fast to the 
memory of what has become its accustomed habit, implanting strength and intensity to 
our diligence.      (Plutarch, On Moral Progress 83A4–B8) 
 
The well-trained non-rational part of the soul guards (τηρεῖ) and holds fast to the memory 
(διαμνημονεύει) of what it has received in its education by reason. What is meant here in “made 
tame and disciplined by reason” is somewhat ambiguous. By reason (ὁ λόγος), Plutarch could 
mean the rational part of one’s own soul, but I think it probable that he also includes reason in 
the sense of the rational guidance of one’s educators who have shaped one’s passions from birth, 
                                               
It ‘attempts to have sex with one’s mother,’ as Plato says, and pursues unlawful meats and does not hold off from 
doing any action, taking enjoyment in illegal activity as much as it is able with images and appearances that do not 
come to fulfillment in any pleasure or in the cessation of what desires, but are able only to stir up and greatly incite 
passions and diseases” (οὕτω δὲ καὶ φθόνος καὶ φόβος καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἀκολασία διατίθησι. μεθ’ ἡμέραν μὲν  
γὰρ ἔξω βλέπουσα καὶ συσχηματιζομένη πρὸς ἑτέρους ἡ κακία δυσωπεῖται καὶ παρακαλύπτει τὰ πάθη, καὶ 
οὐ παντάπασι ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἐκδίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν ἀλλ’ ἀντιτείνει καὶ μάχεται πολλάκις· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὕπνοις 
ἀποφυγοῦσα δόξας καὶ νόμους καὶ πορρωτάτω γενομένη τοῦ δεδιέναι τε καὶ αἰδεῖσθαι, πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν 
κινεῖ καὶ ἐπανεγείρει τὸ κακόηθες καὶ ἀκόλαστον. “μητρί τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖ μίγνυσθαι,” ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, 
καὶ βρώσεις ἀθέσμους προσφέρεται καὶ πράξεως οὐδεμιᾶς ἀπέχεται, ἀπολαύουσα τοῦ παρανομεῖν ὡς 
ἀνυστόν ἐστιν εἰδώλοις καὶ φάσμασιν εἰς οὐδεμίαν ἡδονὴν οὐδὲ τελείωσιν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος τελευτῶσιν, 




as I mentioned above and will discuss further in Chapter 5. Reason in this sense belongs to 
another person, as described in Plato’s Republic 9, where those who are deficient in their own 
rational powers, which would include children as well as some adults, should yield themselves to 
another to be guided by their reason and shaped by it (590c7–591a3).32 The non-rational part of 
the soul has thus been made tame and disciplined through early education (Plutarch, On Moral 
Virtue 443B8–10).33 
 Although the description of the non-rational part of the soul (τὸ ἄλογον) is general in 
this passage, the context indicates that Plutarch has the spirited part of the soul in mind. The well 
trained non-rational aspect in question is keenly concerned with holding fast to what is honorable 
out of a sense of shame (αἰσχύνῃ), avoiding unlawful deeds and desires that it should shrink 
back from out of fear (φόβῳ). These emotional responses are characteristic of the spirited part of 
the soul, which desires what is honorable and to assert one’s self as worthy of honor in the eyes 
of others.34 This also aligns well with the passage that Plutarch draws upon in Plato’s Republic, 
where the “better” passions that are in league with reason constrain the worse in lieu of the law 
and reason’s normal constraint of the worse, lawless desires (9, 571b3–c1). For when the 
individual falls asleep, as the tyrannical soul does in this passage, the Republic indicates that the 
rational part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν) no longer maintains a tight rein on the desires within 
the soul (9, 571c3–4). The better passions that help restraint lawless desires and are normally in 
league with reason (μετὰ λόγου, 9, 571b6) belong to the spirited part of the soul that is the 
natural ally to reason. 
 The beasts that have been trained well (καλῶς) also bear a resemblance to the noble 
                                               
32 See n. 45 in Chapter 2. 
33 See n. 46 below for the quotation. Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 441a2–3. 
34 Cf. Republic 4, 439e1–3, 440b9–d3; 9, 581a9–b4. See also the following note. 
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(καλός) horse in the Myth of the Charioteer, which represents the non-rational spirited part of 
the soul, in other respects. The characteristics of the non-rational part of the soul described in 
[T64] belong to the well functioning spirited part of the soul: it is readily obedient (εὐπειθές) 
and adds strength and intensity to diligence (ἰσχὺν ἐμποιοῦντα τῇ προσοχῇ καὶ τόνον) in 
continuing along the path set by the rational part of the soul, opposing errant desires toward 
lawless and insolent behavior, just as we saw before in On Moral Virtue, where the spirited part 
of the soul provides strength and power to the rational part of the soul against the appetitive part 
of the soul when its desires run awry of our rational intention (τῷ λογισμῷ παρέχον ἰσχὺν ἐπὶ 
τοῦτο [τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, 442A7] καὶ δύναμιν, On Moral Virtue 442A8–9). The lawless 
desires, then, issue from the appetitive part, while the spirited part of the soul keeps course, 
guarding the path it has been set on by reason, providing strength and intensity as a sort of ally to 
reason.35 
 During dreams external influence has been removed: the laws and fear of censure from 
other individuals are no longer of immediate concern. In a passage parallel to [T64], where 
Plutarch also discusses and quotes Republic 9 on lawless desires in sleep, he again notes that 
indulgence in such licentious desires occurs in sleep when “[the soul of a such a person] flees 
from the opinions of others and the laws and is furthest from feeling fear and a sense of shame” 
(ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀποφυγοῦσα δόξας καὶ νόμους καὶ πορρωτάτω γενομένη τοῦ δεδιέναι 
τε καὶ αἰδεῖσθαι, On Virtue and Vice 101A3–6).36 Fear of external reproach and a sense of 
shame before others, which are desires characteristic of the spirited part of the soul, are internal 
psychological motivating factors that keep such licentious desires restrained in waking life. We 
fear consequences to our actions, in terms of punishment or diminished reputation. In our 
                                               
35 See also §A.V. in the Appendix. 
36 See n. 31 above for more of this passage. 
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dreams, however, when the rational part is put to sleep and not operative in overseeing our 
desires, the spirited part of the soul operates out of a sense of shame that has been internalized. 
There is no external force regulating or judging one’s desires. No one else is watching. There is 
no rational part of the soul active to quell errant passions or command the spirited part of the soul 
to constrain them. In these states, only errant desires and the spirited part of the soul are active, 
and the spirited part sees those desires as shameful and opposes them.  
 So, it would seem that the evaluation of errant desires as shameful and to-be-opposed 
must be a function of the non-rational spirited part of the soul. This activity, which takes place 
while reason is inactive, looks to be an instance of deploying an internalized evaluative standard, 
perhaps one stored up for later use, and making a judgment based on internalized standards. As 
with the example of the early education of spirited passions, I will discuss how the spirited part 
of the soul is able to internalize standards and use them below in §VII. For now, I present this as 
evidence that spirited emotions are cognitive, since they involve evaluative representational 
content, and that the spirited part of the soul can make evaluative judgments on its own. It may 
internalize standards it receives from reason, but it looks as though it uses these standards to 
make judgments on its own, apart from reason. 
 
§III The Spirited Part of the Soul and Cognitive Emotions in Plato: A Synopsis 
Now that we have seen that certain passions which belong to the spirited part of the soul 
serve a positive role in restraining errant passions, we turn in this section and in those that follow 
to an analysis of how the internal dynamics of the psyche allow for more cognitive emotions, 
such as shame, to respond to evaluations of actions and desires deemed inappropriate. Is the 
spirited part of the soul capable of having evaluative judgments about certain desires or actions 
apart from the rational part of the soul? Further, is the spirited part of the soul capable of forming 
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evaluative judgments, not just receiving and preserving them from the rational part of the soul, as 
we find in the definition of courage in Plato’s Republic (4, 442b10–c2=[A14] in the 
Appendix37)? 
 For the sake of space, I provide in this section a brief outline of the major points that can 
be gleaned from several Platonic dialogues as a background for Plutarch’s development and 
adaptation of his own view on the evaluative capacities of the spirited part of the soul. I should 
note that there are numerous approaches of interpretation that have been applied to the discussion 
of the spirited part of the soul and its function in Plato’s dialogues which address and raise many 
puzzles for Plato’s considered or developing views.38 It is not my purpose here to solve these 
                                               
37 “And I suppose that we call each individual courageous in virtue of this part of the soul, whenever his spirited part 
preserves through pleasures and pains the command given by reason on what one should shrink back from or not” 
(καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασῴζῃ διά τε 
λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή). 
38 The extent to which tripartite psychology indicates that the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts function as 
distinct agent-like parts is a topic of enduring contention. Moline 1978, Annas 1981, Irwin 1995, Bobonich 2002 and 
2010a, Lorenz 2006 and 2012, Brown 2012, and Erginel (forthcoming), for instance consider the parts of the soul to 
be agent-like. (Bobonich (2002, pp. 259–67; 2010a passim), however, considers Plato’s later views, taking Plato to 
develop and change his views on the soul’s parts after the Republic, to be less agent-like, describing the role of the 
non-rational aspects of soul as “cognitively impoverished.” Persisting descriptions of the soul as agent-like in the 
Timaeus are exaggerated according to Bobonich’s developmentalist view (2002, pp. 295–8 and 316–31). For 
dissenting views see Shields 2001 and 2014, Moravcsik 2001, Dorter 2006, Kamtekar 2006, Stalley 2007, and Price 
2009a. Stalley (2007, p. 73) wants to read the person or individual as the subject of the non-rational parts’ desires 
and opposing forces in cases of psychic conflict. I take it that Erginel (forthcoming), p. 4, correctly criticizes 
Stalley’s interpretation on the grounds that it does not do justice to the argument in Republic 4, in which the 
Principle of Opposites dictates that two opposing actions / states occurring at the same time, in the same respect, and 
in relation to the same thing require two subjects. See Lorenz 2006, p. 21, who likewise argues that, while it must be 
acknowledged that the descriptions of pushing, pulling, bidding, and forbidding, etc. in Republic 4 are metaphorical, 
the distinctions made between the parts of the soul are meant to be taken more literally. Plato intends for us to 
understand that there are distinct parts of the soul that serve as the subjects of opposing actions. Price (2009a, p. 10) 
argues that the unity of consciousness is impossible if the soul’s parts are agent-like. Against Price’s view see 
Brown 2012, p. 62, n. 25. Moravcsik (2001, p. 41) prefers to describe the parts of the soul more as agent-like 
sources of desire and forbiddance than as agent-like subjects, while Shields (2001 and 2014) prefers to describe the 
parts of the soul as motivational streams. Dorter (2006, p. 118) also thinks that the description of separate 
motivations within the soul may ultimately be more fluid than scholars have assumed: “In Book 6 Socrates will offer 
a description of our soul’s striving that confirms these hints that the tripartite division of the soul can be reduced to 
something much more continuous.” Kamtekar (2006, p. 200) considers the parts of the soul to be “likely falsehoods” 
used to support Plato’s ethical psychology which “seems to have the status of possibly true, provisional, 
motivationally approved-of way for non-philosophers to understand themselves as they move toward philosophy.” 
See also n. 44 of Chapter 2. If the parts are agent-like, another potential difficulty of infinite regress is raised for 
further subdivisions of parts with appetitive, rational, and spirited parts, often called the “homunculus problem.” See 
n. 66 below. A further point of puzzlement and contention concerns how the different functions and 
characterizations of the spirited part of the soul fit together so as to belong to a single spirited part or aspect of the 
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puzzles in Plato’s psychology. I only hope to set a background for Plutarch’s own view, which 
draws upon different points in Plato’s dialogues without assuming a developmentalist or 
unitarian view of Plato’s dialogues.39 
I discuss the following points in greater detail and with more argumentation in the 
appendix to this chapter (§A.I.–§A.V.). First, there is some ambiguity in Plato’s Republic about 
how the spirited part of the soul reacts to representations of injustice and shame, such as whether 
these reactions are due to evaluations of the spirited part of the soul, the rational part of the soul, 
or the overall person whose soul is under discussion (§A.I.). The ambiguity arises in the 
expositional passages aimed at showing that the spirited part of the soul is a third part, distinct 
from the rational and appetitive parts, namely in the examples of Leontius, who has a spirited 
emotion opposed to his appetitive desire, and Odysseus, who quells his spirited anger through the 
use of his reason (Republic 4, 437b1–4, 440a6–b4, 441a2–3). Despite ambiguity concerning the 
evaluation of actions that lead to spirited anger, the spirited part of the soul nonetheless 
consistently is described as being responsive to certain types of information concerned with 
injustice, honor, and shame (Republic 4, 439e1–3, 440b9–d3). 
Secondly, (§A.II.) while there are hints that the non-rational parts of the soul may have 
the ability to form their own evaluative beliefs in contrast with the rational part of the soul 
                                               
soul. See Singpurwalla 2010, pp. 883–4, and 2013, pp. 41–2 with notes, for a succinct summary of this issue. Penner 
1971 argues that the spirited element is not a unified psychological element but exhibits characteristics of both the 
rational and appetitive parts of the soul in its different activities. Gosling 1973, Kamtekar 1998, and Brennan 2012 
argue that the external enculturation of shame and honor culture becomes internalized within the soul, and the 
ultimate unifying characteristic of the spirited part is the desire to maintain and promote self-worth in competition 
and in terms of not violating social standards and one’s own standards of good conduct. Cf. also Annas 1981, pp. 
128–8, and Cooper 1999b, who also seem to hold this view. 
39 Plutarch does not appear to hold to a developmentalist view. Note, however, that if we do take a developmentalist 
view, then the more permissive extension of belief to the non-rational parts of the soul of Republic 10 seems to be 
denied in dialogues that follow the Republic before being reasserted in Plato’s last dialogue, the Laws, where the 
passionate parts of the soul retain beliefs and are educated before reason is operative in children (1, 631d6–632a2, 
643c1–644a2, 647a4–b7; 2, 653a5–c8, 654c3–d3). 
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(Republic 10, 602e4–603a8), in a number of Plato’s other works (§A.III.) belief-formation 
requires rational capacities that do not belong to the non-rational parts of the soul (Sophist, 
Theaetetus, Timaeus, and Philebus). Belief-formation seems to require rational thought 
(διάνοια), and access to the content of belief seems to require understanding of propositional 
statements, which are activities and capacities limited to the rational part of the soul. Further, 
although there are hints in the Timaeus that the non-rational parts of the soul may have an 
intimate connection to sense-perception and sense-perceptible content, where the gods are 
described as having mixed the non-rational passionate parts of the soul with sense-perception 
(αἰσθήσει… συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα [τὰ πάθη], 69c8–d6; cf. 77b1–6), the Philebus explicitly 
describes belief-formation as a rational process that occurs before sense-perceptible information 
reaches the non-rational parts of the soul (§A.IV.). Passages in both the Timaeus and Philebus 
seem to indicate that information gathered through the senses goes through the rational part of 
the soul first. It must be structured and translated by the rational part of the soul into formats to 
which the non-rational parts are capable of responding. Information flow seems to be “top-
down,” from the rational part of the soul to the lower, non-rational parts of the soul.40  
                                               
40 For the full argument see §A.III.–§A.IV. In the Philebus’s account of sense-perception and belief-formation, a 
scribe within the soul (γραμματεύς) writes propositional statements (γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς…λόγους, 
39a3) as beliefs are formed. In the Timaeus, the appetitive part of the soul cannot understand propositional 
statements but is instead led by images and phantoms (ὑπὸ δὲ εἰδώλων καὶ φαντασμάτων…μάλιστα 
ψυχαγωγήσοιτο, 71a3–7). Hence, the propositional statements that are formed in the intellect (the rational part of 
the soul) are reflected as images through the liver in the Timaeus so that information can be passed down to the 
appetitive part and affect it (71b3–c4), i.e. the information is translated into a more rudimentary form to which the 
lower part of the soul can respond. Likewise, in the Philebus the propositional statements formed by the inner scribe 
(γραμματεύς) are depicted as images by an inner painter (ζωγράφος) who passes this information to the appetitive 
part of the soul (39b6–7). The overall view that emerges for the information flow from sense-perception to the 
appetitive part of the soul is top-down insofar as information and belief contents are first formulated as propositional 
statements before being depicted in a format (images) to which the appetitive part of the soul is responsive. For the 
spirited part of the soul, the Philebus account similarly indicates that information is first formulated by the rational 
part of the soul before it is communicated to the spirited part. There seems to be no direct connection between sense-
perceptible information and the non-rational parts of the soul if information must be processed and formulated as 
statements before communicated to the lower parts of the soul. For Bobonich (2002, pp. 259–67, 295–8, 316–31, 
and 343–5; 2010a), the lower parts of the soul, both the spirited and appetitive passionate parts suffer from 
“cognitive impoverishment” in Plato’s later dialogues. They lack the capacity to form representations and their 
 
 181 
Finally, (§A.V.) there are hints that the spirited part of the soul may have a capacity to 
apply different beliefs it receives from the rational part of the soul and a capacity to evaluate 
desires in the absence of rational influence (Republic 9, 571b3–d1; Laws 1, 631d6–632a2, 
643c1–644a2, 647a4–b7; 2, 653a5–c8, 654c3–d3). These notions, as I mentioned in the previous 
section, Plutarch himself draws upon. If this is true, then these points seem to contradict the view 
that all evaluative beliefs are formed by the rational part of the soul. So, the top-down view of 
the Philebus and Timaeus may not be explanatory for all belief-formation and representational 
content.41  
Given this last evidence, it is not apparent that Plato’s dialogues present a single, fleshed-
out, and consistent view on the non-rational spirited part of the soul’s capacity to form evaluative 
beliefs. Nor do I need to come to a definitive answer on how information moves from sense-
perception to the non-rational parts of the soul or the extent to which non-rational parts of the 
soul can form or have evaluative beliefs with complex content in Plato’s psychology overall or 
as part of a developing or considered view. This brief synopsis and the analysis of the appendix 
to this chapter serve to set the stage for Plutarch’s view of the cognitive capacities of the spirited 
part of the soul. Taking stock of these points in Plato’s moral psychology, both the overall top-
down view and hints that paint a picture opposed to the top-down view, we find that Plutarch’s 
adoption of Platonic psychology is an adaptation, highlighting certain features over others. As 
we will see below, Aristotle plays a significant role in this adaptation. 
 
                                               
contribution to emotions with cognitive content should be understood as non-conceptual affective states. Full-blown 
emotions with cognitive content are dependent on the resources and capacities for representation and conceptual 
content provided by the rational part of the soul. Spirited emotions in particular are dependent on the conceptual 
resources of reason (pp. 343–5). As Kamtekar 2010, p. 133, points out, in Bobonich’s interpretation, the non-rational 
parts of the soul are reason-dependent for content and for action, since the non-conceptualized, non-representational 
affective states of the non-rational parts alone would be ineffective in producing action. 




§IV Non-Rational Passions are Not Wholly Non-Rational 
 In §II above, I already noted that we have good evidence in Plutarch’s works that the 
non-rational spirited part of the soul has a capacity to evaluate actions and internal psychological 
states independently of the rational part of the soul. In dreams when the rational part of the soul 
is inactive and in early education before the rational part of the soul is developed, our spirited 
emotions are able to evaluate desires and actions. Plutarch elsewhere writes that these cognitive 
emotions are not identical with rational judgments: 
[T65] εἰ γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἦν κρίσις, ἔδει τῇ τοῦ φιλεῖν χρῆναι καὶ μισεῖν κρίσει τὸ φιλεῖν 
ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μισεῖν· νυνὶ δὲ συμβαίνει τἀναντία, ταῖς μὲν προστιθεμένου τοῦ 
πάθους κρίσεσι ταῖς δ’ ἀπειθοῦντος.  
  
For if passion were judgment, loving and hating would necessarily follow a judgment of 
what we ought to love or hate. But contrary results occur: passion adds force to some 
judgments while opposing others.  (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 449B11–C3). 
 
That emotions such as hate can disagree and conflict with our judgments is sufficient evidence to 
establish that cognitive emotions are not identical with rational judgments. Throughout this 
section, Plutarch argues that emotions are separate from reason and that the passionate parts of 
the soul are different from the rational part. These differences are established by the Principle of 
Opposites in Plato’s Republic 4, and Plutarch gives several examples in which we perceive the 
force of our passions at variance with our rational judgments (On Moral Virtue 448B3–9). 
 Before we can address how the spirited part of the soul is able to make evaluative 
judgments apart from reason, we first must address how the non-rational parts of the soul, both 
the spirited and appetitive parts, are responsive to reason and rational judgments, considering 
their status as non-rational parts of the soul. As we will see in this section, Plutarch argues that 
both of the non-rational passionate parts of the soul are non-rational, but they are not wholly non-
rational (οὐκ παντελῶς ἄλογόν). To understand what this means, we will turn in the next 
 
 183 
section to Aristotle’s argument that the non-rational passionate part of the soul participates in 
some way in reason which allows it to listen to the dictates of reason and obey them 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.13). Plutarch takes this position as well, as we will see in Platonic 
Questions 9, but he argues there that we can make further distinctions beyond whether the non-
rational parts of the soul can listen to reason or are wholly non-rational. The spirited part of the 
soul, we will see, has a greater capacity to listen to reason than the appetitive part of the soul. 
 Let us begin with the first distinction between non-rational and wholly non-rational 
capacities. Taking Aristotelian psychology as generally consistent with Platonic psychology,42 
Plutarch argues that the non-rational passionate parts of the soul, i.e. the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές) 
and appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) parts of the soul, are not entirely void of reason unlike lower, 
or the lowest, parts associated with nutrition / vegetation (τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ φυτικόν) and 
sense-perception (τὸ αἰσθητικόν): 
[T66] ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ πλέον Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν 
ἔγραψεν· ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν 
τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως, τῷ μέντοι παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ 
μέχρι παντὸς ὡς διαφέροντι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ χρώμενος διετέλεσεν, οὐχ ὅτι 
παντελῶς ἄλογόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ φυτικὸν τῆς 
ψυχῆς μέρος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως ἀνήκοα λόγου καὶ κωφὰ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς 
σαρκὸς ἐκβεβλάστηκε καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παντελῶς καταπέφυκε, τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν 
οἰκείου λόγου στέρεται καὶ ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ 
φρονοῦντος εἰσακούειν καὶ τρέπεσθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὑπείκειν καὶ 
κατασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐὰν μὴ τέλεον ᾖ διεφθαρμένον ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἀμαθοῦς 
καὶ ἀκολάστου διαίτης. 
 
Aristotle used these principles [that differentiate the parts of the soul in Plato’s works] for 
a long time,43 as is evident from what he [Aristotle] wrote, but later he attributed the 
                                               
42 For Plutarch’s view of Aristotle’s philosophy and psychology as generally compatible with Plato’s and as part of 
the Platonic tradition see §IV–§V.a. of the Introduction and §VII of Chapter 2.  
43 Babut 1969b, pp. 137–40, assumes that Plutarch understood Aristotle as having a tripartite Platonic phase in his 
psychology, though he later conflated (in Plutarch’s view) the spirited part of the soul with the appetitive part of the 
soul in On the Soul 1.1, 403a30, making the soul bipartite between a rational and non-rational part. On this point, 
Sandbach 1982, pp. 212–19, argues that in Nicomachean Ethics 7.6, 1149b1–2, where spirit follows reason, but 
desire does not (ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία οὔ), and in Politics 7.15, 1334b21–5, 
Aristotle continued to abide by Platonic tripartition of the soul. Contra Sandbach, Vander Waerdt (1985a, p. 379–80, 
n. 23) convincingly argues that passages such as Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b30, once properly understood, do 
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spirited part to the appetive part of the soul, since anger is a kind of appetite and desire 
for causing pain in return [Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 403a30]. Nevertheless, he continued 
through and through to treat the passionate and non-rational part of the soul as different 
from the rational part of the soul, not because it is wholly without reason, like the sense-
perceptive part of the soul or the part of the soul responsible for nutrition and growth, 
which are wholly incapable of listening to reason, deaf, and in a way sprout from the 
body and are naturally concerned in their entirety with the body. The affective part of the 
soul lacks its own reason and does not have a share in it, but otherwise naturally takes 
heed of the rational and thinking part of the soul, turns toward it, submits to it, and 
conforms to it, if it has not been completely corrupted by witless pleasure and an 
indulgent lifestyle.      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 442B4–C5) 
 
With the exception of Aristotle’s conflation of the spirited part with the appetitive part of the 
soul, Plutarch takes Aristotle’s psychology to be, on the whole, consistent with Platonic 
psychology.44 Plutarch affirms that Aristotle is right and consistent throughout his works in 
differentiating the rational and non-rational aspects of the soul. He also adopts Aristotle’s 
additions of vegetative and sense-perceptive parts of the soul.45 Here, he likewise attributes to the 
non-rational passionate parts of the soul an ability to listen to reason and obey it, which is 
                                               
not lend support to a tripartite interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology. Even in Politics 7.15, 1334b17–19, the 
division that Aristotle outlines is bipartite: “Then, just as the soul and the body are two, so even we see two parts of 
the soul, the non-rational and the part that has reason” (ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύ’ ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς 
ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον). Aristotle often speaks of the soul as composed of 
parts, but rejects soul-partition in favor of a view that the soul has several distinct capacities in On the Soul 3.9. On 
Plutarch’s access to Aristotelian texts see §IV of the Introduction, esp. nn. 44–5. 
44 Cf. Opsomer (1998, pp. 33–6; 2006, p. 213; and 2012, p. 316–23), who argues that Plutarch is right to treat 
Aristotelian bipartite psychology as compatible with Platonic tripartite psychology. See also §V.a. in the 
Introduction with the accompanying notes. 
45 See On the Obsolescence of Oracles 429E7–9: “For [nature] distributed to us five senses and five parts of soul, 
the nutritive, sense-perceptive, appetitive, spirited, and rational” (ἔνειμε γὰρ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεις πέντε καὶ 
μέρη ψυχῆς, φυτικὸν αἰσθητικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμοειδὲς λογιστικόν). See also On the E at Delphi 390E9–F5. 
Cf. Opsomer 2012, pp. 323–4 and n. 68. In Opsomer’s view, the further division of the soul into an additional 
vegetative and sense-perceptive part should not be taken to be Plutarch’s considered view, since the speaker in both 
of the instances given above is listing as many natural groups of five as come to mind. Contra Opsomer, Plutarch 
attributes a nutritive / vegetative part of the soul to both plants and humans not only when he is listing off different 
entities that consist of five parts, but also when drawing on Plato’s dialogues (Causes of Natural Phenomena 1, 
911C1–D4). Plutarch draws upon Republic 6, 491d; 8, 564a and Timaeus 90a, which imply rather than explicitly 
state this view, as Sandbach notes in the Loeb edition of Causes of Natural Phenomena. Nevertheless, Plutarch can 
point to Socrates’ caveat that there may be more parts of the soul “between” the rational, spirited, and appetitive (εἰ 
ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, Republic 4, 443d7–e1). They are not “between” the other three parts of the soul 
for Plutarch; they are below them. Plutarch thus finds evidence for the lowest parts of the soul in Plato’s dialogues, 
but he draws on Aristotle in his interpretation of Platonic psychology to make their place in the soul explicit. 
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enough for the non-rational passionate parts of the soul to qualify as not entirely non-rational 
(οὐκ παντελῶς ἄλογόν).46 
 Plutarch’s view in this passage draws upon several key points in Nicomachean Ethics 
1.13. In that chapter, Aristotle writes that the non-rational part (τὸ ἄλογον) is able to listen to 
and obey reason (κατήκοον καὶ πειθαρχικόν, 1103b21). Because this part of the soul is 
capable of listening, being persuaded in some manner, and obeying, we should say that it has 
reason (ἔχειν λόγον), though not in the strict sense of having reason and having it in itself 
(κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, 1102b30–1103a3). The vegetative part of the soul, however, has no share 
in reason whatsoever (τὸ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, 1102b29–30). So far, Plutarch’s 
position, given above, is in line with Aristotle’s view. 
 Plutarch, however, writes that the sense-perceptive part of the soul is completely void of 
reason, which is something Aristotle elsewhere denies (On the Soul 3.9, 432a30–1).47 Here 
Plutarch echoes a description in Plato’s Timaeus of non-rational perception (ἄλογος αἴσθησις, 
69d4),48 but he appears to describe an Epicurean view, which Plutarch addresses in Reply to 
Colotes.49 If our sense-perceptions are unadulterated, striking us directly without an intermediate 
                                               
46 Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443B8–10: “The part with which we experience spirited passion within ourselves 
and appetitive passions as well as pleasure and pain naturally hearkens to the thinking part and allows itself to be 
conformed by it” (τὸ θυμούμενον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον ὑπακούειν τε τῷ 
φρονοῦντι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ συνδιατίθεσθαι πέφυκεν). Though Plutarch does not write it here, he 
elsewhere indicates that both the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul participate in reason (λόγου μέτεστιν) to 
different degrees (Platonic Questions 9, 1008C11–D6=[T71] below), which seems to speak against taking the 
statement that the non-rational part of the soul has no share in reason (λόγου ἄμοιρος) as meaning that each can in 
no way participate in reason, which I discuss further in the next section. 
   Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b11–12; On the Soul 1.4, 409a9–10; 1.5, 411b27–8; 2.2, 413a25–b1; 
2.3, 424b32–415a3; 3.12, 434a26. Cf. also Caston 2006, p. 317 and n. 3. 
47 “The sense-perceptive, which one could not easily establish as either non-rational or as having reason…” (τὸ 
αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως…). 
48 See [A17] in the Appendix. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 77b1–6. 
49 Cf. D.L. 10.31 and S.E. Against the Professors 7.210. See nn. 51–2 below. 
 
 186 
interpretation or distortion through some psychic faculty,50 they nevertheless are not inerrant 
indicators of truth about the world around us (Reply to Colotes 1118B1–10).51 The oar can appear 
bent in water and the tower round, but it could be the case that neither is as it appears to us 
(Reply to Colotes 1121A1–E7).52 
 If perceptions can be true or false, such as when the tower looks round but is not, then 
sense-perceptions seem to be cognitive, which would be an odd thing to think in conjunction 
with Plutarch’s assertion that sense-perception is wholly non-rational. Add to this what appears 
to be an argument that sense-perception depends on reason for its function. In On the Cleverness 
of Animals, Plutarch’s interlocutor, Autoboulos, who may be the persona of Plutarch’s father, 
gives the following argument: 
[T67] καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι 
τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις 
ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς 
καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἶτ’ αὖθις ἐπανῆλθε καὶ μεταθεῖ 
καὶ διώκει τῶν προϊεμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ᾗ καὶ λέλεκται “νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ 
νοῦς ἀκούει, τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά”, ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν 
                                               
50 Cf. Plutarch, Pericles 1.2, quoted in n. 58 below; On the Sign of Socrates 588E4–6: “For, whenever we talk with 
each other, sound is like an impact, with the soul receiving the speech through the ears by force” (πληγῇ γὰρ ἡ 
φωνὴ προσέοικε τῆς ψυχῆς δι’ ὤτων βίᾳ τὸν λόγον εἰσδεχομένης, ὅταν ἀλλήλοις ἐντυγχάνωμεν). 
51 “But to perceive appearances and to receive impressions from them is a common experience since it is 
accomplished by causes that are not rational. The argument that introduces sense-perceptions as inaccurate and 
unstable for conviction does not do away with the fact that each of these matters appears to us, but rather does not 
grant to those who use sense-perceptions according to appearance for practical ends the belief in those perceptions 
as entirely true and infallible. For what is necessary and useful from them is sufficient, since there is nothing else 
better, but they do not have the knowledge and understanding about each thing for which the philosophical soul 
longs” (τὸ δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα κοινόν ἐστι πάθος ἀλόγοις περαινόμενον 
αἰτίαις. ὁ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις λόγος ἐπαγόμενος ὡς οὐκ ἀκριβεῖς οὐδ’ ἀσφαλεῖς πρὸς πίστιν οὔσας οὐκ 
ἀναιρεῖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμῖν ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ χρωμένοις κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις 
ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ πιστεύειν ὡς ἀληθέσι πάντῃ καὶ ἀδιαπτώτοις οὐ δίδωσιν αὐταῖς· τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον 
ἀρκεῖ καὶ χρειῶδες ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, ὅτι βέλτιον ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν· ἣν δὲ ποθεῖ φιλόσοφος ψυχὴ λαβεῖν 
ἐπιστήμην περὶ ἑκάστου καὶ γνῶσιν, οὐκ ἔχουσι). 
52 Plutarch criticizes the Epicurean view that all perceptions are true, since, he argues, it limits them to making sure 
statements about the experience of their perceptions but not the objects perceived. All perceptions could be true in 
virtue of the fact that we actually have these experiences the way that we do, but that does not tell us about the 
external world on which our perceptions report. Cf. Kechagia 2011, pp. 261–89. On the bent oar and round tower 
examples cf. S.E. Against the Professors 7.208–9; Lucretius 4.353–63 and 4.438–42. 
   The Stoics separate off the act of assenting to appearances, which involves commitment to a belief. See LS 40, 
41A(=Cicero, Academica 2.145=SVF 1.66), 53S(=Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1057A=SVF 3.177), and 
esp. 69G–K. See nn. 94 and 96 below. 
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μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.  
 
And indeed, there is an argument of Strato the natural philosopher that proves that it is 
absolutely impossible for there to be sense-perception without thinking, for, often the 
words when we are going over letters strike our eyes or our ears and escape us and elude 
us when we are paying attention to other things. Then, our attention returns and pursues 
and hunts after each of the things that passed it by as it reads back through them, for 
which reason it has been said ‘intellect sees and intellect hears, everything else is deaf 
and blind,’ [Strato fr. 112 Wehrli]53 since what happens to the eyes and ears does not 
produce perception unless the thinking part of the soul is present. 
(Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 961A2–11) 
 
Prima facie it appears that Autoboulos, via Strato, establishes that intellect (νοῦς) or the thinking 
part of the soul (τὸ φρονοῦν) is integral to the function of sense-perception. That is not quite 
what Autoboulos argues, however, as the surrounding context indicates. What Autobolous argues 
is that sense-perception serves no purpose unless there is some mental faculty that is able to 
understand the information it provides and then use it: 
[T68] ἡ γὰρ φύσις, ἣν ἕνεκά του καὶ πρός τι πάντα ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψιλῷ 
τῷ πάσχον τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν ἐποίησεν. 
 
For nature, which they correctly assert produces everything for the sake of something and 
for some purpose, did not produce the animal faculty of sense-perception just for it to 
have a passive experience of something. 
(Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 960E1–3)  
 
Sense-perception is present in animals, the argument goes, so that its information can be used to 
avoid dangers and pursue what is beneficial to these animals (960E3–F5). Only rational 
capacities of the soul can use this information (960E7–F5 and [T67]). So, animals must have 
these rational capacities. If animals were merely capable of passively receiving information and 
feeling pain but unable to react to or use this information, it would be cruel and  
[T69] αἰσθήσεώς τε πάσης καὶ φαντασίας τὸ χρώμενον οὐκ ἐχούσης ἀπηλλάχθαι 
βέλτιον ἢ πονεῖν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ᾧ διακρούσεται ταῦτα μὴ παρόντος. 
 
                                               
53 Plutarch attributes this quotation to Epicharmus in On the Great Fortune or Virtue of Alexander 336B4–5. 
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it would be better for for animals to be deprived of all sense-perception and 
representation that is not accompanied by a capacity to use that sense-perception and 
representation than for the animal to struggle, feel pain, and suffer, without a capacity 
present by which it could avoid these things.   
(Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 960F5–961A2) 
 
The quotation from Strato, then, is used in support of a teleological argument that sense-
perception serves no purpose unless its information can be used by rational processes that guide 
the actions of an animal,54 but the argument does not show that sense-perception as a faculty 
requires intellect or reasoning in its own function, a point that Autoboulos concedes (961B5–6).55 
It only requires that animals have the ability to use sense-perceptive information. 
In this argument, Autoboulos denies the notion that animals might very well be capable 
of avoiding dangers and seeking what is beneficial through the use of less rational capacities of 
descrimination and representation.56 Just after this argument, however, he grants that many of 
these abilities might be possible without intellect and reason through sense-perception and 
representation alone (961B5–8).57 In On Moral Virtue, Plutarch writes that animals’ defensive 
actions, avoidance of dangers, and activities in general could be explained by the affections that 
are closely tied to animals’ bodies rather than by rational beliefs (450F6–451A7). Nevertheless, 
Autoboulos argues, even if we grant that discrimination of this sort can occur apart from higher 
                                               
54 Cf. Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 960E7–F1: “The grasping and pursuing that follows the perception of 
things beneficial and the pushing away and avoidance of things destructive and painful is impossible for creatures 
not naturally capable of reasoning, judging, remembering, or attending to something” (τὰς δ’ ἑπομένας τῇ 
αἰσθήσει τῶν μὲν ὠφελίμων λήψεις καὶ διώξεις, διακρούσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς τῶν ὀλεθρίων καὶ λυπηρῶν 
οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ⟨παρεῖναι⟩ τοῖς μὴ λογίζεσθαί τι καὶ κρίνειν καὶ μνημονεύειν καὶ προσέχειν πεφυκόσιν, 
accepting the addition of παρεῖναι in Porphyry). 
55 “But let it be the case that sense-perception does not require intellect for its own function” (ἔστω δὲ μὴ δεῖσθαι 
τοῦ νοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). As with Aristotle, we can consider sense-perception to be different 
from the faculty that uses the information it provides, such as the representational faculty of the soul. Aristotle says 
that the faculty of representation is something altogether different (On the Soul 3.9, 432a31–432b1). Cf. Caston 
2011, p. 47. 
56 See, for example, Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3, 428a18–24; 3.9, 432a15–433a8; 3.10, 433a11–12; 3.11, 434a5–7. A 
representational capacity in animals, which is not identical with thought or other rational capacities, allows for 
discriminatory responses and the mental activities of animals that lead to their actions. Cf. Sorabji 1993, pp. 17–20, 
35–40, 50–1, 54–7, and 64. 
57 See n. 73 below. 
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rational powers, how could an animal continue to discriminate between what is dangerous and 
beneficial later, after the perception of these objects ceases, unless it has some rational capacity 
to remember its previous experiences (On the Cleverness of Animals 961B7–10)? As we will see 
below in §VII, Plutarch provides an answer to this question that does not require the rational part 
of the soul. If animals have non-rational passionate parts of the soul that are similar to humans’, 
which Autoboulos accepts (961D2–5), there is a sense in which animals can be habituated to 
respond in certain ways to types of representations, retaining certain orientations and 
representational capacities without using the rational part of the soul.58 
 What Plutarch means in claiming that the sense-perceptive part of the soul is wholly non-
rational should not be understood in terms of whether it can relate information that is true or 
false or give information about the world that can be evaluated by reason. Instead, we should 
understand Plutarch’s denial to concern whether the sense-perceptive part of the soul, like the 
vegetative / nutritive part, can obey or respond to the dictates of the rational part of the soul in 
certain ways that would qualify as rational. This, I take it, is what Plutarch means to deny to the 
sense-perceptive part of the soul and the vegetative / nutritive part. Consider that most of 
humankind cannot consciously control or influence their metabolic functions or the qualia they 
receive in sense-perception.59 Our rational powers may receive information from our sense-
                                               
58 In On the Cleverness of Animals, the interlocutors take it for granted that non-rational animals are rational and are 
endowed with many rational capacities, since this entire dialogue centers on a debate over whether sea or land 
animals are cleverer (960A3–B3). Nevertheless, Autoboulos and Soclarus canvass several arguments for the 
rationality of animals before the debate begins. One challenge, which I believe presents a strong case for animal 
rationality but is outside the scope of this chapter and my dissertation to explore, asks how animals can make 
preparations for the future, such as traps, lairs, and places of shelter, without some rational capacity that allows them 
to learn to do some of these tasks and also to have prospective representations, i.e. projected representations about 
future events (961B10–C3). Stoics deny that animals have memory (Seneca, Letters 124.16–24) or a sense of the 
future (Cicero, On Duties 1.11), though certain actions provide evidence that they do. 
59 Plutarch, Pericles 1.2: “For, perhaps it is necessary for sense-perception to observe everything that becomes 
apparent to it, whether useful or useless, since it receives what it chances upon in virtue of the experience of an 
impact” (τῇ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσει κατὰ πάθος τῆς πληγῆς ἀντιλαμβανομένῃ τῶν προστυγχανόντων ἴσως 
ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον, ἄν τε χρήσιμον ἄν τ᾽ ἄχρηστον ᾖ, θεωρεῖν). 
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perceptive faculties, and we may become aware of certain nutritive functions of our bodies, but 
the flow of information between these non-rational aspects and reason seems to go in one 
direction only, toward our conscious experience. In normal human experience, we cannot control 
these parts of our nature consciously at whim.60 Our passions, on the other hand, are far more 
responsive to our thoughts and are within our power to shape, oppose, or incite through rational 
control or influence. 
 
§V Participating in Reason to Different Degrees 
 Now, in [T66], Plutarch writes that the non-rational part of the soul should not be thought 
to have its own reason (οἰκεῖος λόγος). This denial answers a question raised in the opening of 
the same work, namely, 
[T70] πότερον οἰκείῳ λόγῳ κεκόσμηται τὸ δεδεγμένον μόριον αὐτὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ 
μετέσχηκεν ἀλλοτρίου. 
 
whether the [passionate] part of the soul that receives it [moral virtue] has been equipped 
with its own reason or has come to participate in reason that does not belong to itself.  
      (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 440D4–9) 
 
The non-rational part of the soul, taking both the spirited and appetitive parts together, does not 
have its own internal rational part by which it responds to the rational part of the soul.61 This 
leaves open the second option of participating in reason in [T70], except that Plutarch also seems 
to deny it in [T66]: the non-rational part of the soul does not have a share in reason (λόγου 
ἄμοιρον). Is Plutarch denying the notion of participation here or does he mean something else? 
                                               
60 Wim Hof, who can consciously raise his body temperature in extreme conditions, may be an exception. 
61 Though I have not included it in the quotation here, Plutarch is speaking of the passionate part of the soul 




 If we turn to Plutarch’s Platonic Questions 9, it would seem that Plutarch cannot be 
denying that the non-rational parts of the soul participate in reason, unless he changes his mind 
between the two works: 
[T71] ὥσπερ οὖν συνωρίδος οὐχ ὁ ἡνίοχός ἐστιν ἀρετῇ καὶ δυνάμει μέσος, ἀλλὰ τῶν 
ἵππων ὁ φαυλότερος μὲν τοῦ ἡνιόχου βελτίων δὲ τοῦ ὁμοζύγου, οὕτω τῆς ψυχῆς 
οὐ τῷ κρατοῦντι τὴν μέσην ἀπένειμε τάξιν, ἀλλ’ ᾧ πάθους μὲν ἧττον ἢ τῷ ⟨τρίτῳ 
μᾶλλον δ’ ἢ τῷ⟩ πρώτῳ, λόγου δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τρίτῳ ⟨ἧττον δ’ ἢ τῷ πρώτῳ⟩ 
μέτεστιν.62 
 
Therefore, just as in a chariot drawn by two horses, the charioteer is not in the middle in 
terms of virtue and power, but the horse that is inferior to the charioteer but superior to 
his yoke-mate [is in the middle], in like manner does he [Plato] assign the middle position 
of the soul not to the part that rules but to the part that has less participation in passion 
than the ⟨third part [the appetitive part], but more than the⟩ first part [the rational part], 
and has more participation in reason than the third part, ⟨but less then the first⟩.  
(Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1008C11–D6) 
 
In this passage, which follows [T63], Plutarch continues his exegesis of the Myth of the 
Charioteer in Plato’s Phaedrus and his explanation of why the spirited part of the soul is the 
natural ally of the rational part of the soul. As we saw in §I, the higher status of the spirited part 
was granted to it due to its greater receptivity to commands and its greater obedience to reason. 
Here, its greater participation in reason than the appetive part coordinates with its greater 
receptivity to instructions from reason.63 
 The notion that listening indicates a form of participation in reason fits well with 
Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, which, again, Plutarch draws upon in [T66]. Aristotle writes that  
[T72] τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου,τὸ δ’ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως 
ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ 
πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον. 
 
the vegetative part in no way has a share in reason, but the appetitive and desiderative 
part in general participates in it in some way insofar as it listens and is submissive to it, 
just as we say that one pays attention to one’s father or friends.  
                                               
62 Accepting emendations by Wyttenbach, which are marked by angle brackets. 
63 Cf. Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures: The capacity to listen to reason is more rational than passionate in nature 
(ἔστι δὲ λογικωτέρα μᾶλλον ἢ παθητικωτέρα, 37F11–38B1). 
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(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b29–32) 
 
Aristotle qualifies his remarks: the non-rational part of the soul participates in some way (πως) in 
reason. The capacity due to this participation is limited to a certain receptivity and ability to obey 
reason, and we should not simply say that the non-rational part is rational or fully participates in 
reason. Shortly after this, Aristotle further remarks: 
[T73] εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν 
κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ’ ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. 
 
If we should say that this [the non-rational part] has reason, what has reason will be two 
in number, namely, one strictly so and in itself and another as something as though it is 
capable of listing to its father.  (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1103a1–3) 
 
Reception of commands is possible, but, as Aristotle asserts by contrast, he does not mean 
something more advanced, such as a reasoning in the sciences and mathematics (1102b33).64 
Taking this context into consideration, namely, these passages of Nicomachean Ethics 
1.13 that lie in background to [T66] and the coordination of listening to reason and participating 
in reason in Platonic Questions 9, I take it that Plutarch is not denying that the non-rational parts 
of the soul participate in reason in some way in [T66]. First, even in [T66], the non-rational parts 
of the soul are said to listen to (εἰσακούειν) and submit to (ὑπείκειν) the rational part of the 
soul, capacities which, according to Platonic Questions 9 and Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, are due 
to the participation in reason by the non-rational parts of the soul. Plutarch attributes these 
capacites to the non-rational part of the soul immediately after writing that it has no share in 
reason. Secondly, participation in reason is the only other option given in the opening to On 
Moral Virtue: passions either participate in reason (μετέσχηκεν) or they are equipped with their 
                                               
64 See also Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 2.1, 1219b26–1220a4. 
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own reason (οἰκείῳ λόγῳ κεκόσμηται, 440D3–9=[T70]). They do not have their own reason. 
Therefore, participation in reason is the only other option left. 
I suggest, then, that Plutarch’s denial that the non-rational passionate parts of the soul 
have a share in reason should be understand in one of the two ways.65 (1) Plutarch means for us 
to understand that the non-rational parts of the soul do not have their own internal rational part. 
The denial of having a share in reason (ἄμοιρον) would really mean not having reason as a part 
(τὸ μέρος / τό μόριον). In this interpretation, Plutarch would forestall an objection that concerns 
whether each part of the soul could be subdivided further into appetitive, rational, and perhaps 
spirited parts.66  
Alternatively, (2) Plutarch may intend only that the non-rational passionate parts of the 
soul cannot be said to have reason in the strict sense and in itself (κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ), as 
Aristotle writes (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b30–1103a3). On this reading, Plutarch 
emphasizes the distinction between the non-rational parts of the soul compared to the rational 
part of the soul. Taken this way, Plutarch’s point would be, again, that passions are not identical 
to rational judgments (On Moral Virtue 449B11–C3=[T65]) and that the non-rational parts of the 
soul are non-identical to the rational part. 
 Now, in Platonic Questions 9, Plutarch indicates not only that both non-rational 
                                               
65 It is unclear whether the partitive genitive of ἄμοιρον is οἰκείου λόγου or λόγου. If Plutarch meant that the non-
rational part of the soul does not have a share in its own reason (οἰκείου λόγου ἄμοιρον), which would make this 
statement part of the first denial: “The affective part of the soul lacks its own reason and does not have a share in [its 
own reason]” (τὸ παθητικὸν οἰκείου λόγου στέρεται καὶ ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν, 442C1–2), it would get us out of the 
problem of denying participation in reason to the non-rational part of the soul. That interpretation, however, seems 
untenable, since I cannot imagine what it would add to say that the non-rational part of the soul does not have a 
share in its own reason after establishing that it does not have its own reason. 
66 Plutarch would block the “homunculus problem” that some authors (Crombie 1962, Vol.1, p. 356; Cross and 
Woozley 1964, p. 124; and Moravcsik 2001, pp. 44–5) allege Plato’s tripartite psychology cannot avoid. The 
homunculus problem considers each part of the soul in need of at least its own rational and appetitive parts in order 
to act as agents, like little persons within each person. If each part of the soul can have its own parts, there is fear 
that these smaller parts within each part of the soul may also require their own smaller parts to act as agents, which 
would lead to an infinite regress. For arguments against attributing the homunculus problem to Plato’s tripartite 
psychology see Annas 1981, pp. 44–5; Moline 1981, p. 75; Bobonich 2002, pp. 222, 248; Erginel 2013, p. 204. 
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passionate parts of the soul participate in reason, but that they participate in it to different 
degrees. The distinction of emotions by degree finds precedence in Theophrastus,67 but Aristotle, 
as Plutarch recognizes in [T66], does not differentiate the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul 
in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13. Aristotle often treats the spirited part of the soul as though it were 
merely part of the appetitive, which is reflected in Aristotle’s description of the non-rational 
passionate part of the soul as “the appetitive and desiderate part in general” (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν 
καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν, 1102b30).68 
 In distinguishing between the non-rational passionate parts of the soul, Plutarch adds, 
beyond Aristotle’s discussion of participation in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, that the spirited part 
of the soul has greater access to cognitive content than the appetitive part of the soul because it 
has access to a representation of what is noble: 
[T74] καὶ καθάπερ ἐν γράμμασι τὰ ἡμίφωνα μέσα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν φωνηέντων 
τῷ πλέον ἐκείνων ἠχεῖν ἔλαττον δὲ τούτων, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ 
θυμοειδὲς οὐκ ἀκράτως παθητικόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ φαντασίαν καλοῦ πολλάκις ἔχει 
μεμιγμένην ἀλόγῳ τῇ τῆς τιμωρίας ὀρέξει.  
 
And just as in the case of letters, the semi-vowels69 are between the mute consonants and 
regular vowels, in that they sound more than the former but less than the latter, so in the 
case of the human soul, the spirited part is not purely affective but often has a 
representation of what is noble mixed with a non-rational desire for revenge. 
     (Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1008B10–C4) 
 
The desires of the non-rational appetitive part of the soul lack this capacity to represent what is 
noble. In contrast with spirited emotions, Plutarch likens the limited capacity of appetitive 
desires to tentacles of an octopus that reach only so far as to obtain a morsel of food within 
reach: 
                                               
67 Cf. Theophrastus, On Emotions in Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 235.7–8. Cf. Fortenbaugh 2006, p. 96, 
though the passage is incorrectly cited as 253.7–8. Cf. also Fortenbaugh 2008. 
68 Cf. Fortenbaugh 1975, p. 35. 
69 According to LSJ, s.v. ἡμίφωνος, under the substantive ἡμίφωνον (2), ρ and ς are semi-vowels. LSJ cites 
Aristotle, Poetics 1456b27; Philodemus, On Poems 2.16; among others. 
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[T75] οὐ γάρ τι φαῦλον ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ μικρὸν οὐδ’ ἀγεννές ἐστιν οὐδ’ ὥσπερ ⟨τὰς 
πλεκτάνας⟩ οἱ πολύποδες ἄχρι τῶν ἐδωδίμων ἐκτείνει τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ ταύτην 
μὲν ὀξύτατος ἀποκόπτει κόρος ἀκαρὲς ὥρας μόριον ἀκμάσασαν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ 
καλὸν ὁρμῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ τιμὴν καὶ χάριν “οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μέτρον ὁ τοῦ 
βίου χρόνος”, ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐπιδραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ 
φιλάνθρωπον ἐξαμιλλᾶται ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς χάρισιν ἡδονὰς ἀμηχάνους 
ἐχούσαις.70 
 
For the soul is not something of little worth nor is it devoid of nobility, and it does not 
extend its desires like octopi, stretching their tentacles out so far as to obtain what is 
edible. Rather, satisfaction of a desire very swiftly brings such [an appetitive] desire to its 
end, which flourishes for a hair’s breadth of an hour, while “the length of one’s life is no 
measure for”71 the impulses toward what is honorable and the esteem and favor due to 
honor. Instead, the love of honor and love for others, laying hold of all time, strives 
vehemently after actions and favors that hold indescribable pleasures. 
(Plutarch, That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1098D11–E9)72 
 
In the context of this passage, Plutarch criticizes the Epicureans for praising pleasures of the 
belly as the focal point of a blessed life, quoting Metrodorus in particular (1098C9–D7). Plutarch 
believes that the Epicurean view neglects the higher pleasures of public and social life (D7–11).  
 Contained within Plutarch’s polemical criticism of the Epicurean view, however, is a 
point of particular interest in distinguishing the nature of appetitive desires and spirited desires. 
Appetites, like spirited desires, are about something and intentional insofar as they have objects 
toward which they stretch. The appetitive desire stretches out toward what can sate that desire, 
like an octopus’ tentacle snatching at a morsel of food. The object is in some sense represented 
                                               
70 Accepting Einarson and DeLacy’s emendation here marked by angle brackets. Pohlenz adds πλεκτάνας τῆς 
before ἐπιθυμίας and Döhner adds πλεκτάνας after ἐπιθυμίας. 
71 Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, Adespota fr. 1241 Kock. 
72 See also Sandbach fr. 118 from Plutarch’s Against Pleasure=Stob. 3.6.51: “But the law for our pleasures [of 
appetite] is the same as the one even of non-rational animals, who do not have a desire for anything after remedying 
the appetites, but satiety for what urges them on since they are not compelled by pleasures” (ὁ δὲ εἰς τὰ ἡμέτερα 
νόμος ὁ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων, οἷς μετὰ τὸ ἀκέσασθαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδενὸς ὄρεξις, ἀλλὰ κόρος τῶν 
ἐπειγόντων ἀβιάστοις ἡδοναῖς). Reading καί for Jacobs’ κατά in καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων; οἷς, added by Sandbach in 
οἷς μετὰ; and omitting ταῖς before τῶν ἐπειγόντων. Sandbach follows Wilamowitz (1923, p. 84) in denying the 
authenticity of this fragment based on hiatus and “nauseous affection of style.” While the portion I quote here seems 
in line with That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1098D11–E9, the preceding sentence treats all 
pleasures not just as satiety of desires but like treatments of a disease (θεράπειαι). While at times Plutarch treats 
inordinate or excessive passions and desires as diseases, the view that even legitimate pleasures (δίκαιαι ἡδοναί) 
and desires are like diseases is not Plutarch’s own view. See §VI of Chapter 2. 
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as an object of desire that is appropriate to one’s nature (τὸ φανὲν οἰκεῖον), i.e. the appetitive 
part of the soul need not have an evaluative representation of food that is any more complex than 
as something that is the right type as to-be-pursued and to-be-eaten (φαντασία τοῦ οἰκείου, 
Reply to Colotes 1122C9–D1).73 Once the object is obtained, the appetitive desire ceases.74  
 Here we find that Plutarch affirms that the non-rational passions are intentional with 
evaluative representational content. If the appetitive part of the soul did not have any capacity for 
an evaluative representation, it would not be able to motivate action, since it would not able to 
focus the direction of the affective energies of the passions.75 This capacity also appears to 
belong to the non-rational appetitive part itself, which has some participation in reason, though 
less than the spirited part (Platonic Questions 9, 1008C11–D6=[T71]). 
 In contrast with the simple representations of appetitive desires, however, spirited 
emotions reach toward something far harder to grasp and endure for far longer, since they stretch 
                                               
73 In his defense of Academic withholding of assent, Plutarch writes: “Action needs two things, the representation of 
what is fitting and impulse toward what is apparently fitting, neither of which is in conflict with suspension [of 
belief and assent]” (ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις δυοῖν δεῖται, φαντασίας τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὲν οἰκεῖον ὁρμῆς, ὧν 
οὐδέτερον τῇ ἐποχῇ μάχεται). Cf. On the Cleverness of Animals 961B7–8: Sense-perception can allow for an 
animal to distinguish between what is appropriate or alien to itself (τῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον ἡ 
αἴσθησις ἐνεργασαμένη διαφορὰν). The evaluative representation of something as fitting or appropriate need not 
be complex or count as a more rational state of belief involving assent. Cf. Moss 2012b, pp. 274–5, and 
Singpurwalla 2011, pp. 283–98, on the simple, evaluative content of appetitive desires in Plato’s works. For 
Aristotle, emotion, which would describe both spirited and appetitive passions for Plutarch, and apprehension of 
things and activities as pleasant or painful, is a way of evaluating an apparent good (On the Soul 431a8–11); cf. 
Sherman 1997, p. 78. 
74 Greed for more possessions and wealth can be insatiable. Corrupt, insatiable desires such as greed, however, 
would not count as appetites. See Plutarch fr. 150, Concerning Wealth=Stob. 4.31.86. See also On Virtue and Vice 
100F9–101B, quoted in n. 31 above. 
75 For this argument applied to Plato’s psychology see Kamtekar 2010, p. 133: Undirected affective states, as 
Bobonich (2002, p. 259) understands passions to be in Plato’s later works, would lack the capacity to be “goal-
setting agents or the possessors of beliefs and desires.” Every emotion, according to Bobonich’s view, requires the 
rational part of the soul to represent objects and to provide direction to passions, which have no cognitive content of 
their own (see nn. 40–1 above). Cf. also Nussbaum 2001, pp. 24–33: Although Nussbaum does not attribute the 
“adversary’s position” on emotions, which holds that they are energies without cognitive content, the position, 
which is sometimes attributed to Plato, would not be able to account for the evaluation of objects as fitting even for 
simple appetitive evaluations of objects, much less more complex spirited evaluations. Cf. also Ben-Ze’ev 1997. 
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out toward a more abstract and less concrete goal, namely, honor and glory.76 The representation 
of what is noble (φαντασία καλοῦ), to which the spirited part of the soul has access and the 
appetitive part does not, is more complex in nature and more cognitively rich. First, spirited 
emotions of honor and shame involve the evaluation of desires and actions according to 
standards of what is sanctioned and forbidden, honorable and shameful. These standards are 
essential features of the representational content of cognitive emotions such as shame and honor, 
and used in the evaluation of actions, desires, and habits, either one’s own or those that belong 
to, or are perceived to belong to, another person.77 Unlike the general appetite for drink, as it is 
described in Republic 4 (437d7–438a6), or the tentacular notion of appetites in [T75], where the 
valence of a particular object is only in terms of its perceived ability to satisfy a particular 
appetite, the spirited emotions also evaluate desires and actions based on whether they conform 
to standards of honor and shame.78 
 Secondly, spirited emotions are more complex than those of the appetitive part of the soul 
because they involve the awareness of others as a feature of their representational content or a 
                                               
76 By “more abstract” I mean that a sense of honor requires more cognitive content and notions than the evaluation 
of objects as the right type to go after and that a standard of honor and notions of glory or ill-repute are not tangible 
or concrete; they exist as representations of mind. I do not mean to imply that the spirited part of the soul is capable 
of abstracting to ideas as part of its cognitive capacities, but that the spirited part of the soul has some greater grasp 
on what is honorable and appropriate by which it is able to judge actions and desires.  
   On abstraction, which Plutarch describes as a process by which we move from sense-perceptible objects to objects 
of thought and the Forms themselves see Platonic Questions 3, 1001E. Cf. Opsomer 2007b, p. 394 and Sierksma-
Agteres 2015, p. 65, n. 32.  
   Aristotle holds a different view on the relationship between a representation of what is noble / appropriate 
(φαντασία καλοῦ) and spirited anger. He denies that spirited emotions aim at what is noble (καλόν) due to 
cognitive deficiency of emotions such as anger which we share with non-human animals (Nicomachean Ethics 
1116b23–1117a9). Those who are valiant in battle, for instance, act on the passion of θυμός, not on account of what 
is noble (οὐ διὰ τὸ καλὸν…ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος, 1117a8–9). A representation of what is noble for Aristotle requires 
the rational part of the soul in policy / choice (προαίρεσις) and rational desire (βούλησις, Great Ethics 1191a22–3). 
Cf. Irwin 2011, p. 247 on these points. 
77 This last qualification concerns the attribution of desires and intentions to others, to which we do not have direct 
access, but may believe to be of a certain kind and directed toward certain ends. 
78 I do not want to overstate the case, since, as Glaucon remarks in Republic 4, 438d, perhaps someone would have a 
point if they were to say that even appetitive desires were for hot, cold, or good drink, and not just drink. 
Nevertheless, Plutarch’s example of tentacular desires seems to speak to very limited evaluations of desires in terms 
of perceived satisfaction. 
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representation of an ideal image for one’s aspiration. There is some debate on whether the 
spirited emotions of anger, shame, and digust are so rooted in a shame-based culture centered on 
perceived self-worth, wherein one’s social status is the central case by which all evaluations of 
what is honorable and shameful are made, that these emotions must always refer back to one’s 
standing in society. What is shameful and honorable and other spirited emotions in this view all 
refer to one’s perceived social standing in the eyes of outside observers, real or imagined.79 
Alternatively, some hold to the “ideal image” view of shame and honor at work in Plato’s 
psychology of spirited emotions, where an ideal image of what it means to be honorable is the 
standard by which actions and desires are judged. This ideal image is taken to be a projection 
within the soul; the standards of evaluation are thought to be internalized, so that judgment need 
not require actual outside observers.80 Plutarch’s moral psychology incorporates both the external 
view and the internalized ideal image view, as we will see in the discussion of particular spirited 
emotions in the next section. 
 Before we move to specific examples, I would like to note that the spirited part of the 
                                               
79 Cf. Annas 1981, pp. 126–8; Taylor 1985, pp. 57–77; Cairns 1993, pp. 16–18; Cooper 1999b, pp. 132–4, 420–3; 
and Burnyeat 2006; Wilberding 2009; Brennan 2012. See also n. 83 below. Cairns (1993, p. 18), for instance, writes 
that shame seems to require an audience that passes judgment, whether or not that audience is imagined or real: 
“One can be one’s own audience, provided one comes to take up the position of a detached observer vis-à-vis 
oneself.” Taylor (1985, p. 67) believes that “[s]hame requires a sophisticated type of self-consciousness. A person 
feeling shame will exercise her capacity for self-awareness, and she will do so dramatically: from being just an actor 
absorbed in what she is doing  she will suddenly become self-aware and critical. It is plainly a state of self-
consciousness which centrally relies on the concept of another, for the thought of being seen as one might be seen by 
another is the catalyst for the emotion.” Bobonich (2002, pp. 343–7) argues children feel an angry desire for 
retaliation at perceived harm, develop an evaluation of that harm as an affront to their sense of honor and status, 
grow to identify their own sense of honor with others they value, and then, if all goes well, begin to value their own 
soul as something to be honored through a recognition of what is fine and valuable. Burnyeat 2006 and Wilberding 
2009 hold the view that societal standards inform spirited evaluations but are not internalized. Brennan 2012 takes 
societal standards of honor and shame to be the basis for all spirited emotions. 
80 Cf. Cairns 1993, pp. 387–8. Cf. also Gosling 1973, pp. 41–51; Kamtekar 1998, pp. 315–39; and Hobbs 2000, p. 
30. Cf. also Singpurwalla 2013, who argues that the spirited part of the soul, in its desire for honor, seeks to live 
according to the rational standards of what is honorable according to the rational part of the soul, not just standards 
informed by societal expectations: spirit wants to live up to one’s own rational expectations, and, if all goes well, to 
track what is discovered to be truly honorable in that pursuit. It ought not to internalize standards so much as to 
depend on reason. 
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soul’s greater participation in reason helps shed light on why the spirited part of the soul is the 
ally of reason. The spirited part of the soul is able to understand the dictates of the rational part 
of the soul better. While appetitives focus on satisfaction almost exclusively, the spirited part of 
the soul can be induced to avoid or pursue certain actions based on whether the command it 
receives from the rational part of the soul concerns notions of honor or shame. The spirited part 
of the soul is sensitive to more information than the appetitive part of the soul, and therefore does 
not simply yield to reason; it is better able to be persuaded by reason.81  
 
§VI Cognitive Emotions: The Desire for Honor, Shame, Anger, Hate, and Envy 
 Turning now to particular types of spirited emotions and their representational content, 
we will look at examples of complex representational content involved in spirited emotions. We 
begin with Plutarch’s notion that the desire for honor and a sense of shame can incorporate an 
ideal image of what one desires to be, both in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of others. I repeat 
here a quotation from Chapter 3. When one is rebuked, it 
[T56] ζῆλον ἐμποιεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν αἰδουμένῳ τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομνήσει καὶ  
παράδειγμα ποιουμένῳ τῶν βελτιόνων ἑαυτόν. 
 
produces rivalry against oneself, because one feels shame over one’s disgraceful deeds by 
the memory of [one’s past] noble deeds, and one considers onself [from the past] as a 
model of better deeds.  (Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 72D2–4).  
 
In this example, Plutarch incorporates an ideal image of oneself, setting within one’s mind the 
projection of one’s better self from the past. This projected ideal may be based on reality or on 
an idealized view of one’s own past self and actions. Against this ideal, current shameful actions 
                                               
81 It is interesting that Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, without making much of a point of it, focuses on what 
would be called spirited emotions in Plato’s dialogues and Plutarch’s works, which are sensitive to admonition, 
rebuke, and encouragement (νουθέτησις καὶ ἐπιτίμησις καὶ παράκλησις) as proof that the non-rational part of the 
soul participates in reason and is persuaded by it (1102b33–1103a1). He does make this distinction however, in 
Nicomachean Ethics 7.6, 1149b1–2, for which see n. 43 above. I discuss the difference between rational and non-
rational persuasion in §I of Chapter 5. 
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and one’s current state of character are compared. One then tries to change one’s action and to 
reshape one’s current self into the mold of that ideal. 
 The desire for honor that is present here is inward focused. One looks at oneself as 
though from an external perspective, taking on the role of an outside observer, but it really is a 
case of introspection into one’s own actions and character.82 What is considered honorable and 
shameful may have been shaped by society at large or one’s own reflections, but the desire to be 
honorable is considered in terms of how one looks at oneself in the mirror of the soul, as it were, 
to see whether one’s current image lives up to one’s own aspirations to be a certain kind of 
person who acts a certain way.83 The ideal we imagine for ourselves could be far different from 
the ideal set by society at large, or heavily modified from what we were taught earlier in life.84 
 In this example, we also see that the initial rebuke comes from another person. In this 
instance, it is a friend who speaks frankly about one’s shortcomings (72B9–72D1). The rebuke 
draws upon standards of shameful and honorable actions and character that both the friend and 
the one rebuked ostensibly share. In the example that Plutarch provides, the friend intends to 
provoke a sense of shame by revealing himself as a disapproving observer, and the example 
                                               
82 Cf. Cairns 1993, p. 18, quoted in n. 79 above. 
83 Cf. Tracy and Robins 2007, pp. 5–9: Modern studies classify a sense of shame as a self-conscious emotion, which 
admits of complex representational content: “Self-conscious emotions require self-awareness and self-
representations.…A sense of self…includes both an ongoing sense of self-awareness (the ‘I’ self) and the capacity 
for complex self-representations (the ‘me’ self, or the mental representations that constitute one’s identity). 
Together, these self processes make it possible for self-evaluations, and therefore self-conscious emotions, to occur” 
(pp. 5–6). Emphasis is original. They continue, “by self-representations, we do not mean simply the cognitive 
contents of the personal self, but also relational, social, and collective self-representations….To experience 
shame…an individual must have the capacity to form stable self-representations and to consciously self-reflect (i.e., 
direct attentional focus toward those representations)” (pp. 6–7). 
84 I turn to the formation of character in terms of inculcating beliefs about what is shameful and honorable below in 
§VII, but more fully in Chapter 5. Cf. Taylor 1985, pp. 76–7: “There is no reason to deny that shame in all its 
occurrences is a moral emotion, provided that morality is not thought of just in terms of adhering to or breaking 
certain moral rules, but is taken to include personal morality, a person’s own view of how he ought to live and what 
he ought to be. The final self-directed adverse judgment in shame is always the same: that he is a lesser person than 
he should be, for in some way a better person would not find himself in a position where he can be seen as he is or 
may be seen.” 
 
 201 
described in [T56] sits among Plutarch’s suggestions on ways to incite our friends to better 
themselves by drawing upon their sense of honor and shame (69E9–74E10). 
 Yet there is no indication here that another individual is required to begin the process of 
self-improvement. We could, presumably, compare our current selves and actions to those of the 
past and to a future ideal and be motivated by a sense of shame that our ideal has not been met. 
So, while the friend who points out one’s faults may be someone whose respect we desire, it 
seems entirely possible that this form of shame and desire to become better could be effective 
without any outside observers rebuking us and without consideration of how we look to those 
around us, focusing solely on how well we abide by our own standards.85 
 Elsewhere, Plutarch goes into more detail on the affective experience of shame. If we are 
not thoroughly corrupted, we should feel painful bites (δηγμοί) and remorse (μεταμέλεια) over 
our faults. If we are exposed in our faults before others, we should feel an agitation of mind or 
dizziness (ἴλιγγος) and experience a great deal of sweat (ἱδρώς, On Listening to Lectures 46D4–
13; On Compliancy 536C5–9). 
 Similar to the first example is Julius Caesar’s desire for greater glory and reputation, 
which I also mentioned in §V of Chapter 3. Caesar’s  
[T76] τὸ μὲν πάθος οὐδὲν ἦν ἕτερον ἢ ζῆλος αὑτοῦ καθάπερ ἄλλου καὶ φιλονικία τις 
ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ πεπραγμένα. 
 
passion was nothing other than a rivalry with himself as though with another person, and 
[it was] a kind of competition for future actions compared to those already complete. 
        (Plutarch, Caesar 58.4)  
 
Here, the notion of imagined future actions is more explicit. So too is the comparison with 
oneself as though the projected self were another person (καθάπερ ἄλλου). This desire for 
                                               
85 Cf. Singpurwalla 2013 and nn. 80 and 84 above. 
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greater glory, however, does not involve retrospective shame or remorse. The image of his past 
self and past feats serve not as an ideal that Caesar desires to return to or match, but as 
comparanda to be surpassed in action and glory. 
 In examples of anger, Plutarch, focuses more on perceived slights than codes of conduct, 
but standards of what is honorable or shameful are no less part of the evaluation of actions that 
result in anger. In On the Control of Anger, the speaker Fundanus makes the following general 
observation: 
[T77] ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς γε τῆς ὀργῆς ἀναθεωρῶν τὴν γένεσιν ἄλλους ὑπ’ ἄλλων αἰτιῶν 
ἐμπίπτοντας εἰς αὐτὴν ἑώρων, οἷς ἐπιεικῶς ἅπασι δόξα τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι καὶ 
ἀμελεῖσθαι παραγίνεται. 
 
But in observing the origin of anger itself, I noticed that different people are swept into 
anger due to different causes. But for nearly all of them there occurred a belief that they 
had been treated disdainfully and slighted. (Plutarch, On the Control of Anger 460D1–4) 
 
While there are various reasons why particular people find this or that action to warrant the 
reaction of anger, the general structure remains the same. One has a belief (δόξα) that damage 
has been done to oneself and to one’s reputation. One’s sense of honor and self-worth are at 
stake.86 As in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,87 Plutarch’s examples of anger involve perceived slights as a 
                                               
86 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.2, 1378b16–17: “For one shows contempt for as many things as one supposes not to be 
worth anything and slights those things as worth nothing” (ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων 
καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν). We believe that our sense of worth, our honor, is violated 
when we are treated as though we were of less value than we perceive ourselves to be. 
87 Rhetoric 2.2, 1378a30–1378b1: “Let anger be a desire involving pain for revenge because of what appears to be a 
slight against oneself or one’s friends, because the slight was not fitting. If this is what anger is, then it must be the 
case that the angry person is always angry at some particular person, such as Kleon, but not against a human in 
general, and [it must be the case] that he did something to oneself or to one’s friends or intended to do so” (ἔστω δὴ 
ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ 
προσήκοντος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τινι, 
οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὑτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τί πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν, I follow Jebb in omitting 
φαινομένης after τιμωρίας). See also Rhetoric 2.4, 1382a2–7: “Anger, spiteful treatment, and slander are causes of 
enmity. Therefore anger comes from slights against onself while enmity can occur even without slights against 
oneself, since we hate those whom we suppose to be of a particular sort. And anger always is concerned with 
particular individuals, as toward Callias or Socrates, but hate can also be against general classes, since everyone 
hates a thief or a sycophant” (ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, διαβολή. ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν 
πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν 
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central feature, but these slights must violate some code of conduct and cause unwarranted 
dishonor if anger is to be justified.88 Standards of what is honorable and shameful, then, are in 
play in one’s evaluations of actions that give rise to anger.89 
Plutarch notes that emotions can be closely related in certain respects and differ by their 
representational content.90 In making a distinction between the spirited emotions of envy and hate 
(On Envy and Hate 536F3–5), for example, Plutarch writes: 
[T78] γεννᾶται τοίνυν τὸ μῖσος ἐκ φαντασίας τοῦ ὅτι πονηρὸς ἢ κοινῶς ἢ πρὸς αὐτόν 
ἐστιν ὁ μισούμενος (καὶ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξαντες αὐτοὶ πεφύκασι μισεῖν καὶ τοὺς 
ἄλλως ἀδικητικοὺς ἢ πονηροὺς προβάλλονται καὶ δυσχεραίνουσι)· φθονοῦσι δ’ 
ἁπλῶς τοῖς εὖ πράττειν δοκοῦσιν. ὅθεν ἔοικεν ὁ μὲν φθόνος ἀόριστος91 εἶναι, 
καθάπερ ὀφθαλμία πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ λαμπρὸν ἐκταρασσόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῖσος ὥρισται, 
καθ’ ὑποκειμένων ἀεί τινων ἀπερειδόμενον προσώπων.92 
 
                                               
ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην 
μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας). Cf. also Aristotle, Topics 127b30–2. 
88 See Rhetoric 2.2, 1378a30–1378b1, quoted in the preceding note: The slight must be thought to be unjustified. 
See also Nicomachean Ethics 5.8, 1135b25–9. For Aristotle, rational reflection on the justification of anger cause its 
increase (see Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b25–1103a1; cf. Kraut 2012, p. 531). Cf. Harris 2001, p. 61; Konstan 
2006, pp. 66–9 and 128. Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 440c6–d3=[A16] in the Appendix. Cf. also Chrysippus’ definition of 
anger as directed at injustice (Stob. 2.7.10c (p. 91, ll. 10–11)=SVF 3.395; D.L. 7.113; cf. Konstan 2006, p. 66 and n. 
49). 
   On the justification of anger, Plutarch contrasts an irrational form of anger, which is directed at one’s loved ones 
in error, from one that is justified against those who do wrong (δικαίως, On Moral Virtue 448D5–7). He later 
revisits the notion, calling the form of anger that aids and intensifies justice (ἡ δικαιοσύνη) righteous anger 
(μισοπονηρία, 451D9–E4=[T55] in Chapter 3). In On Envy and Hate, he writes that we praise righteous anger 
(μισοπονηρία) and that those whom we say deserve to be hated (ἀξιομισότητοι) are hated justly (δικαίως, 
527C9–10, D3). If we believe that we have not been treated unjustly (πεισθέντες μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι), these 
emotions cease (538C5–8). In On the Control of Anger, he writes that our anger is increased when we feel that 
injustice goes unpunished (460A10–B10). Cf. Ingenkamp 2000, pp. 263–4, and Van Hoof 2005, p. 502. See also 
Chapter 3, n. 56.  
89 Cf. Rozin, Lowery, and Imada 1999, who connect emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust (the CAD triad) as 
elicited by the violation of standards of conduct. While I do not think that Plutarch’s standards are identical to those 
of Rozin, Lowery, and Imada, they share the same basic structure. For Rozin et al. and others who follow the CAD 
triad hypothesis, anger is a response to the violation of an individual’s autonomy, which for Plutarch, Plato, and 
Aristotle, would include slights on one’s social standing; contempt is a response to violations of conduct concerning 
one’s community; and disgust is elicited by perceived violations made against what is considered sacrosanct. 
90 Several emotions often occur in close connection to each other in Plutarch’s works. Anger, righteous anger, and 
justified hate for people of bad character are closely connected. See n. 88 above. Shame, remorse, and repentance 
often occur together, too (On the Bravery of Women 259B6–8; Sayings of Kings and Emperors 207D; Can Vice 
Cause Unhappiness 498C12–D8; On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 554A8–B4, 554D10–55; On Tranquility 
of Mind 476E11–477A6; Marius 29.11). 
91 Following the reading of ἀόριστος against MS HU1, which has ὁ ἄριστος, since it fits with the contrast being 
made between bounded hate and unbounded envy. 
92 Following Kronenberg’s conjecture of προσώπων for πρὸς αὐτόν, which Einarson and DeLacy omit. 
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Therefore, hate comes about from a representation that the one hated is bad either 
generally or toward oneself (since, indeed, those who believe that they themselves have 
been treated unjustly naturally feel hatred, and they also censure and feel disgust toward 
those who act unjustly in other ways or are bad). But people simply feel envy toward 
those who seem to fare well. For this reason, envy seems to be without limit, just as a 
disease of the eyes is agitated in response to everything bright, but hate is bound by 
limits, since it always fixes itself against certain individual subjects.  
     (Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 536F6–537A8)93 
 
As with other spirited emotions, Plutarch treats hate and envy as passions (τὰ πάθη, On Envy 
and Hate 536F3–5)94 that involve representational content and belief.95 In the first clause we see 
that a representation (φαντασία) of injustice either within another’s character or in their actions 
against oneself gives rise to hate. In the parenthetical explanation, Plutarch reformulates the 
perceived injustice in terms of belief (ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξαντες αὐτοί). This representation / belief 
issues in the passionate response of hate directed at particular individuals. 
 When Plutarch turns to the origins of envy, he condenses the description: people feel 
envy toward those who appear to fare well (τοῖς εὖ πράττειν δοκοῦσιν), using a form of δόξα. 
Not long after, he writes that envy involves a “representation that another is doing well or badly” 
(τοῦ εὖ πράττειν ἢ κακῶς ἕτερον φαντασίαν, On Envy and Hate 537B6–8), once again 
returning to the term φαντασία. Plutarch moves seamlessly between representation and belief  
                                               
93 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.4, 1382a2–7: We hate general types of people, like the thief or sycophant, but we are 
angry at particular individuals like Callias or Socrates (quoted in n. 87 above). Plutarch, like Aristotle, considers 
scope to be part of what differentiates emotions. Interestingly, Plutarch defines hate as directed at individual 
persons, while envy is less bounded. For a general discussion of hate in Aristotle see Konstan 2006, pp. 185–200. 
See also Fortenbaugh 1975, p. 15. 
94 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b21–3; Eudemian Ethics 2.2, 1220b12–14. Cf. also Cairns 1993, pp. 
382–92: Against Fortenbaugh (1975, pp. 27–8 and 32) Cairns convincingly argues that shame is attributed to the 
passionate part of the soul in Plato’s Republic, not the rational part. Cf. Bobonich 2002, p. 347, n. 85. 
95 On the representational capacity involved in Aristotle’s definition of anger and other emotions see On the Soul 
2.2, 413b12–32; 3.9, 432a22–b7; 3.10, 433b1–4; Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1102a26–32; Eudemian Ethics 2.1, 
1219b32–6. Only a rational capacity can produce conviction (πίστις) and belief (δόξα) according to On the Soul 
3.3, 428a18–24, which may indicate commitment to the way something appears, i.e. to certain representations 
(φαντασίαι, cf. Dow 2015, pp. 185–225, esp. p. 183–92 and the accompanying notes). Representations involved in 
emotions, if they belong to the non-rational part of the soul for Aristotle, appear to be different from beliefs and 
convictions. On the representational capacity (φαντασία) involved in emotions for Aristotle see Cooper 1996, pp. 
246–7; Price 2009b, pp. 133–5; Moss 2012a, p. 70; Dow 2015, p. 189–213. Cf. also Caston 1996 and 1998. 
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in these passages.96 As in other contexts, Plutarch usually does not treat the difference between 
the capacity for representation and belief as significant. In On the Generation of the Soul in the 
Timaeus, Plutarch nearly equates the two (1017A8–B3, 1023F6–1024A8, 1030D7–E5).97 
 In addition to distinguishing hate from envy in terms of the structure and properties 
involved in their respective contents, Plutarch remarks that hate is common to both humans and 
beasts (cf. 537B3–4, C3–6), but that beasts are probably not capable of having a representation 
of “faring well” or “faring badly” and “a sense of glory” or “ill-repute”: 
[T79] ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις φθόνον μὲν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐγγίνεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα (τοῦ γὰρ εὖ 
πράττειν ἢ κακῶς ἕτερον φαντασίαν οὐ λαμβάνουσιν, οὐδ’ ἅπτεται τὸ ἔνδοξον ἢ 
ἄδοξον αὐτῶν, οἷς ὁ φθόνος ἐκτραχύνεται μάλιστα)· μισοῦσι δ’ ἄλληλα καὶ 
ἀπεχθάνονται καὶ πολεμοῦσιν.  
 
Among the beasts, it is not likely that envy occurs between them (for, they do not 
apprehend a representation that another is faring well or badly, and a sense of glory or ill-
repute does not affect them, and these are the things that especially exasperate envy). But 
they [non-rational animals] do hate each other and incur each other’s hatred and war 
against each other.     (Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 537B5–9) 
                                               
96 Cf. also §A.II. and §A.III. in the Appendix to this chapter for the terminological overlap in some of Plato’s 
dialogues. 
97 Cf. Plato, Republic 10, 602e4–603a8 (=[A6] in the Appendix), where Socrates appears to use representational and 
belief language interchangeably. An exception in Plutarch occurs in Reply to Colotes 1122C6–D8: “What then do 
they [Academics] avoid? Only what falsity and deception naturally grow in, namely, the formation of belief and 
being precipitous in giving assent” (τί οὖν φεύγουσι μόνον; ᾧ μόνῳ ψεῦδος ἐμφύεται καὶ ἀπάτη, τὸ δοξάζειν 
καὶ προπίπτειν τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, C6–8). Plutarch then asks what is needed for action and argues that only a 
representation of what is fitting (φαντασία τοῦ οἰκείου) and impulse (C9–D1, quoted in n. 73 above), but not 
belief (δόξα). The Academic argument does away with belief, not representation (δόξης γάρ, οὐχ ὁρμῆς οὐδὲ 
φαντασίας ὁ λόγος ἀφίστησιν, D2). It appears that rational belief and conviction is intended, i.e. a certain kind of 
commitment to a representation. See n. 95 above for a similar distinction in Aristotle. 
   It also appears that that the rational part of the soul can form beliefs (δόξαι) about physical objects and states of 
affairs in addition to having knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of universals and eternal truths. Plutarch adopts the “Two-
Worlds” thesis in which intelligible items that are eternal, unchanging, and incorporeal comprise one world and are 
more truly real than the sense-perceptible entities that exist in the second, physical world characterized by change 
(Plutarch, Platonic Questions 2, 1002C10–E1; Reply to Colotes 1114C4–D4; cf. Boys-Stones 1997a, pp. 228–30; 
Sierksma-Agteres 2015, esp. pp. 59–62). He also draws on the Divided Line argument of Plato’s Republic (6, 
509d1–511e4) to distinguish faculties of cognition that range over these two worlds, namely, the intelligible (τὸ 
νοούμενον) and the sense-perceptible (τὸ αἰσθητόν) or visible (τὸ ὁρώμενον, Platonic Questions 3, 1001C6–D3; 
cf. Platonic Questions 2, 1002D8–E1; cf. also Sierksma-Agteres 2015, pp. 60–66). Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) ranges 
over the intelligible realm, belief (δόξα), over the sense-perceptive (Plato, Republic 7, 533e3–534a8; 5, 477a2–b10 
and 6, 511d6–e4; Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 382D2–383A7; Platonic Questions 3, 1002D2–E4; On the Generation 
of the Soul in the Timaeus 1023D10–1024D4; Reply to Colotes 1114C4–D9). In setting out this division between 
belief and knowledge based on the objects cognized by these faculties, Plutarch does not deny belief to the rational 




What seems to be denied here is that animals evaluate character and the conditions of others 
except insofar as they are somehow directly related to themselves. Let me explain beginning 
with hate. 
In the case of hate, its cause may be the representation that someone is bad in general or 
toward oneself (πονηρὸς ἢ κοινῶς ἢ πρὸς αὐτόν, 536F6–537A1 in [T78]). The causes of hate 
are given in a disjunctive form which would allow Plutarch to deny that animals evaluate 
character in terms of good or bad apart from how they are directly affected. Someone could be 
bad toward oneself inasmuch as they have caused harm to oneself or are perceived to be a threat, 
i.e. a probable cause of harm to oneself.98 Animals need not perceive that the perpetrator is bad in 
some more general sense (πονηρὸς κοινῶς), such as in his character, which might require an 
evaluation of his habits and person beyond how he is directly related to or has directly affected 
the animal.99 
In the case of envy, however, certain essential features of the emotion are inaccessible to 
non-human animals. Representations of glory and ill-repute are beyond animal apprehension. 
Whether someone is faring well or faring badly likewise does not grip them. Where hate can be 
roused in animals due to the harm they receive from others, instances in which envy is vexed that 
                                               
98 One might think that Plutarch means something different by the hate that animals have toward one another, since 
in 537C1–4, he writes “It is likely that fear has given birth to strong hate in the lion against the rooster and the 
elephant against the boar, since what they fear they also naturally hate” (εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τῷ λέοντι πρὸς τὸν 
ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ τῷ ἐλέφαντι πρὸς τὴν ὗν μῖσος ἰσχυρὸν γεγεννηκέναι τὸν φόβον· ὃ γὰρ δεδίασι, καὶ μισεῖν 
πεφύκασιν). While it may look as though fear is the origin of hate in animals, it could simply be the case that fear 
intensifies hate: “fear has given birth to strong hate.” Hate and fear naturally occur together when there is fear, since 
“what they fear they also naturally hate,” but it is not clear from the passage that fear must be present for there to be 
hate in animals. Cf. also Stob. 4.7.20: “Desire that those who live with you respect you more than they fear you, 
since reverence comes hand in hand with respect, while hate comes along with fear” (θέλε μᾶλλον τοὺς συνόντας 
σοι αἰδεῖσθαί σε ἢ φοβεῖσθαι· αἰδοῖ μὲν γὰρ πρόσεστι σέβας, φόβῳ δὲ μῖσος).     
99 For Aristotle, we feel anger toward those who do us harm, but we can feel enmity (ἔχθρα) toward others even 
without being harmed by them if we believe that they are of a certain kind of character (Rhetoric 2.4, 1382a3–5). 
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another individual seems to fare better than oneself but has not caused injury to oneself are 
irrelevant to them (538C4–E5). 
  Animals might still comprehend a notion of their ranking among other members of their 
species, but it would not be in terms of reputation as it is described in the definition of envy. 
Imagine the case of non-human animals, such as wolves, who enter into contests for dominance 
within their pack. In these instances, they are competing against one another, and their own 
standing in relation to each other is directly affected by the outcomes of these contests. The wolf 
who prevails will have a higher ranking in the pack than the one who submits. Envy, however, 
considers whether another, who is not competing directly with oneself in a confrontation, is 
faring well or badly or has a good or bad reputation. The notions of reputation and of faring well 
or badly are divorced from a ranking system determined by direct conflict here. These notions 
depend on other systems of ranking, such as honors earned by one’s actions or according to some 
other standard of evaluation like wealth.  
We might consider the example of the ranking systems of the Iliad as a parallel. Achilles 
is first and best in skill and prowess. In direct, one-on-one combat with Agamemnon, he would 
prevail and be higher ranked. Agamemnon, on the other hand, is best according to another 
ranking system, namely, how many men swear allegiance to him and follow him into battle.100 
Animals might be able to enter into the ranking system of Achilles and understand ranking based 
on direct conflict, but the standards by which Agamemnon is best would be entirely irrelevant to 
them. 
 These distinctions bring out, once again, the notion of a projected other. Hating someone 
for their perceived bad character, especially when it is not concerned with how they have 
                                               
100 On these two ranking systems in the Iliad see Kim 2000, esp. Chapter 3, and Wilson 2002. 
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affected oneself, involves the attribution of shameful or honorable features to another individual 
from a distance. The projection seems further removed and more abstract in nature than feeling 
hate due to the harm and pain caused more directly to oneself. The projection involved in envy 
seems similar. We envy from a distance, since the condition or status of those we envy has no 
direct effect on us. 
 In the examples of spirited emotions that we have explored in this section, we see that 
complex representational content varies in structure and in complexity. Nevertheless, standards 
of what is honorable or shameful are involved and are used to evaluate desires and actions in a 
number of spirited emotions. In certain cases, they are even used to evaluate habits and character. 
 
§VII Internalizing Standards and Forming Beliefs 
The next question to ask, which I have not sufficiently addressed up to this point, is 
whether these emotions require a partnership between the rational part of the soul and the 
spirited part of the soul for evaluative representations and emotional reactions to occur. In the 
case of anger, for example, does Plutarch imagine that the rational part of the soul is responsible 
for evaluating whether one has been slighted or treated unjustly while the spirited part of the soul 
merely provides an affective response?101 
We might think that Plutarch already has a simple answer to this question. Spirited 
emotions can be in disagreement with our rational judgments and oppose them (On Moral Virtue 
449B11–C3=[T65]). If that is the case, then the spirited part of the soul may have its own 
representations that conflict with those that belong to the rational part of the soul and psychic 
                                               
101 Bobonich 2002, pp. 259–67, 295–8, 316–31, 343–5, and 2010a, holds a view of this kind for Plato’s later 
dialogues. See nn. 38, 41 and 75 above. 
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conflict may involve conflict of belief.102 The fact that emotional reactions can vary from rational 
judgments, however, does not prove that the non-rational passionate parts of the soul form their 
own judgments independently of reason. As I explore in the Appendix (§A.IV.), it is possible 
that the non-rational passionate parts of the soul respond only to certain types of information, 
which can cause them to differ in their reactions from the final judgments of the rational part of 
the soul, even if all belief-formation occurs in the rational part of the soul.  
As I argue there, it may be the case that the rational part of the soul provides all of the 
evaluative content in the soul. The spirited part reacts to certain features while not taking into 
account others. It reacts without calculation (ἀλογίστως) and bids us to retaliate, for instance, 
when the relevant information of being slighted or treated unjustly reaches it. Only these features 
are salient and important to the spirited part of the soul.103 The rational part of the soul, however, 
takes more information into consideration and calculates about what is better or worse, the right 
time to act, etc. It may be best, given other conditions, not to retaliate now, or perhaps not at all, 
since it may be the case that our first impressions that we were slighted were incorrect. With 
greater consideration of more details, the rational part of the soul may determine that it is not 
best to retaliate now, even though the spirited part of the soul prompts us to act immediately.104  
                                               
102 In Republic 10 (602e4–603a8=[A6] in the Appendix), Socrates appears to describe a conflict of belief between 
the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. See Appendix §A.II. 
103 Cf. Ben-Ze-ev 1997, p. 196: “The partiality of emotions is clearly demonstrated by their intentional components, 
namely, cognition, evaluation, and motivation. The cognitive field of emotions does not engage varied and broad 
perspectives of our surroundings but a narrow and fragmentary perspective focused upon an emotional object 
and a subject-object relation.” 
104 In §A.IV., I present two models to explain how spirited passions can come to be opposed to rational evaluation, 
even if all information is top-down and all belief-formation and evaluation occurs in the rational part of the soul to 
be translated / transmitted to the non-rational parts of the soul. In Model 1, the spirited part of the soul reacts only to 
certain types of information and is not responsive to other types of information that are important in deciding the 
best response. In the example of Odysseus opposing his spirited anger through rational calculation (Republic 4, 
441b3–c2), Odysseus’ anger without calculation (ἀλογίστως) reacts to the evaluation that he has been treated 
unjustly, which provokes his angry desire for revenge. The rational part of his soul is responsible for having this 
evaluation that Odysseus has been treated unjustly and that revenge is suitable, but in addition to this evaluative 
judgment, to which the spirited part of the soul reacts, the rational part of Odysseus’ soul also takes into account 
other information to which the spirited part of the soul is deaf, namely, it calculates about timing and better 
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Returning to the examples I discussed in §II above, we will see that the spirited part of 
the soul is able to apply evaluative standards independently of the rational part of the soul. The 
standards by which desires are judged may originate in reason and from the guidance of other 
rational agents in our early childhood training. Nevertheless, the spirited part of the soul must 
use these standards in certain instances without receiving instructions from others and without 
receiving instructions from the rational part of the soul. This does not prove that the spirited part 
of the soul is responsible for all evaluative judgments involved in spirited emotions, but it does 
show that the spirited part of the soul is capable of evaluating actions apart from the rational part 
of the soul. 
 Let us begin with the inculcation of standards of honor and shame and with Plutarch’s 
example of the beasts that pull the cart when the leader lets loose the reins (Plutarch, On Moral 
Progress 83A4–B8=[T64]). I repeat part of that quotation for the reader’s convenience: 
ὥσπερ οὖν τὰ πεπαιδευμένα καλῶς τῶν ὑποζυγίων, οὐδ’ ἂν ἀφῇ τὰς ἡνίας ὁ 
ἄρχων, ἐπιχειρεῖ παρατρέπεσθαι καὶ ἀπολείπειν τὴν ὁδόν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴθισται 
πρόεισιν ἐν τάξει, διαφυλάττοντα τὴν πορείαν ἄπταιστον, οὕτως οἷς ἂν εὐπειθὲς 
τὸ ἄλογον ἤδη καὶ πρᾶον ᾖ γεγονὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ κεκολασμένον, οὔτε καθ’ 
ὕπνους οὔθ’ ὑπὸ νόσων ἔτι ῥᾳδίως ἐξυβρίζειν ἢ παρανομεῖν ἐθέλει ταῖς 
ἐπιθυμίαις, ἀλλὰ τηρεῖ καὶ διαμνημονεύει τὸν ἐθισμόν, ἰσχὺν ἐμποιοῦντα τῇ 
προσοχῇ καὶ τόνον. 
 
Therefore, just as beasts of burden that have been well trained do not attempt to turn 
aside or abandon the path if their leader lets loose the reins, but instead proceed in order 
just as they have become accustomed to do, maintaining the course without error, in the 
same way, whoever has had their non-rational part of soul already made tame and 
disciplined by reason, it [their non-rational part of soul] is not readily willing in sleep nor 
                                               
circumstances in which one should take one’s revenge, calculating ((ἀνα-)λογίζεσθαι) about what is better or 
worse (περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος). In Model 2, the analysis of an angry reaction is similar to Model 1, 
but differs insofar as the rational part of the soul forms two different evaluative judgments at different times. First, 
the rational part of the soul forms the belief that revenge is warranted because one has suffered an injustice. The 
spirited part of the soul receives and responds to this evaluation. Unlike in Model 1, this rational evaluation is 
modified and reevaluated at a subsequent point in time so that the rational part of the soul comes to hold an 
evaluative judgment that is contrary to its first. The spirited part of the soul holds on to the initial evaluation against 
this second rational evaluation, which leads to critical conflict of belief and pursued actions. Both models provide a 
way in which all rational evaluation can originate within the rational part of the soul but still lead to critical psychic 
conflict between the rational and spirited parts of the soul. 
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still in the throes of illness to act insolently or lawlessly due to desires, but it carefully 
guards and holds fast to the memory of what has become its accustomed habit, 
implanting strength and intensity to our diligence.  
    (Plutarch, On Moral Progress 83A9–B8, part of [T64]) 
 
The internalization of these standards of propriety, shame, and honor are described as a form of 
habituation in [T64]: the spirited part of the soul retains, as though in memory, a habituated 
orientation to act. 
 While retaining an accustomed habit (ἐθισμός) seems a far cry from more advanced 
cognitive senses of memory or the inculcation of beliefs about what is honorable or shameful, a 
passage in Plutarch’s Beasts are Rational gives an example in which habituation is assimilated to 
reception and retention of rational instruction and teaching. In a long list of examples given as 
evidence that non-rational animals are endowed with rational powers, Gryllus, Odysseus’ former 
comrade turned into a pig by Circe, explains to Odysseus that when partridges habituate 
(ἐθίζειν) their young to lie back and cover themselves with mud, this habituation is an example 
that shows that they retain the teaching of their parents: 
[T80] ὅσα γοῦν ἄνθρωποι τρυφῶντες ἢ παίζοντες εἰς τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν ἄγουσι, 
τούτων ἡ διάνοια καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ σώματος105 περιουσίᾳ συνέσεως 
ἀναλαμβάνει τὰς μαθήσεις. ἐῶ γὰρ ἰχνεύειν σκύλακας καὶ βαδίζειν ἐν ῥυθμῷ 
πώλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλὰ κόρακας διαλέγεσθαι καὶ κύνας ἅλλεσθαι διὰ τροχῶν 
περιφερομένων. ἵπποι δὲ καὶ βόες ἐν θεάτροις κατακλίσεις καὶ χορείας καὶ 
στάσεις παραβόλους καὶ κινήσεις οὐδ’ ἀνθρώποις πάνυ ῥᾳδίας ἀκριβοῦσιν 
ἐκδιδασκόμενοι καὶ μνημονεύοντες εὐμαθείας ἐπίδειξιν εἰς106 ἄλλο οὐδὲν 
οὐδαμῶς χρήσιμον ἔχουσαν107. εἰ δ’ ἀπιστεῖς ὅτι τέχνας μανθάνομεν, ἄκουσον ὅτι 
καὶ διδάσκομεν. αἵ τε γὰρ πέρδικες ἐν τῷ προφεύγειν τοὺς νεοττοὺς ἐθίζουσιν 
ἀποκρύπτεσθαι καὶ προΐσχεσθαι βῶλον ἀνθ’ ἑαυτῶν τοῖς ποσὶν ὑπτίους 
ἀναπεσόντας· καὶ τοῖς πελαργιδεῦσιν ὁρᾷς ἐπὶ τῶν τεγῶν ὡς οἱ τέλειοι παρόντες 
ἀναπειρωμένοις ὑφηγοῦνται τὴν πτῆσιν. 
 
Therefore, as many animals, at any rate, that humans in an indulgent lifestyle or out of 
frivolity drive to learn and practice, the faculty of thought of these animals receives these 
instructions with an abundance of understanding, even when it is contary to the nature of 
                                               
105 Following Helmbold who deletes the καί printed by Reiske. 
106 Following Helmbold who prints εἰς; Reiske prints ὡς. 
107 Following Helmbold who prints ἔχουσαν; Wyttenbach prints ἔχουσιν. 
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their body. For, I leave off that puppies practice following tracks108 and colts practice 
walking in rhythm,109 while crows are trained to speak, dogs to leap through spinning 
hoops. And horses and bulls in the theatres execute with precision lying down, dancing, 
standing in precarious positions, and movements that not even humans perform easily 
because they have been thoroughly taught to do these things and they retain these 
instructions in their memory as a display of their readiness to learn, though this display 
has no other useful purpose whatsover.110 But if you do not believe that we can learn 
crafts, take to heart the fact that we even teach them. For patridges habituate their young 
to hide and to place in front of themselves a clod of earth with their feet, throwing 
themselves on their back, while they flee from danger. You can also see upon roofs that 
adult storks, standing next to their fledglings, instruct them as they attempt again and 
again to take flight.    (Plutarch, Beasts are Rational 992A5–B10)111 
 
Note the terminology of teaching (διδάσκειν), being taught (διδάσκεσθαι), learning 
(μανθάνειν), and retaining in memory (μνημονεύειν), as well as the necessity of thought 
(διάνοια) and understanding (σύνεσις) in the passage surrounding the use of habituation 
(ἐθίζειν). Habituation is not a cognitively void affair, but in these instances involves instruction 
and retention of what one has been taught. Plutarch’s switch to habituation in [T80] from more 
                                               
108 Cf. Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 969A9–B10. Chryisppus presented a puzzle for the Stoic denial of 
animal cognition, using the example of a dog that seems to use syllogistic reasoning, which the Stoics deny to 
animals, to determine that its prey went down a certain path (S.E. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.69-70=LS 36E; cf. also 
Porphyry, On Abstinence from Eating Flesh 3.6; Aelian, On the Nature of Animals 6.59; Basil, Hexaemeron 9.4). 
Cf. Sorabji 1993, p. 46. In On the Cleverness of Animals, Plutarch denies that the dog is using a syllogism. The 
representational capacity of the dog, using perception and tracking, is sufficient to account for how the animal 
follows one path over another, rather than puzzling over whether or not the dog reasons something such as, “The 
prey either went down this way (i) or that way (ii) or that other way (iii). But not this way (i) or that way (ii). 
Therefore, that other way (iii)” (ἤτοι τῇδε ἢ τῇδε ἢ τῇδε διῆλθε τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῇδε οὔτε τῇδε· τῇδε ἄρα, 
S.E. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.69–70=LS 36E). Tracking, then, is not something Plutarch considers a cognitively 
complex capacity on par with syllogistic reasoning. He does not deny, however, that it could require or be refined by 
teaching and practice, as we see in this passage. Puppies practicing tracking is dismissed as part of a praeteritio. It is 
treated as evidence that animals can learn but is not the main point that Gryllus uses to demonstrate that animals 
learn. 
109 Cf. Plato, Laws 2, 653e3–5, which seems to deny a sense of rhythm to non-rational animals: “Therefore, the other 
animals do not have a perception of order or disorder in movements, to which belong the names of rhythm and 
harmony” (τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ 
ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία); cf. 2, 664e–665a. 
110 Cf. On the Cleverness of Animals 968B10–C3. 
111 Cf. Plutarch’s On the Cleverness of Animals 971C5–9: “And partridges display another example of cleverness 
together with the love of their offspring at the same time, habituating their young who are not yet able to flee to 
throw themselves on their backs whenever they are being hunted and to put a clod of earth or refuse over their body 
as concealment” (ἄλλην δὲ πανουργίαν ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῦ φιλοστόργου πέρδικες ἐπιδεικνύντες τοὺς μὲν 
νεοττοὺς ἐθίζουσι μηδέπω φεύγειν δυναμένους, ὅταν διώκωνται, καταβαλόντας ὑπτίους ἑαυτοὺς βῶλόν 
τιν’ ἢ συρφετὸν ἄνω προΐσχεσθαι τοῦ σώματος οἷον ἐπηλυγαζομένους). 
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cognitively loaded terms of teaching, being taught, learning, and retaining in memory is an 
example of variatio here, as well as the final verb in the passage that describes the instruction 
(ὑφηγεῖσθαι) in flight that storks provide to their fledgings. Gryllus, in fact, gives the 
partridges’ habituation of their young as an example of a craft that “we,” i.e. non-human animals 
like Gryllus himself, teach (διδάσκομεν) to each other.112 
 The speaker in this passage, Gryllus, has a particularly strong motivation to assimilate the 
habituated actions of animals as proof of their rational capacity to learn, since he is arguing with 
Odysseus that his new porcine form is superior and preferable to his old human condition. He 
claims not only that non-human animals are rational, as many of their more complex actions 
prove, but also that non-human animals are naturally more virtuous than humans. They are less 
capable of the kinds of error that arise from more advanced rational capacities in humans 
(986F1–988E10).113 While the context of [T80] may make the assimilation of habituation to 
learning and retaining instruction suspect, given the rhetorical strategy of Gryllus, it nevertheless 
fits with the description of the early education of the passions, which reveals that certain beliefs 
about what is honorable and shameful may be planted in the soul through habituation. 
 Since I discuss the education of our spirited emotions more fully in the next chapter, and 
because I already introduced this topic above, I will only provide a few points of interest here. 
                                               
112 Cf. On the Education of Children 2A8–B5: “For complete virtuous action, three things must come together: 
nature, reason, and habit. I mean by reason, learning, and by habit, practice. The starting-points belong to our nature, 
advancements to learning, and uses to practice, and the perfection to all of these. Insofar as these are lacking, to that 
same extent one’s virtue necessarily turns out to be deficient. For nature without learning is something blind, 
learning apart from nature is lacking, and practice barring both [nature and learning] is incomplete” (εἰς τὴν 
παντελῆ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεῖ συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος. καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, 
ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν. εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ τῆς φύσεως, αἱ δὲ προκοπαὶ τῆς μαθήσεως, αἱ δὲ χρήσεις τῆς 
μελέτης, αἱ δ’ ἀκρότητες πάντων. καθ’ ὃ δ’ ἂν λειφθῇ τούτων, κατὰ τοῦτ’ ἀνάγκη χωλὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν 
ἀρετήν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἄνευ μαθήσεως τυφλόν, ἡ δὲ μάθησις δίχα φύσεως ἐλλιπές, ἡ δ’ ἄσκησις χωρὶς 
ἀμφοῖν ἀτελές). Although this work is generally agreed to be spuriously attributed to Plutarch (see n. 39 in Chapter 
5), it supports the notion that habituation depends on a capacity to learn, since practice, which produces habit, is 
incomplete without learning. 
113 See n. 101 of Chapter 5 on the notion of natural virtue. 
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Plutarch describes the education of our spirited passions with the Platonic image of dyeing the 
soul with a hue that is hard to remove (Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power 779C1–6; On 
Moral Virtue 443D1–10). That image in the Republic describes the internalization of beliefs 
(δόξαι) within the guardians about what is appropriate or not, including aversion to actions that 
are shameful (4, 429b1–430b5). The guardian class is the analogue to the spirited part of the 
soul, and it is through the spirited part of the soul that the guardians are said to preserve these 
beliefs which guide their actions (4, 442b10–c2).114 
 One’s earliest education of these passions, moreover, occurs before the rational part of 
the soul is well developed in children.115 Plutarch, like Plato, describes our passions as shaped 
and molded from our earliest moments so that we take pleasure in what is honorable and feel 
pain toward was is shameful; we are habituated to develop certain orientations toward actions 
before we can reason about them.116 These orientations involve evaluative representations that 
guide our behavior and help us regulate our appetites, especially in instances where our 
educators let loose the reins, as it were, and give us freedom to choose whether we will indulge 
in inappropriate desires or maintain self-control over them.117 
 The clearest evidence that the spirited part of the soul evaluates actions, however, occurs 
in Plutarch’s description of periods of sleep ([T64]). As in the image of beasts that pull the cart, 
                                               
114 =[A14] in the Appendix. Cf. Wilberding 2009, pp. 361–4, who takes the inculcation of evaluations to apply to 
rational formation, not formation of the spirited part of the soul. Contra Wilberding, I take the isomorphic 
relationship between the city of speech and parts of the soul, and the corresponding virtues that apply to each, to 
make a strong connection between how courage is informed in the city and how it is also informed in the spirited 
part of the soul. According to the passage I cite here, it is by means of one particular part of the soul (τῷ μέρει), the 
spirited part (τὸ θυμοειδές), that we preserve the standards of appropriate behavior. Cf. also Wilburn 2015, who 
argues that moral education of the spirited part of the soul in the Republic helps provide stability to belief before one 
comes to have more secure knowledge about what is good and bad and what is honorable and shameful. 
115 See nn. 26–29 above and §II. 
116 Plutarch, Can Virtue be Taught 439F2–5, On Moral Virtue 452D8–12. Cf. Plato, Republic 2, 377c3–6; Laws 2, 
653a5–c4, 659d4–e5; 7, 808d1–e4. Cf. also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b11–16. I discuss these points 
and passages in Chapter 5. 
117 Cf. Plato, Republic 3, 413d6–414a6. 
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these ingrained beliefs, which the spirited part of the soul retains, continue to guide actions and 
to regulate desires and behavior even when the rational part of the soul is inactive. More than 
simply following the path, Plutarch indicates that the spirited part of the soul refuses to condone 
errant passions. If we follow through with the example and the analogy, we see that the spirited 
part of the soul must be applying these standards of belief to determine which desires are 
acceptable and which are errant. Errant desires arise in the soul like new obstacles one chances 
upon on a path. The beasts pulling the cart take steps along a familiar path, but not every patch 
under foot will be the same as it was on the last journey. Furthermore, obstacles may be 
encountered along the way. When the animals come across these obstacles, if the rider is asleep 
or not paying attention, the animals themselves must make adjustments to keep everything 
moving in the right direction. 
 In similar fashion, the spirited part of the soul, unbidden and unaided by the rational part 
of the soul in sleep, will evaluate and react to errant desires it encounters in one’s dreams. Some 
of the lawless and perverse desires it encounters may be of the same type that it has seen before, 
but it may also come across new and unfamiliar desires. In either case, the spirited part of the 
soul reacts to these desires without calling upon the resources of the rational part of the soul. It 
applies standards of what is shameful or honorable, appropriate and illicit, and it makes 
evaluative judgments about the desires it encounters. If it comes across a new type of desire that 
it does not recognize, it must form a belief about this desire, deciding whether it conforms to the 
standards of what is appropriate and honorable. 
 If we look closely at Plutarch’s analogies, we see that the spirited part of the soul plays an 
important role in regulating appetites and behavior even apart from the rational part of the soul’s 
commands. The spirited part of the soul is shaped to retain certain dispositions toward types of 
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desires and actions and to evaluate these desires and actions as shameful or honorable. It can 
oppose errant desires on its own according to internalized standards of evaluation of what is 
appropriate and honorable, and it can help ensure that we are on a path to virtue, even before we 
are able to reflect on why we should do what we do beyond the perception of our actions as 
conforming to what is acceptable and admirable. 
*** 
 Given the capacities attributed to the spirited part of the soul, it is shocking that so many 
Plutarchean scholars consider the spirited part of the soul to be unimportant to Plutarch’s moral 
psychology.118 I have tried to show that we should not be too quick to neglect the important 
functions that Plutarch assigns to the spirited part of the soul in moral progress. Plutarch may 
often refer to both the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul without distinguishing the two, but 
we should be careful not to fall into the trap of thinking that Plutarch’s soul is essentially 
bipartite and that he only treats the non-rational parts of the soul as distinct when he feels the 
need to emphasize Platonic precedent.119 
 Instead, when we read the distinctions that Plutarch makes about the differentia of 
representational content and capacities of the spirited part of the soul together with his 
discussions of the evaluative representations involved in spirited emotions, we find that 
Plutarch’s moral psychology, far from neglecting the differences between the spirited and 
appetitive parts of the soul, carves out an interesting and important role for the spirited part of the 
soul based on them. As we will explore in the next chapter, the habituation of our passions is the 
                                               
118 Westaway 1922, p. 41; Vander Waerdt 1985b, pp. 284–6; Opsomer 1994, pp. 33–6; 1998, pp. 33–6; 2006, p. 
213; 2012, pp. 316–24 and n. 68; Beneker 2012, pp. 12–17. See §V.a. in the Introduction. 
119 Cf. Karamanolis 2006, pp. 115–23. Cf. also Opsomer 2007a, p. 154, n. 15. See also Wilburn 2013, who similarly 
argues against the view that Plato’s moral psychology becomes essentially bipartite in the Laws, which some believe 




most important and foundational aspect of moral education for Plutarch. If well nurtured and 
trained, spirited passions and a well-attuned sense of honor and shame are able not only to 
redirect one away from shameful courses of action, but also to give direction to the young as they 









Building on the last chapter, we now turn to the positive role that non-rational passions, 
particularly those of the spirited part of the soul, can play in redirecting and keeping us on the 
path to virtue, i.e. in ethical education. While several recent studies focus on important aspects of 
ethical education in Plutarch’s works,1 my focus in this chapter will be an important thread 
running throughout Plutarch’s view of education, which has not been sufficiently explored or 
appreciated. From early childhood through later stages of education in which we begin to shape 
our own passions and character, one’s sense of shame plays an important and positive role as we 
begin our journey and make progress, as Plutarch describes it, on the path to virtue.2 
In the first section, we will look at the role that Plutarch carves out for non-rational 
persuasion (ψυχαγωγία), which can be used to change others’ intentions and redirect them 
                                               
1 Xenophontos 2016 presents the most recent and comprehensive work on ethical education in both Plutarch’s 
Moralia and Lives. Cf. Duff 1999, who focuses on Plutarch’s educational views and efforts to reach his readers in 
the Lives. For a detailed study of educational aims in several works from Plutarch’s Moralia, namely, On 
Tranquility of Mind, On Exile, On Talkativeness, On Being a Busybody, and Advice on Keeping Well, see Van Hoof 
2010. I will refer to other studies of interest on this topic in the notes that follow. My study of early education in 
Plutarch will focus primarily on the theoretical aspects of ethical training for virtue that are found in Plutarch’s 
Moralia, though I also draw upon instances from the Lives as well. While not comprehensive, my purpose in this 
chapter is to highlight the positive role that passions play in our ethical formation. I will have little to say on the 
importance of more rational studies that lead up to and include dialectic and training in philosophy, except insofar as 
Plutarch contrasts their importance with the need to form our passionate nature in preparation for a life of virtue. 
2 As both Cairns 1993 (p. 372, n. 83, and p. 373, n. 86) and Konstan 2006 (pp. 91–110) note, the terminology for 
respect / a sense of shame (αἰδώς) and the feeling of being ashamed (αἰσχύνη) become generally interchangeable 
by the time of Plato, though the former in older usage tended to be prospective in the desire to show due respect and 
avoid incurring shame, while the latter denoted retrospective remorse and regret for past offenses. Throughout this 
chapter I am concerned primarily with the prospective sense of shame, insofar as it denotes a desire for honor and an 
aversion to shame, though for Plutarch that also includes in later stages of development retrospective reflection 
(ἐπιλογισμός) upon one’s past faults to correct one’s moral failings and the dispositions that led to them (§IV). 
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to a different course of action, sometimes even against their own rational calculations. One’s 
sense of shame and desire for honor, emotions belonging to the spirited part of the soul, can be 
used to powerful effect to alter others’ behavior. While in this first section I do not discuss 
Plutarch’s view of education, the examples drawn upon highlight how spirited emotions, 
particularly a sense of shame, can be put to good use in redirecting others, which will be 
important for the discussion of education that follows. 
In the second section, we will turn to Plutarch’s view on the importance of early 
education and its effect on non-rational passions. Drawing upon while at the same correcting 
Xenocrates, a former head of Plato’s Academy, Plutarch describes passions as the “grips of 
philosophy” (λαβαὶ φιλοσοφίας), which serve as the point at which virtue starts to take hold of 
our lives. In Xenocrates’ view, education in music, geometry, and astronomy serves as 
preparation and as the starting-point for philosophy to make its first grip on the soul. Against 
Xenocrates, Plutarch argues that the formation of our passionate nature, particularly the spirited 
part of the soul, provides the most important preparation for education in virtue, setting our first 
step on the path to virtue. Plutarch takes the grips of philosophy in several senses. Passions not 
only develop early on and lay the foundation for our further progress, the greatest preparation 
for a life oriented to virtue, but also grip the soul to help guide our progress toward virtue. They 
also maintain an enduring hold on our character as it develops. 
In the third section, I take up the topic of whether Plutarch pits Aristotle against Plato by 
emphasizing the importance of habituation in ethical education over later studies. Emphasis on 
the habituation of passions appears far more developed and emphasized in Aristotle’s ethics than 
in, say, Plato’s Republic. If we turn to Plato’s Laws 1–2, however, we find that habituation of 
passions is not only called true education but is also described as the first means by which 
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children begin to develop virtues. Aristotle, moreover, attributes to Plato the view that early 
education consists in habituating passions, with Laws 1–2 being the probable point of reference. 
The fourth section concerns the continued role of a sense of shame and desire for honor 
in later moral progress. As one becomes more autonomous and begins to shape one’s own 
character and passions, a proper sensitivity to praise and blame is a sign of a healthy soul. It also 
allows for one to self-diagnose and begin to treat flaws within one’s own character. 
In the final section we return to the topic of being swayed to act contrary to one’s own 
rational judgments and calculations through praise and blame. Plutarch presents a cautionary tale 
that illumines not only the ambivalent potential of being persuaded to good or bad ends through 
passions, but also the vulnerability of a well-developed sense of shame that is not anchored, as it 
were, to reason. Unless we form firm convictions through philosophy, we are open to being 
tossed about, even if we maintain a generally good and proper sensitivity to praise and blame. 
Early education that habituates our passionate nature is important for Plutarch but far from 
sufficient for producing the stability of character necessary for virtue. 
 
§I Shame, Honor, and Non-Rational Persuasion (ψυχαγωγία) 
 
 In the last chapter and its appendix, we found a distinction drawn in Republic 4 between 
the cognitive content to which spirited emotions react and the kinds of information that only the 
rational part of the soul seems to entertain and take into account. Spirited emotions such as anger 
and a sense of shame are triggered by representations in which codes of conduct are violated or 
harm and personal honor are at stake. The rational part of the soul takes further information into 
account when deliberating and weighing what is better or worse in situations (ἀναλογισάμενον 
…περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος), while the spirited part of the soul reacts without 
calculations (ἀλογίστως, Plato, Republic 4, 441b3–c2).  
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 We find in the following examples that Plutarch has the same basic distinction in mind. 
He adds, however, that even when someone fails to reason through to the conclusion that they 
should alter their responses, the emotion of shame can be used as a tool to persuade them to 
change their intentions. Spirited emotions can thus be put to positive use in persuading others to 
change their actions for the better, overpowering or circumventing others’ calculations or lack of 
correct reasoning. 
 In his biographical work on Demosthenes, Plutarch describes the power of emotions in 
his analysis of the power of rhetoric. The orator Demosthenes attempts to call the Thebans to 
make a stand with Athens against Philip of Macedon after the Third Sacred War: 
[T81] τὸ μὲν οὖν συμφέρον οὐ διέφευγε τοὺς τῶν Θηβαίων λογισμούς, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὄμμασιν 
ἕκαστος εἶχε τὰ τοῦ πολέμου δεινά, τῶν Φωκικῶν ἔτι τραυμάτων νεαρῶν 
παραμενόντων· ἡ δὲ τοῦ ῥήτορος δύναμις, ὥς φησι Θεόπομπος, ἐκριπίζουσα τὸν 
θυμὸν αὐτῶν καὶ διακαίουσα τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐπεσκότησε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, 
ὥστε καὶ φόβον καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ χάριν ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας ὑπὸ τοῦ 
λόγου πρὸς τὸ καλόν. 
 
What was to their own benefit, then, did not escape the calculations of the Thebans, but 
each had before his eyes the horrors of war, since their Phocian defeat was still near and 
fresh in mind. But the power of the orator, as Theopompus says [FGrH 115 F 328], 
stirring up their spirit and igniting their love of honor, obscured all else, with the result 
that they cast off their fear, calculation, and sense of obliged return of favors, inspired by 
his [Demosthenes’] speech toward the pursuit of honor. (Plutarch, Demosthenes 18.2–3) 
 
While the Thebans at first calculate what is to their own interest, considering the horrors of war 
and their previous losses, Demosthenes persuades them back to the fight by appealing to their 
spirited passions. Demosthenes, in fact, turns the Thebans back to the pursuit of what is 
honorable against their rational calculations. Instead of arguing with them to change their minds, 
Demosthenes helps the Theban men forget their reasons for hesitancy and fear, obscuring 
(ἐπισκοτεῖν) their rational calculation (λογισμός), by stoking the flames of their anger and 
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desire for honor (θυμὸς καὶ φιλοτιμία).3 His appeal to their emotions overpowers and 
circumvents their rational calculation for self-preservation, which Plutarch commends as a 
laudable endeavor on Demosthenes’ part (Demosthenes 13.5–6).4 The result is that Demosthenes 
induces the Thebans to stand with Athens; Philip consequently sends an embassy seeking peace.5  
 The notion of persuasion by emotion, however, seems to be problematic, given that 
persuasion is said to belong to the rational part of the soul alone:  
                                               
3 Consider also Plutarch’s discussion of how anger can distort our representations, as, for example, when in an angry 
and agitated state the severity of matters can appear greatly distorted, as though magnified through a lens: “For as 
bodies appear larger through a mist, likewise do matters appear greater when seen through anger” (ὡς γὰρ δι’ 
ὁμίχλης τὰ σώματα, καὶ δι’ ὀργῆς τὰ πράγματα μείζονα φαίνεται, On the Control of Anger 460A4–5). In 
certain cases, one’s anger can lead to a state of inordinate, implacable rage: “Nevertheless, the other passions, even 
at the time when they are most intense, in some way yield and allow reason to enter into the soul from outside and 
help, but rage…completely shuts our wits out of doors and locks them out, just as people who light themselves on 
fire together with their homes fill everything inside with confusion, smoke, and clamor, with the result that the soul 
cannot see or hear anyone who tries to help them” (ὅμως δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ παρ’ ὃν ἀκμάζει καιρὸν 
ἁμωσγέπως ὑπείκει καὶ παρίησι βοηθοῦντα λόγον ἔξωθεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς… τὰς 
φρένας…ἐξοικίσας τελείως καὶ ἀποκλείσας, ὥσπερ οἱ συνεμπιπράντες ἑαυτοὺς ταῖς οἰκίαις, πάντα 
ταραχῆς καὶ καπνοῦ καὶ ψόφου μεστὰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐντός, ὥστε μήτ’ ἰδεῖν μήτ’ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ὠφελούντων, ibid. 
E7–F3). Cf. also Plutarch, Timoleon 6.1–2, discussed below in §V, where Timoleon is described as knocked out of 
his own rational calculations due to shame (ἐκκρουόμεναι τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν), as the representation of what 
was noble faded away (ἀπομαραινομένης τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας, 6.4). See also Chapter 4, n. 11. 
   On distorted representations in Plato’s Republic 10, 602e4–603a8=[A6] and Philebus 38c5–7=[A9], see the 
Appendix to Chapter 4, §A.II–§A.III. For Aristotle’s account of representational distortion see On Dreams 3: The 
corporeal aspect of bodily heat from food or the elements in wine has an effect on our representations during sleep. 
See especially 461a21–5: “And sometimes there are representations of appearances that are confused and monstrous, 
and their dreams are not describable, as, for example, the dreams of those who are melancholic, have a fever, or are 
drunk with wine, for all affections of that sort, since they are of an airy nature produce great confusion and 
commotion” (ὁτὲ δὲ τεταραγμέναι φαίνονται αἱ ὄψεις καὶ τερατώδεις, καὶ οὐκ εἰρόμενα τὰ ἐνύπνια, οἷον 
τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς καὶ πυρέττουσι καὶ οἰνωμένοις· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη πνευματώδη ὄντα πολλὴν 
ποιεῖ κίνησιν καὶ ταραχήν). 
4 In his speeches, Demosthenes “did not lead the citizens [of Athens] toward what was most pleasant, easiest, or 
most expedient, but in many places of his speech he thought that safety and security ought to be considered 
secondary to what is honorable and appropriate” (οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον ἢ ῥᾷστον ἢ λυσιτελέστατον ἄγει ποὺς 
πολίτας, ἀλλὰ πολλαχοῦ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν οἴεται δεῖν ἐν δευτέρᾳ τάξει τοῦ καλοῦ 
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ πρέποντος, Demosthenes 13.6). Plutarch describes these as honorable and noble aspirations 
(φιλοτιμία καὶ εὐγενεία). 
   Although the point is not obvious in Plato’s dialogues, Irwin 2011, p. 246, argues that desire for honor is intended 
to play a similar role for Plato, at least insofar as rational calculation looks to self-interest: “This connection between 
the kalon and the spirited part is helpful, insofar as the spirited part is capable of being moved by motives that are 
not purely self-confined. Even if some course of action is advantageous to me, I may be deterred from it by the 
thought that it would involve shameful betrayal of my friends.” Cf. Mossman 1999, pp. 88–9. 
5 While Demosthenes turns the Thebans to seek what he believes to be beneficial (συμφέρον) for both Athens and 
Thebes, his intervention is part of the chain of events leading to the defeat of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea, to 
Thebes’ great disadvantage in the future. On Plutarch’s negative portrayal of Demosthenes and the lack of congruity 
between his rhetorical aspirations and actual effectiveness see Mossman 1999. 
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[T82] διὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ λογισμός, ὅταν φανῇ, προέμενος τὸ ψεῦδος ἀσμένως 
ἀπέκλινεν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, τὸ πειθόμενον καὶ μεταπειθόμενον. 
 
Therefore, reason gladly inclines toward what is true whenever it becomes apparent, 
letting go of what is false, since it is in reason and in nothing else that the faculty capable 
of being persuaded and of changing intention due to persuasion exists.  
       (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 448A6–9) 
 
The ability to be persuaded and to change one’s mind due to arguments (τὸ πειθόμενον καὶ 
μεταπειθόμενον) belongs to reason and the rational part of the soul alone. Yet, as we see in 
Demosthenes above, this is not the only means of persuading others to change their intention. 
 In his biographical work on Pericles, Plutarch carves out a separate but parallel form of 
persuasion for emotions, described as an allurement or a leading of the soul (ψυχαγωγεῖν, 
ψυχαγωγία). In addition to rational means of persuasion, Pericles is able to manipulate the 
emotions of the Athenians, as though steering wild beasts, or turning their emotions like rudders: 
[T83] οὐκέθ’ ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν οὐδ’ ὁμοίως χειροήθης τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥᾴδιος ὑπείκειν καὶ 
συνενδιδόναι ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ὥσπερ πνοαῖς, τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς ἀνειμένης 
ἐκείνης καὶ ὑποθρυπτομένης ἔνια δημαγωγίας, ὥσπερ ἀνθηρᾶς καὶ μαλακῆς 
ἁρμονίας ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐντεινάμενος πολιτείαν, καὶ χρώμενος 
αὐτῇ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ὀρθῇ καὶ ἀνεγκλίτῳ, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ βουλόμενον ἦγε 
πείθων καὶ διδάσκων τὸν δῆμον, ἦν δ’ ὅτε καὶ μάλα δυσχεραίνοντα κατατείνων 
καὶ προσβιβάζων ἐχειροῦτο τῷ συμφέροντι, μιμούμενος ἀτεχνῶς ἰατρὸν ποικίλῳ 
νοσήματι καὶ μακρῷ κατὰ καιρὸν μὲν ἡδονὰς ἀβλαβεῖς, κατὰ καιρὸν δὲ δηγμοὺς 
καὶ φάρμακα προσφέροντα σωτήρια. παντοδαπῶν γὰρ ὡς εἰκὸς παθῶν ἐν ὄχλῳ 
τοσαύτην τὸ μέγεθος ἀρχὴν ἔχοντι φυομένων, μόνος ἐμμελῶς ἕκαστα 
διαχειρίσασθαι πεφυκώς, μάλιστα δ’ ἐλπίσι καὶ φόβοις ὥσπερ οἴαξι συστέλλων τὸ 
θρασυνόμενον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ δύσθυμον ἀνιεὶς καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ἔδειξε τὴν 
ῥητορικὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα (Phaedr. 271c) ψυχαγωγίαν οὖσαν καὶ μέγιστον ἔργον 
αὐτῆς τὴν περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ πάθη μέθοδον, ὥσπερ τινὰς τόνους καὶ φθόγγους 
ψυχῆς μάλ’ ἐμμελοῦς ἁφῆς καὶ κρούσεως δεομένους. 
 
No longer was he [Pericles] the same nor submissive in the same way toward the people, 
and he no longer readily yielded and gave in to the desires of the multitude, as though 
yielding to the winds, but from his former slack and sometimes nerveless leadership of 
the people, like a flowery and soft harmony, straining the pitch high to an aristocratic and 
monarchic administration and using it for what is best in a straight and unbending 
manner, he often led the people when they were willing by persuading and instructing 
them. There were other occasions, however, when they were especially vexed with him 
that he put them into submission, tightening the reins and pulling them to his purposes for 
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what was beneficial, resembling, in truth, a doctor who supplies harmless pleasures on 
the right occasion and painful operations and drugs on other critical occasions to one who 
is sick with a complicated and chronic disease, using these treatments to cure the patient. 
For, while so many varied passions were growing, as is reasonable to expect in a crowd 
with an empire so great in power, he alone was equipped by nature to bring each of these 
passions into harmony, especially by using their hopes and fears like rudders, humbling 
their over-confidence and relieving and bringing encouragement against their 
despondency. In so doing, he demonstrated that the art of rhetoric, as Plato relates, “is a 
leading of the soul” [Phaedrus 271c10]6 and that its greatest work consists in the 
treatment of character and passions, as though these are pitches and sounds of the soul 
that are in great need of a harmonious touch or strike. (Plutarch, Pericles 15.1–2)7 
 
Distinguishing two forms of persuasion, Plutarch first describes Pericles’ use of rational 
persuasion (πείθειν). At times, Pericles led the people who were willing (βουλόμενοι)8 by 
persuading them and instructing them (πείθων καὶ διδάσκων), i.e. using arguments aimed at 
changing their minds. This form of persuasion is unproblematic for the definition of persuasion 
in On Moral Virtue above (448A6–9=[T82]), since the instructions and arguments affect the 
rational part of the soul, which “gladly inclines toward what is true” (πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ 
λογισμός ἀσμένως ἀπέκλινεν). 
 The alternative form of persuasion becomes apparent when the people are belligerent and 
unyielding to Pericles. Pericles resorts to bending the will of the people by, as it were, drawing 
the reins taut and pulling the people in the direction he desires them to go. Like the charioteer in 
the Phaedrus, which we explored in previous chapters, Pericles directs the Athenians by guiding 
their passions, as though the Athenian populace were the horses of the chariot and the passionate 
parts of the soul writ large in the city.9 He uses their passions, moreover, like rudders (ὥσπερ 
                                               
6 Plato, Phaedrus 271c10–d1: “Since the power of speech really is a leading of the soul, the one who intends to be 
an orator must know about the soul, how many kinds there are” (ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία 
οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει). 
7 Cf. Plutarch, Phocion 2.6–9. 
8 Plutarch need not be using βούλεσθαι to indicate rational desire (βούλησις), as we find it in Aristotle, but the 
choice of the term is suggestive. Cf. Eudemian Ethics 2.10, 1226b2–5 and 1227a3–5. 
9 Pericles here fits with the role that Plutarch assigns to the ruler in To an Uneducated Ruler 780B8–10: “The ruler 
must first establish rule within himself and make straight his own soul and make firm his character and then in the 
same way make what is subject to his rule [in the city] in harmony with his character” ([δεῖ, 780B5] παραπλησίως 
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οἴαξι), Plutarch writes, to steer them this way or that, toward the end that he sees to be in their 
best interest.10 This, Plutarch emphasizes, reveals exactly what Plato meant when he called 
rhetoric the leading the soul (ψυχαγωγία), namely, a persuasion that uses emotions rather than 
rational arguments to lead and steer the soul in a different direction.11 
 Perhaps to avoid confusion and align his view with Platonic precedent, Plutarch 
distinguishes rational and emotional persuasion terminologically. One persuades (πείθειν) 
rationally through instruction and arguments, but leads the soul (ψυχαγωγεῖν) in the persuasion 
of non-rational passions.12 The latter term is not only what we find in the Phaedrus used to 
                                               
τὸν ἄρχοντα πρῶτον τὴν ἀρχὴν κτησάμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κατευθύναντα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ καταστησάμενον 
τὸ ἦθος οὕτω συναρμόττειν τὸ ὑπήκοον). Plutarch likens Pericles as the leader of the city to the captain of the 
ship, and the people to the winds that toss it about, aligning the leader of the city with the rational part of the soul 
and his subjects to the spirited parts of the soul, as we find in the Wind in Our Sails passage of Chapter 3 (§II). The 
movement from the pattern of soul to the city itself mirrors the isomorphism of the City of Speech and soul in the 
Republic, but then Plutarch adds that the ruler, as the rational part of the city’s, as it were, soul, is to imitate the 
divine ruler of the cosmos, the Demiurge (To an Uneducated Ruler 780D–E). Plutarch suggests this patterning of 
ruler as an imitation of god also in this passage on Pericles. The analogy to the musician should remind us of the 
Demiurge’s role of taking pre-existing sounds and readjusting them to bring them into a harmonious blend in 
Plutarch’s On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus (1014B6–C10). I take up these points further in Chapter 6, 
§II. 
10 On a similar use of the charioteer image together with the image of the captain of a ship steering the state see 
Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft 801C13–F10. See also Numa 6.2–4, where Plutarch similarly likens the ruler of the 
city to a charioteer, guiding the people in their desires and impulses as though holding the reins of their passions in 
hand (τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν τρέπειν, διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντα τὰς ἡνίας). Cf. Plato, Critias 108c, where persuasion is 
applied to the soul like a rudder. 
11 Plutarch faces a difficulty in assimilating Pericles’ rhetorical persuasion to Platonic views of rhetoric. First, in 
Plato’s works Pericles is portrayed negatively for failing to educate his own children and make them virtuous 
(Protagoras 319e–320a). Secondly, among the Platonic criticisms of rhetoric in the Gorgias there is a particular 
criticism leveled at Pericles that he corrupted the people by implementing jury pay (Gorgias 515e; cf. Plutarch, 
Pericles 9.1). Thirdly, Pericles is liable to Platonic criticisms of political rhetoric in the Menexenus (for which, see 
Monoson 1998). Plutarch’s tactic, as Stadter 1989 (pp. xxxviii–xliv) notes, is to focus on how Pericles used his 
power to persuade and lead the people and to what ends to avoid the criticisms mentioned above. Plutarch 
assimilates Pericles’ activity, to some extent, with the proper use of rhetoric, as outlined in Plato’s Phaedrus 
(269c7–272b4; cf. Plutarch, Pericles 8.1 and 15.2), which both justifies Plutarch’s use of Pericles as a fitting model 
for imitation in certain virtues while at the same time allowing Plutarch to discuss what he takes Plato to have 
intended as the use of persuasion of passions (ψυχαγωγία), namely to steer people back on the right course as 
though one stood as a proxy rational part for those who fail to be moved to do the right thing. 
12 Plutarch appears to maintain this distinction in Bravery of Women 243A9–B3, though he does not explicitly state 
what distinguishes these forms of persuasion there. While conviction through rational persuasion is no doubt 
preferable, as indicated in this passage, persuasion of passions is also able to be used to good ends. 
   On the role of persuasion in Plutarch’s works see Stafford 1999, who discusses the Greek background to the cult 
of Persuasion and Plutarch’s emphasis on the ambivalent nature of persuasion as a tool (ὄργανον) used for good or 
bad (Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft 801C–802A, Cicero 4.5, Fabius 1.7, and Pericles 8.1), and the praise and 
blame possible for those who are persuaded easily or rightly, with particular emphasis on Plutarch’s interest in the 
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describe the redirection of another by steering their emotions (271c10–d1), but it is also the term 
we found in the Timaeus for the persuasion of the appetitive part of the soul through imagistic 
representations (ψυχαγωγεῖσθαι, 71a3–7=[A10]), where the appetitive part of the soul lacks the 
capacity to be persuaded by rational arguments (§A.III.–§A.IV. in the Appendix to Chapter 4), 
but nonetheless is persuaded in a non-rational way.13 
Before ending this section, I would like to discuss one more passage from Plutarch’s 
works that brings to the fore the importance and usefulness of persuading others through a sense 
of shame and honor. Suppose that someone is dead set on an a course of destruction, folly, or 
disgrace; their mind may be deaf to all arguments intended to direct them in a better direction. In 
Bravery of Women, Plutarch discusses a case of this kind with an anecdote in which young 
women of Miletus suddenly, without obvious reason, begin to commit suicide en masse (249B3–
C11).14 Sneaking past their parents and guardians, they hang themselves. They cannot be averted 
from their intention to bring about their own deaths until one man comes to an ingenious 
solution: the bodies of all women who hang themselves should be carried through the 
marketplace nude. If they did not fear death and suffering, they would nonetheless fear the 
                                               
good use of persuasion in marriage. See Gorgias’ description of persuasion molding the soul of the listener however 
one wishes (τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο) in Encomium to Helen 13. Cf. also Pelling 2014, p. 155. For 
an analysis of Plutarch’s use of rhetorical strategies in Dialogue on Love 13–18 see Russell 1997. 
13 Cf. also Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1450a33–5: Tragedy has its greatest effect on the soul (τὰ μέγιστα οἷς ψυχαγωγεῖ) 
through reversals of fortune and discoveries, which are parts of the plot, i.e. these elements of the plot have their 
greatest effect on human emotion. This is the only use of ψυχαγωγία / ψυχαγωγεῖν in Aristotle’s extant corpus. 
Emotions for Aristotle can, of course, be used to alter judgments (Rhetoric 2.1, 1378a20–3), since things can be 
made to appear differently due to emotion (1377b30; cf. On Dreams 460b1–16). Since Plutarch is in dialogue with 
Plato and drawing heavily on the notion of spirited emotions being used to guide behavior, I have focused on the 
Platonic background. The Aristotelian notions of emotional persuasion and Plutarch’s relationship to them deserve a 
longer discussion outside the scope of this chapter. On the importance of altering judgment through emotion in 
Aristotle’s rhetoric, see Fortenbaugh 1975 (esp. pp. 9–22), 2006 (esp. pp. 9–38), and the collection in Rorty 1996 
(Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric). Cf. especially Carey 1996, Leighton 1996, and Nussbaum 1996 (which overlaps 
with Ch. 3 in Nussbaum 1994) in that collection. On the role of emotional appeal in moral reform both in Plato’s 
works (Gorgias and Phaedrus) and Aristotle’s Rhetoric cf. Klosko 1993. On the development of rhetoric in ancient 
Greece, cf. also Kennedy 1963. 
14 Cf. Aulus Gellius 15.10=Sandbach fr. 175, who also relates the story from Plutarch’s lost work On the Soul. 
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shame attached to the spectacle of their naked corpses borne through public places.15 The 
solution works with complete success, entirely halting the girls from bringing about their own 
deaths (παντελῶς ἔπαυσε θανατώσας τὰς παρθένους, 249C6–7).  
In explanation of the great effectiveness of this solution, Plutarch remarks that although 
arguments and tears (λόγοι καὶ δάκρυα) were unable to abate the girls’ desire to hang 
themselves, which seemed to be a god-inflicted evil (κακὸν δαιμόνιον, 249C2),16 a sense of 
shame overcame this desire: 
[T84] μέγα δὴ τεκμήριον εὐφυΐας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἡ τῆς ἀδοξίας εὐλάβεια καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ 
δεινότατα τῶν ὄντων, θάνατον καὶ πόνον, ἀδεῶς ἐχούσας αἰσχροῦ φαντασίαν μὴ 
ὑπομεῖναι μηδ’ ἐνεγκεῖν αἰσχύνην μετὰ θάνατον ἐσομένην. 
 
And, in fact, a great proof of natural goodness of growth and of virtue is the caution taken 
against ill-repute and the fact that those women, who were not afraid of the most dreadful 
of things, death and suffering, could not endure the appearance of something shameful 
nor could they bear the shame that they would have after death.    
(Plutarch, Bravery of Women 249C7–11) 
 
The solution that halted the epidemic of mass suicide relied on the manipulation of the spirited 
passion of shame. The young women, whose minds were not changed by rational arguments 
(λόγοι) or deterred by the prospects of pain and death, were persuaded by the representation of 
the great shame (αἰσχροῦ φαντασία) they would inflict on their post-mortem reputation if they 
were to go through with their original intentions.17 Passion, appealed to through the 
                                               
15 The shame of exposing one’s naked body publicly need not always fall upon the one exposed. Plutarch gives two 
examples in which mothers expose their naked bodies to heap shame upon their sons as they attempt to flee from 
battle, and effectively weaponize female nudity against their kin (Sayings of the Spartans 241B1–4; Bravery of 
Women 246A1–B1). For a similar scene see Bravery of Women 248B. For the weaponization of female nudity cf. 
Håland 2011, pp. 16–17. On Plutarch’s treatment of women in general see Le Corsu 1981. 
16 “The evil seemed to be of divine origin” (τὸ κακὸν ἐδόκει δαιμόνιον εἶναι). 
17 Cf. Plutarch, Lycurgus 18.1: As another example that the fear of shame can be greater than the fear of death, 
Plutarch also mentions a Spartan boy who conceals a stolen fox under his cloak, enduring the excruciating pain of 
his own disembowelment by the fox, lest he be caught stealing and endure the shame of being caught. 
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representation of prospective shame (αἰσχύνη), redirected their actions away from error even 
when reason failed.18 
Just as in the other examples we have seen in this section, the spirited part of the soul’s 
sensitivity to honor and shame serves as an additional system to which one can appeal in order to 
turn the soul in the right direction. Where the arguments and heartfelt appeals of our loved ones 
fail to move us, there is nonetheless a natural capacity for virtue and goodness within our nature 
that remains ready to respond to a sense of honor and shame. This passionate aspect of the soul is 
vitally useful in certain circumstances, such as when individuals are out of their wits or unable to 
be moved through rational persuasion.19  
It is nonetheless ambivalent, since it can be used to manipulate others to bad ends as well 
as good. If our sensitivity to shame is not well-grounded, we can be easily led into error 
                                               
18 In On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, Plutarch describes an afterlife scenario in which those who lived a life 
of vice have their vice revealed, put to shameful display, naked (γυμνός) before the sight of the souls of their 
ancestors and descendants (565A8–67E3). The pain of one’s own vice and ill-repute, moreover, lives on after one’s 
earthly life and brings pain and punishment even upon the souls of one’s children and descendants (εἴς τινας 
ἐκγόνους ἢ παῖδας ἡ ποινὴ περιῆλθεν, 567D3–6). Upon entering the afterlife, the souls of one’s descendants, in 
turn, condemn and torture the souls of their ancestors for bringing pain and shame to themselves (567D6–E3). 
According to this view of the afterlife, our actions and reputation have a profound effect on our descendants and can 
have an effect on our own post-mortem happiness or misery. For more on Greek views of how we affect others in 
the afterlife and are affected by our descendants cf. Pritzl 1983, Gooch 1983 and Dubois 2014, who discuss how 
reputation and happiness are affected after death in wider Greek culture, though they focus more specifically on 
Aristotle’s comments in Nicomachean Ethics 1.10–11. 
19 Plutarch also uses several Homeric examples to demonstrate the point. In How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 
74B5–9, Plutarch follows the example of Odysseus chiding Achilles with the more general remark that “Therefore 
in the spirited and manly individual by the representation of cowardice… [those who chide others] rouse an impulse 
toward noble things and drive him away from things that are shameful” (τὸν μὲν οὖν θυμοειδῆ καὶ ἀνδρώδη 
δειλίας δόξῃ…παρορμῶσι πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπελαύνουσι). In On How a Young Man Should 
Study Poetry 27A3–6, Meleager is given as an example of one who is correctly criticized for being swept away into 
folly through his anger but then praised for being brought back to do what is honorable and beneficial (καλὸν καὶ 
συμφέρον), changing his mind (μετανοεῖν). In the context of the passage from Iliad 9, which Plutarch does not 
provide, Meleager, like the women of Miletus, is not persuaded by arguments or tears from family or his fellow 
citizens (Iliad 9.574–89), but instead is persuaded by the fear of greater shame and disgraceful consequences that 
will befall him, his family, and his city if he does not change his mind. Meleager’s wife effectively provokes his 
spirited passion (θυμός, 595) to action in a more beneficial direction by invoking the prospect of great dishonor and 
shame. In close connection, Plutarch also analyzes Phoenix’s change of intention (μετανοεῖν) in what is sometimes 
printed as Iliad 9.458–61, lines which are not present in any MS of Homer, but which Plutarch claims Aristarchus 
excised without seeing their appropriateness (On How a Young Man Should Study Poetry 26F3–27A2). In those 
lines, Phoenix explains that the prospect of shame and the rumors of men cause him to change his intention from 
what he had decided to do in anger. 
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(Plutarch, Timoleon 6.1–7), as I will discuss further in §VI. We can be tossed about, like a ship 
without an anchor (Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler 782D7–E10; On the Control of Anger 
460A10–B10).  
 Plutarch, however, makes a more general and significant claim here in [T84] that will be 
important for §II and the next chapter. Built into our constitution is not only a capacity to be 
formed in our rational minds, but also a natural aptitude to be formed in our passionate nature: 
the natural goodness for growth and development (εὐφυΐα) and virtue (ἀρετή) is evidenced in 
our desire to pursue what is honorable and avoid what is shameful, passions belonging to the 
spirited part of the soul.20 This, Plutarch emphasizes, is proof (τεκμήριον) of a natural 
propensity for virtue and an inherent disposition to become good. 
 
§II Correcting Xenocrates on Education and the “Grips of Philosophy” 
 Following upon the last section, Plutarch considers the natural goodness for growth and 
development toward virtue (εὐφυΐα) vital to the formation of human character, since the 
education of one’s spirited passions sets one’s foot, as it were, on the first step down the path to 
virtue. Because moral virtues require the harmonization of passions with reason,21 and because 
                                               
20 On εὐφυΐα as a potential to grow toward virtue in Plutarch see Table-Talk 636B2–6, How a Young Man Should 
Read Poetry 26A4–B2, Dialogue on Love 767B3–4, Cimon 5.6, Marcus Cato 20.9, Alcibiades 4.1, Galba 23.2, 
Aratus 10.5, and Stob. 1.44.60=Sandbach fr. 200. I pick up on this notion further in Chapter 6. The term never 
occurs in Plato’s works. Among the Stoics, this sense of potential to grow toward virtue is also frequent, for which 
see Plutarch, On Common Notions 1073B10–11=SVF 3.719; SVF 3.366; SVF 3.135; D.L. 7.106=SVF 3.127; D.L. 
7.107=LS59m; D.L.7.129=SVF 3.716; Stob. 2.7.7b (p. 80, l. 22–p. 81, l. 6)=SVF 3.136. For the Stoics, this potential 
is rational in nature (cf. Inwood and Donini 1999, pp. 724–36), while in Plutarch, as we will see below and in 
Chapter 6, it is in the passions. Aristotle in several instances uses the term to indicate a natural endowment of a 
rational capacity, such as moral vision (Nicomachean Ethics 3.17–18, 1114b6–12), the ability to create metaphor 
(Poetics 22, 1249a4–8), and the natural ability to choose what is true over what it false (Topics 8.14, 163b12–15). 
Cf. also Nicomachean Ethics 6.1 and 10.3. On the potential for passions to grow into excellence see Aristotle, 
Eudemian Ethics 8.2, 1247b33–1248a1. In later Platonists, such as Alcinous (Handbook 152.14–29 and 183.17–27), 
Arius Didymus (Stob. 2.7.18 (p. 131, ll. 14–19)), and the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus (4.46–5.3, 
4.27–5.3, and 11.12–13.12), it indicates potential to grow toward virtue. Cf. Whittaker’s Budé edition of Alcinous 
(1990), p. 2, n. 15; p. 144, n. 487. Cf. also Gill 1983b, p. 469 and n. 5. 
21 On Moral Virtue 444C6–D1, 444E9–445A2, 449F2–4; Platonic Questions 9, 1008E3–1009B2; On Moral 
Progress 84A5–10. See §V–§VII in Chapter 2. 
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Plutarch holds passions to be strong and malleable at early stages of development before reason 
is strong in humans,22 he also deems the initial stages of one’s upbringing the most critical time 
for setting the direction of one’s life either on the path to virtue or toward corruption and vice 
(§II.a.).23 The reasons why Plutarch holds our early education of passions to be so important are 
twofold. First, these passions, particularly spirited emotions concerned with shame and honor, 
can build up resistance to becoming allied to reason later in life due to corrupt upbringing 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 442B4–C5 and On Being a Busybody 522E6–9).24 Nurses, tutors, 
parents, and instructors must do their part to shape one’s passionate nature so that it is amenable 
to moral development while they are impressionable and before they are self-reliant (§II.b.).25 
Secondly, our passionate nature has a strong role in guiding the behavior of children before they 
are more autonomous and self-governing rational beings (On Listening to Lectures 37D11–E3).26 
Spirited emotions thus play a mediating role between infancy and adulthood, guiding our 
orientation to what is honorable or shameful as we begin to make good choices for ourselves 
without the constant oversight and direction of others (§II.c.). 
                                               
22 See §II and §VII and n. 26 in Chapter 4. The claim that we are not endowed with our full rational powers does not 
imply that we have no rational part of the soul whatsoever from early infancy. See nn. 25 and 39 below.  
23 On Moral Virtue 452D8–12. 
24 See n. 41 below. 
25 The stages of childhood education that Plutarch generally follows are described in both Plato’s Laws and 
Protagoras. In Laws 7, 808d1–e4, the progression moves from mothers and nurses to tutors and then instructors: 
Just as sheep must not be allowed to live apart from a shepherd, when they leave their mothers and nurses (τροφῶν 
καὶ μητέρων ὅταν ἀπαλλάττηται), young children should not be without tutors (ἄνευ ποιμένος δὲ οὔτε 
πρόβατα οὔτ’ ἄλλο οὐδέν πω βιωτέον, οὐδὲ δὴ παῖδας ἄνευ τινῶν παιδαγωγῶν), who serve as bridles to 
constrain their actions and possible deviant impulses, as they have a font of thought that is not yet mature (ἔχει 
πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην). After this, the next stage involves training under teachers 
(διδάσκαλοι). A similar account is given in Plato, Protagoras 325c5–a4: Earliest education is under one’s parents 
and nurses, then tutors. Children are thereafter sent to school-houses for grammar instruction before being sent to 
teachers of poetry. For a partial quotation of this text see n. 52 below. 
   On the stages of general education, see Marrou 1956 for an overview of educational curricula outlined from 
Homer to Classical Christian education. On the stages of childhood education through adulthood in Plutarch, with 
focus on both Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives, see Xenophontos 2016, esp. pp. 42–107. 
26 One’s progression from childhood to manhood (εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ παίδων ἀγωγή) is not a casting off of rule within 
the soul (οὐκ ἀρχῆς ἀποβολή), but rather a change in what is ruling within the soul (μεταβολὴ ἄρχοντος), as one 
becomes self-governing through reason, which one receives as the divine element set to rule within (θεῖον ἡγεμόνα 
τοῦ βίου λαμβάνουσι τὸν λόγον). 
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§II.a. The Grips of Philosophy as Preparation for Progress in Virtue 
 To emphasize the importance of the early formation of our passionate nature for making 
progress in virtue, Plutarch borrows and repurposes Xenocrates’ metaphor of the “grips of 
philosophy” (λαβαὶ φιλοσοφίας). Xenocrates, according to the anecdote alluded to by Plutarch 
and given with variation by Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and preserved in other fragments,27 
considered education in discourse and the sciences to be the “grips of philosophy,” by which he 
seems to mean primarily preparation for advancement in philosophy and virtue.  
 In the anecdote, Xenocrates turns away a potential disciple in philosophical dialectic on 
the grounds that he has not come fit to receive further education. The young man lacks the “grips 
of philosophy,” which Xenocrates identifies as the precursory education in music, geometry, and 
astronomy,28 following the Republic’s description of preliminary education (προπαιδεία) that 
precedes the study of dialectic (ἣν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, 7, 536d4–7).29 
Xenocrates thus treats the young man as unprepared for advancement in philosophy as it is 
                                               
27 See the following note. 
28 D.L. 4.10=fr. 2.53–7 Parente: “To one who had not learned music, geometry, and astronomy, but who wished to 
study with him [Xenocrates] said, ‘Go, since you do not have the grips of philosophy.’ Others say that he said this: 
‘since fleece is not carded at my house’” (πρός τε τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρικὴν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν 
μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ’ αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν, “πορεύου,” ἔφη· “λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας.” οἱ δὲ 
τοῦτό φασιν εἰπεῖν, “παρ’ ἐμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνάπτεται”). Stob. 2.31.111=fr. 57 Parente: “Xenocrates, 
whenever a certain person, who had not a portion of general education, desired to devote himself to him, said ‘Go 
away. You do not have the grips for philosophy, since it is necessary for one to be pre-softened by these studies in 
his soul’” (Ξενοκράτης, ὁπότε τις αὐτῷ σχολάζειν ἤθελεν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐγκυκλίων μαθημάτων μετειληφώς· 
“ἄπιθι, εἶπε, λαβὰς οὐκ ἔχεις πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν· δεῖ γὰρ προμεμαλάχθαι διὰ τούτων τὴν ψυχήν”). Cf. fr. 58 
Parente: “For Xenocrates asked a young man who desired to do philosophy with him whether he had learned 
geometry and whether he had taken in music. When he said he had not, Xenocrates bade him to go back from where 
he came, since he did not have the grips of philosophy” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ξενοκράτης ἐρόμενος τὸν παρ’ αὐτῷ 
φιλοσοφεῖν νέον βουλόμενον εἰ γεγεωμέτρηκεν, εἰ μουσικῆς ἀπακήκοεν, ὡς οὐκ ἔφη, ἀπιέναι πάλιν αὐτὸν 
ἐκέλευσεν, οὐκ ἔχειν γὰρ  λαβὰς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν); fr. 59 Parente: “They say that Xenocrates the philosopher, 
when a certain unlearned person wished to philosophize, said to him, ‘Go away since you do not have the grips, i.e. 
ears’” (Ξενοκράτην δὲ τὸν φιλόσοφον λέγουσι βουλομένου τινὸς ἀγραμματικεύτου φιλοσοφεῖν εἰπεῖν· 
“ἄπιθι· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐδὲ ὦτα ἔχεις”). 
29 “Therefore, we ought to introduced to children the elements of calculation, geometry, and all of the preliminary 
education that they must have been educated in before dialectic without making the entire schema of their education 
something forced” (τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν τῆς 




outlined for those who are to become philosophic rulers in the Republic (7, 521d13–40c2). 
The “grips” (λαβαί) of philosophy for Xenocrates, then, are the point at which 
philosophy is first able to take hold (λαβεῖν). In one version of the anecdote, the young man’s 
lack of education means that he has not been “pre-softened” (προμεμαλάχθαι) by these studies 
(Stob. 2.31.111). In another, his fleece, as it were, has not been carded already and prepared 
(D.L. 4.10).30 There is no pre-existing state or disposition of soul that has been made ready for 
modification by virtue, a preparation in which philosophy can “take hold.” 
Plutarch also takes “grip” in this sense of preparation and as the first point at which 
philosophy gets a grip on the soul,31 but he disagrees with Xenocrates on what constitutes the 
grips for philosophy and progress: 
[T85] οὐ γὰρ οὕτως τὰ μαθήματα φαίη τις ἄν, ὡς ἔλεγε Ξενοκράτης, λαβὰς εἶναι 
φιλοσοφίας, ὡς τὰ πάθη τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνην ἐπιθυμίαν μετάνοιαν ἡδονὴν λύπην 
φιλοτιμίαν· ὧν ἐμμελῆ καὶ σωτήριον ἁφὴν ἁπτόμενος ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ νόμος εἰς τὴν 
προσήκουσαν ὁδὸν ἀνυσίμως καθίστησι τὸν νέον. 
 
For someone would not so much call our studies the “grips of philosophy,” as Xenocrates 
said, so much as the passions of the young, namely, shame, desire, repentance, pleasure, 
pain, and love of honor, which, if reason and the law get a suitable and secure grasp of, 
set the young man on a fitting path to great effect.  (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 452D3–8)  
 
Plutarch moves the emphasis in education from the rational studies that precede philosophical 
dialectic in Plato’s Republic to the habituation of pleasure, pain, and the passions that belong to 
the non-rational part of the soul, drawing us back to the notion that we need to shape the nature 
of the young in pre-philosophical stages of life to make them amenable to receive further 
                                               
30 For the last two citations, see n. 28 above. 
31 The notion of a grip or handle (λαβή) that Plutarch gives can indicate any number of functions, such as the handle 
of a sword (Alcaeus 33.2; cf. Demosthenes 27.20) or a cup (Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 473; cf. Aristophanes, 
Peace 1258), a place that one can grab (Plutarch, Theseus 5.4), or an opportunity that one can put one’s hand to 
metaphorically. In the dialogues, Plato uses λαβή variously as a “hold,” as in a metaphorical wrestling bout between 
interlocutors (ὥσπερ παλαιστής, Republic 8, 544b5; Phaedrus 236b8; cf. Plutarch, Eumenes 7.10), and as the 
starting point in “getting a hold” on an argument (Laws 3, 682e10–11: “The argument, as it were, provides a grip for 
us” (καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οἷον λαβὴν ἀποδίδωσιν) to make a fresh start. Cf. Plutarch, Cicero 20.6: “he gave no hold 
for a conviction” (λαβὴν δ’ οὐδεμίαν εἰς ἔλεγχον παρέδωκεν)). 
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education later in life. But, that shaping will predominantly take the form of habituating passions 
so that the young feel pleasure in what is correct and shame and disgust for what is wrong, i.e. 
the spirited emotions associated with honor and shame (Republic 2, 375a2–3; 4, 414a6). The 
preparatory education (προπαιδεία) that is of greatest importance, then, is not found in the 
sciences, Plutarch argues, but in the habits one has developed in one’s passionate nature much 
earlier in one’s life. 
Moral virtue for Plutarch is not simply knowledge.32 Nor is virtue merely having a well-
stocked set of concepts about what is appropriate or being informed through higher education 
and philosophy, as though learning these concepts will automatically bring one’s passionate 
nature into harmony with one’s rational convictions.33 Even if we are well-informed in the 
rational part of our soul, our passions can oppose and operate independently of our rational 
judgments (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 448B3–9 and 449B11–C334). Additionally, passions are 
not particularly well suited to respond to formation through rational instruction.35 Moral virtue is 
produced within passions, however, when they are brought into harmony with reason and into 
proper limits.36 
 To shape the passionate nature, Plutarch argues that the most effective education lies in 
                                               
32 Socrates is sometimes thought to have held that virtue is knowledge or rather that knowledge of virtue is sufficient 
to make one virtuous. Proponents of this view often draw upon Plato’s Meno and Protagoras. Cf. Pangle 2014 for a 
recent defense of this position. For a succinct history of the view and its relation to Plato’s view of virtue cf. Vasilou 
2014. I take Plutarch’s position to be closer to what Yong 1996 sees in Plato’s theory of ethical education, who 
argues that knowledge is not sufficient for someone to become good, since moral habituation is as basic an element 
to Plato’s theory on how one becomes good as is ethical theorizing, and is, in fact, prior (see esp. pp. 54–8). 
33 For the Stoics, a soul is virtuous depending on the state of the commanding-faculty and reason within it, which, 
according to Chrysippus, “is a collection of certain conceptions and preconceptions” (ἔστιν ἐννοιῶν τέ τινων καὶ  
προλήψεων ἄθροισμα, Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 5.2.49 and 5.3.1=LS 53V=SVF 2.841). 
Perfected reason for the Stoics is virtue (ratio perfecta virtus vocatur, Seneca, Epistles 76.9–10=LS 63D=SVF 
3.200a). 
34 =[T65] in Chapter 4. 
35 See §I and §V in Chapter 4. 
36 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 444C6–D1, 444E9–445A2, 449F2–4; Platonic Questions 9, 1008E3–1009B2; On 
Moral Progress 84A5–10. 
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habituation (ἐθισμός, ἐθίζειν). All passions, Plutarch writes, require habituation (πάντων δὲ 
τῶν παθῶν ἐθισμοῦ δεομένων, Plutarch, On the Control of Anger 459B3–537), and the earlier 
one begins to shape habits, the better (πόρρωθεν ἀρξάμενοι, On Being a Busybody 520D3–738). 
Drawing on the Republic’s metaphor of molding character (2, 377c3–6), Plutarch goes so far as 
to call the formation of our earliest habits the first step we take on the path to virtue: 
[T86] πρῶτοι γὰρ οὗτοι [οἱ παιδαγωγοὶ, 439F2] παραλαμβάνοντες ἐκ γάλακτος, ὥσπερ 
αἱ τίτθαι ταῖς χερσὶ τὸ σῶμα πλάττουσιν, οὕτω τὸ ἦθος ῥυθμίζουσι τοῖς ἔθεσιν εἰς 
ἴχνος τι πρῶτον ἀρετῆς καθιστάντες.  
 
For these [tutors], receiving [the children] first from when they are weaned, bring their 
character into good measure through habits, just as nurses mold the body with their 
hands, setting them to take their first footstep on the path to virtue.   
(Plutarch, Can Virtue be Taught 439F2–5)39 
 
To do this, tutors, just as nurses before them, shape and mold the passions into habits not so 
much by rational instruction, but by harmonizing (ῥυθμίζειν) children’s passionate character to 
be in conformity with reason. They bring their passions into alignment with evaluations, the 
                                               
37 “All passions need habituation, since habituation, as it were, subdues and masters the non-rational, disobedient 
part of the soul through practice” (πάντων δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἐθισμοῦ δεομένων οἷον δαμάζοντος καὶ 
καταθλοῦντος ἀσκήσει τὸ ἄλογον καὶ δυσπειθές). 
38 “The greatest means for averting excessive passion is habituation, if beginning from far away we train ourselves 
and teach ourselves for this self-mastery. For the increase of the diseased state came about through habit, moving 
forward little by little” (μέγιστον μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν ὁ ἐθισμός, ἐὰν πόρρωθεν 
ἀρξάμενοι γυμνάζωμεν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ διδάσκωμεν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὔξησις ἔθει 
γέγονε, τοῦ νοσήματος κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ πρόσω χωροῦντος). In this passage, Plutarch describes self-directed 
training and habituation, but I take it that the sentiment is also applicable to training others from as early as one can 
in forming correct habits. Hence, as we will see, Plutarch declares early education, i.e. habituation, of passions to be 
the most important aspect in training the young to be virtuous, since it sets a firm foundation for later development. 
39 Cf. On Moral Virtue 452D7–8: “If reason and the law take hold of the passions with a harmonious and salvific 
grip, they efficaciously set the young man on a fitting path” (ὧν ἐμμελῆ καὶ σωτήριον ἁφὴν ἁπτόμενος ὁ λόγος 
καὶ ὁ νόμος εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν ὁδὸν ἀνυσίμως καθίστησι τὸν νέον). While the non-rational passions, once 
properly habituated, set us on the right path, reason and instruction come from outside to direct the course and give 
course correction. For the Platonic image and reference to nurses shaping the limbs and character of the young cf. 
also Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Education of Children 3E2–F7: We ought to bring the character of children into 
harmony from the beginning of their life (τὰ τῶν τέκνων ἤθη ῥυθμίζειν προσήκει), just as nurses shape their 
limbs straight from the womb. The period of life in one’s youth is very plastic and soft (εὔπλαστον γὰρ καὶ ὑγρὸν 
ὁ νεότης, 3e6–7) and the impressions made upon children’s minds become hard to remove later. Plato thus 
recommended that nurses guard against stories of just any sort so that they should not happen to be filled with 
foolishness and corruption in their souls from the start. On the spurious attribution of On the Education of Children 




justification of which they cannot yet understand, but which they will hopefully come to 
appreciate later as their rational powers mature.40  
The attunement of one’s passionate dispositions is possible because of the nature of 
spirited emotions. The spirited part of the soul has certain basic favorable and unfavorable 
attitudes to somewhat abstract notions of what is honorable and ignoble. Spirited emotions, that 
is, exhibit complex cognitive features that are naturally programmed to evaluate desires and 
actions as honorable, to-be-pursued and shameful, to-be-avoided. But, what falls into these 
evaluative classes is also subject to modification through our upbringing. 
Our natural desire and aversion for certain objects that fit into those opposing evaluative 
classes of what is honorable or shameful can err (On Listening to Lectures 38C4–D6). They can 
also become corrupted (On Moral Virtue 442B4–C5).41 The educator’s task, then, is to give a 
generally well-oriented sense of shame, desire for honor, and disgust for what is shameful 
through habituation, inculcating the right evaluative standards into the passionate emotions of 
children. 
 
§II.b. The Grips of Philosophy as Oar-Handles 
To attune these spirited emotions, Plutarch does not turn to rational discourse as the 
primary means of shaping spirited emotions. Where passions can be deaf to reason, they are, 
                                               
40 See Chapter 4, n. 28. 
41 The affective part of the soul (τὸ παθητικόν), which stands for the spirited part here, “naturally takes heed of the 
rational and thinking part of the soul, turns toward it, submits to it, and conforms to it, if it has not been completely 
corrupted by witless pleasure and an indulgent lifestyle” (τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος εἰσακούειν καὶ 
τρέπεσθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὑπείκειν καὶ κατασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐὰν μὴ τέλεον ᾖ διεφθαρμένον ὑφ’ 
ἡδονῆς ἀμαθοῦς καὶ ἀκολάστου διαίτης). This quotation is part of [T66] in Chapter 4. On τὸ παθητικόν as the 
spirited part of the soul here cf. Plato, Republic 4, 441a2–3. 
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especially early on, responsive to pleasure and pain.42 The same is true of children whose 
cognitive capacities are also in their infancy, but whose passions are strong from birth.43 
Plutarch instead describes the use of a more rudimentary system to shape spirited 
emotions: the tutor trains children to feel pleasure in what is honorable and pain in what is 
shameful:  
[T87] μὴ κακῶς εἰπεῖν τὸν Λάκωνα παιδαγωγόν, ὅτι ποιήσει τὸν παῖδα τοῖς καλοῖς 
ἥδεσθαι καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδέν  ἐστιν οὐδὲ κάλλιον 
ἀποφῆναι τέλος ἐλευθέρῳ προσηκούσης παιδείας. 
 
The Spartan tutor was not wrong to say that he would make a child take pleasure in what 
is honorable and be grieved by what is dishonorable. There is no end of education fitting 
to a free-born youth that is greater or more noble than this. 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 452D8–12)  
                                               
42 As in the Myth of the Charioteer metaphor, the deaf horse representative of the appetitive part of the soul does not 
understand honor and shame, but responds only to pleasure and pain (Plato, Phaedrus 254e5). Cf. Yunis ad loc.: 
Physical pain is “the only language it understands.” While the spirited part has a greater capacity to listen to reason 
than the appetitive, as we saw in Chapter 4, it nonetheless is less sophisticated than the rational part of the soul. 
43 Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 441a7–b1; Laws 2, 653a5–6 and Protagoras 325d5–7. Cf. also Aristotle Rhetoric 2.6, 
1383b12–15, and 1384a22; Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b30–1105a3, and 10.9, 1179b28–9. In Rhetoric 2.6, 
shame is experienced as something negative and to be avoided because it is represented as painful: “Let shame be a 
certain pain or disturbance about what appears to bring one to bad reputation of evil deeds that are present, have 
already happened, or will happen in the future, and let shamelessness be a certain disdain and lack of feeling about 
these same things” (ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ 
παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα). In 
Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, Aristotle describes our attraction as under the guise of three separate categories: the 
pleasant, the honorable, and the good. Conversely, we are averse to the painful, the shameful, and the bad: “Since 
there are three things that move us toward choice or avoidance, namely, what is noble, beneficial, or pleasant, and 
their opposites, namely, what is shameful, harmful, or painful, the good man will be correct in his action and the 
vicious man erring in his action concerning all these things, especially concerning pleasure, since this is shared with 
the animals and follows closely all things under our choice. And indeed, what is noble and what is beneficial are 
represented as pleasant. And moreover, from infancy our sense of pleasure has been bred up and nurtured with all of 
us as a familiar. For this reason, it is hard to get rid of this passion since it has been ingrained in our life” (τριῶν 
γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν] τῶν 
ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς 
ἁμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν 
παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι δ’ ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· 
διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ, 2.3, 1104b30–1105a3). Passion, which is 




Plutarch here describes a kind of calibration of spirited passions, drawing on a common trope of 
the effectiveness of Spartan rearing or training in habits ((ἀνα-)τροφή).44 There are certain 
standards of what is shameful and honorable that children should come to internalize in their 
dispositions, a process in which Spartans claim particular expertise (Can Virtue be Taught 
439F645 and Lysander 2.246).47 Taking what is honorable (τὰ καλά) in a normative sense, 
habituation is a prolonged process of making children associate positively with what they should 
pursue as honorable and associate negatively with what they should avoid as shameful. 
This process of habituation takes constant major and minor readjustments, recalibrating 
children’s passions little by little toward progress (κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ πρόσω, Plutarch, On 
Being a Busybody 520D3–7), until habitual acquaintance with what is honorable makes 
everything honorable also pleasant (τὴν πᾶν τὸ καλὸν ἡδὺ ποιοῦσαν… συνήθειαν, Plutarch, 
On Listening to Lectures 47C3–4).48 Habituation thus initially involves solidifying associations 
of positive and negative valence, such as pleasurable and painful experiences, with certain types 
                                               
44 Spartan women were thought particularly good at training young children in their early passions and desires. We 
more frequently know the names of Spartan nurses than other household figures because of this. Cf. Plutarch, 
Alcibiades 1.2; Marrou 1956, pp. 19–20. Cf. also Powell 2015, pp. 93–102. 
45 “When asked what he provided by his teaching, the Spartan said, ‘I make honorable things pleasant to children’” 
(καὶ ὁ Λάκων ἐρωτηθεὶς τί παρέχει παιδαγωγῶν, “τὰ καλά,” ἔφη, “τοῖς παισὶν ἡδέα ποιῶ”). 
46 “For they [the Spartans] wish for their children straightway from the beginning to be affected in some way with 
regard to reputation, feeling pain from censures and elation due to praises, and the man who is without passion and 
unmoved by these things is looked down upon as lacking in the love of honor for virtue and barren in relation to it. 
Thus his [Lysander’s] love of honor and love of contest remained, brought about from his Spartan education, and 
one ought not to find any great fault with his nature in these things” (βούλονται γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάσχειν τι 
τοὺς παῖδας αὐτῶν πρὸς δόξαν, ἀλγυνομένους τε τοῖς ψόγοις καὶ μεγαλυνομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαίνων· ὁ δὲ 
ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀκίνητος ἐν τούτοις ὡς ἀφιλότιμος πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀργὸς καταφρονεῖται. τὸ μὲν οὖν 
φιλότιμον αὐτῷ καὶ φιλόνεικον ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς παρέμεινε παιδείας ἐγγενόμενον, καὶ οὐδέν τι μέγα χρὴ 
τὴν φύσιν ἐν τούτοις αἰτιᾶσθαι). 
47 Cf. also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a17–19; 1.13, 1102a7–15; 3.7, 1115b23; 3.9, 1117b1–17; 10.9, 
1180a24–9. There is also a negative portrayal of this form of education. The Spartan system was sometimes 
criticized for going beyond preparatory and preliminary education, creating unquestioning obedience to the state. 
See Plutarch, Lycurgus 30.4. Cf. Marrou 1956, pp. 19–22. 
48 In line with Aristotle on this point, pleasure not only draws one to act in certain ways, but also increases one’s 
drive to continue in the activity and to form a habituated disposition toward it (Rhetoric 1.11, 1370a5–9; 
Nicomachean Ethics 10.5, 1175a29–36; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1105a3–7; 10.4, 1174b20–5; 10.5, 1175a34–
b24). Cf. Sherman 1989, p. 184. 
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of actions through the spirited passions of honor and shame. And so, associating pain with 
certain types of activity helps to solidify a connection, especially as instructors continue to 
represent the actions and desires as shameful in conjunction with painful punishment and 
censure.49 The path to virtue, becomes even smoother and easier as one continues to reinforce 
good habits through practice (Progress in Virtue 77D4–8).50 
Children begin to see certain actions and desires as to-be-done or not-to-be-done, 
inculcating certain standards of judgment through habituation, not only due to corporal 
punishment, but also through the pleasures and pains of praise and blame (On Moral Virtue 
452C6–D151; On Listening to Lectures 46D4–13 and On Compliancy 528F1–4). They operate on 
                                               
49 Plutarch, like Plato, Aristotle, and the author of On the Education of Children, often uses a kind of “mechanical 
metaphor” to describe the habituation of passions, bending and twisting them into a certain shape, even as we see in 
the metaphor of shaping the passions of the young, as nurses shape and mold the limbs of infants (Plato, Republic 2, 
377c3–6; Plutarch, Can Virtue be Taught 439F2–5=[T86]). Cf. On the Education of Children 2D1–10, which likens 
habituation to bending wood into chariot wheels so that the wood cannot be made straight again (cf. Plato, 
Protagoras 325c5–e1), the hollowing of rocks produced by small and consistent drops of water, and the wearing 
down of iron and bronze by touch over time. For the mechanical metaphor in Aristotle see Sorabji 1973, pp 201–19, 
and Burnyeat 1980, esp. pp. 73–4. Sherman 1989, pp. 157–87, focusing on Aristotle’s theory of habituation, finds 
fault with this metaphor precisely because it neglects to explain the transition from early education of passions, 
when we are less cognitively capable, to the development of practical wisdom and discernment as we mature into 
the cultivators of our own passions. Cf. Russell 2014 and Jimenez 2015, for a similar view. Wilberding 2009, pp. 
358–64 (cf. also Singpurwalla 2013, pp. 50–2; Jenkins 2015), raises a similar worry for Plato’s description of early 
education and proposes that what is really educated in early habituation is not the passionate part of the soul, but 
instead proto-rational capacities.  
   One might worry that my own presentation of the education of passions through habituation is open to the same 
criticism, especially since in §II and §VII of Chapter 4, I stressed the cognitive aspect of inculcating standards of 
judgment through habituation (ἐθίζειν / ἐθισμός) as a form of learning (μανθάνειν) but here present a more 
rudimentary system of associating pleasure and pain with seeing things as honorable or shameful. To such an 
objection I can say that, while I emphasize in this section the rudimentary aspects of association, those associations 
are part of a process of inculcating standards that are representational and evaluative. Pleasure and pain are used to 
help calibrate positive and negative valence within the representational and evaluative capacities of the spirited part 
of the soul. While the methods used to attune spirited emotions to absorb correct standards of evaluation are simple, 
the emotions are still complex in their content. While I focus on shaping spirited emotions here, even early 
education will begin a process of informing the rational part of the soul with correct beliefs. See §IV below. 
50 “The most ancient evidence of progress from Hesiod, namely, that the path no longer is uphill nor extremely 
steep, but is easy, smooth, and easily tread, as though it has been thoroughly smoothed out by practice” (τὸ 
πρεσβύτατον δήλωμα προκοπῆς τοῦ Ἡσιόδου, μηκέτι προσάντη μηδ’ ὄρθιον ἄγαν ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ λείαν 
καὶ δι’ εὐπετείας εἶναι τὴν ὁδόν, οἷον ἐκλεαινομένην τῇ ἀσκήσει). 
51 Plutarch notes that his Stoic opponents enact correction of the young especially through the use of praise and 
blame (τούτοις μάλιστα χρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις). Even the Stoic Cato, Plutarch writes, preferred 
youths who would blush over those who were pale, since he could habituate them in the correct manner and teach 
them to fear censure more than hard work and suspicion of wrongdoing more than danger (Plutarch, On Compliancy 
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the basis of certain standards of what they see to be honorable / shameful before they have access 
to the contents and reasons why what they have come to treat as honorable / shameful and 
appropriate / inappropriate ought to be seen as such.52 Children learn to track what is honorable 
and shameful, like a well-trained set of hunting dogs.53 
The process of shaping these habits and evaluative standards brings out another sense in 
which the passions serve as the grips of philosophy: like oar-handles of a ship’s rudder, we can 
use them to guide the progress of children in the formation of their habits. As we saw in the 
description of certain spirited passions that function like rudders (ὥσπερ οἴαξι) in Pericles 15.1–
2 (=[T83]), Plutarch lists among the spirited emotions that serve as grips in On Moral Virtue 
452D3–8 (=[T85]), not only shame (αἰσχύνη), a desire for honor (φιλοτιμία), and repentance 
(μετάνοια), which help to redirect and change our course, but also pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain 
(λύπη), which help us to shape the spirited emotions of shame and the desire for honor. 
                                               
528F1–4). As I note below, this use of praise and blame to bring about shame over one’s inadequacies fits uneasily 
within the Stoic view that passions such as shame are states of erroneous belief. See §IV below.  
52 Cf. Plato, Protagoras 325c5–e1: “Beginning when they are small children, and for as long as they live, they teach 
and advise them. As soon as one understands what is said, his nurse, mother, pedagogue, and his father himself 
compete with one another so that he is the best he can be, teaching and pointing out to him in every situation, both in 
word and deed, what is just and what unjust, that this is honorable but that is shameful, that this is sanctioned while 
that is unsanctioned, and ‘do these things’ but ‘do not do those other things.’ If he obeys willingly, that is, but if he 
does not, just like a piece of dry wood that is twisted and bent, they make him straight through threats and blows. 
Next, sending them to the school-house they entrust teachers to care more about the good conduct of children than 
about their instruction in grammar and in playing the cithara” (ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν 
ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ 
παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ’ ἕκαστον 
καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, 
τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ “τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει.” καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν 
πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ 
δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ 
γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως); Laws 2, 653a5–c4=[T92] below. 
53 We are to keep children on the right path and protect them from alluring distractions, “just as those who hunt with 
dogs do not allow their pups to turn aside and pursue every which smell, but draw them and check them with the 
leash, keeping their sense-perceptive faculty pure and free from mixture with other scents for their own proper work, 
in order that they more vigorously cling closely to the tracks” (καθάπερ οἱ κυνηγοὶ τοὺς σκύλακας οὐκ ἐῶσιν 
ἐκτρέπεσθαι καὶ διώκειν πᾶσαν ὀδμήν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ῥυτῆρσιν ἕλκουσι καὶ ἀνακρούουσι καθαρὸν αὐτῶν καὶ 
ἄκρατον φυλάττοντες τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐπὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, ἵν’ εὐτονώτερον ἐμφύηται τοῖς ἴχνεσι, On Being 
a Busybody 520E7–11). Cf. also the sheep / shepherd metaphor in Laws 7, 808d1–e4 (for which see n. 25 above). 
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If our sense of shame and desire for honor are sufficiently healthy and intact, then praise 
and blame, once again, are powerful instruments used like oar-handles to direct us. A proper 
sense of shame and desire for honor, for instance, helps one to be responsive to criticism and 
receive a dose, as it were, of corrective medication aimed at the improvement of one’s soul when 
one errs. If one fails to have a proper emotional response when one’s moral fault is revealed, he 
fails to receive the drug (φάρμακον) aimed at correcting his character (πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν 
ἤθους, On Listening to Lectures 46D4–1354; On Moral Virtue 452C6–D1).55 Use of praise is 
preferable treatment, like a doctor’s prescription of proper diet and rest over the use of drugs 
(How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 73D10–E2).56 
Unlike in the majority of examples in §I, however, the grips of philosophy are intended to 
steer the soul in its development to form habits and dispositions, not merely to change someone’s 
                                               
54 “But, if one is not humbled at hearing a reproach and admonition, which make use of a convicting word as a drug 
with a stinging bite and is aimed at the correction of his character, and if he is not full of sweat and agitation of 
mind and does not burn with shame in his soul but instead is unmoved and grins and treats it slightingly with banter, 
he has the character of a dreadfully slavish young person who is incapable of feeling shame. This insensitivity is due 
to a familiarity and constant contact with erroneous ways. Such a person does not, as it were, receive a stripe from 
the lash on his hardness of soul, as though it were a bit of callous flesh” (ἐπαφῆς δὲ καὶ νουθεσίας πρὸς 
ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους ὥσπερ φαρμάκῳ δάκνοντι λόγῳ χρωμένης ἐλέγχοντι μὴ συνεσταλμένον ἀκούειν μηδ᾿ 
ἱδρῶτος καὶ ἰλίγγου μεστόν, αἰσχύνῃ φλεγόμενον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ᾿ ἄτρεπτον καὶ σεσηρότα καὶ 
κατειρωνευόμενον, ἀνελευθέρου τινὸς δεινῶς καὶ ἀπαθοῦς πρὸς τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι νέου διὰ συνήθειαν 
ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ συνέχειαν, ὥσπερ ἐν σκληρᾷ σαρκὶ καὶ τυλώδει τῇ ψυχῇ μώλωπα μὴ λαμβάνοντος). 
   As Xenophontos 2016, pp. 38–40, notes, “For Plato ἐπανόρθωμα is an intellectual procedure designed to rectify 
conceptual errors” (p. 38). Cf. Protagoras 340a, d; Theaetetus 146c; Gorgias 461c. Aristotle uses correction once in 
terms of shaping character (ἦθος, Nicomachean Ethics 1165b), but generally to describe the correction of mental 
errors (1135a, 1137b). Plutarch, however, frequently uses the term to describe correction of character and habits, 
though he does, however, at times use terminology for correction in an intellectual sense: Demosthenes 6.2, 8.2; 
Lives of the Ten Orators 844E; On How a Young Man Should Study Poetry 22B, 34B; Cicero 4.7, and Caesar 59.2. 
For discussion of these uses and further instances see Xenophontos, p. 39, n. 65. 
55 Plutarch elsewhere describes the cure or treatment with the term θεράπευμα (cf. On Compliancy 529A7–10), 
which can indicate a general sense of attendance to, care for, surgical intervention, or curative drugs / herbs (for this 
last “concrete” use with the plural τὰ θεραπεύματα, see Hippocrates On Sickness 4.34.20–5). Cf. also On 
Talkativeness 502B1–C1, where Plutarch describes the cure and treatment that philosophy provides for inordinate 
behavior with both θεράπευμα and φάρμακον. 
56 “For, just as a doctor with good intentions would rather remove disease from one whose sick through sleep and 
nutrition than by the use drugs like castor and scammony, likewise a suitable friend and good father and teacher like 
to use praise more than censure for the correction of character” (ὡς γὰρ ἰατρὸς εὐγνώμων βούλοιτ’ ἂν ὕπνῳ καὶ 
τροφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ καστορίῳ καὶ σκαμωνίῳ τὸ νόσημα λῦσαι τοῦ κάμνοντος, οὕτω καὶ φίλος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ 
πατὴρ χρηστὸς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἐπαίνῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ψόγῳ χαίρει πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους χρώμενος). 
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mind or action at a particular moment. An educator takes hold of these grips for the benefit of 
students’ souls, shaping their character to have a more enduring quality. The goal is for children 
and students to develop the right kinds of habits that continue to guide their future actions and 
orient them to desire and act correctly.57 
 
§II.c. The Grips of Philosophy as Enduring Holds on Character 
 Eventually, shaping these habits, namely the way one is oriented to act and react, 
produces a more stable character. Plutarch takes the etymological connection seriously: changing 
one’s ways (οἱ τρόποι) and habits (τὰ ἔθη / τὰ ἤθη) amounts to changing one’s character (οἱ 
τρόποι / τὰ ἤθη, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 551E6–9).58 The disposition becomes 
                                               
57 Plutarch even extends this goal to slaves that are under one’s supervision, arguing that properly attending to 
slaves’ sense of shame brings about moderation in their souls: “in those [slaves] who show a sense of shame, the 
fear that comes about brings self-control” (αἰδουμένοις ὁ σωφρονίζων ἐγγίνεται φόβος, On the Control of Anger 
459D2–6). Contra Van Hoof 2007, p. 75, I do not think that Plutarch, or the speaker Fundanus, is solely concerned 
with the moral development of the master in On the Control of Anger. Masters ought to avoid punishing their slaves 
excessively to avoid damaging their own character, as though avoiding a perverse pleasure of being drunk on cruelly 
punishing others or taking vengeance (On the Control of Anger 460C1–7; cf. On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 
550E2–551A3), and masters may use their treatment of slaves as practice in moderating their own anger (459B). 
Nevertheless, Fundanus notes how much better it is to train slaves to become moderate in their own character. In On 
the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, moreover, the goal is to benefit the one punished. Likewise, the moderation 
brought about in one’s slaves is meant to bring benefit and correction to their habits and character, even if that goal 
is in line with the further goal of benefitting the masters themselves. On the decorum linked with moderate treatment 
of slaves see also Harris 2001, pp 317–36, esp. 327–8.  
   Poor supervision of slaves and neglect of how one’s actions affect their character can in fact lead to bad results. 
“Constant and merciless beating does not produce repentance from evil-doing,” Fundanus argues in Plutarch’s On 
the Control of anger, “but rather forethought to not get caught” (ἡ δὲ συνεχὴς πληγὴ καὶ ἀπαραίτητος οὐ 
μετάνοιαν ἐμποιεῖ τοῦ κακουργεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῦ λανθάνειν πρόνοιαν μᾶλλον, 459D4–6). Cruel treatment, 
Plutarch argues elsewhere, renders one callous and unresponsive to improvement through punishment, since it often 
removes a sense of goodwill and a sense of shame. Cf. Precepts of Statecraft 820F11–B11: Just as the affection of 
dogs (κυνῶν ἀσπασμός), which serve us in the hunt, and the goodwill of horses (ἵππων εὔνοια), which serve as 
beasts of burden, is not to be spurned (οὐ ἀπόβλητον) but is useful and pleasant (χρήσιμον καὶ ἡδύ), while the 
cruel treatment of bees, dogs, and horses has a negative effect, likewise instilling goodwill and trust within one’s 
human subjects renders them willingly submissive and gentle (χειροήθη καὶ πρᾶον ἑκουσίως) to one’s rule. Cf. 
also How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 74E3–6 and On Listening to Lectures 46D4–13, where Plutarch argues 
that improper upbringing can snuff out the sense of shame necessary for improvement of character. On the rough 
treatment of individuals who lack a proper sensitivity to shame and honor in Aristotle see Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 
1179b11–16, 23, 27–9 and 1180a4–12; Sherman 1989, p. 164. 
58 Cf. Plutarch Sulla 30.5, where Plutarch treats moral character (τὰ ἤθη) as synonymous with one’s character / 
ways (οἱ τρόποι): Sulla “probably attached to great offices of governance a bad reputation, as though these offices 
did not allow men’s characters to remain in the same condition as their character was from the beginning” (εἰκότως 
προσετρίψατο ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐξουσίαις  διαβολὴν ὡς τὰ ἤθη μένειν οὐκ ἐώσαις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τρόπων). 
On the nearly synonymous use of τὰ ἤθη and οἱ τρόποι in Plutarch’s works cf. Gill 1983b, p. 474. On the 
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settled, like a dye that becomes fixed over time and is hard to wash out (ἡ βαφὴ ἐν πολλῷ 
χρόνῳ δευσοποιὸς οὖσα καὶ δυσέκπλυτος, Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power 
779C1–6; cf. On Moral Virtue 443D1–10). Drawing on the image from the Republic, the dye 
represents the inculcation of correct standards within the spirited part of the soul, which absorbs 
the laws like a dye (τοὺς νόμους δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφήν, Republic 4, 429b8–430c6),59 adding 
further credence to Plutarch’s identification of shaping habits as the place where reason and the 
laws first get a grip on the soul in On Moral Virtue 452D3–8=[T85]. The beliefs and standards of 
what we ought to pursue or avoid permeate and soak into, so to speak, the character of our 
spirited passions. 
 Plutarch, then, emphasizes much more the effect that instruction and guided behavior 
plays on the formation of habits as the most vital aspect of our early education, more so than 
children’s understanding and attendance to the contents of wise precepts and instructions they 
receive from their teachers and parents, which is to come later.60 In On the Delays of the Divine 
Vengeance, the grip that habituation takes upon our nature, in fact, has the greatest control over 
                                               
connection between the naming of character (ἦθος) from habit (ἔθος) see also Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443C5–
D1; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a17–18; Eudemian Ethics 2.2, 1220a39–b6; and Politics 7.13, 1332b1 
ff.; Sherman 1989, p. 177; and Kraut 2012, p. 538. 
   On the problem of static character tropes in Plutarch’s Lives, despite his description of molding and shaping 
character in the Moralia, see Gill 1983b, Duff 1999 and 2008, who note that the representation of unchanging static 
character in the Lives is largely due to the influence of the genre of biographical representations of character and 
also probably due to the source material that Plutarch inherits. Cf. also Dihle 1956, pp. 57–87; Pelling 1988 and 
2000; Swain 1989; Xenophontos 2016, pp. 29–41. 
59 Cf. also Republic 7, 522a3–9, 538a9–e4; 10, 619c6–d1; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104b11–13; 1105a6–7. 
See also §VII of Chapter 4. 
60 Cf. Plato, Republic 7, 522a3–9: The early education of the guardians educates them in habits, providing them with 
a certain harmonious disposition, not knowledge, according to its harmony, and a certain rhythmic disposition 
according to its rhythm, and, in its stories, other habits akin to these (ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε 
ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδοῦσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις 
ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη); Republic 7, 538a9–e4: Guardians will be equipped to pursue what is honorable and 
shun what is shameful reliably based on the standards they were taught by their upbringing (ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα 
ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι), but will not have a sufficient grasp due from that upbringing alone to explain why they hold 
to those beliefs and habits unless they have further education. Cf. also Republic 10, 619c6–d1: In the Myth of Er, the 
soul of one who participated in virtue based on habit without philosophy (ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς 




[T88] ἦθος ὡς πλεῖστον ἐνδύεται τὸ ἔθος καὶ κρατεῖ μάλιστα καθαπτόμενον. 
 
habit to the greatest extent possible enters into character and comes to have the greatest 
control once it has been gripped.  
(Plutarch, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 551e8–9) 
 
Here, the grip of philosophy is not only the point at which philosophy first gets a hold on our 
character, putting our foot on the path to virtue from the beginning, but it also is the enduring 
hold, as in the metaphor of wrestling,61 that does not let up and additionally guides our progress.62 
 By guiding us, directing and redirecting our actions, teachers instill habits until we no 
longer require constant oversight from another to restrain us from error (On Talkativeness 
511E8–11).63 As I already explored in Chapter 4, spirited passions serve to help guide one’s 
actions and desires on a path consonant with certain standards that have been inculcated by habit 
(Plutarch, On Moral Progress 83A4–B8=[T64] in Chapter 4). More and more they become a 
guiding force within the soul. So, this early shaping of habits not only helps children to take their 
first footstep on the path to virtue (Plutarch, Can Virtue be Taught 439F2–5), but also helps to 
keep them on that path. 
 For these reasons, Plutarch’s remarks at the end of On Moral Virtue should come as no 
surprise. The cultivation of good habits, taking pleasure in what is honorable and feeling pain in 
what is shameful, is the greatest and most honorable education available to the young (On Moral 
                                               
61 On “grips” (λαβαί) used in this sense, see Plato, Republic 8, 544b5; Phaedrus 236b8; Plutarch, Eumenes 7.10. 
62 Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451B12–C1: “For it is by habit that [a human] remains consistent, by nature that he 
is nurtured and uses reason and thought” (καὶ γὰρ ἕξει [ὁ ἄνθρωπος, B11] συνέχεται καὶ φύσει τρέφεται καὶ 
λόγῳ χρῆται καὶ διανοίᾳ). 
63 “Habituation is great for all things…for it is not possible to restrain the babbler as though taking hold of the bit in 
his mouth, but one must overcome his disease by habituation” (μέγα πρὸς πάνθ’ ὁ ἐθισμός ἐστι...οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς 
χαλινῶν ἐφαψαμένους ἐπισχεῖν τὸν ἀδολέσχην, ἀλλ’ ἔθει δεῖ κρατῆσαι τοῦ νοσήματος). While in this 
passage Plutarch has framed the need for habituation negatively, noting that constant restraint of those who have 
vicious habits is not enough but that habituation is needed to stop them, the upshot is that if habituation is effective, 
then it will remedy the propensity to vice and no longer require consistent and continued application of restraint. 
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Virtue 452D8–12=[T87]). This education is primary since it lays the foundation for our later 
development, comes earlier, and plays a role in guiding our continued development on the path 
to virtue. 
 
§III Aristotle and Plato on Habituation of Passions 
At first glance, Plutarch seems to be more in line with Aristotle than with Plato’s 
Republic in emphasizing the training and habituation of passions. As noted above, Xenocrates, a 
head of Plato’s Academy, seems to be on good Platonic footing in his identification of music, 
geometry, and astronomy as the “grips of philosophy,” the preparatory education (προπαιδεία) 
for progress in philosophy and virtue (Plato, Republic 7, 521d13–40c2, esp. 536d4–7). Plutarch, 
however, seems closer to Aristotle in laying the emphasis on the formation of passions that 
occurs earlier, even though Aristotle falls within the Platonic tradition for Plutarch.64 According 
to Aristotle, education in moral theory cannot take hold unless students already have a proper 
education of their passions before embarking on the study of ethics: 
[T89] ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ’ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι 
τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν 
τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα.  
 
Discussion and teaching may not be strong always in everything, but the soul of the 
listener must have been cultivated beforehand in character for the purpose of feeling 
enjoyment and hating well, just like soil provides nourishment to the seed.  
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1179b23–6).65 
 
                                               
64 Cf. Dillon 1977, pp. 193–8; Dillon and Long 1988, pp. 1–14 (“Introduction”); Gill 2006, p. 229; Karamanolis 
2006, pp. 85–126. See §IV of the Introduction and §VII of Chapter 2. 
65 Cf. Aristotle, Politics 8.5, 1340a14–18: “And since music happens to belong to things that are pleasant, and virtue 
concerns feeling enjoyment, loving, and hating correctly, we clearly ought to learn and to become habituated to 
nothing so much as to making judgments correctly and feeling enjoyment in suitable characters and noble actions” 
(ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ 
μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς 
ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν). 
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The seeds of education can only flourish and grow into fully mature virtue if the soul is already 
in a proper and sufficiently rich state to nourish it.66 Cultivation of character, which Plutarch as 
well as Aristotle identifies as the habituation of our passionate nature, must come first. It will be 
hard to be educated in virtue unless one has already been reared in one’s habits correctly 
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1179b28–1180a1).67 
 Plutarch’s insistence that the education of passions through habituation is more important 
than more advanced studies, against Xenocrates’ position, is also in line with Aristotle, who also 
emphasizes the great importance of habituated passions for the development of character: 
[T90] οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ 
πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν. 
 
To habituate someone this way or that from their youth makes no small difference, but a 
very big one, or rather all the difference. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103b23–5) 
 
To prepare the soul for virtue, parents, teachers, and instructors must first look to shaping the 
habits and passions of children.68 These habits are more important, because, if they are not in 
place, one will not be prepared for further advancement in virtue, engaging in studies of ethics or 
politics (Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095b4–6).69 
                                               
66 Cf. Tigner 2000, p. 14. 
67 “In general, it seems that passion does not yield to reason but to force. It is necessary then for the character 
that belongs to virtue to somehow already be present, namely one that feels affinity for what is noble and 
disgust for what is shameful. From one’s youth it is hard to obtain correct education toward virtue unless one 
has been reared under laws of such a kind. For to live moderately and with self-control is not pleasant to many 
people, especially the young. For this reason, it is necessary for nurture and activities to be arranged by laws, 
since what is habituated will not be painful” (ὅλως τ’ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ 
τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου 
δ’ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως 
καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ 
τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα). 
68 Cf. Sherman 1997, p. 80 and n. 111: “The bulk of the work [of habituating passions] is done early on under the 
tutelage of teachers and elders and within the context of early family life” (p. 80). 
69 “For this reason, one who is to become a sufficiently competent student concerning what is noble, just, and, in 
general, with politics, needs to have been well-trained in their habits” (διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ 
καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς). 
 
 246 
Although it might appear that Plutarch pits Aristotle against Plato on the topic of 
preparatory education, we have already seen some indications that habituation of passions plays 
an important preliminary role in character formation even within Plato’s Republic. The idea that 
habituation of passions is necessary for character formation is expressed more explicitly in 
Republic 3 (401e1–402a4), but nevertheless is present in descriptions of the early education as 
shaping the souls of the young in Republic 2 (377c3–6) and forming their characters early in life 
through habituation, as though dyeing their souls with a purple hue that is difficult to remove, in 
Republic 4 (429b8–430c6).70 Plutarch seems right on track, in fact, when he writes that reason 
and the laws first take their grip on our passionate nature in On Moral Virtue 452D3–8=[T85], 
just as the laws and standards that provide guidance are absorbed and, in a way, take hold of the 
spirited part of the soul in Republic 4’s image of dying the soul a purple hue. 
Aristotle even gives credit to Plato for the view that habituating children to take pleasure 
and feel pain correctly is preparatory and the first and primary education of the young: 
[T91] διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ 
λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ’ εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ 
πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. 
 
For this reason one ought straightway to be guided from one’s youth, as Plato says, so as 
to feel enjoyment and pain in the things that one ought to, since this is correct education. 
And moreover, if virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and pleasure and pain 
follow upon every passion and action, then for this reason virtue concerns pleasures and 
pains.     (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b11–16) 
 
Aristotle probably refers to Plato’s Laws 1–2, which are most explicit on this point. In Book 1, 
the chief point of education (κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας) centers on teaching children to have 
                                               
70 Cf. Plato, Republic 7, 522a3–9, 538a9–e4; 10, 619c6–d1. Cf. also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b11–
13, 1105a6–7. On Aristotle’s debt to Plato on the role of habituation see Lord 1982; Irwin 1999; Broadie and Rowe 
2002; and Vasiliou 2011, pp. 170–1. 
 
 247 
correct dispositions to love and hate appropriately (643c1–d3).71 The interlocutors of the Laws 
later call this education of passions, which prepares one for complete virtue in being a good 
citizen (643e5–7), the only definition of education (μόνη παιδεία, 643e4–644a272 and 2, 653C7–
873).  
Plutarch’s criticism of Xenocrates and emphasis on early education, in fact, follows 
closely the views laid out in Laws 1–2. Book 2 argues that habituation of passions to correct ends 
takes place before children understand the reasons why their dispositions to take pleasure in 
honorable and good ends are justified and their hatred for what is shameful and vicious is 
warranted: 
[T92] λέγω τοίνυν ⟨τὴν⟩74 τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ 
λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ’ εἶναι, 
φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους, εὐτυχὴς75 ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας 
παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ’ οὖν ἔστ’ ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα 
κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν· 
ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω 
δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ 
⟨τῷ⟩76 ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη ’σθ’ ἡ συμφωνία 
σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς 
ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ 
στέργειν, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν 
ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.  
                                               
71 “One ought…to attempt through play to turn the pleasures and desires of children in that direction, where they 
ought to have their end when they arrive [as virtuous adults]. We in fact define the chief point of education to be the 
correct rearing that especially leads the soul of one at play to love the thing that one ought to love when one 
becomes complete in the excellence of the matter as an adult” (χρή…πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν ἐκεῖσε τρέπειν 
τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἷ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν. κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας 
λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον 
ἄνδρ’ αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς). 
72  “But the education aimed at virtue from childhood, which makes one a desirer and lover of becoming a perfect 
citizen, and one who knows how to rule and be ruled justly, the argument, as it seems to me, sets this rearing apart 
and now would want to call this alone education” (τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν 
ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. 
ταύτην τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτ’ ἂν μόνην παιδείαν 
προσαγορεύειν). 
73 The interlocutors recapitulate their point on education: “Indeed, when these pleasures and pains have been reared 
correctly, it is education” (τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὀρθῶς τεθραμμένων ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν παιδειῶν οὐσῶν). 
74 Accepting the insertion by Richard Janko, suggested in a personal comment. 
75 Accepting the emendation by Ast from εὐτυχές, a correction that Janko also suggested independently. 




Therefore, I say that the first childhood sensations of children are experiences of pleasure 
and pain, and these are the means through which virtue and vice first come to the soul, 
while one is lucky if wisdom and securely held true beliefs come to them even with old 
age. One is a complete human being if he has acquired these and all the goods 
encompassed by them. I say, in point of fact, that education is the first emergence of 
virtue in children whenever pleasure, affection, pain and hatred first occur correctly in 
their souls even though they have not yet received them with reason, but once they have 
received reason, these feelings harmonize with reason because they have been habituated 
correctly by fitting habits. This harmony is as a whole virtue. Part of this [virtue] is being 
reared correctly concerning pleasures and pains so that one hates what one ought to hate 
straight through from beginning to end and loves what one ought to love. If you should 
separate this part off in the argument and call it education, you would call it the right 
name, as far as I see it.      (Plato, Laws 2, 653a5–c4) 
 
Habituated passions must come first. These orientations to act and feel in the right way are in 
harmony with reason, or in accordance with reason, even though we only come to understand 
later why we should love or hate what we have already become disposed to see as honorable or 
shameful from early life (2, 659d4–e5).77 
 Plutarch, then, is not pitting Aristotle against Plato, a point he would deny since he takes 
Aristotle to be part of the Platonic tradition and generally in line with Plato’s intended 
teachings.78 In any case, upon surveying Plato’s Laws, we see that Plutarch is on good Platonic 
                                               
77 “Therefore, in order that the soul of a child not be habituated to take pleasure and feel pain in things in a way that 
is contrary to the law and to those who have obey by the law, but in order that it [the soul of a child] follow together 
in taking pleasure and feeling pain in those same things as an old man, for those reasons, what we call songs, but 
what seem to me really to have become enchantments for souls, which in all seriousness aim at the kind of harmony 
that we described, but because the souls of the young are unable to endure seriousness, these are called and acted out 
as play and songs.” (ἵν’ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς 
ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ 
χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως 
μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, 
διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ 
πράττεσθαι). On the importance of play in early education cf. Saunders 1972 on Laws 1, 643c, and Meyer 2015, 
pp. 164–5. Cf. also Russell 2014, pp. 25–6. 
   Kamtekar 2010 (see esp. p. 128) and Bobonich 2010a both consider the attunement of pleasures in Plato’s Laws as 
an attempt to bring the soul to take pleasure in order, which will lead to rational appreciation of order and 
advancement in rational ascent to philosophical investigation. Cf. Aristotle, Politics 8.5, 1340a14–25. My focus in 
Plutarch’s works, however, is on the cultivation of passionate dispositions, not on further advancement in rational 
thought through the process of habituating passions, though that is no doubt part of the process that Plutarch has in 
mind for education, as is evidenced in §IV below. 
78 See n. 64 above. 
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footing and may in fact be a better interpreter of Plato’s works than his predecessor Xenocrates, 
since he has managed to draw upon both Plato’s Republic and Laws to support his position that 
passions play a fundamentally important role in preparing the soul for progress in virtue. 
 
§IV Reflection and Shame as One Becomes the Cultivator of One’s Own Passions 
In time, as children mature in reason, they not only reflect upon their reasons for action, 
but also begin to cultivate their own character by shaping their passions.79 At the beginning of On 
Listening to Lectures, Plutarch exhorts his reader to take stock of his newfound responsibility in 
forming his own character:   
[T93] σὺ δὲ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὼς ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεῷ καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι λόγῳ, 
νόμιζε τὴν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ παίδων ἀγωγὴν οὐκ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν 
ἀποβολήν, ἀλλὰ μεταβολὴν ἄρχοντος, ἀντὶ μισθωτοῦ τινος ἢ ἀργυρωνήτου θεῖον 
ἡγεμόνα τοῦ βίου λαμβάνουσι τὸν λόγον, ᾧ τοὺς ἑπομένους ἄξιόν ἐστι μόνους 
ἐλευθέρους νομίζειν. 
 
But you, since you have often heard that to follow god is the same thing as obeying 
reason, consider the training from childhood to manhood not to be a departure from its 
beginning for those who are wise, but instead a change of the ruling element; instead of a 
hired servant or silver-bought slave, they take reason as their divine guide of life, and it is 
only those who follow reason that are worthy of being considered free.   
(Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures 37D9–E4) 
 
Becoming more autonomous, Plutarch writes, is not a radical break from being habituated by 
one’s instructors. Transitioning to a more autonomous stage of life, the young man must now 
take on a greater responsibility.80 No longer is his character primarily under the tutelage and 
guidance of parent, pedagogue, or slave. A changing of the ruling power in his life (μεταβολὴ 
ἄρχοντος) recasts the rule of reason from outside himself to the reason within him. 
                                               
79 Cf. Gill 1983b, p. 470: “On becoming an adult (a process associated, in ancient thought, with the development of 
rationality), the person becomes, in principle, capable of playing a major role in his own character-formation through 
reasoned reflection and decision.” See also ibid. p. 470, n. 7. 
80 Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114b22–3: We become responsible for our own habits of virtue and vice 
(τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν). Cf. Sherman 1997, p. 78. 
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 Plutarch’s Moralia are full of advice for this stage of life when one first takes steps to 
become the cultivator and craftsman of one’s own passions and character. He advises the young 
on how they are to continue to learn and guard themselves from vice not only in On Listening to 
Lectures, but also in How a Young Man Should Read Poetry.81 In the latter case, he explicitly 
attacks the Epicureans and argues for the usefulness of poetry in moral education. Yet, at the 
same time, he implicitly argues against the psychological criticism of poetry from Plato’s 
Republic 10, since one begins to discriminate in how one allows poetry to affect one’s passions 
and dispositions.82 
For those who struggle with excessive anger, talkativeness, curiosity, or bashfulness, 
Plutarch has particular works dedicated to each of these emotions in the Moralia that provide 
methods of diagnosis and exercises to train oneself to experience emotions in their proper, 
moderate forms.83 In numerous works, including On Moral Progress, Plutarch is concerned that 
                                               
81 Perhaps also in the lost work, On How One is to Use School Exercises (no. 106 in the Lamprias Catalogue). 
82 See for instance Plutarch, How a Young Man Should Study Poetry 15D7–14: “Shall we, then, plastering over the 
ears of the young, just like the Ithacans, with some unyielding and water-resistant wax, force them, upon taking up 
their Epicurean raft, to flee and row past poetry, or rather should we stand them upright next to certain straight and 
correct reason and bind them fast to it and guide their judgment and protect it so that they are not carried away by 
delight toward what is harmful?” (πότερον οὖν τῶν νέων ὥσπερ τῶν Ἰθακησίων σκληρῷ τινι τὰ ὦτα καὶ 
ἀτέγκτῳ κηρῷ καταπλάττοντες ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτοὺς τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτιον ἀραμένους ποιητικὴν 
φεύγειν καὶ παρεξελαύνειν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀρθῷ τινι λογισμῷ καὶ παριστάντες καὶ καταδέοντες, τὴν κρίσιν, 
ὅπως μὴ παραφέρηται τῷ τέρποντι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον, ἀπευθύνωμεν καὶ παραφυλάττωμεν;) Cf. Plutarch, 
That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1092F. It may come as some surprise that Plutarch defends a view 
in which the proper training of youths can help inoculate them, so to speak, against the corrupting influences of 
poetic representations. Plutarch’s defense of poetry’s usefulness in education, especially as he defends its use against 
the psychological criticisms of poetry in Plato’s Republic 10, deserves a much longer discussion, which is outside 
the scope of this chapter and this dissertation. My own view is that Plutarch’s defense of poetry relies both on his 
view that moral virtue is a harmony between moderated passions and reason, not a mastery of passion that requires 
passions to be relatively weak, and his view that we can teach students to use discrimination to keep their own 
passions from becoming inordinate and misdirected. Cf. Neumayr 1963 and 1964; Zadorojnyi 2002; and Blank 
2011. 
83 On the Control of Anger, On Talkativeness, On Being a Busybody, and On Compliancy respectively. Plutarch also 
gives advice and instruction throughout other works, such as How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend, and Precepts of 
Marriage. Cf. Van Hoof 2010. On Plutarch’s insistence that even formal education continues to help us shape 
spirited and appetitive desires as well as to advance in knowledge, especially in the Lives, cf. Swain 1990a and 
1990b; Pelling 1990, pp. 213–44; Duff 1999, pp. 76–8; 2008; Gill 2006, pp. 412–21; Beneker 2012, pp. 70–1. 
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his audience learn to recognize their errors and track their progress as they work on developing 
virtues as far as they are able.  
Much of this advice relies, once again, on a well-attuned sense of shame, the habituated 
spirited passions established in one’s early education, in order for one to make moral 
improvement. Now, in addition to making one receptive and well-oriented to moderate one’s 
own desires and passions, a sense of shame plays a greater role in error-detection useful for self-
improvement in later stages of moral progress.84 The sting of shame should bring error to one’s 
attention, leading one to give more personal thought as to how one ought to live and shape one’s 
own habits to reflect that kind of life (On Talkativeness 510C11–E10=[T95]; On Listening to 
Lectures 46D4–13).85  
When it comes to detecting our own errors, Plutarch notes that for many individuals, the 
shameful consequences of certain types of action are not readily apparent to one before 
commiting the error. We often feel shame and regret retrospectively over what we have done. In 
such instances, shame helps us to detect error in a kind of feedback loop, indicating that that 
course led to an undesirable outcome, i.e. a shameful one. Plutarch’s advice is to commit to 
memory the negative consequences in order to avoid making the same mistakes in the future: 
[T94] ὡς γὰρ οἱ λίθῳ προσπταίσαντες ὁδοιπόροι ἢ περὶ ἄκραν ἀνατραπέντες 
κυβερνῆται, ἂν μνημονεύωσιν, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προσόμοια 
                                               
84 Konstan (2006, pp. 101–2) also argues that Aristotle bridges the divide between feeling ashamed of one’s past 
actions and attempting to make amends for one’s faults, since one becomes aware of one’s faults because of the 
shame one feels over them. Although Konstan is not as explicit on the point, I take it that he also holds that in 
Aristotle’s understanding of a sense of shame, becoming aware of our faults can be a point of error-detection used to 
make self-improvement to our character, as is the case for Plutarch. Cairns (1993, pp. 17–28) also seems to hint at 
the same use of a sense of shame for remediation of character. For a recent discussion of a sense of shame used in 
moral improvement in Aristotle’s ethics see Raymond 2017.  
   In modern psychological literature, shame was for a time considered a purely self-abasing, retrospective “dark” 
emotion with no practical or positive prospective aspect. Cf. Linsday-Hartz, De Rivera, Mascolo 1995 and Tangney 
and Dearing 2002. Against this view, more recent studies such as Ferguson, Brugman, White, Eyre 2007 and 
Deonna, Rodogno, Teroni 2012 argue for the positive, prospective use of shame for moral self-improvement. 
85 Cf. Plato, Symposium 216a4–c3, wherein Alcibiades describes how Socrates causes him to feel shame 
(αἰσχύνεσθαι) about his own moral failing and subsequently a desire to learn to make moral improvement. Cf. also 
Xenophontos 2016, pp. 13–14. 
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φρίττοντες καὶ φυλαττόμενοι διατελοῦσιν, οὕτως οἱ τὰ τῆς δυσωπίας αἰσχρὰ καὶ 
βλαβερὰ συνεχῶς τῷ μετανοοῦντι καὶ δακνομένῳ προβάλλοντες ἀντιλήψονται 
πάλιν ἑαυτῶν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ οὐ προήσονται ῥᾳδίως ὑποφερομένους. 
 
For just as travelers, after stumbling on a stone or pilots once they have capsized round a 
headland, if they put it to memory, not only continue to shudder at those events and guard 
against them, but also from those that are like them, likewise those who consistently put 
the shameful and harmful deeds of their bashfulness before their change of heart and the 
biting sting of regret they feel will recover themselves in similar circumstances and will 
not give themselves up to be carried away easily.  
      (Plutarch, On Compliancy 536C9–D5) 
 
By putting to memory the harmful and shameful outcomes of certain types of actions, just as the 
ship captain keeps in mind the antecedent signs of danger that preceded his former shipwreck, 
we can guard against (φυλάττεσθαι) future dangers and shameful outcomes. There is a fearful 
reaction, moreover, that gets instilled within us when we see the conditions that preceded the 
negative results we previously experienced: we shudder with chilling fear (φρίττοντες). The 
emotional reaction, attended by a physical reaction of a cold chill, draws our attention to possible 
impending danger in future occurrences. The painful reminders of a biting pain (δηγμός) or the 
psychic anguish of remorse (μεταμέλεια) serve as poignant deterrents and warning signs (τὰ 
σημεῖα, On Compliancy 536C5–9).86 
 Plutarch claims that we can avoid making not only those same mistakes (ἐκεῖνα), but 
even more generally others that are like them (προσόμοια). We can induce a changed orientation 
                                               
86 “We ought forcefully to hold in our memory, putting within ourselves the warning signs of the painful sting and 
remorse, storing them up and maintaining them for the greatest extent of time” (δεῖ…ἰσχυρῶς μνημονεύειν καὶ τὰ 
σημεῖα τοῦ δηγμοῦ καὶ τῆς μεταμελείας θεμένους ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀναλαμβάνειν καὶ φυλάττειν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον 
χρόνον). 
   Plutarch discusses a fault of excessive shame in On Compliancy 536C5–9, which pertains to our moral character, 
but training ourselves to avoid shameful or harmful consequences need not always involve an ethical dimension 
aimed at improving our character or even for the sake of doing a morally upright action. The analogy he draws upon 
is non-moral; ship captains and wayfarers remember mistakes to avoid painful and injurious consequences. Plutarch 
at times uses terminology associated with moral regret (μεταμέλεια) and repentance (μετάνοια) from immoral 
actions and desires in non-moral senses. To feel regret may involve no more than to wish that things had turned out 
differently, regardless of any moral implications. Cf. Plutarch, Dinner of the Seven Wise Men 163F and Cato the 
Younger 7.1.4. Cf. also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166b24–5; Curzer 2012, p. 344 n. 5. 
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to those types of action by reminding ourselves of their negative consequences of harm and 
shame, things we naturally desire to avoid. As he notes elsewhere, this requires a rational power 
of reflecting on the consequences of actions: 
[T95] τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει περιγινόμεθα, προτέρα δ’ ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν. 
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐθίζεται φεύγειν καὶ ἀποτρίβεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ μὴ δυσχεραίνει· 
δυσχεραίνομεν δὲ τὰ πάθη, ὅταν τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῷ 
λόγῳ κατανοήσωμεν….ὥστε τοῦτο πρῶτον ἴαμα καὶ φάρμακόν ἐστι τοῦ πάθους, 
ὁ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινομένων αἰσχρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν ἐπιλογισμός. 
 
For we overcome diseased passions through diagnosis and treatment, but the diagnosis is 
prior. For no one is accustomed to avoid or reject from his soul what one does not feel 
disgust toward, but we feel disgust for diseased passions whenever we understand 
through the use of reason the harm and shame that results from them.…Consequently, 
this is the first remedy and curative drug for excessive passion, namely, reflection on the 
shameful and painful effects that occur consequent to excessive passion.87  
     (Plutarch, On Talkativeness 510C11–E10) 
 
Diagnosis must occur first, since reason applies the treatment for the diseased passions of the 
soul. The strong association of shame with certain desires and actions serves as a prophylactic 
measure that triggers strong emotional warning and counter-motivation to avoid that course of 
action when the urge to act in such a way arises (On the Control of Anger 460C8–9; On the 
Obsolescence of Oracles 420E).88 Reflection that produces a diagnosis is, in fact, the first part of 
the treatment and cure for the diseased state of passionate character (πρῶτον ἴαμα καὶ 
φάρμακόν ἐστι τοῦ πάθους).  
As in a favorite Platonic craft-analogy, shame and reflection are like medical remedies 
meant to spur and bring one back to normative states (Gorgias 464a–465e and 476a–479d). The 
                                               
87 Plutarch has thus far been discussing excessive passions, pairing passion (an excessive form) with disease (νόσος) 
throughout the discussion. On this distinction see §VI in Chapter 2. 
88 In On the Control of Anger 460C8–9, the advice for those who have a disposition to react excessively in anger or 
too quickly “perhaps does not appear to be a complete cure for anger, but an evasion and prophylactic against the 
mistakes that one makes in anger” (ἴσως οὐκ ὀργῆς ἰατρεία φανεῖται, διάκρουσις δὲ καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν ἐν ὀργῇ 
τινος ἁμαρτημάτων). Plutarch’s point here is that the measures he has outlined thus far are only one means of 
treating a symptom, as he explains in 460D, but that these measures alone are only part of the treatment and will not 
completely remove the underlying causes themselves. Attributing the wrong to ignorance or error rather than to 
malevolence is given as another suggested treatment of premature wrath (On the Control of Anger 460D4–7). 
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painful procedure is part of the remedy for setting the body aright, or in the case of shame and 
guilt, these passions can act as a curative drug (φάρμακον) for the soul’s recuperation, setting it 
back in the direction of restoring balance of harmonious interrelations, even as bodily health is 
restored through a shift that rebalances its humors back into a harmonious arrangement. 
In addition, more than just remembering the associations of certain actions with shameful 
and painful results, reflective consideration (ἐπιλογισμός) allows one to draw inferences from 
causes of an action to further consequences. It is through the use of one’s own reason (τῷ λόγῳ) 
and the capacity to observe (κατανοεῖν) and reflect on (ἐπιλογίζεσθαι) cause and effect that 
one begins to work on self-diagnosis and a prescribed treatment of self-correction. Rational 
reflection (ἐπιλογισμός), then, becomes of great importance as one matures in one’s rational 
powers and naturally accompanies and becomes an essential component to our education in 
addition to habituation (On Talkativeness 514E3–4).89 
Plutarch’s view on the usefulness of shame for correction falls quite close to that of 
certain Stoics, though there is some contention among their leading figures over whether shame 
is appropriate.90 For Chrysippus and his followers, a teacher can use censure to bring to light 
elements of bad character in others, for which they feel shame (αἰσχύνη). The distress over their 
failings, presumably, is intended to spur them to correct their faults and character.91 Yet this fits 
                                               
89 “With these applications of habituation we ought always to mix in and combine attentiveness and rational 
reflection” (τούτοις δ’ ἀεὶ δεῖ καταμεμ⟨ε⟩ῖχθαι καὶ συμπεπλέχθαι τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς τὴν προσοχὴν ἐκείνην καὶ 
τὸν ἐπιλογισμόν). 
90 Cleanthes, for instance, believes that an error must be present within this feeling of distress, which would make it 
a passion that is vicious, is to be avoided, and is not helpful for virtue. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.77. Even 
Posidonius, a later Stoic, denies that anyone ever actually feels distress over the bad state of one’s character (Cicero, 
Academica 1.38). Chrysippus, however, argues that the passion can be useful for those who are not yet sages. 
Epictetus, much later, exhorts non-sages to feel distress and shame for moral progress (Discourses 3.7.27; 3.19.1; 
3.23.30 and 37; 4.9.10; 4.10.3). My discussion here of shame among the Stoics relies heavily on both Sorabji 2000, 
pp. 32 and 47–52, and Graver 2007, pp. 191–211. 
91 See Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 452C6–D1. The sage, the Stoics admit, cannot feel this emotion as he is perfect 
and in need of no correction, while the one who is not a sage may benefit from correction and repent due to 
emotional distress and remorse (Stob. 2.7.11i and 2.7.11m; cf. Seneca On Benefits 4.34). 
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uneasily with the Stoic notion that passions, which include shame, are irrational and misplace 
value. For in the case of feeling shame over one’s bad character, it certainly seems that one can 
be correct in the estimation of one’s moral standing as deficient and also be correct in seeing 
one’s state of character as what is of ultimate value, since character is what is important for 
virtue. This comes out in Chrysippus’ disagreement with Cleanthes on the correct use of shame 
(Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.77).92 Nevertheless, Chrysippus still seems to walk a fine line 
in advocating the use of shame, since even in his view one still ought not to assent to this 
emotion, even though one can use it to spur another to correct his character.93 
For Plutarch, however, even a painful emotion such as shame is not problematic for 
moral improvement. Correction of character through the use of shame fits neatly within 
Plutarch’s moral psychology and view of moral progress. As an emotion, shame can incorporate 
a correct estimation of one’s fault, since emotions need not be cognitively false for Plutarch. It 
also can serve a positive function, just like other emotions that are teleologically oriented for the 
good of the human soul, as the ox is fit for the plow and the horse for the yoke (Plutarch, On 
Moral Virtue 451D6–8). 
Plutarch, in fact, believes that a sense of shame is so vital for error-detection in youths 
that he argues they have little hope of seeking or finding a means of improving the internal 
psychic state that led to their shameful actions unless they feel a sting of pain over the 
shamefulness of their deeds (Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures 46D4–13). Even censures by 
those who do not have our best intentions in mind should be taken into consideration, then, since 
                                               
92 Drawing on the example of Alcibiades’ distress over his moral faults when confronted by Socrates, Chrysippus 
argues that Alcibiades’ distress over character is not misplaced. 
93 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.61, 68, 70, 77–8; 4.61. Cf. White 1995, who draws out this implication. Cf. also 
Sorabji 2000, p. 32 and n. 17. On the Stoic distinction between a prospective sense of shame (αἰδώς) that belongs to 
the sage and the retrospective shame (αἰσχύνη) felt over past faults or the state of one’s character see Plutarch, On 
Moral Virtue 449A2–B2; Pseudo-Andronicus, On Emotions 6=SVF 3.432. 
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they also can help us see our own faults, provided they are correct and we take them accordingly. 
Words of good counsel are preferable (βέλτιον), Plutarch notes, since we can avoid making 
mistakes in the first place (τὰς ἁμαρτίας φυλάττεσθαι). Nevertheless, censures of those who 
hate us can be put to our benefit, if they help us to diagnose our own problems and change our 
behavior (μετανοεῖν, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 74C7–D1).94 This requires some 
discernment and reflection on our part in deciding how we are to be affected by the praise and 
blame of others, deciding whether or not it is warranted and apt. 
 
§V Anchoring the Sense of Shame to Reason 
 
 Because shame is a such a powerful tool in persuading others to act or change their 
course of action, Plutarch also highlights the importance of having a firm foundation for 
discriminating the appropriateness of censure and blame. We must be discerning not only in 
determining how we receive and use the censures of our enemies, but also our loved ones whose 
advice and admonitions may still be in error. To avoid being blown about to negative effect, 
reason must become, as it were, the anchor to our passions (ὡς ἄγκιστρον ἀγκύρας), including 
the passions of shame and regret (To an Uneducated Ruler 782D7–E10; On the Control of Anger 
460A10–B10).95 Through a set of well-established reasons for action, we come to anchor our 
                                               
94 “We see even enemies make use of censures of what one has done against each other, just as Diogenes used to say 
that one who intends to be saved must have good friends or ardent enemies, since the former teach while the latter 
find our faults. But, it is better to guard against making mistakes by listening to those who give us counsel than it is 
to repent of our mistakes because of those who malign us” (τῷ δὲ ψέγειν τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κατ’ 
ἀλλήλων ὁρῶμεν χρωμένους, ὥσπερ Διογένης ἔλεγεν ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι σῴζεσθαι δεῖ φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἢ 
διαπύρους ἐχθροὺς ὑπάρχειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διδάσκουσιν, οἱ δ’ ἐλέγχουσι. βέλτιον δὲ τὰς ἁμαρτίας 
φυλάττεσθαι τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι πειθόμενον ἢ μετανοεῖν ἁμαρτόντα διὰ τοὺς κακῶς λέγοντας). 
95 To an Uneducated Ruler 782D7–E10: “‘For spirit yields and does not resist [the temptation to retaliate 
immediately], like the hook of an anchor in the sand battered by tossing waves’ [Tragicorum Graecorum 
Fragmenta, Adespota fr. 379 Kannicht and Snell] if reason does not check and press its power with weight” (“εἴκει 
γὰρ ἤδη θυμὸς οὐδ’ ἔτ’ ἀντέχει,/ θινῶδες ὡς ἄγκιστρον ἀγκύρας σάλῳ” ἂν μὴ βάρος ἔχων ὁ λογισμὸς 
ἐπιθλίβῃ καὶ πιέζῃ τὴν ἐξουσίαν). For the quotation, see also On Moral Virtue 446A11–12, where Plutarch 
likewise compares spirited reaction opposed to rational judgment as a passion unhinged from the better judgment of 
the rational part of the soul. 
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sense of shame to what we ought, so that we are not swept away or persuaded by others contrary 
to our own better judgment. 
 In several examples at the beginning of this chapter, I highlighted how shame can be used 
as a tool to lead others toward a better end. In Plutarch’s biographical work on Timoleon, we find 
that infirmity of conviction can leave one vulnerable to the manipulation of passions set to a 
worse end. Plutarch recounts that Timoleon served and protected his brother so long as he fought 
for their country, but when his brother plotted against the city and enslaved it, Timoleon slew 
him (5.1–2). Though Timoleon chose to do what was honorable, Plutarch explains, since he put 
the interests of the city above his own kin, Timoleon nonetheless later gave in to censure and 
blame from his fellow citizens, who reviled him as though he had committed an unholy and 
abominable deed (λοιδοροῦντες, ὡς ἀσεβὲς ἐξειργασμένον καὶ μυσῶδες ἔργον), and to his 
mother’s disgust for him because he killed her son, his tyrannical brother. Afterwards, Timoleon 
became despondent, full of grief, and, as Plutarch surmises, accomplished nothing of worth for a 
long period of time (5.3–4).  
 Plutarch presents Timoleon as a negative example whom we ought not to emulate: 
[T96] οὕτως αἱ κρίσεις, ἂν μὴ βεβαιότητα καὶ ῥώμην ἐκ λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας 
προσλάβωσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις, σείονται καὶ παραφέρονται ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῶν 
τυχόντων ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων ἐκκρουόμεναι τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν. 
 
And so our judgments, if they do not receive stability and strength from reason and 
philosophy toward practical ends, are shaken and are moved in the wrong direction easily 
by praise and blame from people we meet with at random, knocked out of their own 
rational calculations.      (Plutarch, Timoleon 6.1–2) 
 
Plutarch explains that Timoleon came to regret that he chose the right course of action as the 
representation of what was noble faded away (ἀπομαραινομένης τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας, 
6.4). As in the example from Demosthenes and Pericles in §I above, he was brought to a change 
of heart through passion, even against his own rational calculations, overcome with shame due to 
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the imposition of blame by others, shaken and led astray (σείονται καὶ παραφέρονται).  
In his closing remarks, Plutarch writes that standing firm with one’s choice of action 
despite blame from outside is “characteristic of perhaps a greater and more complete virtue” 
(ἴσως μείζονος καὶ τελειοτέρας ἀρετῆς ἐστι, 6.7), which Timoleon would have exemplified if 
he had been more firm in holding to his convictions.96 This higher virtue is characteristic of a 
soul that has been trained to hold fast to correct convictions that have been reflected upon and 
informed by philosophical investigation (ἐκ λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, Timoleon 6.1–2=[T96] and 
6.497). The early childhood training in shame is not sufficient but must be further developed 
through reflection and higher education if we are to steel ourselves against emotional 
manipulation and develop a more stable character.98  
We must become adept at guiding our actions through practical wisdom (φρόνησις), the 
optimal state of practical reason (πρακτικὸς λόγος, On Moral Virtue 444A3–B1),99 to develop a 
                                               
96 Plutarch presents an example of this higher virtue with Metellus in Marius 29.8–9. Marius and Saturninus set a 
trap for Metellus: they try to incur hatred against Metellus, knowing that he would refuse to abide by the additional 
clause of a proposed agrarian law, which would require the members of the Senate to take an oath binding them to 
follow without opposition whatever the people decided by vote (Marius 29.1–8). Metellus, as expected, refused to 
take the oath. Metellus thereafter is sentenced to punishment and though his friends beg him to change his mind and 
swear the oath, “remaining steadfast in his character and preparing to suffer everything dreadful on the condition 
that he committed no shameful deed, he departed from the forum, saying to those around him that to do an evil deed 
is base and to do something honorable when there is no risk is common, but to do honorable deeds in the midst of 
dangers is a quality peculiar to a good man” (ἐμμένων τῷ ἤθει καὶ πᾶν παθεῖν δεινὸν ἐπὶ τῷ μηθὲν αἰσχρὸν 
ἐργάσασθαι παρεσκευασμένος, ἀπῆλθεν ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς, διαλεγόμενος τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ κακόν τι 
πρᾶξαι φαῦλον εἴη, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μέν, ἀκινδύνως δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον δ’ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ 
καλὰ πράσσειν). Metellus thus exemplifies a steadfast, stable commitment to what he sees as honorable, in spite of 
censure, dangers, and punishment. Plutarch provides another example in On Brotherly Love 484B, where 
Athenodorus is praised for being generous to his brother, even though his brother squandered his half of the 
inheritance. Athenodorus divides his own portion equally with his brother without vexation or a later change of heart 
(μετάνοια), despite the potential shame he could incur for helping his brother. 
97 See n. 100 below. 
98 See Plutarch, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 52F5–7: “Thus was Plato of such a character in Syracuse as 
he was in the Academy, and toward Dionysius he was the same in character as toward Dion” (οὕτω καὶ Πλάτων ἐν 
Συρακούσαις οἷος ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ, καὶ πρὸς Διονύσιον οἷος πρὸς Δίωνα). Cf. How to Tell a Flatterer from a 
Friend 52A1–5, 11–12. Stability as a key component of virtuous character is often revealed by contrast with 
instability of character in Plato. Cf. Lysis 214d; Republic 1, 352a; 7, 535a–538e; and Gorgias 481e. Among the 
Stoics, stable character is not led astray by the persuasion of false impressions but holds fast to convictions of what 
is good or bad. Cf. Epictetus, Discourses 2.22.6 and 25. For a general discussion on the importance of character 
stability in virtue ethics see Kamtekar 2004, esp. pp. 482–3. 
99 =[T47] in Chapter 3. See Chapter 3, §I. 
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stable policy that guides our actions (προαίρεσις, Timoleon 6.4).100 The same would be true for 
any soul so lucky as to be well-endowed with good and ordinate passions from birth. As we will 
see in Plutarch’s metaphor of cultivating plants in the following chapter, even such “natural 
virtue” would be insufficient, since it provides good potential for development but can easily be 
corrupted toward vice as well as cultivated for virtue.101 
*** 
 By focusing on the positive contributions that spirited emotions make in Plutarch’s view 
of ethical education, I hope to have illumined yet another motivation for Plutarch’s positive 
evaluation of non-rational passions. In addition to adding drive and enhancing action, non-
rational passions, particularly spirited emotions, also serve an important role in providing a 
naturally good disposition to advance toward virtue (εὐφυΐα), which we can use to develop good 
character. Not only do passions lie at the beginning of our journey on the path to virtue, making 
them crucial to our early education, but they also help us to continue on that path and to continue 
to make progress toward virtue. 
                                               
100 Plutarch describes stable policy for action as arising from knowledge and calculation (ἡ δ᾿ ἐξ ἐπιστήμης 
ὡρμημένη καὶ λογισμοῦ προαίρεσις). See the following note on the connection with Aristotle’s view. 
101 The notion of natural virtue crops up in Plutarch’s Beasts are Rational, where Gryllus, Odysseus’ former 
comrade turned into a pig endowed with speech by Circe, argues that animals are superior to humans because they 
naturally exhibit virtuous actions without being taught or habituated (987A–B and F). Yet even Gryllus in that 
passage notes that animals can be corrupted (987D–E). This brings the discussion of natural virtue in this text close 
to the Aristotelian conception in Politics 7.13, 1332A40–B3, where Aristotle describes natural virtue more as a 
natural disposition that is indeterminate and able to be shaped toward virtue or corrupted toward vice. In 
Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b1–1145a11, Aristotle distinguishes natural virtue from virtue in the full sense, 
which requires practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and knowledge to produce stable policy that guides actions 
(προαίρεσις). Cf. ibid. 3.8, 1116b24–1117a1. For further discussion of natural virtue in Aristotle’s works cf. also 
Sorabji 1973, esp. pp. 120–2; White 1992; Pakaluk 1992, esp. pp. 176–7; Kamtekar 2004, p. 480; Dominick 2006; 
Curzer 2012, pp. 341–66. Cf. Plato, Laws 6, 765e3–766a4, which describes natural virtue as a certain passionate 
endowment useful for moving toward virtue. In Plato’s Republic (7, 518d–e), however, the so-called virtues from 
one’s early education come about through teaching and habituation, not on their own. In the Laches (197a–b), virtue 









 We have already explored a number of arguments and several vivid metaphors that 
Plutarch uses to highlight his positive evaluation of passions. In the first section of this chapter, 
we will explore Plutarch’s metaphor of cultivating passions. Like a field that is fertile for the 
cultivation of a fruitful crop, the human soul is full of different passions that can be developed 
toward virtue. Yet, also like a field full of different kinds of growth, there are weeds that can 
overshadow and choke out fruit-bearing crops, i.e. natural inclinations toward vice within our 
passionate nature that can stifle the good passions from being fully developed in the right 
manner. The formation of virtuous character, then, requires the cultivation of passions, 
promoting the growth of good passions that lead to virtue while removing or curbing bad 
inclinations and passions that lead to corruption and vice. In this metaphor, Plutarch highlights 
the good aspects of our passionate nature that contain the potential to grow and develop virtue as 
their fruit (§I). 
 Together with this plant metaphor, Plutarch, in contrast with a number of his 
predecessors, including Plato, identifies certain passions as the seeds of virtue. The passion of 
affection (φιλοστοργία) plays a particularly important role for Plutarch as the seed that bears the 
fruit of justice. Drawing on the model of Stoic οἰκείωσις, Plutarch describes the foundations of 
our social lives with the seed of affection. Starting with affection between parents and offspring, 
we begin to identify with other human beings more generally in an outward extension, sharing 
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others’ cares and concerns. Unlike in the Stoic account, a non-rational passion initiates this 
outward movement and permeates all of our human social relations (§II–§III). 
 In the final section of this chapter (§IV), I argue that Plutarch appropriates a form of 
οἰκείωσις from the Stoics and unites it with the Platonic ideal of becoming like god (ὁμοίωσις 
τῷ θεῷ). In the process of adapting these theories into his own philosophical worldview, he 
places passions at the center of moral progress and incorporates them into the good life. First, by 
modifying a form of οἰκείωσις from what we find in the Stoics, Plutarch indicates that passions 
are fundamental to moral development from our inception and through all social interactions up 
to the formation of just relations with others. This form of affiliation and identification corrects 
the shortcomings of the Stoic model for Plutarch, since it allows for genuine concern for others 
through emotional vulnerability, unlike the isolation and alienation from others and from one’s 
passionate nature that Plutarch criticizes as the Stoic goal of becoming an invulnerable Stoic sage 
(Chapter 1). Though the non-rational passion of affection initiates our affiliation and 
identification with others, it is insufficient to account for how humans become fully virtuous. 
For the fulfillment of human nature, Plutarch adapts a form of the Platonic goal in which 
human nature becomes complete in becoming like god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ). Far from holding 
that becoming like god entails “flight” from this world or becoming other-worldly, as some 
interpretations of both Plato’s dialogues and his followers suggest, Plutarch holds that we 
become like god while remaining fully human as moral agents. This includes maintaining and 
developing our passionate nature. For Plutarch, becoming like god involves practical action and 
engagement with this world, attempting, like the Demiurge in the Timaeus, to make the world the 





§I Character Formation and the Metaphor of Cultivation 
 As we will explore in this section, Plutarch understands the human propensity to pursue 
virtue as growing from our passionate nature, like plants in fertile soul.1 Before discussing the 
positive features of this metaphor and the natural goodness for growth and development toward 
virtue (εὐφυΐα), we will look at several passages in which Plutarch highlights the ambivalence 
of our early nature that can grow to be fruitful for virtue or stifled by weeds that lead to vice. 
  
§I.a. Cultivating Virtue: Plant Metaphors, Passions, and Pruning the Desire for Honor 
 Together with a natural aptitude and sensitivity to develop our nature toward virtue, 
evidenced by the goodness to grow toward virtue (εὐφυΐα),2 Plutarch holds that we also have 
natural tendencies to become vicious. “Human nature” (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις), Plutarch writes, 
“does not produce any character indisputably oriented toward virtue” (οὐδ᾿ ἀναμφισβήτητον 
εἰς ἀρετὴν ἦθος γεγονὸς ἀποδίδωσιν, Cimon 2.5). Progress in virtue (προκοπή) occurs 
between the starting-point (ἀρχή) of our naturally good potential to develop toward virtue 
(εὐφυΐα) and its fulfillment (τέλος, Table-Talk 636B2–6),3 but that natural process is no 
guarantee of success.  
 Our passionate nature is, as Plutarch frequently describes it, a field full of different kinds 
of plants. Certain passions and natural impulses blossom into virtue while others, like weeds, 
                                               
1 See Ray 2010 for a brief overview on the centrality of farming in the literatures of Greece and Rome and the 
frequent use of farming as a metaphor in reflections on human nature and virtue. 
2 See Plutarch, Bravery of Women 249C7–11=[T84] in Chapter 5. See also the discussion of εὐφυΐα and spirited 
emotions in Chapter 5, including n. 20. 
3 Discussing the proverbial question of whether the chicken or the egg came first, Plutarch’s interlocutor, Firmus, 
says, “And in general the starting-point is first and the seed is the starting-point, but the egg is larger than the seed 
but smaller than the animal, for, as progress seems to be between goodness of natural growth and virtue, so is the 
egg a certain progress of the nature toward the ensouled being from the seed that is progressing” (καθόλου δ’ ἡ μὲν 
ἀρχὴ πρῶτον, ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ σπέρμα, τὸ δ’ ᾠὸν σπέρματος μὲν πλέον, ζῴου δὲ μικρότερον· ὡς γὰρ ἡ προκοπὴ 
μέσον εὐφυΐας εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἀρετῆς, οὕτω τὸ ᾠὸν προκοπή τίς ἐστι τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σπέρματος πορευομένης). Cf. Roskam 2004a. 
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lead to the corruption of the garden’s fruitful crop. Our souls need cultivation to protect and 
promote the right kinds of passions while, as it were, weeding out and stifling vicious 
inclinations and bad growth. 
 On the ambivalent potential of one’s passionate nature, the characters of Alcibiades and 
Marcius Coriolanus serve as poignant examples in Plutarch’s Lives. Although Alcibiades was 
full of promise in his nature to develop a virtuous character (πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐα, Alcibiades 
4.1),4 Socrates nonetheless failed to counteract the negative aspects of Alcibiades’ passionate 
nature, since his nature was full of bad impulses as well as good (Alcibiades 2.1). Socrates 
approached Alcibiades like a farmer: 
[T97] οἷος ἦν ἀμύνειν καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν ὥσπερ φυτὸν ἐν ἄνθει τὸν οἰκεῖον καρπὸν 
ἀποβάλλον καὶ διαφθεῖρον. 
 
He [Socrates] intended to ward off [flatterers and corrupting influences] and not to allow 
him [Alcibiades], like a plant in bloom, to cast off his own fruit and lose it.  
        (Plutarch, Alcibiades 4.1) 
 
Despite these efforts to cultivate and protect Alcibiades, like a plant with great potential to 
blossom into an upright character, the negative aspects of Alcibiades’ nature overcame the good, 
and the roots of corruption won out in the end.5  
 Plutarch characterizes Marcius Coriolanus similarly, relating that he was born with a 
nature full of potential for great good as well as great corruption: 
[T98] ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ ἐμαρτύρησε καὶ τοῖς τὴν φύσιν ἡγουμένοις, ἐὰν οὖσα γενναία καὶ 
ἀγαθὴ παιδείας ἐνδεὴς γένηται, πολλὰ τοῖς χρηστοῖς ὁμοῦ φαῦλα συναποτίκτειν, 
ὥσπερ εὐγενῆ χώραν ἐν γεωργίᾳ θεραπείας μὴ τυχοῦσαν. 
 
The same man also gave evidence to those who consider that nature, if it lacks education, 
even if it is noble and good, produces a great deal that is bad along with what is good, 
like a fertile plot of soil that fails to get any agricultural cultivation.    
                                               
4 “Socrates’ love was a great witness to the boy’s natural propensity to grow toward virtue” (ὁ δὲ Σωκράτους 
ἔρως μέγα μαρτύριον ἦν τῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐας τοῦ παιδός), i.e. Socrates’ interest in Alcibiades was proof 
that he recognized in Alcibiades’ nature a great potential to grow toward virtue. 
5 On Alcibiades’ corruption by other would-be lovers (ἐρασταί) in Plutarch cf. Lucchesi 2013. 
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       (Plutarch, Coriolanus 1.3) 
 
As with Alcibiades, Coriolanus’ fertile nature revealed the ambivalence present in how one’s 
character can develop.6 Without proper education and rearing, like an untilled plot of soil, the 
soul is ripe for vice as well as virtue. 
 More generally, in Dialogue on Love, we are told that the gods do not ensure that the 
rearing and education of children and boys leads on a straight path to virtue without a caretaker 
(κηδεμών) to guard the best part within them from corruption: 
[T99] μειρακίων δ’ ἄρα καὶ παίδων ἐν ὥρᾳ καὶ ἄνθει πλαττομένων καὶ ῥυθμιζομένων 
τροφαὶ καὶ αὐξήσεις οὐδενὶ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων προσήκουσιν, οὐδ’ ἔστιν ᾧ μέλει 
φυόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἀρετὴν ὀρθὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ μὴ παρατραπῆναι μηδὲ 
κλασθῆναι τὸ γενναῖον ἐρημίᾳ κηδεμόνος ἢ κακίᾳ τῶν προστυγχανόντων. 
 
The nurture and growth of boys and children when they are being shaped and trained in 
their due season and at the time of their blossoming does not belong to any god or divine 
spirit, nor does it belong to any one of them to take concern over whether a human, in the 
process of growing toward virtue, comes to it on a straight path without deviating nor that 
the noble part of him is not crushed for lack of a caretaker or due to the vice of those 
whom one encounters.   (Plutarch, Dialogue on Love 757F3–759A2) 
 
The noble portion of our nature (τὸ γενναῖον) must be protected, like a young plant, and 
allowed to grow toward virtue (φυόμενον εἰς ἀρετήν), since, once again, the presence of a good 
nature does not assure success without cultivation and a cultivator. The gods do not guarantee 
that human souls produce a crop of virtue without toil, unlike the Cyclopean fields that give their 
fruit without planting or sowing due to divine blessing (Beasts are Rational 986F1–B10).7 
                                               
6 Cf. also Demetrius 1.7, where Plutarch remarks that Plato’s saying “that great natures produce great vices even as 
they do virtues” (ὅτι καὶ κακίας μεγάλας, ὥσπερ ἀρετάς, αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις ἐκφέρουσι) shown in Demetrius 
and Antony. For the saying, Plutarch seems to have in mind Plato, Republic 6, 491d4–492a5. Cf. Duff 1999, p. 48. 
7 In his argument with Gryllus, Odysseus’s former comrade turned into a pig and endowed with speech, Odysseus 
concedes that if the souls of beasts produce virtue without toil, cultivation, or hard work, they would be in a 
preferable and superior state over humans who must work to develop their passions toward virtue. In the passage, 
Gryllus asserts: “The soul of beasts…without commands and untaught, as though unsown and unploughed, naturally 
produces and makes to grow the virtue that befits each” (ἡ τῶν θηρίων ψυχή… ἀνεπίτακτος γὰρ καὶ ἀδίδακτος 
ὥσπερ ἄσπορος καὶ ἀνήροτος ἐκφέρει καὶ αὔξει κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἑκάστῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν). Their 
nature, Gryllus argues, produces virtue like the Cyclopean fields and unlike the rough terrain of Odysseus’ home in 
Ithaca, which, like the human soul, requires arduous cultivation. See also §VII of Chapter 4. 
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Guiding souls to grow in virtue is a human endeavor. The cultivation of the human soul must be 
undertaken with foresight and diligence, tending to the young to promote the right kind of 
growth through education and good upbringing (Lycurgus and Numa 4.4–58 and Numa 6.2–49). 
 Plutarch also interweaves images of medical intervention with the metaphor of 
cultivating passions. In addition to the pruning of passions to grow in the right direction, the hard 
work of cultivating the passionate part of the soul partially consists in weeding out the field of 
bad impulses and desires, like a medical practitioner removing diseased tissue with a knife: 
[T100] ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς ἄγριον μὲν ἐκκόπτων βλάστημα καὶ ἀγεννὲς αὐτόθεν ἀφειδῶς 
ἐμβαλὼν τὸ σκαφεῖον ἀνέτρεψε τὴν ῥίζαν ἢ πῦρ προσαγαγὼν ἐπέκαυσεν, ἀμπέλῳ 
δὲ προσιὼν τομῆς δεομένῃ καὶ μηλέας ἤ τινος ἐλαίας ἁπτόμενος εὐλαβῶς 
ἐπιφέρει τὴν χεῖρα, δεδιὼς μή τι τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος ἀποτυφλώσῃ, οὕτως ὁ 
φιλόσοφος φθόνον μὲν ἐξαιρῶν νέου ψυχῆς, ἀγεννὲς βλάστημα καὶ 
δυστιθάσευτον, ἢ φιλαργυρίαν ἄωρον ἢ φιληδονίαν ἐπικόπτων ἀκόλαστον 
αἱμάσσει καὶ πιέζει καὶ τομὴν ποιεῖ καὶ οὐλὴν βαθεῖαν· ὅταν δὲ τρυφερῷ μέρει 
ψυχῆς καὶ ἁπαλῷ κολούοντα προσαγάγῃ λόγον, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ δυσωπούμενον καὶ 
διατρεπόμενον, εὐλαβεῖται μὴ λάθῃ τούτοις συναποκόψας τὸ αἰδούμενον. 
 
For as the farmer when cutting out wild and bad growth rips up the root on the spot by 
unsparingly pushing the spade into the ground or burns it up by applying fire to it, but 
when he comes to a vine that needs to be pruned and grabs hold of some apple tree or 
olive tree, he carefully puts his hand upon it for fear lest he cut some bud out of what is 
healthy, in the same way the philosopher when he removes envy from the soul of a young 
man, a bad and hard-to-manage growth, or when he cuts out the unbridled love of wealth 
and addiction to pleasure, he draws blood, presses hard, and makes a cut and deep scar, 
but whenever he applies a word of discipline to the soft and delicate part of the soul, such 
as what becomes compliant and bashful, he is careful not to unknowingly cut out together 
with these [compliancy and bashfulness] a sense of shame.   
(Plutarch, On Compliancy 529A10–C2)  
 
                                               
8 “And when a wise man receives the office of rule from a people recently brought together and resistant toward 
nothing, what was the first thing that was appropriate for him to be zealous about other than the upbringing and 
training of children and youths, namely, to see to it that there should be no confusing differences in their characters, 
but that they, being molded and shaped from the beginning, would walk together with one another on one common 
path of virtue straightway from the beginning?” (ἀνδρὶ δὲ σοφῷ βασιλείαν παραλαβόντι δήμου νεωστὶ 
συνισταμένου καὶ πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντιτείνοντος, περὶ τί πρῶτον ἦν σπουδάσαι προσῆκον ἢ παίδων ἐκτροφὴν 
καὶ νέων ἄσκησιν, ὅπως μὴ διάφοροι μηδὲ ταραχώδεις γένοιντο τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἕν τι κοινὸν ἀρετῆς 
ἴχνος εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τυπούμενοι συμβαίνοιεν ἀλλήλοις;) 
9 To the wise man, rulership offers the opportunity to cultivate virtues among the people, like a field ripe for noble 
and great deeds (ἀνδρὶ φρονίμῳ πράξεων καλῶν καὶ μεγάλων οὖσαν χώραν). 
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Both the farmer and doctor alike promote growth of what is fruitful and healthy by removing 
what starves out good growth (To an Uneducated Ruler 779F3–610).11 Vice, as Plutarch explains 
elsewhere, is like a festering cancer that works to pervert one’s character as a whole, leading one 
down a path antithetical to that of virtuous development.12 Like farming and medicine, 
cultivation of passions is an art (τέχνη) aimed at guiding and promoting the development of the 
right kind of character.13 
                                               
10 “But reason derived from philosophy, when it becomes established as the counselor and guardian of a ruler, 
removing what is dangerous from his power, just as though removing what is dangerous from a good condition, it 
leaves health behind [within him]” (ὁ δ’ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας τῷ ἄρχοντι πάρεδρος καὶ φύλαξ ἐγκατοικισθεὶς 
λόγος, ὥσπερ εὐεξίας τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ ἐπισφαλὲς ἀφαιρῶν, ἀπολείπει τὸ ὑγιαῖνον). 
11 Cf. Philo, On the Life of Abraham 220–3: Bad passions grow and choke out what is healthy in the soul. As White 
(2008, p. 292, n. 52) notes, Philo’s use of παρευημερεῖν in this passage evokes the imagery of a tree or weed that 
grows up over and blocks other plants from the sun’s rays. In the allegorical interpretation of Genesis 9.20 in On 
Agriculture 9–18, Philo also takes Noah to have become a farmer of the soul who weeds out evil desires and 
passions. Cf. also the Parable of the Sower in the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew 13.1–9 and 18–23; Mark 4.1–9 and 
13–20; Luke 8.4–8 and 11–15), where worries, the deception of wealth, and other desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) are described 
as thorny weeds (ἄκανθαι) that choke out (συμ-/ἀπο- πνίγειν) good growth. 
12 Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse Than Those of the Body; On Listening to Lectures 39D8–10 (quoted 
in n. 25 below), 43D3–44B5: “If something within oneself causes distress and is in need of urgent attention, namely 
a passion or disease that needs to be pressed down or assuaged” ([ἂν] τι τῶν ἰδίων ἐνοχλῇ καὶ κατεπείγῃ πάθος 
ἐπισχέσεως δεόμενον ἢ νόσημα παρηγορίας, 43D7–8), one ought to treat it (θεραπεύειν, 43D11), since these 
passions are like festering sores (ὕπουλοι, 44A9). Cf. On Listening to Lectures 46E1–47A10; On the Delays of the 
Divine Vengeance 551D4–8: “The nobility of their souls, though it is strong and not faded in its natural roots, gives 
bloom to vice contrary to their nature, since the nobility of their nature has been corrupted by bad nurturing and bad 
company, but thereafter, if this nobility in some is well attended to medically, it takes back its fitting stable 
disposition” (τὸ γενναῖον ὡς ἰσχυρὸν αὐταῖς καὶ οὐκ ἐξίτηλον ἐμπέφυκεν, ἐξανθεῖ δὲ τὴν κακίαν παρὰ 
φύσιν ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ ὁμιλίας φαύλης φθειρόμενον, εἶτα θεραπευθὲν ἐνίοις καλῶς ἀπολαμβάνει τὴν 
προσήκουσαν ἕξιν). Cf. also On Love=Sandbach frr. 134–36 (Stob. 4.20.34 and 4.20.68): The root of the passion 
of ἔρως (ῥίζωσις τοῦ πάθους) is not found in sight or in spending time together with a beloved (fr. 134). Its 
beginning is a desire (τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι). Yet we have some responsibility in how we allow the seed 
of ἔρως to take root and grow within our souls. Concerning certain forms of ἔρως that are excessive and 
misdirected “it would be best not to receive the seed and starting-point of such a passion from the beginning, but if it 
is generated within, go to the altars of the apotropaic gods, as Plato says, go to converse and spend time with wise 
men, drive the beast out of yourself before its claws and fangs grow. Failing that, you will war against the evil in its 
final form, taking this child and infant into the fold of your arms. And what are the claws and fangs of love? 
Suspicion, jealousy” (διὸ κράτιστον μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιούτου πάθους σπέρμα μὴ παραδέχεσθαι μηδ᾿ ἀρχήν· ἂν 
δ᾿ ἐγγένηται, ἴθι ἐπὶ ἀποτροπαίων βωμοὺς θεῶν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν 
συνουσίας, ἐξέλασον αὑτοῦ τὸ θηρίον πρὶν ὄνυχας φῦσαι καὶ ὀδόντας· εἰ δὲ μή, μαχέσῃ τελείῳ κακῷ, τὸ 
παιδίον τοῦτο καὶ νήπιον ἐναγκαλιζόμενος. τίνες δ᾿ εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνυχες καὶ ὀδόντες; ὑποψία, 
ζηλοτυπία, fr. 136). See also n. 106 in Chapter 2. 
13 Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 149e1–4: “Do you suppose that the cultivation and harvesting of crops from the soil belongs 
to the same art as the discernment of what type of soil a certain type of plant and seed must be sown into or do you 
think it belongs to another one?” (τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης οἴει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ 
γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὖ τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;). Cf. Plato, 
Euthydemus 291e8–a2. Cf. also Philo, who refers to the art of farming (τέχνη γεωργική) in On the Creation of the 
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The other point that comes at the end of the quotation is how important it is to preserve 
the roots of one’s sense of shame (τὸ αἰδούμενον) along with other useful passions that are 
developed into virtuous dispositions. This fits, once more, with Plutarch’s view that the sign of a 
natural propensity to develop in virtue (εὐφυΐα) is the presence of an appropriate sense of shame 
and desire for honor (Bravery of Women 249C7–11(=[T84] in Chapter 5)), the noble portion (τὸ 
γενναῖον) of our passionate nature that we should preserve and whose growth we should foster 
(Dialogue on Love 757F3–759A2=[T99]). This passion is so vital to our development that 
Plutarch considers its protection and correct formation to be the most important aspect and 
foundation to our education in virtue (On Moral Virtue 452D8–12=[T87] in Chapter 5). He even 
writes that a soul that loses its sense of shame is like a calloused bit of flesh that cannot be 
brought back to health (On Listening to Lectures 46D4–13). 
We can lose (ἀπολλύειν) the strength and health of this sense of shame through neglect 
and corruption (On Listening to Lectures 46E5; cf. Coriolanus 1.214). Alternatively, if it grows 
incorrectly, even this noble part of the soul can “give bloom to vice contrary to its nature by 
being corrupted due to bad upbringing and influence” (ἐξανθεῖ δὲ τὴν κακίαν παρὰ φύσιν 
ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ ὁμιλίας φαύλης φθειρόμενον, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 
551D5–6). 
 Promotion of good growth sometimes involves not only protecting the noble portion (τὸ 
γενναῖον) of our passionate nature, but also pruning (τομή) certain passions of that noble 
portion to grow in the right direction (On Compliancy 529A10–C2=T[100]). In some 
individuals, Plutarch notes, especially those with vigorous natures in their youth (Precepts of 
                                               
World 81, That the Worse Attacks the Better 104, 105, 109, 111, On Agriculture 4, 7, 20, 181, On Noah’s Work as a 
Planter 1, 94; On the Migration of Abraham 55; and On Flight and Finding 170. 
14 Base men (φαῦλοι) are perverted in their nature and corrupt due to neglect (ὡς ἀμελείᾳ διαφθείρουσα). 
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Statecraft 819F2–820A2),15 one’s desire for honor must be pruned like plants that are prone to 
overtake their due space in one’s garden of passions, since the desire for honor can be 
overpowering and prevail over one’s other passions (πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν, Cimon 
17.9). In the examples of both Alcibiades and Coriolanus, for instance, a desire for honor and 
ambition (φιλοτιμία) inspired not only valiant deeds, but also, in excess, led to vice. Alcibiades’ 
corrupt character, in fact, developed from his strong impulses toward competitiveness and his 
ambition for supremacy, which grew excessive at the expense of a true sense of honor and 
moderation (Alcibiades 2.1).16 As Plutarch writes elsewhere, one’s love of reputation can cloud 
and confuse one’s view of what is actually honorable (τὸ καλόν): 
[T101] τὸ δ’ ἄγαν πανταχοῦ μὲν ἐπισφαλές, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πολιτικαῖς φιλοτιμίαις ὀλέθριον. 
ἐκφέρει γὰρ εἰς μανίαν καὶ παραφροσύνην ὕπαιθρον ἐξουσίας μεγάλης 
ἐπιλαβομένους, ὅταν μὴ τὸ καλὸν ἔνδοξον εἶναι θέλωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὸν ἡγῶνται τὸ 
ἔνδοξον εἶναι. 
 
Excess is dangerous everywhere, but in political ambitions, it is deadly. For, out in the 
view of all, it brings those who lay hold of great power to madness and folly whenever 
they do not desire what is honorable to be glorious, but suppose that what is glorious is 
good.       (Plutarch, Agis and Cleomenes 2.2) 
 
Such a misguided view of honor develops as one becomes addicted to praise and reputation, 
taking these to be good and desirable in themselves, not as a sign that one’s deeds are noble and 
an indication of one’s virtue (Agis and Cleomenes 1.1 and 2.1).17  
 Taken correctly, however, praise can be confirmation of one’s development of virtue and 
                                               
15 The desire for honor (φιλοτιμία) that is full of daring (τολμᾶν) “is not innate in sluggish or humble characters, 
but in those that are especially strong and youthful in their zeal” (ἐμφύεται γὰρ οὐκ ἀργαῖς οὐδὲ ταπειναῖς ἀλλ’ 
ἐρρωμέναις μάλιστα καὶ νεανικαῖς προαιρέσεσι). This passion can become hard-to-manage 
(δυσμεταχείριστον) and difficult-to-control (ἀκατάσχετον) if not attended to early on in one’s youth. On 
προαίρεσις as equivalent to σπουδή here see LSJ, s.v. προαίρεσις, 8. 
16 “Though he was by nature full of many great passions, the strongest was his love of victory and his ambition for 
supremacy” (φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ 
φιλόπρωτον). 
17 Plutarch remarks at the beginning of Coriolanus that such a confusion is evident even in the Romans’ use of virtus 
for virtue, which hints at the Roman fixation on manliness, victory, and courage (ἀνδρεία) as the preeminent and 
central cases of human virtue (1.4). 
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can kindle one’s growth toward virtue (αὔξονται ἐπαιρόμεναι, Agis and Cleomenes 2.3).18 The 
love of honor (φιλοτιμία) is even listed as one of the “grips of philosophy” (On Moral Virtue 
452D3–8).19 Additionally, other spirited emotions associated with the love of honor, including 
the love of competition (τὸ φιλόνεικον) and rivalry (ζῆλος), can be used as an incentive to 
virtue (ὑπέκκαυμα τῆς ἀρετῆς, Agesilaus 5.3–4),20 as I discussed in Chapter 3 with the 
following examples: one’s competition for honor can be channeled into a greater drive to better 
oneself, like horses that run faster when yoked together than when alone, we can be encouraged 
by the partnership in the race to do good deeds and become virtuous individuals (Pelopidas 
19.4). One can even enter into rivaly with oneself (ζῆλος αὑτοῦ),21 which can be directed 
entirely toward one’s own moral progress without resorting to a comparison of oneself with 
others (How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 72D2–4).22 Rivarly with oneself avoids the 
temptation to convert one’s competitive desire toward virtue into a desire simply to surpass 
others.23 As we will see below, Plutarch envisions another innocuous form of emulation beyond 
self-rivalry; one makes moral progress through emulation of the divine. 
 These emotions are useful and motivating, but, as we have already seen, they are 
nonetheless capable of dangerous excess and inappropriate focus.24 The desire for honor, for 
                                               
18 Quoting Theophrastus (fr. 467 Fortenbaugh), Plutarch writes that “the virtues…are confirmed by praises, and 
grow in the future, being kindled with pride” (αἱ ἀρεταὶ… ἐκβεβαιοῦνται τοῖς ἐπαίνοις, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν 
αὔξονται μετὰ φρονήματος ἐπαιρόμεναι). 
19 =[T85] in Chapter 5. See also §I.a–§I.c in Chapter 5. 
20 Cf. On Moral Virtue 452B4–6, which is discussed in Chapter 3, n. 60. 
21 See Plutarch, Caesar 58.4, which is discussed further in Chapter 3, n. 62. 
22 =[T56] in Chapter 3. I discuss these points and the examples in §V of Chapter 3 and §VI of Chapter 4. 
23 Cf. Plutarch, Alcibiades 2.1, quoted in n. 16 above. I discuss other perversions of the desire for honor below. 
24 In Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Politics 786C–D, 791C, 793D, and 794A, Plutarch criticizes excessive 
ambition in older individuals who engage in politics and argues that it is inappropriate in the old in Lucullus 38.3, 
Marius 2.4, 34.6, 45.10–12; Marcellus 28.6; Flamininus 20.1–2. Cf. also On Moral Virtue 447D2–E1, where 
Plutarch describes psychic conflict when a passion such as “ambition, love of strife, desire for favor, jealousy, or 
fear opposes reason” (πρὸς λογισμὸν …φιλοτιμίας ἢ φιλονεικίας ἢ χάριτος ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ δέους 
ἀντιβαίνοντος). In each of these cases, the passion opposing rational calculation is in error and excessive. See §VI 
of Chapter 2 and §I of Chapter 4. 
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instance, can be twisted and give bloom to a bad and good-for-nothing passion such as envy 
(φθόνος, On Listening to Lectures 39D8–10),25 since it results from an inappropriate desire for 
repute and unjust desire for honor (ἐκ φιλοδοξίας ἀκαίρου καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἀδίκου, On 
Listening to Lectures 39E8–11). The overly-quarrelsome disposition brought on by unhealthy 
competition can lead to unnecessary strife within the state, and rivalry that rouses an unhealthy 
love of strife belongs to vice (τὸ φιλόνεικον τῆς κακίας, How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 
72D5–7). To keep this spirited passion from growing beyond its proper bounds and in the wrong 
direction, Plutarch recommends that we moderate this desire for honor (παραμυθώμεθα τὴν 
φιλοτιμίαν, Precepts of Statecraft 820A2–B126; Coriolanus 1.527). As Plutarch remarks 
regarding Alexander’s great ambition, like Alcibiades’ and Coriolanus’, controlling these 
emotions is “the work of many bridling bits as well as rudders” (πολλῶν χαλινῶν ἔργον 
οἰάκων θ’ ἅμα).28 In Alexander’s case, Philip sought Aristotle not only to steer Alexander’s 
passions, but also to curb them from excess and to foster the right kind of growth for the 
development of good character (Alexander 17.1–229).30 
                                               
25 “Envy combined with malignity and enmity” (φθόνος τοίνυν μετὰ βασκανίας καὶ δυσμενείας) “when it is 
present, is not a good thing for any deed, but rather is an impediment to everything noble” (οὐδενὶ μὲν ἔργῳ 
παρὼν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐμπόδιος τοῖς καλοῖς). See §I of Chapter 4. 
26 Cf. Precepts of Statecraft 820A2–B1: We ought to assuage and moderate the love of honor (παραμυθώμεθα τὴν 
φιλοτιμίαν), teaching youths not to become swollen with ambition and pride due to praise.  
27 After discussing Coriolanus’ oversized ambition and spirited emotions, Plutarch writes of spirited passions: “For 
nothing else do humans so enjoy from the favor of the Muses as to be made tame in their nature by reason and 
education, receiving moderation and casting off excess through reason” (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο Μουσῶν εὐμενείας 
ἀπολαύουσιν ἄνθρωποι τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἐξημεροῦσθαι τὴν φύσιν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ παιδείας, τῷ λόγῳ 
δεξαμένην τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἄγαν ἀποβαλοῦσαν). Cf. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 443D7–10: The disposition 
produced in the non-rational part of the soul through habit is vice if the passion is poorly educated, but virtue if the 
passion is educated well by reason (ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος). 
28 Sophocles fr. 869 Radt in Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, quoted in Plutarch, Alexander 17.1–2. Cf. Plutarch, 
Dialogue on Love 767E6 for the same quotation. See the following note. 
29 Plutarch in Alexander 17.1–2 writes that Philip, recognizing that Alexander’s nature was hard-to-subdue 
(καθορῶν δὲ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ δυσνίκητον μὲν οὖσαν), realized that he was in need of a teacher who could use 
bridling bits as well as rudders and thus sent for the most renowned and learned of philosophers, Aristotle 
(μετεπέμψατο τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸν ἐνδοξότατον καὶ λογιώτατον Ἀριστοτέλην), to teach Alexander. 
30 On Plutarch’s treatment of ambition as ambivalent, since it can be used to good ends or in excess to bad ends, see 
Duff 1999, pp. 83–7, and 2008, p. 14, who discusses many of the passages I mention above on the negative and 
positive aspects of ambition. On the ambiguity of the love of honor in Aristotle see Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 
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The natural propensity to become virtuous, however, is not limited to individuals born 
with great natures or exceptional potential, such as Alcibiades, Coriolanus, or Alexander: 
[T102] ἔνεστιν ἁμωσγέπως καὶ τοῖς ἀδοξοτέροις καὶ ταπεινοτέροις μοῖρά τις χάριτος ἢ 
δυνάμεως ἢ πρός τι καλὸν εὐφυΐας.  
 
There is inherent in some way or other, even in less reputable and more humble 
individuals, some share of grace, capacity, or natural goodness of growth for something 
noble.       (Plutarch, On Brotherly Love 485A7–9)31 
 
Even humble individuals are equipped from birth with natural desires for honor and the potential 
to become virtuous, since god grants to each soul from birth “the noble aspect of souls… 
naturally strong and not weakened in its own roots” (τὸ γενναῖον…ἰσχυρὸν αὐταῖς [ψυχαῖς] 
καὶ οὐκ ἐξίτηλον ἐμπέφυκεν, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 551D2–5). Plutarch 
further indicates that “[the young] have from nature a sense of shame as a noble starting-point for 
their salvation” (καλὴν ἀρχὴν πρὸς τὸ σωθῆναι τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔχοντες, On 
Listening to Lectures 46E4–5). We all begin life with a passionate nature that is capable of 
developing and helping us to progress toward virtue, but, for Plutarch, nurture is more important 
than nature.32 
 
§I.b. Cultivation of Virtue and Weeds of Vice Endemic to Human Nature 
 As we already saw in On Compliancy 529A10–C2 (=[T100]), promoting good growth 
sometimes involves more than pruning. One must cut out and uproot bad growth, pushing the 
spade in unsparingly (ἀφειδῶς ἐμβαλὼν τὸ σκαφεῖον ἀνέτρεψε τὴν ῥίζαν). This work of 
cultivation is not limited to souls full of exceptional potential or replete with a variety of strong 
passions, such as Alcibiades, Coriolanus, or Alexander (φύσει πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων 
                                               
1107b21–1108a2, and 4.4, 1125b1–25. Cf. also Raymond 2017, who explores shame and honor in Aristotle and its 
relationship to Aristotle’s conception of virtue. 
31 Cf. Albini 1997, p. 67. 
32 Cf. Xenophontos 2016, pp. 15 and 42. 
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παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, Alcibiades 2.1). In addition to having a natural disposition to grow toward 
virtue, Plutarch describes human nature itself as beset with weeds of vice endemic to its 
passionate nature. Evil desires, not just ambivalent passions, crop up on their own like 
indigenous weeds if the soul remains uncultivated and is left fallow (ὥσπερ ἐκ χώρας 
ἀκινήτου καὶ ἀργῆς ἄγρια πολλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναδιδούς, On Listening to Lectures 38C8–9): 
[T103] τὰς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡδονὴν ὁρμὰς καὶ πρὸς πόνον ὑποψίας (οὐ θυραίους οὐδ’ ὑπὸ λόγων 
ἐπεισάκτους, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ αὐτόχθονας οὔσας μυρίων παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων 
πηγάς) ἂν ἐᾷ τις ἀφέτους ᾗ πεφύκασι χωρεῖν καὶ μὴ λόγοις χρηστοῖς ἀφαιρῶν ἢ 
παρατρέπων καταρτύῃ τὴν φύσιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τῶν θηρίων οὐκ ἂν ἡμερώτερον 
ἀνθρώπου φανείη.  
 
For impulses toward pleasure and suspicious aversion toward hard work (which are not 
impulses introduced from outside our nature nor brought in through the words of others, 
but are, as it were, sources springing from the ground itself, bringing forth a myriad of 
passions and diseases), if one allows these to go unhindered in their natural direction and 
does not tame one’s own nature by removing them with useful words or turning them in a 
different direction, there is no beast that would appear wilder than man.33  
      (Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures 38C10–D7) 
Plutarch does not focus here, though he does elsewhere,34 on especially perverse, lawless desires 
that are roused in dreams, such as the desire for sex with one’s mother, which Socrates discusses 
in Republic 9 (572b3–c5).35 Instead, Plutarch fixes our attention on sources (πηγαί) of desire that 
naturally crop up early in our lives and are ubiquitous and indigenous (αὐτόχθονες) to human 
nature.36 Even natures that seem best poised for excellence are beset by, as it were, internal 
weeds with the potential to lead to vice (Can Virtue be Taught 439B4–7).37 
                                               
33 Cf. Plato, Laws 6, 766a1–4; 7, 808d1–7. 
34 On Virtue and Vice 100F10–101A7; On Moral Progress 83A4–B8=[T64] in Chapter 4. 
35 Socrates likewise claims that these evil desires are ubiquitous (572b3–6), though he does qualify that there may be 
a few individuals who remove these errant passions, or it may just be that they are very weak in these more 
moderate individuals (571b5–c1). Those cases appear to be rare. Whether or not Socrates considers these bad 
passions eliminable, he believes that we all begin life with impulses toward vice. 
36 Cf. Plutarch’s quotation of Democritus in Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse Than Those of the Body 
500D5–E3=68 B 149 DK. 
37 “Even if nature spontaneously produces something noble, this becomes obscured by a great portion of what is 
foreign to itself, just like a fruitful crop mixed with useless, impure material” (εἰ καί τι καλὸν ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτως 
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 Errant desires and evil passions have a deep root that seems relatively innocuous at first 
glance. Yet, if left untended and untrained (ἀπαίδευτοι), these natural inclinations, namely, the 
impulses (ὁρμαί) and desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) toward pleasure and aversion to hard work, tend to 
master the souls of the young and are hard to remove later in life; they become part of their 
nature later (On Listening to Lectures 37C4–D4).38 They have a pull, moreover, that draws one 
along a natural pathway (ᾗ πεφύκασι χωρεῖν) to develop habits in the direction of vice.39 
 Plutarch’s view on the inherent sources of corruption stands in contrast with his Stoic 
opponents, who believe that we have undeviating starting-points toward virtue (ἀφορμὰς 
ἀδιαστρόφους).40 It does, however, fit well with the overall picture we have seen Plutarch 
                                               
ἐκφέρει, τοῦτο πολλῷ τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ, καθάπερ ὕλῃ καρπὸς ἀγρίᾳ καὶ ἀκαθάρτῳ μ⟨ε⟩ιγνύμενος, 
ἐξαμαυροῦται). 
38 “For, lack of control, which some young men consider to be freedom because of their lack of education, 
establishes the desires that have been, as it were, let loose from their restraints, as harsher masters than childhood 
teachers and tutors” (ἀναρχία μὲν γάρ, ἣν ἔνιοι τῶν νέων ἐλευθερίαν ἀπαιδευσίᾳ νομίζουσι, χαλεπωτέρους 
ἐκείνων τῶν ἐν παισὶ διδασκάλων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν δεσπότας ἐφίστησι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν 
λυθείσας). Cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Education of Children 2D1–10: “By hard work, what is contrary to nature 
comes to be greater than what was according to nature” (τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ πόνῳ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐγένετο 
κρεῖττον). Although it is unlikely that Plutarch wrote On the Education of Children (for which, see Wyttenbach 6.1, 
pp. 29–64 and Sirinelli 1987, pp. 25–26), this work nevertheless represents the kinds of arguments and metaphors in 
vogue in Plutarch’s time and also has strong parallels with Plutarch’s own sentiments and language. 
39 In Whether “Live Unknown” is a Wise Precept 1129D3–11, Plutarch describes the natural putrefaction and decay 
that occurs in souls due to inaction and lack of cultivation: The character of a man attracts mold (εὐρώς) or slough 
(γῆρας), as it were, through inaction (ἐν ἀπραξίᾳ). It withers (μαραίνει) and rots (σήπεται) like a stagnant pool. 
One’s natural powers become corrupted and fail (φθείρονται καὶ ἀπογηράσκουσιν αἱ σύμφυτοι δυνάμεις). 
40 For the Stoics, nature provides undeviating starting-points that lead to virtues (ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν 
ἀδιαστρόφους), though the rational mind can be perverted sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external 
matters and sometimes due to discourse with companions (διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς 
τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματειῶν πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατήχησιν τῶν συνόντων, D.L. 7.89=SVF 3.228). 
Corruption comes from outside (ἔξωθεν) ourselves. On the persuasiveness of external matters, Calcidius, 
Commentary on the Timaeus 165=SVF 3.229, understands this to indicate early experiences of pleasure and pain, 
such as the emergence of a newborn to painful cold air and the assuagement of discomfort within a warm bath 
prepared by a doctor. These experiences lead to false notions of good and bad and are learned through experience 
and are still due to external influence. Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 5.5.2–3=SVF 3.229a, argues 
that the Stoics ought to admit that the persuasiveness of pleasurable and painful experiences reveals something 
within our nature itself that is attracted to the former and averse to the latter, which would mean that there are 
natural tendencies for deviation from virtue within our nature. Cf. Long 1968b, pp. 336–7: “The Stoics would 
presumably answer that Galen is confusing sensation with judgment. The young child takes physical well-being as 
his criterion because he has nothing else to take. If in maturity we make sources of pleasure and pain morally 
significant we are continuing to take sensation as our criterion and employing logos not for its own sake but purely 
as the servant of physical well-being. The fact that this is not the role of logos is proved by reference to animals and 
young children who are able to further these ends perfectly well without it.” Cf. Nussbaum 1994, pp. 389–90, n. 68.  
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painting on the need for the cultivation (ἐργάσιμον) of our nature through hard work (ἔργον 
and πόνος).41 A natural distaste for hard work and an attraction to easy pleasure leads one away 
from the arduous steps required to become good.42 Hard work is, for Plutarch, one of two 
essential ingredients for moral progress, as he writes in his biographical work on Demosthenes: 
[T104] εἰκός ἐστι…τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν ὥσπερ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ διαρκὲς φυτὸν ἐν ἅπαντι ῥιζοῦσθαι 
τόπῳ, φύσεώς γε χρηστῆς καὶ φιλοπόνου ψυχῆς ἐπιλαμβανομένην. 
 
It is likely that…virtue, like a strong and robust plant, takes root in any place if it takes 
hold of a nature that is good and a soul that is willing to do hard work. 
(Plutarch, Demosthenes 1.3–4) 
 
Again, not only is a good nature (φύσις) required, of the sort we saw described as fertile for 
good development (εὐφυΐα), but a soul in which virtue is to flourish must not be completely 
averse to hard work, but rather keenly adapted to it (φιλόπονος). 
 The goodness of soul required for virtue is not a final product but goodness in potential 
for development, since even partially corrupted passions, like weeds taking root in one’s soul, 
can be a sign of a nature that is fertile for growth in virtue: 
[T105] ἔνια τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων αὐτὰ μέν ἐστιν ἄγρια τῇ φύσει καὶ ἄκαρπα καὶ 
βλαβερὰν τοῖς ἡμέροις σπέρμασι καὶ φυτοῖς τὴν αὔξησιν ἔχοντα, σημεῖα δ’ αὐτὰ 
ποιοῦνται χώρας οἱ γεωργοῦντες οὐ πονηρᾶς ἀλλὰ γενναίας καὶ πίονος· οὕτω δὴ 
καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς ἔστιν οὐ χρηστά, χρηστῆς δὲ φύσεως οἷον ἐξανθήματα καὶ λόγῳ 
παρασχεῖν ἐργάσιμον ἑαυτὴν ἐπιεικῶς δυναμένης. 
 
Some plants that grow from the earth are themselves wild in nature and not fruitful and 
have growth that is harmful to cultivated seeds and plants, but farmers consider these 
wild plants to be signs of soil that is not worthless but excellent and rich. In this way, 
there are also passions of the soul that are not good, but are like the outgrowths of a good 
nature that is also able to provide itself suitably to reason for cultivation.   
                                               
41 Cf. the Epicurean notion of moral responsibility, given different seeds that tend to grow in different directions 
(Epicurus, On Nature 34.26–30=LS 20C). We are morally responsible, Epicurus argues, otherwise there would be 
no purpose to rebuking (νουθετεῖν), opposing (μάχεσθαι), and changing (μεταρυθμίζειν) one another. Cf. Németh 
2017, pp. 90–2. 
42 Cf. Plato, Republic 2, 364c6–d2, wherein Hesiod, Works and Days 287–9 is quoted: “Wickedness, in fact, in great 
abundance is easy / to choose. The path is smooth and it very much dwells close by, / while the gods have placed 
sweat as a preliminary to virtue” (τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι / ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα 
δ’ ἐγγύθι ναίει· / τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν). 
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      (Plutarch, On Compliancy 528C1–D5)43 
 
In the last line of this passage, Plutarch writes that a good soul provides itself to reason (λόγῳ) 
for cultivation, i.e. the hard work that produces a virtuous disposition occurs through the use of 
reason. It is not merely by blind chance that virtue is developed; it must be overseen and guided 
with foresight and wisdom. This role, in following with Plutarch’s plant metaphors, belongs to 
the caretaker / farmer of the soul (κηδεμών / γεωργός).44 
 Yet sometimes the farmer cannot remove the weeds without damaging the good growth, 
no matter how skillful he may be. In How to Profit by One’s Enemies, Plutarch suggests 
diverting negative passions away from one’s friends toward one’s enemies,45 but only if there is 
no way to rid oneself of these passions:  
[T106] οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῶν καταναλισκόμενα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἧττον 
ἐνοχλήσει τοῖς φίλοις…ἀλλ’ εἰ μηδεὶς τρόπος ἐστὶν ἄλλος ἀπαλλαγῆς ἐρίδων καὶ 
φθόνων καὶ φιλονεικιῶν, ἔθιζε σεαυτὸν δάκνεσθαι τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐημερούντων, 
καὶ παρόξυνε καὶ χάραττε τὸ φιλόνεικον ἐν ἐκείνοις θηγόμενον. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ 
χαρίεντες γεωργοὶ τὰ ῥόδα καὶ τὰ ἴα βελτίω ποιεῖν νομίζουσι σκόροδα καὶ 
κρόμμυα παραφυτεύοντες (ἀποκρίνεται γὰρ εἰς ἐκεῖνα πᾶν ὅσον ἔνεστι τῇ τροφῇ 
δριμὺ καὶ δυσῶδες), οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐχθρὸς ἀναλαμβάνων καὶ περισπῶν τὸ κακόηθες 
καὶ βάσκανον, εὐμενέστερον παρέξει σε τοῖς φίλοις εὖ πράττουσι καὶ ἀλυπότερον.  
 
Therefore, even these passions when used up on our enemies will be less distressful 
against our friends…but if there is no other way to escape strife, envy, and quarrels, 
habituate yourself to feel a sting when your enemies prosper and sharpen and whet your 
quarrelsomeness, brought to a jagged point among them [your enemies]. For just as 
clever farmers think that by planting garlic and onions next to roses and violets they 
make their flowers better (since whatever sharpness and foul-smells are present in their 
food, as a whole it is separated off into those others [the garlic and onions]), likewise 
                                               
43 Cf. Plutarch, Dion 4.1–2; On Nature and Hard Work=Sandbach fr. 172=Photius, Library 161. Cf. also On Envy 
and Hate 537E8–10: “These passions are nurtured and made to grow…just like plants” (τὰ πάθη ταῦτα…ὥσπερ 
τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι). The author of On the Education of Children similarly writes that a piece 
of soil is good, but its goodness will be lost if not tended to, since it requires work for it to be productive and reach 
its potential (2E1–12). 
44 Cf. Plutarch, Lycurgus and Numa 4.4–5, quoted in n. 8 above. Cf. also On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 
552C3–D3: Just as a good farmer will see the potential in a field that is overgrown with thorns and will wisely wait 
for the right moment when it is ripe and ready to produce its own fruit (ἡλικίαν καὶ ὥραν, ᾗ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἡ φύσις 
καρπὸν ἀποδίδωσι), likewise the wise teacher is patient with his students. 
45 This appears to be what Plutarch has in mind for passions that one cannot remove and must divert (παρατρέπων) 
in On Listening to Lectures 38C10–D7=[T82]). 
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even an enemy, receiving and drawing off our nastiness and pettiness, will present you as 
more amiable and less grievous toward your friends when they are prospering.  
   (Plutarch, How to Profit by One’s Enemies 92A3–B10). 
 
These negative emotions are not merely weaponized against one’s enemies, but focused so that 
they do not risk causing collateral damage to our friends.  
 This is not, however, Plutarch’s only suggestion for how we can handle our natural 
inclinations toward meanness and vice. It is a further measure we can take if there is no other 
means of escaping these passions (εἰ μηδεὶς τρόπος ἐστὶν ἄλλος ἀπαλλαγῆς). The better 
option, which Plutarch often recommends, is to cultivate the opposite passions of kindness 
(φιλανθρωπία), benevolence (εὔνοια), and gentleness (πραότης),46 not only toward friends, 
but also toward non-rational animals, since even our treatment of these creatures affects how our 
character develops (On the Eating of Flesh 1, 996A6–9).47 Pythagoras, Plutarch writes, tried to 
keep people from mistreating animals because he understood this principle of human character, 
namely, that how we treat animals affects how we are disposed to treat other humans (How to 
Profit by One’s Enemies 91B13–D6). It is, moreover, characteristic of a good person to be kind 
and gentle toward others when no obligation is present, even to old animals that are no longer 
serviceable and useful to oneself (Marcus Cato 5.2).48 
 
                                               
46 See n. 128 below. 
47 “Does this not seem to you a marvelous habituation for kindness toward other humans? For who could wrong 
another human being if he is so gently and kindly disposed toward creatures that are foreign to his own nature and 
not his kindred?” (ὁ πρὸς φιλανθρωπίαν ἐθισμὸς οὐ δοκεῖ θαυμαστὸν εἶναι; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀδικήσειεν 
ἄνθρωπον οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλότρια καὶ ἀσύμφυλα διακείμενος πράως καὶ φιλανθρώπως;) 
48 “And yet we see that kindness extends more widely than justice, since we use law and what is just naturally only 
in our treatment of humans, but from gentleness of character flows, as though from an abundant spring, acts of 
beneficence and graciousness sometimes even toward non-rational animals. For indeed, the nourishing of horses that 
have been worn down by time and the care of aged dogs, not just young pups, befits a man who is good in character” 
(καίτοι τὴν χρηστότητα τῆς δικαιοσύνης πλατύτερον τόπον ὁρῶμεν ἐπιλαμβάνουσαν· νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῷ 
δικαίῳ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους μόνον χρῆσθαι πεφύκαμεν, πρὸς εὐεργεσίας δὲ καὶ χάριτας ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ μέχρι 
τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς πλουσίας ἀπορρεῖ τῆς ἡμερότητος. καὶ γὰρ ἵππων ἀπειρηκότων ὑπὸ 
χρόνου τροφαὶ καὶ κυνῶν οὐ σκυλακεῖαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γηροκομίαι τῷ χρηστῷ προσήκουσιν). On this 
last passage see Sorabji 1993, p. 118. 
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§I.c. The Growth within the Passions and the Fruit of Virtue 
 Let us take stock of the positive features we already find emerging from Plutarch’s 
metaphor of cultivating plants. Through this metaphor, we find that passions are the plants that 
grow and must be cultivated for virtue (On Moral Virtue 443C10–D1,49 443D7–1050, 451C2–551; 
On Love=Sandbach frr. 134 and 13652). The implication of On Compliancy 528C1–D5 and 
529A10–C2 (=[T105] and [T100])53 is not only that the fertile soil that can grow to vice is often 
equally fertile for development in virtue, but also that virtue requires the growth of certain 
passions. Just as the farmer seeks the growth of fruitful crops, the cultivator of the soul seeks the 
growth and development of fruitful passions. 
 Passions are necessary also because they provide growth toward virtue. The task of 
reason and the rational agent who cultivates passions is to protect and promote virtuous 
development from the passions and impulses inherent within the soul (Plutarch, Whether “Live 
Unknown” is a Wise Precept 1129D3–11)54 so that they grow toward virtue (φύεσθαι πρὸς 
ἀρετήν). But, just as a farmer nourishes plants to promote the growth that unfolds from roots of 
                                               
49 =[T36] in Chapter 2 (see also §V in Chapter 2): Reason produces ethical virtues within the passions. 
50 See n. 27 above. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 245c–e: Plutarch seems to be drawing on the psychic self-movement 
possible in plants, which the rational part of the soul harnesses and guides. Yet, it also has some sense of self-
direction, which I discuss below. 
51 “A human being has participation in the non-rational and has the source of passion as something natural, not as 
added [from outside], but as necessary, which should not be removed entirely but which needs cultivation and 
education” (μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ [τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, B11] καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους 
ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν, οὐδ’ ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ 
παιδαγωγίας δεομένην). 
52 For these passages see n. 12 above. 
53 Cf. Plutarch, How to Profit by One’s Enemies 92A3–B10=[T87]. 
54 See n. 39 above. The good growth needs to be activated and encouraged, since bad growth thrives on lack of 
cultivation and stagnation. Nevertheless, it is the natural powers within the soul (αἱ σύμφυτοι δυνάμεις), as in a 
plant, that are promoted. 
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the plant (Sandbach fr. 10455; On Envy and Hate 537E8–1056), the ability to grow toward virtue 
(πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐα, Alcibiades 4.1) lies within the passions and springs from our passionate 
nature itself. It is not added from outside. 
 Passions additionally provide not only the impetus to grow, but also produce the fruit 
(καρπός) of virtue when brought to their proper ends. Just as the soul has certain impulses and 
desires that naturally lead to vice, like weeds within the soul, the end-goal of certain passions is 
to produce the fruit of character suited to friendship and virtue (καρπὸν ἤθους οἰκεῖον εἰς 
φιλίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν…ἀποδίδωσιν, Dialogue on Love 750E2–6).57 Virtues begin to grow and 
sprout in our youth (φυόμεναι καὶ βλαστάνουσαι, Agis and Cleomenes 2.2), and this growth 
must be guided by a farmer of sorts so that it is not choked out, does not overgrow its bounds, 
and is not corrupted from external forces. Nevertheless, contained within the nature of the 
passions, like plants, is the power to produce the fruit of virtue. 
 Through the metaphor of cultivation analyzed thus far, Plutarch brings out several points 
that we have seen expressed through other metaphors in his works. In the Wind in Our Sails 
passage, the rational part of the soul needs the passions to get the ship of soul moving (On Moral 
                                               
55 =Scholia to Hesiod, Works and Days. Plutarch writes, “The description of ‘nourishing from within’ is appropriate 
for planting, since [Hesiod] indicates through the description that it calls forth the principle from within the root and 
causes it to advance and grow” (τὸ “ἐνθρέψασθαι” οἰκείως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν φυτείαν· τὸ γὰρ προκαλέσασθαι τὸν 
ῥιζικὸν λόγον καὶ εἰς ἐπίδοσιν ἄγειν καὶ βλάστην ἐσήμηνε διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος). 
56 See n. 43 above. Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a15–17: “What has the principle of growth 
comes first by necessity, since this nutritive element belongs to all alike, whether plant or animal” (τοῦτο δὲ 
γίγνεσθαι ἀνάγκη πρῶτον ὃ αὐξήσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχει· εἴτε γὰρ φυτὸν εἴτε ζῷον ὁμοίως τοῦτο πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει 
τὸ θρεπτικόν); ibid. 2.4, 739b34–740a1; On the Soul 3.12, 434a22–434b18; On the Parts of Animals 4.10, 687a24–
690a10; Metaphysics Λ 10, 1075a16–25. 
57 Personified Love (ἔρως) has no desire to continue to cultivate a plant that is ripe and in season (οὐκ ἐθέλει 
παραμένειν οὐδὲ θεραπεύειν ἐφ’ ὥρᾳ τὸ…ἀκμάζον) if it does not produce the fruit of character aimed at 
friendship and virtue (εἰ καρπὸν ἤθους οἰκεῖον εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν). Cf. Badnall 2009, who 
argues that the fruit of virtue and friendship between men in Plutarch’s Dialogue on Love is contrasted with the mere 
flowery blossoms that come from marriage between man and wife, an ironic twist on biological procreation. Cf. also 
Brenk 1988, who defends Plutarch’s praise of marriage as part of one’s ascent to union with god. Contra Badnall, I, 
along with Brenk, find that Plutarch’s positive evaluation of marriage includes deep intimacy and friendship 
productive of virtue. See also n. 75 below and n. 79 in Chapter 3. 
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Virtue 452B1–4).58 We need passions for action, including virtuous action. Likewise, in the Myth 
of the Charioteer drawn from Plato’s Phaedrus, the passions provide drive and motion that is to 
be harnessed and used for good.59 Through the image of virtue as a harmony between the rational 
and non-rational parts of the soul, reason requires the passions in order to produce virtue within 
them (On Moral Virtue 444C6–9).60 Finally, though this list is by no means exhaustive, 
Plutarch’s use of the medical analogy also intimates that passions need to be in a healthy 
condition, moderate and not excessive.61 
 In the metaphor of plant cultivation, we find that Plutarch stresses positive contributions 
beyond their necessity as an ingredient for virtue. Passions provide for growth and development 
toward virtue, all the way up to the culmination of moral virtue, which is the blossoming and 
fruitful outcome of well-developed passions moderated and guided by reason. Passions, from this 
perspective, are not necessary evils of embodiment. They are good for moral progress and part 
of the good, morally virtuous life itself. They contribute to moral virtue. As we move to 
Plutarch’s description of the seeds of virtue and justice in the next section, and then to Plutarch’s 
view of the ideal, morally virtuous life in the final section, we will continue to see that passions 
are an integral part of the moral life for Plutarch from life’s inception to the end-goal (τέλος) of 
becoming like god (ὁμοιώσις τῷ θεῷ). 
 
                                               
58 =[T52] in Chapter 3. See also §II in Chapter 3. 
59 Cf. Plutarch, Platonic Questions 9, 1008A1–5, C5–D6; 1009B2–8. See also §II in Chapter 3. 
60 =[T35] in Chapter 2. See §V in Chapter 2. 
61 On Plutarch’s description of excessive passions as diseases see §VI in Chapter 2, §IV and n. 38 in Chapter 5. On 
the medical analogy applied to excessive passions or toward passions viewed as diseases from Plato’s works, among 
different Hellenistic schools, and through to Neoplatonic writers see Annas 1992, pp. 19–36; Nussbaum 1994, 
passim; Becchi 1999; Sorabji 2000, pp. 17–28; White 2008, pp. 292–6, esp. nn. 50–2; Malherbe 2014, esp. pp. 123–
34 and n. 13. While Nussbaum provides an excellent analysis of therapeutic methods aimed at curing passions, she 
is surprisingly silent on the metaphor of cultivating passions, barring a few dead metaphors that describe the need to 
“cultivate” certain virtues in Aristotle’s view of moral excellence (pp. 78 and 94, in the chapter Aristotle on 
Emotions and Ethical Health, pp. 78–101). 
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§II The Seeds of Virtue: The Background 
 As we will see in the next section, Plutarch goes against the grain in his use of the 
cultivation metaphor. Before we turn to Plutarch’s view, we will look briefly at the background 
to which he responds. In several of Plutarch’s predecessors, including Plato, the seeds of virtue 
are rational in nature; they are not part of our passionate nature, even if they are, as it were, sown 
into it. 
 Plato’s Phaedrus makes use of the metaphor of cultivation but describes the seeds that 
are fruitful for virtue not as passions, but as forms of discourse. The educator in the Phaedrus 
skillfully and seriously considers how he will plant the seeds of discourse and instruction 
(λόγοι), like a skilled and earnest farmer, taking into account the right soil, i.e. the soul of his 
student, and the critical moment to plant the seed, i.e. the right time to provide instruction.62 
Once the seeds take root and come to fruition, they propagate themselves through new discourse, 
planting more seeds in other souls, continuing the process without end (276b1–277a4).63 
 Plato’s Symposium and Theaetetus employ the metaphor of pregnancy to a similar end, 
albeit with the notion of human seed. As in the metaphor of cultivation in the Phaedrus, the 
seeds of discourse that impregnate a soul have a natural impulse toward growth, development, 
and self-perpetuation. One who is pregnant also begins a process that impregnates others with 
the seeds of discourse and argument and propagates virtue through the spread of ideas and 
arguments (Symposium 208e1–209e4).64 In the Theaetetus, Socrates watches over the offspring 
                                               
62 Cf. Plutarch, Sandbach fr. 104=Scholia to Hesiod, Works and Days. 
63 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1179b23–6=[T89] in Chapter 5: The seeds of virtue are discussion and 
teaching (ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχή). They are sown, as it were, into the passionate nature which is likened to soil that 
provides nourishment to the seed (ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα). 
64 In the Symposium, one who is pregnant in soul with wisdom and the rest of virtue (φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη 
ἀρετή, 209a3–4), especially with moderation and justice (σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, 209a8), abounds   
immediately in discourse about virtue and about what kind of character a good man should have and what he should 
do (εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ οἷον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύειν, 
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that one produces to aid in one’s progress (150b6–151a5). The pregnancy, moreover, is one that 
gives birth to either falsehood or a fertile truth (ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτε…ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές, 
150c2–3).65 In both the Symposium and Theaetetus, as in the Phaedrus, discourse and argument 
serve as seeds that are implanted later to blossom and produce an upright, virtuous character of 
soul. Moral development seems primarily concerned with the rational aspect of the soul and 
becoming well informed with the right kinds of beliefs. 
 Philo of Alexandria and the author of On the Education of Children, which is spuriously 
attributed to Plutarch,66 follow suit and identify the seeds of virtue with rational discourse aimed 
at the education of the rational part of the soul. Philo, for example, dedicates several chapters of 
On Agriculture (9–18) to an allegorical interpretation of Noah’s role as a gardener of souls, 
describing the seeds of virtues as rational in nature, closely connecting them with education in 
reading, writing, the interpretation of poetry, geometry, and music in general, which one plants 
within young souls (φυτεύειν δὲ ταῖς μὲν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ παιδικῇ ψυχαῖς, 18).67 In On the 
Education of Children, the seed that develops into the crop of virtue is explicitly likened to 
counsels in speech and instruction (ἔοικεν…σπέρματι δ᾿ αἱ τῶν λόγων ὑποθῆκαι καὶ τὰ 
παραγγέλματα), planted in the soul by the farmer, i.e. the teacher (2B5–C1).68 
                                               
209b8–c1) and he tries to educate the one whom he attempts to impregnate (καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ παιδεύειν, 209c2–3). 
Educated through such discourse, the second person conceives and also gives birth (209c2–4). 
65 Shortly before discussing psychic pregnancy, Socrates draws upon the cultivation metaphor to ask whether the art 
of sowing is the same as that of tending to the crops and harvesting them (149e1–4). See n. 13 above for the 
quotation. For further discussion of the cultivation metaphor in Plato’s Phaedrus and its connection to the pregnancy 
metaphor of the Symposium and Theaetetus see Cotton 2010. 
66 See n. 38 above. 
67 Cf. Philo, On the Life of Abraham 220–3: Passions grow and choke out what is healthy in the soul, namely, “the 
teachings that lead to virtue and the study of wisdom itself” (τὰ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἀρετὴν δόγματα καὶ τὰ σοφίας 
αὐτῆς θεωρήματα, 220). In On the Descendants of Cain 135.4–6, Philo discusses “seeds of thought” (τὰ 
φρονήσεως σπέρματα). Cf. also Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 3.250 where the seeds of virtue are contrasted 
with thorny stuff. Cf. also ibid. 3.187 and On the Life of Abraham 220–3. Cf. also Horowitz 1998, pp. 62–4, who 
connects Philo’s allegory of the garden of the soul with Stoic influence. 
68 “Just as in the case of farming, first, the soil needs to be good, then the cultivator must be knowledgeable, and 
finally the seeds must be excellent. In the same way, nature is like the soul, the educator like the farmer, and 
counsels in speech and instructions are like the seed” (ὥσπερ δ᾿ ἐπὶ τῆς γεωργίας πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθὴν ὑπάρξαι 
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 The notion, and phrase “seeds of virtue” (semina virtutis), is especially prominent in 
Latin Stoic sources and describes the initial development of the rational aspects of human 
nature.69 The seeds of virtue are generally synonymous with the seeds of knowledge (semina 
scientiae) in these sources, connected to the early Stoic notion of the “seminal reason” (λόγος 
σπερματικός) that guides progress throughout nature.70 Yet even among the Stoics, who teach 
that we do not have inherent inclinations toward vice, the formation of virtue still requires 
training and cultivation of these seeds.71 The direction our life will take is not fully determined 
by innate inclination, since we are morally responsible for our actions; we can assent to or 
dissent from impulses that prompt us.72 Additionally, if our nature is neglected, we can fall prey 
to external corruption and fail to develop our rational nature to its full potential.73  
 Nevertheless, in each of these cases, the seeds of virtue are rational in nature. Within the 
human soul, virtues are rooted primarily in seeds implanted by instruction and discourse. 
Passions may be the soil in which they grow or even hindrances that interfere with their 
implantation and growth, but they are not the starting-points for growth in virtue.74 
                                               
δεῖ τὴν γῆν, εἶτα δὲ τὸν φυτουργὸν ἐπιστήμονα, εἶτα τὰ σπέρματα σπουδαῖα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γῇ μὲν 
ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις, γεωργῷ δ᾿ ὁ παιδεύων, σπέρματι δ᾿ αἱ τῶν λόγων ὑποθῆκαι καὶ τὰ παραγγέλματα). Cf. the 
Parable of the Sower in the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew 13.1–9 and 18–23; Mark 4.1–9 and 13–20; Luke 8.4–8 and 
11–15), where the seed sown is the word of God (ὁ σπόρος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, Luke 8.11, cf. Matthew 
13.18–23; Mark 4.14). 
69 See esp. Cicero, On the Republic 1.41, On Ends 5.17–20 (=LS 64G), 5.58–9; Seneca, Letters 65.4, 65.12, 90.29, 
90.46; 124.10–11.  
70 See Seneca, Letters 49.12 and 120.4. Cf. Horowitz 1998, pp. 26–34, esp. 27–30. 
71 SVF 3.225. 
72 SVF 2.91, 2.980, 3.171, 3.307; D.L. 7.86. Cf. Long 1968b, pp. 336–9. 
73 SVF 3.537; 3.214 and 216. Cf. Long 1971a, p. 184 and nn. 36–9. 
74 Cf. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.58=LS53Y=SVF 1.172, where the Stoic speaker, Balbus, refers to seeds 
that provide impulse (ὁρμαί) in the world, which are likened to passions in the human soul, but the connection is not 
made firm or clear in this passage. 
   The exception may lie, curiously, in the Epicurean notion of seeds, but the notion of cultivating character is less 
developed here than one would like. According to Epicurus, we all begin with seeds of varied kinds that lead us in 
this direction or that, including toward certain actions (πράξεις), thoughts (διανοήσεις), and dispositions 
(διαθέσεις) of character. We are responsible for how we develop our character given these different sources of 
motion within our nature (Epicurus, On Nature 34.26–30=LS 20C), which Epicurus offers as proof that we have free 
will. Cf. Németh 2017, pp. 90–2. Horowitz 1998 completely neglects the Epicurean notion of seeds in her book on 
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§III Affection and the Seeds of Virtue in Plutarch 
 Given this background, it is perhaps surprising that Plutarch does not describe the seeds 
of virtue as rational in nature, especially vis-à-vis Plato’s Phaedrus, Symposium, and Theaetetus. 
In line with the positive implications of Plutarch’s metaphor of cultivating passions, the seeds for 
Plutarch, like the plants that blossom into virtue, stem from our passionate nature in desires and 
impulses.75 Plutarch calls the natural goodness (εὐφυΐα) aimed at what is honorable and wont to 
avoid what is shameful the seed (σπέρμα), as it were, and the starting-point (ἀρχή) to progress 
(προκοπή) in virtue (Table-Talk 636B2–6).76 Plutarch also identifies the spirited passions 
associated with his concept of εὐφυΐα as the elements that set one’s first footstep on the path to 
virtue (εἰς ἴχνος τι πρῶτον ἀρετῆς καθιστάντες, Can Virtue be Taught 439F2–5).77 Passions 
not only provide growth, as though adding nourishment or increase from without, but passions 
also contain the initial impetus for growth and development in virtue within their very nature, as 
the seeds that are the starting-points for virtue.  
 Just as a seed contains natural powers within itself (αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις) for 
growth and is determinative of the initial direction of this growth (Plutarch, Sandbach fr. 104),78 
                                               
the seeds of virtue and knowledge. Cf. also Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 1.159–73=LS 4B; 2.251–93=LS 20F; 
5.837–77=LS 13I. Cf. also Aristotle, History of Animals 8.1, 588a31–b3. 
75 While Plutarch identifies the seeds of character development, particularly moral virtue, as sprouting from our 
passionate nature, he does sometimes use the imagery of seeds for teaching that shapes belief. See Advice to Bride 
and Groom 145D9–E3, where Plutarch advises husbands to guard against the seeds of bad beliefs that can crop up in 
the minds of their brides. They ought to sow the seeds of good teachings and arguments (λόγων χρηστῶν 
σπέρματα), since, Plutarch writes, their brides do not receive the same education (παιδεία) as their husbands. Cf. 
Horowitz 1998, p. 31, n. 65. Cf. also Badnall 2009, who argues that the friendship between husband and wife is 
represented as producing flowers, while that between men can produce the fruit of virtue. Contra Badnall, see Brenk 
1988, Crawford 1999, and n. 79 in Chapter 3. 
76 See n. 3 above. 
77 =[T86] in Chapter 5. 
78 =Scholia to Hesiod, Works and Days: The seed needs external pressure, “pressing into the natural powers within 
the seed and causing them to flow out” (πιεζόντων ἔσω καὶ χεόντων τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ φυσικὰς δυνάμεις). Cf. Philo, 
On the Life of Moses 2.181–2: The seed of virtue “grows from no other power but from itself” (οὐκ ἐξ ἑτέρας 
δυνάμεως ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς φύεται); On Rewards and Punishments 172. Cf. also Aristotle, Great Ethics 1.10.1.2–
1.10.2.1: Every nature is generative of what is like itself (πᾶσα γὰρ φύσις γεννητική ἐστιν οὐσίας τοιαύτης οἵα 
ἐστίν), both plants and animals (τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα), since both are generative from their starting-points 
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certain passions have natural pathways that draw us in the right direction of virtue (On Moral 
Virtue 452D3–8).79 Not only do they have virtue as their fruit (καρπός), but they can produce 
powerful affective desires for virtue (δεινοὶ ἔρωτες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, On Listening to Lectures 
47C5–6), so that one is “driven like a non-rational animal with a longing for philosophy” 
(ὥσπερ ἄλογος ἐλαύνεται πόθῳ τῷ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, On Moral Progress 76F7–77C6),80 
causing an experience like hunger and thirst for moral progress (πείνῃ τινὶ καὶ δίψῃ πάθος 
ὅμοιον, 77C8–10).81 They engender strong passions that draw us ever more to progress in virtue. 
 In addition to passions associated with honor and shame, Plutarch lays particular 
emphasis on the passion of affection (φιλοστοργία) as the seed that leads to the virtue of justice 
and is at the heart of human social life. As we will explore in this section, we all are born with a 
natural tendency toward affiliation with others rooted in affection. This non-rational passion is 
insufficient to take us to a fully virtuous life without rational instruction and guidance; justice 
requires the presence of practical wisdom (ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς φρονήσεως δεῖται παρούσης, 
On Chance 97E9–10). Nor will it provide a conception of the good.82 Nevertheless, it is a 
starting-point (ἀρχή) and sign of our natural orientation to the social virtue of justice (On the 
                                               
(γεννητικὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν) and what follows from them is like them (ὡς γὰρ ἂν ἔχωσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, οὕτως καὶ 
τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἔχει). On questions of authorship of the Great Ethics see Rowe 1975; Kenny 1978. pp. 215–39; 
and Cooper 1999d and n. 45 in Chapter 1. Cf. also Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2, 739b34–740a1: “For 
the first principle is present in the seeds within them [humans, whose seeds act like seeds sown in soil], and, 
whenever it, though being present potentially prior, is made distinct, a shoot and root proceed from it. This, then, is 
the means by which it receives nourishment, since the plant needs to grow” (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
σπέρμασιν ἐν αὐτοῖς [παραπλήσιον ποιεῖ τοῖς σπειρομένοις, b34] ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη· ὅταν δ’ αὕτη ἀποκριθῇ 
ἐνοῦσα δυνάμει πρότερον, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀφίεται ὅ τε βλαστὸς καὶ ἡ ῥίζα. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ᾗ τὴν τροφὴν 
λαμβάνει· δεῖται γὰρ αὐξήσεως τὸ φυτόν). 
79 =[T85] in Chapter 5. 
80 Plutarch describes here the desire for philosophy and advancement with the metaphor of the shoot of a reed (ἡ 
τοῦ καλάμου βλάστησις) which naturally grows upward but faces setbacks due to periodic lack of nourishment 
and adverse conditions. See [T57] in Chapter 3.  
81 I discuss On Listening to Lectures 47C5–6 and On Moral Progress 76F7–77C6, 77C8–10 at greater length in §V 
of Chapter 3. 
82 Cf. Boys-Stones 2014.  
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Cleverness of Animals 962A6–B1).83 It is, as Plutarch writes, the “seed that bears the fruit of 
justice” (φερέκαρπον σπέρμα πρὸς δικαιοσύνην, On Affection for Offspring 495B9–C6). 
In Chapter 1, I discussed Plutarch’s “Affection Account” and the role that φιλοστοργία 
plays in our orientation to others. There I proposed that the Affection Account is a construction 
derived from Chrysippus’ examples of the explanatory power of the Stoic foundational theory of 
ethics (οἰκείωσις). While Plutarch never endorses the Stoic theory, and, in fact, as we saw in 
previous chapters, gives reasons why we ought to reject the end-goal of the dispassionate sage as 
both impossible and undesirable, he nevertheless holds that a pattern of behavior found in our 
earliest moments, as well as in non-rational animals, reveals a non-rational passionate drive at 
the core of human sociability and the virtuous life lived in communion with others, i.e. Plutarch 
supports the general features of the Affection Account. Unlike what we find in Stoic οἰκείωσις, 
however, Plutarch’s emphasis is on the foundation of social virtues that begin with our 
passions.84 Plutarch, I propose, presents an alternative “cradle argument” that reveals the 
importance of passions to our lives from our nature observed from birth.85 
Beginning with Plutarch’s notion of φιλοστοργία, he expands the semantic range 
beyond the usage we find in his predecessors, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Philo of Alexandria. 
In each of these authors, φιλοστοργία centers on affection felt between parents and their 
                                               
83 Contrast Plutarch’s position with Porphyry’s view that οἰκείωσις is a capacity for being a member of the moral 
community but is not a principle or starting-point in the sense of leading to the virtue of justice (On Abstinence from 
Eating Flesh 3.19=SVF 1.197; cf. Boys-Stones 2014, p. 309, n. 20). 
84 I turn to the topic of Plutarch’s appropriation of οἰκείωσις in the next section. 
85 Cradle arguments draw on observable behavior of children in particular, though often also on the behavior of non-
human animals, to explain natural impulses of human nature that fit with one’s own view of human nature and are 
thought to comport with one’s own theory of ethics and lead to it. On the role of cradle arguments among the 




offspring.86 Plutarch uses φιλοστοργία to describe both parents’ love for their children87 and 
children’s love for parents,88 love between siblings,89 and even love between spouses.90 This 
expansion reflects the first steps in the outward motion that φιλοστοργία initiates. Plutarch does 
not deny that the love between children and parents is a fundamental and primary form of 
friendship that is natural (ἡ πρώτη φιλία), but he sees this affection as more inclusive, since 
immediate love between siblings is also a natural primary friendship (On Brotherly Love 479C9–
D2). Starting with the natural passion of φιλοστοργία, seen especially in the central case of 
parents’ care for their offspring, we begin a progressive process of establishing relationships with 
others until we reach a point in which our relations with others outside our family exhibit the 
virtue of justice (On Affection for Offspring 495B9–C6). 
One of the first indications that this is possible can be found in the further extension 
beyond the examples listed above to children who are not our own and to slaves: 
[T107] ἐχούσης…τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαπητικὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ πεφυκυίας…τὸ φιλόστοργον 
ἀλλότριοι καὶ νόθοι παῖδες ἢ θεράποντες εἰσοικισάμενοι καὶ καταλαβόντες. 
                                               
86 Geert Roskam, in a study of Plutarch’s On Affection for Offspring, gives a history of the term and concept of 
φιλοστοργία / τὸ φιλοστοργόν (2011, pp. 180–4). For convenience, I will use φιλοστοργία as shorthand for both 
φιλοστοργία and instances of τὸ φιλοστοργόν. From at least the time of Plato’s Laws, φιλοστοργία denotes 
passions and affections shared between parents and children, and in some cases also between siblings. In the Laws, 
for instance, children feel affection for their elders (11, 927a8–b7). In Aristotle’s works, the term is used exclusively 
for animals, as perhaps a kind of demotion of the term from the status of a cognitive emotion, since animals are 
incapable of cognitive emotions for Aristotle but show a semblance of love in their affection and care for their 
young (for which see Sorabji 1993, pp. 55–8). In Philo’s works, we find φιλοστοργία restricted in use to the love 
between parents and children (see citations in Roskam 2011, p. 183). On Plutarch’s expanded usage cf. 
Panagopoulos 1977, pp. 214–15. 
87 Bravery of Women 258D; Consolation to his Wife 698C, 609A, 609E; Table-Talk 634E; On the Cleverness of 
Animals 962A; Pericles 1.1; Demosthenes 22.2. Cf. Roskam 2011, p. 184 and n. 47. Cf. also Håland 2011, p. 22, 
who explores primarily a mother’s love for children as a central case. In On Brotherly Love, Plutarch writes that 
parents have no say in whether they feel affection for their children: “Nature does not give authority to judgment for 
benevolence nor await the proverbial measure of salt but gives birth to the starting-point of friendship [together with 
the birth of the child]” (ἡ φύσις ἡγεμονίαν τῇ κρίσει πρὸς εὔνοιαν οὐ δίδωσιν οὐδ’ ἀναμένει τὸν 
θρυλούμενον τῶν ἁλῶν μέδιμνον ἀλλὰ συγγεγέννηκε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς φιλίας). The love for offspring is 
automatic and not developed by continued association (cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.3, 1156b25–9) and is not 
within one’s power to deny. 
88 On Brotherly Love 483C. Cf. Roskam ad loc. 
89 On Brotherly Love 479C9–D2; Fabius Maximus 21.1; Cato The Younger 11.1–3. Cf. Roskam ad loc.  
90 Letter of Consolation to Apollonius 106B; Advice to Bride and Groom 140D and 144F; Agis 17.2; Cleomenes 1.2; 




The soul even has a certain natural love in itself…illegitimate children who have no 
relation to us and slaves take possession of our affection and settle to become occupants 
of it.        (Plutarch, Solon 7.2)91 
 
This expansion could be an exception and error in the direction our affections take. Before this 
expansion beyond one’s natural kin in [T107], the bonds of affection appear to be founded on 
what would today fall under the concept of a biological mandate to preserve offspring and one’s 
genetic inheritance. Conjugal affection even fits such a goal in promoting one’s offspring 
through conjoined parental care and shared heritable traits.92 Extending the domain of affection’s 
application outside of one’s natural family to adopted children and slaves, however, does not fit 
into these ways of viewing the proper objects of our affection. 
A further objection to the natural expansion of affection might be drawn from Plutarch’s 
biographical work on Pericles, where affection for offspring is described as misplaced: 
[T108] ξένους τινὰς ἐν Ῥώμῃ πλουσίους κυνῶν ἔκγονα καὶ πιθήκων ἐν τοῖς κόλποις 
περιφέροντας καὶ ἀγαπῶντας ἰδὼν ὁ Καῖσαρ ὡς ἔοικεν ἠρώτησεν, εἰ παιδία παρ’ 
αὐτοῖς οὐ τίκτουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ἡγεμονικῶς σφόδρα νουθετήσας τοὺς τὸ φύσει 
φιλητικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ φιλόστοργον εἰς θηρία καταναλίσκοντας, ἀνθρώποις 
ὀφειλόμενον. 
 
 When Caesar saw certain wealthy foreigners in Rome carrying and fawning on puppies 
and baby monkeys at their bosoms, he asked, as one reasonably would, whether the 
women did not have children they had given birth to among their own people, very 
masterfully criticizing those who waste the love and affection that is natural within us on 
beasts when it is owed to humans.    (Plutarch, Pericles 1.1) 
 
There is a misapplication of love and affection described in [T108], but it is in terms of species. 
Plutarch praises Caesar’s criticism of what he considers to be outlandish behavior but makes no 
                                               
91 I am surprised that Roskam 2011 does not mention this extension. 
92 While such an explanation would need to be adapted for Plutarch and philosophers of his time, we already find in 
Plato’s Symposium the idea that offspring are an extension of oneself, as though one might attain immortality 
through a series of descendants (206c1–208b6). There is a sense of purpose or explanation of care through tracked 




gesture to restrict affection to one’s own family members in this passage. It is, then, still an open 
question whether the extension in [T107] is an error or natural expansion of affection outside 
one’s own natural familial relations. 
Several other passages, however, confirm that affection follows an outward moving 
pattern to other humans, so that the expansion of affection in [T107] is not an aberration or 
misapplication but part of a natural progression. In a passage aimed against a Stoic target, for 
instance, Plutarch has his interlocutors argue that it seems odd to grant a capacity for 
φιλοστοργία to animals, but then to deny that they can attain its end: 
[T109] ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ᾿ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις, ὦ Σώκλαρε, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἄτοπον εἶναι 
δοκεῖ· τὴν γοῦν πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργίαν ἀρχὴν μὲν ἡμῖν κοινωνίας καὶ 
δικαιοσύνης τιθέμενοι, πολλὴν δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ ἰσχυρὰν ὁρῶντες παροῦσαν, οὔ 
φασιν αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾿ ἀξιοῦσι μετεῖναι δικαιοσύνης. 
 
But, Soclarus, this does not seem to those very men [our opponents] to be strange: they 
posit affection for offspring, at any rate, as the beginning of our social relations and 
justice and observe that it is present in animals in abundance and with great force, but 
they assert and claim that animals have no share in justice. 
      (Plutarch, On the Cleverness of Animals 962A–B1) 
Plutarch, in the context of another work that we will discuss next, denies that animals can attain 
the virtue of justice. Plutarch does not, however, deny that φιλοστοργία is in some sense 
foundational as a starting-point for human social interaction and also for justice in humans 
(ἀρχὴν μὲν ἡμῖν κοινωνίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης). Instead, he seems to agree with his Stoic 
opponents that justice is indeed the end-goal (τέλος) of φιλοστοργία in human development.93 
In another polemical passage, Plutarch affirms that affection is at the core of our 
sociability and even calls φιλοστοργία the “seed of justice”: 
[T110] τοῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλόστοργον ἀτελὲς καὶ οὐ διαρκὲς πρὸς 
δικαιοσύνην οὐδὲ τῆς χρείας πορρωτέρω προερχόμενον ἔδωκεν, ἄνθρωπον δέ, 
λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῷον, ἐπὶ δίκην καὶ νόμον εἰσάγουσα καὶ θεῶν τιμὰς καὶ 
                                               
93 On the “Affection Account” see §VI of Chapter 1. 
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πόλεων ἱδρύσεις καὶ φιλοφροσύνην, γενναῖα καὶ καλὰ καὶ φερέκαρπα τούτων 
σπέρματα παρέσχε τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα χάριν καὶ ἀγάπησιν, ἀκολουθοῦσαν ταῖς 
πρώταις ἀρχαῖς. 
  
 To non-rational animals [nature] has given a love for offspring that is imperfect, not 
sufficient for achieving justice, and which does not extend farther than utility, but to 
humans, rational and political animals, by introducing them to justice, law, the honors 
due to the gods, the foundings of cities, and friendliness, nature has given favor and love 
for offspring as seeds that are noble, and fruitful for producing all these things. This love 
and favor for offspring attends to their first beginnings. 
(Plutarch, On Affection for Offspring 495B9–C6) 
 
Plutarch makes affection the seed whose fruit is a host of features that belong to human 
sociability and civilization. Love of offspring, described as both φιλοστοργία and ἀγάπησις in 
an example of variatio,94 is the seed that bears the fruit (φερέκαρπον σπέρμα) of justice, law, 
honor due to the gods, the founding of cities, and friendliness in general. Our entire social life 
begins with this affection, Plutarch writes, which runs through every aspect of our orientations to 
others, including even our relations to the gods.95 Affection (φιλοστοργία), then, cannot be 
limited to promoting one’s own descendants, but must involve one’s interactions with other 
humans more generally, up to the point that we seek just relations among other humans. 
 Thus far, the inclusive nature of φιλοστοργία, moving from the love between parents 
and offspring to other humans, appears similar to the Stoic definition of affection as applicable to 
one’s friends as well as relatives (φίλοι καί οἰκεῖοι).96 In the Stoic definition, however, 
                                               
94 Contra Nygren 1969, ἀγάπη and other terms for love and affection are often interchangeable or overlap in sense 
both in Plutarch’s works as well as in Plato’s dialogues. See Plato, Phaedrus 253a6; Plutarch, On Compliancy 
528F1–4, Solon 7.2, Pericles 1.1. 
95 Cf. Roskam 2011, p. 194, who notes that this last feature is unique in Plutarch and not to be found in any Stoic 
account. Given my argument in Chapter 1, I agree, but my own view is that the Affection Account does not begin as 
a legitimate version of the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις, so I would not expect to find the Stoics ascribing to affection 
the foundations of our relationship to the gods any more than I would expect affection to be foundational to other 
social interactions on the Stoic theory. 
96 In the Stoic definition, “it is a certain skill concerned with the love of friends or relatives” (φιλοτεχνία τις οὖσα 
περὶ στέρξιν φίλων ἢ οἰκείων, Clement, Miscellanies 2.9.41.6=SVF 3.292). As Roskam notes (2011, p. 181), this 
is a rather broad definition. See also Hierocles’ outward movement of οἰκείωσις in Stob. 4.27.23 (p. 671, l. 7–p. 
673, l. 11)=LS 57G. 
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φιλοστοργία is a pro-attitudinal disposition of benevolence, a good feeling (εὐπάθεια), but not 
a passion.97 It represents a necessary standing attitude that a sage must have to qualify as a sage, 
but it cannot involve the vulnerability and sense of identification Plutarch sees as essential to true 
benevolence.98 For Plutarch, who follows the non-Stoic understanding of the concept,99 
φιλοστοργία is a passion and involves identifying with the concerns and well-being of others.100  
Plutarch gives some explanation for why affection is the beginning of our social life in 
his Dialogue on Love. Affection draws us out of ourselves into our social roles through a sense 
of assimilated identity. In Plato’s Republic, the city-planners are to foster a sense of shared 
identity with pleasures and pains felt in common between the guardian and philosopher-ruler 
classes (5, 462c2–d5). Alluding to this passage, Plutarch writes: 
[T111] “στέργεσθαι” δὲ καὶ “στέργειν” ἑνί μοι δοκεῖ γράμματι τοῦ στέγειν παραλλάττον  
εὐθὺς ἐμφαίνειν τὴν ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας ἀνάγκῃ μεμιγμένην εὔνοιαν. ῷ δ’ 
ἂν Ἔρως ἐπισκήψῃ ... καὶ ἐπιπνεύσῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς Πλατωνικῆς πόλεως “τὸ 
ἐμὸν” ἕξει καὶ “τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν”· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων”…ἀλλ’ οἳ  τοῖς 
σώμασιν ὁριζόμενοι τὰς ψυχὰς βίᾳ συνάγουσι καὶ συντήκουσι, μήτε βουλόμενοι 
δύ’ εἶναι μήτε νομίζοντες. 
  
The fact that “feeling affection and loving,” differs from “covering and protecting” by a 
single letter, seems to me to indicate that benevolence comes of necessity from being 
joined together over time and from familiarity. Whomever Love falls upon…and 
inflames, at first will consider “what’s mine” and “what’s not mine” as it is considered in 
Plato’s Republic [5, 462c2–3], since it is simply not the case that “all things are common 
between friends” [4, 424a2 and 449c5]…but [it is true] between those who, although 
separated by their bodies, bring their souls together per force and fuse them together, not 
desiring nor considering themselves to be two individuals any more.   
      (Plutarch, Dialogue on Love 767D5–E2) 
 
Love and affection draw one to see others not just as another self (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
                                               
97 See n. 115 in Chapter 1. 
98 See Chapter 1, §IV. 
99 Namely, the tradition we find exemplified in Plato’s Laws and in Aristotle’s and Philo’s works. 




9.4–10),101 but as the same self. Drawing on the image from Aristophanes’ speech in the 
Symposium (192d2–e9), one’s identity is melded and fused together with others through 
affection, drawing one outside one’s concern for oneself to the exclusion of others, to the 
inclusion of others in the concern for oneself.102 The good man (ὁ χρηστός), Plutarch writes, is 
seen 
[T4] καὶ τὸ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐ χρείαις οὐδὲ πράξεσι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ 
συναλγεῖν πταίουσι καὶ κατορθοῦσι συγχαίρειν ἐπιδεικνύμενος. 
 
displaying both his care and friendliness toward others, not only by his useful actions, but 
also by sharing in the grief of their misfortunes and sharing in the joy of their successes. 
    (Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft 823A9–B1) 
 
He exhibits true benevolence (εὔνοια) and affection, which involve sharing in the joys and pains 
of one another (συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451E4–6).103 
Our affection, expressed by στέργεσθαι and στέργειν in [T111], is foundational to our 
shared life together. Not only is it at the core of how we meet our obligations to care for children 
or associate with other citizens, but it also is found at work in the most intimate of our 
relationships. Affection brings us to identify with others to the point of “unification and shared 
nature” (ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυής, Plutarch, Advice to Bride and Groom 142E12–F8104), “fusing 
souls together” (τὰς ψυχὰς συντήκουσι, Dialogue on Love 767D5–E2=[T111]) and achieving 
                                               
101 See esp. 9.4, 1166a31–2; 9.9, 1170a2–4, 1170b6–7; 8.10, 1159b2–4. Cf. Eudemian Ethics 7.12, 1245a29–35. Cf. 
also Price 1989, p. 130. 
102 Pace Roskam 2004b, I do not see Plutarch as falling into the camp of those who formulate one’s concern for 
others as a means “to act oneself in a virtuous way” (p. 249), as though others were a means to one’s own fulfillment 
of actualization in virtue, “used as a mere means to reach one’s own τέλος of a φιλία πρὸς ἑαυτόν” (pp. 250–251). 
Roskam is concerned with analyzing how well we can understand Plutarch to have respected the views of others, 
both in his moral theory and in his practice as an author writing on different individuals and their views. Contra 
Roskam’s view, I have tried to place emphasis more on Plutarch’s view that we share our lives together by 
identifying with others, rather than to highlight, as Roskam sees it, Plutarch’s failure to respect others’ views when 
they conflict with Plutarch’s own. 
103 =[T5] in Chapter 1. 
104 =[T60] in Chapter 3. 
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“total blending” (δι’ ὅλων κρᾶσις, 766F3–5).105 
 
§IV Plutarch, Identification (οἰκείωσις), and Becoming Like God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) 
As should become clear from the preceding section, Plutarch “appropriates,” so to speak, 
the Stoic theory of identification / appropriation (οἰκείωσις) but modifies it in order to improve 
upon what he finds to be its deficiencies.106 Let me quickly retrace the steps. As we saw in 
Chapter 1 (§IV–§VI), Plutarch finds fault with the end-goal (τέλος) of Stoic ethical development 
founded on their theory of οἰκείωσις. The Stoic sage, the exemplar of virtue we are to emulate, 
fails to have true benevolence (εὔνοια ἀληθινή) according to Plutarch, because he is dissociated 
from his own passionate nature and has made his own human nature callous.107 He is insulated 
from others by his invulnerability; he is unaffected by whether or not he succeeds in benefitting 
others, and the condition of others in no way affects his own virtue or happiness. 
Drawing on what I called the Affection Account of οἰκείωσις in Chapter 1, Plutarch 
endorses a kind of starting-point (ἀρχή) for the shared life of communal living with the non-
rational passion of φιλοστοργία, a passion that we do not dispense with as we mature and 
progress in the ethical life that we share with others. As we found at the end of the last section, 
                                               
105 On the Stoic notion of total blending and other types of cohesion see §VI and n. 78 in Chapter 3.  
   Affection need not and cannot lead to such a total fusion with every human soul in one’s life. We cannot be friends 
with everyone in the same way (Plutarch, On Having Many Friends 93F3–94A1). As in obligations and our ability 
to socialize with our families, neighbors, and fellow citizens, affection comes in degrees. Albeit the extreme case is 
unfeasible, this passage describes a pattern of identifying our concern and interests with others that emerges from 
the first root of passionate affiliation. Cf. Van der Stockt 2011, esp. pp. 25 and 29. 
106 Karamanolis (2006, p. 122) is correct to point to On Common Notions 1060D2–E8 for Plutarch’s argument, 
similar to Antiochus’, that it makes little sense for the Stoics to argue that we are oriented to appropriate goods that 
are indifferent to happiness, which is achieved through virtue alone. In so doing, he aligns himself with Aristotle, 
Xenocrates, and Polemo (On Common Notions 1069E–F; cf. Dillon 2003 (pp. 139–40 and 161–2) on this passage), 
to improve upon the Stoic theory. Cf. also Boys-Stones 2014 (p. 299), who alludes to Plutarch, Dialogue on Love 
759E6–7 and the description of ἔρως as a power that is oriented to what is beautiful (δύναμις… οἰκειωτικὴ πρὸς 
τὸ καλὸν). Karamanolis and Boys-Stones, however, do not attend to the “Affection Account” of social 
identification as I have developed it here and to what I consider Plutarch’s more revolutionary attempt to correct the 
account of social identification and join it together with the Platonic ideal of becoming like god. 
107 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451E4–6; On Brotherly Love 483C4–7; Letter of Consolation to Apollonius 102C5–
E1=[T15] in Chapter 1. 
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the care and concern for others that Plutarch has in mind begins from φιλοστοργία and draws us 
to see others as ourselves and to identify their interests as our own (οἰκεῖον), even sharing in 
their sense of well-being and emotions outside of what is within our own power to choose (ἐφ’ 
ἡμῖν) in our emotional lives. Our joy and grief is affected by others (τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ 
συναλγεῖν, Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 451E4–6; τῷ συναλγεῖν πταίουσι καὶ κατορθοῦσι 
συγχαίρειν, Precepts of Statecraft 823A9–B1). By altering the Stoic account of οἰκείωσις as 
starting from the passion of φιλοστοργία, Plutarch outlines a pathway to communal life and 
justice that not only begins from a non-rational passion, but also continues to incorporate the 
emotional vulnerability he sees as necessary to genuine benevolence and concern for others. We 
will see shortly that this emotional attachment remains a part of Plutarch’s view of the 
fulfillment of human nature in the imitation of god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ). 
Unlike the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις, which is intended to explain the foundations of 
ethical development up to the summum bonum of becoming perfected in virtue, Plutarch’s 
version of identification through φιλοστοργία, though it lies at the beginning of our social lives, 
does not fully explain one’s progress to becoming virtuous and reaching the end-goal of human 
nature. Like other passionate seeds of virtue, φιλοστοργία requires cultivation by reason. 
Additionally, this non-rational passion does not provide our conception of the good. To explain 
how we acquire a conception of the good and achieve the end-goal of fulfillment in our human 
nature, Plutarch turns to the Platonic goal of becoming like god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ, Plato, 
Theaetetus 176a5–b2).108 
                                               
108 Gerson (1994, p. 263, n. 56) believes that this goal is described also in Plato’s Republic 1, 352a; 2, 383c; 10, 
610a and 621b; in Phaedo 78c; and in Phaedrus 249c. Mahoney (2004, p. 321, n. 1) also identifies Phaedo 79d and 
Phaedrus 248a as key passages, adding Timaeus 90a and Laws 4, 715c–716d. Cf. Alcinous, Handbook 28; Arius 
Didymus claims that even Socrates thought this was the goal (Stob. 2.7.3f (p. 49, ll. 8–9)). On Alcinous and 
becoming like god see Whittaker 1990, p. 137, n. 451, and Sedley 2012. 
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For Plutarch, as we will see in passages below, one is to emulate god not only through 
intellectual virtue to come to an understanding of what is good (On Isis and Osiris 382D4–E2109; 
On Quietude=Sandbach fr. 143110) but also through moral virtue, with qualities that aim at 
benefitting others.111 Plutarch is quite emphatic on this point, more so than is sometimes 
appreciated.112 The goal of becoming like god is sometimes thought to be merely the act of 
                                               
109 Plutarch couches the contemplation of god in language alluding to initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries, 
drawing the contemplation of god together with the Symposium’s attainment of union with the Form of Beauty and 
the Good (210a1): “The intellection of what is intelligible, pure, and simple, like a lightning-bolt illumining 
throughout the entire soul, lets one touch and see it once. For this reason Plato [Symposium 210a1] and Aristotle call 
this the ‘viewing’ part of philosophy, insofar as those who move past objects of appearance, mixture, and variation 
through reason and make the jump to that which is first, pure, simple, and immaterial, when they in fact actually 
touch the pure truth of it, consider it to be as though they have reached the fulfillment and end of the Mysteries of 
philosophy” (ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἁπλοῦ νόησις ὥσπερ ἀστραπὴ διαλάμψασα τῆς ψυχῆς, 
ἅπαξ ποτὲ θιγεῖν καὶ προσιδεῖν παρέσχε. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης “ἐποπτικὸν” τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς 
φιλοσοφίας καλοῦσιν, καθ’ ὅσον οἱ τὰ δοξαστὰ καὶ μικτὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ταῦτα παραμειψάμενοι τῷ λόγῳ 
πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἄυλον ἐξάλλονται καὶ θιγόντες ἀληθῶς τῆς περὶ αὐτὸ καθαρᾶς 
ἀληθείας οἷον ἐν τελετῇ τέλος ἔχειν φιλοσοφίας νομίζουσι). On the allusions to the Eleusinian Mysteries 
(τελετή) and “viewing” the mysteries (ἐποπτεία / τὸ ἐποπτικόν), see also n. 119 below. On Plutarch’s fusion of 
imitating and contemplating god with union and contemplation of the Forms and the Demiurge of the Timaeus see 
Jones 1926, p. 325; O’Brien 2015, pp. 85–6; Reydams-Schils 2017, pp. 154–6. 
110 =Stob. 4.16.18 (p. 398, ll. 7–10): “The possession of quietude seems to be something wise, especially for the 
practice of knowledge and wisdom. I do not mean that of a merchant or what is associated with buying and selling, 
but that great [knowledge and wisdom] which makes the one who receives it like god” (σοφὸν ἔοικε χρῆμα τὸ τῆς 
ἡσυχίας πρός τ᾿ ἄλλα καὶ εἰς ἐπιστήμης καὶ φρονήσεως μελέτην· λέγω δ᾿ οὐ τὴν καπηλικὴν καὶ ἀγοραίαν 
ἀλλὰ τὴν μεγάλην, ἥτις ἐξομοιοῖ θεῷ τὸν αὐτὴν ἀναλαβόντα). While Dillon (1977, pp. 192–3) takes this 
passage to be evidence that Plutarch is rejecting all practical wisdom in favor of contemplative and theoretical 
wisdom, that conclusion is not warranted. What Plutarch denies is that knowledge and wisdom associated with trade, 
a kind of cleverness, which he goes on to describe as “so-called keenness of mind, but really knavery” (τὴν 
λεγομένην δριμύτητα, πανουργίαν οὖσαν, ll. 11–13) contributes to one’s assimilation to the divine. 
111 Cf. Brenk 2012, who explores Plutarch’s monotheistic notions vis-à-vis other Middle Platonists and Egyptian, 
Jewish, and Christian views of monotheism, arguing that Plutarch believes that the supreme deity is personal in 
nature and fits with the descriptions of god in philosophical tradition that he inherits. This monotheistic trend in 
Plutarch does not, however, deny the existence or activity of lesser deities. Cf. also Dillon 2001a; Lanzillotta 2012; 
and O’Brien 2015, pp. 83–116. 
   Plutarch also rejects the idea of god as self-centered and only contemplating his own nature in On the 
Obsolescence of Oracles 426C1–D8, which he attributes to Aristotle, arguing that the supreme deity takes delight in 
watching over this world and the creatures therein. He also exhibits care and providence (ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πρόνοια) 
over what he has created. Plutarch seems to have passages such as Eudemian Ethics 7.12, 1245b14–19; Metaphysics 
Λ 7, 1072b14–30; and ibid. Λ 9, 1074b15–1075a10 in mind in his criticism of Aristotle’s view. 
112 Cf. Karamanolis, 2006, pp. 122–3, and 2014 (“6. Ethics and Politics”). Although Karamanolis notes that 
Plutarch’s ideal life involves a political and practical dimension, it is practically as a footnote to the ideal that, as 
Karamanolis believes, Plutarch advocates in terms of the contemplative life through theoretical reason alone, apart 
from passions and the active life. The same is true for Dillon 1977, pp. 192–8. Bonazzi 2012b (pp. 149–50), to 
whom I will refer below, Boys-Stones (2014, pp. 317–18 and nn. 35–6), drawing on Bonazzi 2012b, and Reydams-
Schils 2017 (pp. 154–8) appreciate the practical and ethical dimensions in Plutarch’s ideal, but do not develop the 
point as I do here. Cf. also Duff 1999, pp. 66 and 75, and Boys-Stones 2017, pp. 460–3. 
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contemplating truth through theoretical intellect (θεωρητικὸς νοῦς), dissociated from society 
and one’s own passionate nature, which Julia Annas describes as the problem of becoming 
“unworldly” or “some other kind of being” rather than fulfilling one’s own human nature.113 
While Plutarch describes an afterlife goal of transcending human nature,114 he lays greater 
                                               
113 Annas 1999, pp. 54–71. On the interpretation that the goal of assimilation to god is to become something 
radically different from what we are as human creatures, Annas (1999, p. 56) writes “Surely this is in itself an odd 
idea of virtue: how could virtue lie in altering yourself into some other kind of being?” She continues by describing 
the oddity that “it is in transcending our human nature, not fulfilling it, that we find happiness” (pp. 57–8). Among 
Plato’s dialogues, Annas (1999, pp. 70–1) sees Plato’s goal of assimilation to god as creating a tension between the 
contemplative life and the life of practical virtues: “There is a rift in Plato’s thought, as he is torn between 
conceptions of virtue as, on the one hand, an uncompromising but committed engagement with the world and, on the 
other, a flight from and rejection of it…. We can sympathize with both…. But it is not possible to combine these 
strands into a single set of ideas; one or other will suffer too much strain.” To help shed light on attempted 
resolutions to this tension, Annas draws upon Plotinus’ division of higher, intellectual virtues and lower, civic and 
moral virtues (πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί) in Plotinus’ Enneads 1.2 (pp. 66–71). Though she notes that this division may 
succeed in drawing the different notions of moral and intellectual virtue apart, it leaves the problem of which life is 
to take precedence. Sedley (1997 and 1999, pp. 316–28) presents a similar view in which imitation of god as 
incarnate beings in Plato’s dialogues involves contemplation of the divine with circular thoughts, dissociating 
oneself from one’s mortal passions and nature, and moving past moral virtues to the purely intellectual virtue of 
contemplation. See also Festugière 1950, Merki 1952. Contra this interpretation, cf. Hackforth 1936 and Menn 1992 
(pp. 555–8) and 1995 (pp. 6–18), who argue that god in Plato’s dialogues is to be identified with νοῦς and the 
Demiurge of the Timaeus, who acts in the world to make it as good as it can be. See also Neschke-Hentschke 1995 
(pp. 207–16), Armstrong 2004, Mahoney 2004 and 2005, Silverman 2010 (pp. 84–7), and Bonazzi 2012b (p. 150), 
who argue, contrary to Festugière 1950, Merki 1952, Sedley 1997 and 1999, and Annas 1999, that imitation of god 
in Plato’s works is active, looks to the good of others, and is achieved through moral virtues and practical action. 
   On the importance of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ as the goal among Platonists, see Alcinous, Handbook 152.30–153.24 
and 181.19–182.14; Stob. 2.7.3f (p. 49, l. 8–p. 50, l. 2); D.L. 3.78; Philo of Alexandria, On Flight and Finding 63; 
Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 5.14, 95.1–96.2. Cf. Armstrong 2004, p. 172: “Ever since ancient Platonists 
such as Eudorus, Philo, and Alcinous, Plato’s notion of ‘becoming like god’ (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ), or ‘following god’ 
(ἀκόλουθος θεῷ) has been understood to be a flight from this world to a higher one.” For references see Armstrong 
2004, p. 172, n. 2. Cf. also Dillon 1977, pp. 71 and 121. For a recent and concise discussion of the goal of becoming 
like god in Middle Platonists see Boys-Stones 2017, pp. 460–3. For the attribution of the formula “following god” to 
Pythagoras see Stob. 2.7.3f (p. 49, l. 16). Arius Didymus claims that Socrates and Plato agreed with Pythagoras in 
identifying becoming like god with following god, but, as Annas 1992 (p. 53, n. 4) argues, it is unclear to what 
extent this tradition is Neo-Pythagorean from Hellenistic times rather than from Pythagoras himself. See VII in 
Chapter 2. Cf. also Frede 1987. 
114 In a few places Plutarch describes the transcendence of human nature to pure, passionless intellection, by 
becoming a δαίμων (On the Sign of Socrates 593D2–8) when intellect (νοῦς) dissociates from the soul after death, 
which is left to dream on the surface of the moon apart from intellect (On the Face in the Moon 944E4–F5). Cf. 
Dillon 2001b, pp. 37–40, for further discussion of νοῦς and its relation to the human soul; cf. Babut 1969a, pp. 470–
2, on divinization and transformation of the soul after death; cf. Jones 1916, pp. 27–40, and O’Brien 2015, pp. 83–
116, on the relationship between different kinds of divine beings in Plutarch’s works. See also n. 118 below on the 
different accounts of δαίμονες and their relationship to human souls and human passions.  
   In On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, we also see souls that undergo metempsychosis “because of the 
weakness of their reason and laziness in contemplation they sink to rebirth for practical action” (ἀσθενείᾳ λόγου 
καὶ δι’ ἀργίαν τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἔρρεψε τῷ πρακτικῷ πρὸς γένεσιν, 565D7–8). This, however, is generally due to 
having lived a life of inordinate passions that entangle and weigh down the soul (565A8–67E3, esp. 566A).  
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emphasis on becoming like god with the whole of one’s human nature in the embodied life, 
aimed at benefitting others and developing one’s passions into the fully virtuous moral life 
(Plutarch, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 550A1–10, C12–E5; To an Uneducated Ruler 
780B8–792A5).115 
Just as Plato’s Demiurge attempts to make the universe the best it can be (Plato, Timaeus 
29a1–b1, e1–3; Laws 10, 903b4–e1), for Plutarch, human imitation of the divine is manifest in 
ruling and controlling the soul in its passions and development of virtue as a microcosmic 
imitation of the Demiurge ruling the world-soul.116 God, in fact, establishes himself as the model 
(παράδειγμα) to which we are to assimilate (ἐξομοίωσις πρὸς αὑτόν) through human virtue 
(ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετή, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 550D1–3).117  
In To an Uneducated Ruler, Plutarch outlines a kind of process that one uses to become 
like god. He writes that the wise become imitators of god from philosophy (ἐκ φιλοσοφίας), 
which implants the disposition within them (ἐμποιεῖ τὴν διάθεσιν) as they mold themselves into 
                                               
   On the separation of νοῦς from soul in Plato’s dialogues, see Euthydemus 287d7–e1; Philebus 30a9–10; Timaeus 
37a2–4, 46d5–6; and Sophist 239a4–8. Cf. also Menn 1995, pp. 19–24, and Hackforth 1936, who argue that νοῦς 
can exist apart from the soul in the intelligible realm. 
115 Plutarch provides a division of labor between passionless intellectual virtue and impassioned moral virtue (On 
Moral Virtue 444A3–B1; On the Sign of Socrates 588D9–10). See §I of Chapter 3. Cf. Dillon 1977, pp. 193–8; 
Roskam 2005, pp. 312–20, and Gill 2006. While Karamanolis (2006, pp. 122–3, and 2014, “6. Ethics and Politics”) 
and Dillon (1977, pp. 192–8) interpret this division as implying that only by intellectual virtues humans emulate god 
in Plutarch, I hope to show otherwise in this section. The post-mortem existence of pure contemplation is not the 
goal we are to seek while embodied in this life. Nor are we to seek death before the gods will it. Even in On 
Tranquility of Mind 476A10–C2, where Plutarch discusses the dissociation from passions at death, he seeks to 
alleviate the fear of death, not to praise the transition as something we should seek in this life. Cf. also Alt 1993, pp. 
185–204. On the prohibition of suicide in Plato’s Phaedo (64a4–c1), see Warren 2001, pp. 91–106, and Murray 
2001, pp. 247–55. 
116 Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler 780B8–10; Isis and Osiris 382A4–B4; On Moral Virtue 441E8–442A5; On 
the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1023D10–E7, 1025A–D, and 1026D. Cf. Reydams-Schils 2017 (p. 155), 
who argues that Plutarch moves beyond Plato’s Timaeus in describing the Demiurge as the god humans are to 
emulate. Cf. Brenk 2012, p. 80, and O’Brien 2015, pp. 84–6. See also n. 111 above. 
117 “God, establishing himself at the center as the model of all things noble, provides for human virtue to be an 
assimilation to himself in some manner for those who are able to follow god.” (πάντων καλῶν ὁ θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐν 
μέσῳ παράδειγμα θέμενος τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετήν, ἐξομοίωσιν οὖσαν ἁμωσγέπως πρὸς αὑτόν, ἐνδίδωσι 




his image (782A1–5). They contemplate his nature. In their approach to becoming like god, they 
first observe that the sun is a physical imitation of god within the sensible realm (781F1–782A5). 
What they grasp is that the sun imitates the divine as a physical being, even though god is not 
physical (780F1–4), and that the sun’s movement emulates the heavenly order, though not in an 
exactly identical pattern (Plutarch, Phocion 2.6–7). Likewise, human nature must also imitate 
god given the human condition, which involves the passionate nature, even though god does not 
have passions (On the Obsolescence of Oracles 420E2–6; Marcius Coriolanus 38.3–7118). So, 
although one contemplates the divine nature through reason alone (Table-Talk 718B7–D3)119 to 
                                               
118 “For god in no way resembles anything human, not in nature, activity, skill, or strength” (οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὐδαμῶς 
ἀνθρωπίνῳ προσέοικεν οὔτε φύσιν οὔτε κίνησιν οὔτε τέχνην οὔτ’ ἰσχύν, 38.6).  
   While god may not have passions, δαίμονες seem to share in both the power of god and the passionate nature of 
mortals (ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος θνητοῦ καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν, On the Obsolescence of Oracles 
416D4–5). Some δαίμονες are said to be the souls of humans whose passions remain after death to differing 
degrees (417B4–9). A few δαίμονες become completely purified of passions and godlike (ἐκ δὲ δαιμόνων ὀλίγαι 
μὲν ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ δι’ ἀρετὴν καθαρθεῖσαι παντάπασι θειότητος μετέσχον, 415B11–C1; cf. On the Face in 
the Moon 944E4–F5 and Romulus 28.10) while others return to mortal bodies (415C1–4). Other δαίμονες were 
never embodied and therefore were never human souls (431E1–3). 
119 Asking what it would mean for god to be doing geometry, Tyndares remarks that Plato often intimates that 
“geometry draws us away from turning toward sense-perception and turns us toward the intelligible and eternal 
nature, the sight of which is the goal of philosophy, just as ‘viewing’ is fulfillment of initiation into the Eleusinian 
Mysteries” (γεωμετρίαν ὡς ἀποσπῶσαν ἡμᾶς προσισχομένους τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀποστρέφουσαν ἐπὶ τὴν 
νοητὴν καὶ ἀίδιον φύσιν, ἧς θέα τέλος ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας οἷον ἐποπτεία τελετῆς, 718C9–D3). Cf. also On Isis 
and Osiris 382D4–E2: The intellection of what is intelligible, pure, and simple (ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ εἰλικρινοῦς 
καὶ ἁπλοῦ νόησις), which both Plato and Aristotle called the “viewing” part of philosophy (ἐποπτικὸν τοῦτο τὸ 
μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας), is achieved by ascending past sense-perception to thought alone. The language here is 
reminiscent of Eleusinian Mysteries, wherein one would achieve the final viewing of the mysteries after initiation 
through the lower stages. Cf. Plato, Symposium 210a1. Cf. also Plutarch, Alexander 7.5· “It is likely that Alexander 
received [from Aristotle] not only instruction in ethics and politics, but also participated in the unspeakable and 
deeper teachings that men do not introduce to many, calling them by the special names of lessons in ‘hearing’ and 
‘viewing’” (ἔοικε δ’ Ἀλέξανδρος οὐ μόνον τὸν ἠθικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν παραλαβεῖν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
ἀπορρήτων καὶ βαθυτέρων διδασκαλιῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνδρες ἰδίως ἀκροατικὰς καὶ ἐποπτικὰς προσαγορεύοντες 
οὐκ ἐξέφερον εἰς πολλούς, μετασχεῖν). Though Aristotle never uses the term ἐποπτικόν, Plutarch seems to take 
it to be the pinnacle and fulfillment of philosophy (ἐν τελετῇ τέλος φιλοσοφίας, On Isis and Osiris 382E1–2), 
perhaps drawing together Aristotle’s discussion of contemplation in the latter half of Nicomachean Ethics 10 (esp. 
10.7, 1177a12–10.8, 1179a32) with contemplation of the Forms in Plato’s dialogues, particularly Republic 7, 
514a1–520e2, Symposium 210a4–212a7. Annas (1992, pp. 53–4, n. 4), however, argues that the passages on 
contemplation in the latter half of Nicomachean Ethics appear to have had little impact on the view of “Aristotelian” 
ethics during the Hellenistic period, which leads her to doubt that there was much access to these passages of 
Aristotle during this period. The connection Plutarch draws between Plato and Aristotle in terms of ἐποπτεία is 
evidence that Plutarch, at least, had access to the Aristotelian view on divine contemplation. Plutarch’s criticism of 
Aristotle’s god as self-centered in his contemplation is further evidence. See n. 111 above. Cf. also Inwood 2014, 




see the image of god in the sun (To an Uneducated Ruler 780F8–781A4), one nevertheless 
imitates god through the whole person, including one’s passions, as much as one is able, forming 
oneself into a likeness of god through virtue (αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι᾿ ἀρετῆς 
καθιστάς, 780E9–F1).120 
The purpose of philosophy, Plutarch writes, is to produce living and active imitations of 
god, not inert statues at which one would marvel: 
[T112] oὐκ “ἀνδριαντοποιός” ἐστιν ὁ τῆς φιλοσοφίας λόγος, “ὥστ’ ἐλινύοντα ποιεῖν 
ἀγάλματ’ ἐπ’ αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος ἑσταότα” κατὰ Πίνδαρον· ἀλλ’ ἐνεργὰ βούλεται 
ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἅψηται καὶ πρακτικὰ καὶ ἔμψυχα, καὶ κινητικὰς ὁρμὰς ἐντίθησι καὶ 
κρίσεις ἀγωγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα καὶ προαιρέσεις φιλοκάλους καὶ φρόνημα καὶ 
μέγεθος μετὰ πραότητος καὶ ἀσφαλείας, δι’ ὧν τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι καὶ δυνατοῖς 
ὁμιλοῦσιν οἱ πολιτικοὶ προθυμότερον. 
 
The purpose of philosophy is not “statue-making, with the result that one makes statues 
that rest without moving, standing still upon their own base” as Pindar puts it [Nemean 
Ode 5.1–3], but it is wont to make whatever it touches active, effective, and full of life. It 
establishes within one active impulses and judgments that lead to what is beneficial, 
policies that aim at what is noble, and thoughtfulness and greatness with gentleness and 
security. Through these characteristics those engaged in politics more eagerly associate 
with those who are powerful and in power. 
(Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power 776C8–D3) 
 
                                               
120 Cf. Bonazzi 2012b, p. 150, who argues that Plutarch is not only correct to stress the practical life as consequential 
upon the contemplative life, but also is correct in understanding Plato’s own view in this interpretation: “Also in 
Plato, then, assimilation is not resolved in contemplation, but is a prerequisite for action. Indeed, Plutarch proves to 
be well aware of these Platonic reverberations. For sure, even granting that other Platonists (i.e. Antiochus or 
Alcinous) too have appreciated the weight of the practical consequences of theoria, Plutarch undeniably stood out 
among them as the one who stressed the importance of this aspect as the feature that best defines the nature of 
Platonism.” Cf. also Price 1989 (pp. 50–1), who argues that union with the Forms leads to appropriate virtuous 
actions toward others, and Silverman 2010 (p. 87), who writes: “If I am right that Plato never intends us to hive off 
the practical from our model divine mind, it is because he is committed to the thesis that knowing the good entails 
not only being good, and being imperviously happy, it also entails doing good, in whatever circumstances one finds 
oneself in, to the extent that doing good is possible. By such an exercise of reason, one models oneself on the divine 
mind.” Neschke-Hentschke (1995, pp. 207–16) also argues that assimilation to the divine includes practical action as 
an essential component. Speaking generally about Platonists, Boys-Stones (2017, p. 461) considers the goal of 
becoming like god and “flight” from this world to mean that one looks to the divine in contemplation and then acts 
in the world as a practical agent: “The Platonist definition of the end, in short, is not about swapping the human state 
for the divine, but about bringing the divine values to what we do as human beings…; not about becoming gods 
rather than humans…but realising what is divine in our humanity.” 
   Xenocrates also appears to have considered imitation of god to include one’s whole person. Happiness 
(εὐδαιμονία) is found in the soul that is morally virtuous (Aristotle, Topics 2.6, 112a36–8) and involves the 
passionate parts of the soul, which, as Xenocrates appears to have inferred from Plato’s Phaedrus, are essential 
components of the soul. Cf. Sedley 1999, p. 322, nn. 18–19. 
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Drawing on the Phaedrus’ image (252d5–e1), Plutarch up-ends the statue-making metaphor so 
that philosophy’s goal and purpose for human development is to create something that is quite 
the opposite of a statue, namely, practical agents.121 Philosophy makes everything active and 
effective that it touches (ἐνεργὰ καὶ πρακτικά).122 As we saw in Chapter 3 (§I), practical action 
requires passions. The imitation of god, then, will be as creatures endowed with passions through 
the exercise of practical reason (πρακτικὸς λόγος), not as passionless creatures enrapt in the 
exercise of contemplative intellect (θεωρητικὸς νοῦς) alone, which produces no practical 
action.123 As Plutarch additionally indicates in [T112], philosophy shapes and promotes certain 
impulses of soul, which are within the passionate nature, to seek after what is beneficial (ἐπὶ τὰ 
ὠφέλιμα). As imitators of god, humans promote and use certain passions for the benefit of their 
own constitution, activities, and, as will become more apparent in what follows, for the good of 
others. 
                                               
121 Cf. Irwin 1977, p. 269, who considers those treated like statues in the Phaedrus to be inert, passive recipients. 
Contra Irwin, cf. Price 1989, p. 101.  
122 Given this explanation, I take it that the goal outlined in Table-Talk 718C9–D3, i.e. contemplation of the divine, 
indicates the goal of philosophy in bringing us to an understanding of the pattern we are to imitate, but not bringing 
about the fulfillment of imitation as practical agents who confer benefits upon others. 
123 Cf. Karamanolis 2014 (“6. Ethics and Politics”): “To achieve this [becoming like god], one should let his 
intellect rule and get beyond having any emotions. This amounts to having and exercising theoretical virtue alone, 
which pertains to the intellect.” Contra Karamanolis, who cites That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 
1092E as evidence that Plutarch advocates the renunciation of moral virtue and the passions simpliciter to achieve 
the state of human happiness and imitation of god, the passage indicates otherwise. The passage reads as follows: 
“the good that is proper to the soul, genuine and truly of the soul is not irrational or introduced from without, but is 
most rational, naturally growing from the theoretical part of the soul that loves to learn or from the practical and 
honor-loving part of thought” (οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ψυχικὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ γνήσιον καὶ οὐκ ἐπείσακτον 
αὐτῶν τἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἄλογον, ἀλλ’ εὐλογώτατον ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ καὶ φιλομαθοῦς ἢ πρακτικοῦ καὶ 
φιλοκάλου τῆς διανοίας φυόμενον, 1092E5–8). Where Karamanolis believes that this indicates only theoretical 
reason without the passionate aspect of soul, he neglects to acknowledge that Plutarch also mentions that the good 
grows also from the practical and honor-loving part of the soul (τὸ πρακτικόν καὶ φιλόκαλον), which is 
passionate in nature and necessarily involved in moral virtues (see Chapter 3, §I). What the passage indicates is that 
the human good must be guided by reason, not by passions, but the latter are still necessary to the practical and 
moral life. Passions must be in harmony with reason, not opposed to it. Karamanolis also cites Tyrwhitt fr. 1.6–7 (p. 
68 in Sandbach’s Loeb edition), but (a) the general consensus is that this fragment is not a genuine work of Plutarch, 
and (b), like That Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible 1092E, the passage does not indicate that “civic 
virtues” (πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, cf. Plato, Republic 4, 430c, and Phaedo 82a; Plotinus, Enneads 1.2) occur without 
passion, but rather that the passionate part of the soul is affected and works simultaneously with reason as the 
passions are brought into measure by reason. 
 
 300 
Coming now to the world-stage of human activities, Plutarch also considers human 
imitation of god to be manifest in the correct ruling of cities, which aims at benefitting its 
citizens by bringing about virtues, chiefly justice and the rule of law within the state (To an 
Uneducated Ruler 780D3–9, 780E5–F2; Pericles 15.1–2124). The act of ruling (ἀρχεῖν) is an 
imitation of the divine, since “a ruler is the image of the god who orders all things” (ἄρχων δ᾿ 
εἰκὼν θεοῦ τοῦ πάντα κοσμοῦντος, To an Uneducated Ruler 780E6–7). One imitates god as a 
“craftsman of justice” (δίκης δημιουργός, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 550A1–10), 
Plutarch holds, just as the philosophic rulers of the Republic imitate the Demiurge of the 
Timaeus, becoming craftsmen of justice, moderation, civic virtues, and order in our world 
(δημιουργὸν σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς, Plato, 
Republic 6, 500d5–9125; Timaeus 29a3).126 
To become like god, Plutarch writes, is to imitate his beneficent qualities more than his 
display of power as ruler.127 With an outward focus, those who imitate god correctly attempt to 
emulate the type of ruler that he is, namely one who seeks the benefit of those whom he rules: 
[T113] [ὁ θεὸς, 780E10] τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ζηλοῦντας αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ 
φιλάνθρωπον ἀφομοιοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἡδόμενος αὔξει καὶ μεταδίδωσι τῆς περὶ 
αὐτὸν εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ πραότητος· ὧν θειότερον οὐ πῦρ ἐστιν 
οὐ φῶς οὐχ ἡλίου δρόμος οὐκ ἀνατολαὶ καὶ δύσεις ἄστρων οὐ τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ 
ἀθάνατον. 
 
                                               
124 =[T83] in Chapter 5. 
125  “‘If, then,’ I said, ‘there is some compulsion for him to practice what he saw there, implanting and molding the 
character of people both in private and in public, not just his own character, do you suppose that he would himself 
become a bad craftsman of moderation, justice, and all the rest of the civic virtues?’” (ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ 
ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν 
πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης 
τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;) 
126 Cf. Bonazzi 2012b, p. 150. Cf. also Reydams-Schils 2017, pp. 155–6, who argues that Plutarch, not Plato, is the 
one to make this connection between the philosophic-rulers’ activity as craftsmen of moderation and virtue and the 
Demiurge of Timaeus 29a3.  
127 To an Uneducated Ruler 780F10–781A1: “God grows angry with those who imitate his thunderings, bolts of 




[God] gladly brings to increase those who emulate his virtue and make themselves like 
him in nobility and love for humanity, and grants to them a share of his own good order, 
justice, truth, and gentleness. Compared to these qualities, nothing is more divine, not 
fire, not light, not the course of the sun, nor the rising and setting of the stars, nor 
immortality and eternity.   (Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler 781A1–7) 
 
The qualities that one emulates in making oneself like god are characteristics aimed at care and 
concern for others, namely love for humans, good order, justice, and gentleness (τὸ 
φιλάνθρωπον…εὐνομία καὶ δίκη καὶ πραότης).128 These other-regarding qualities, Plutarch 
claims, are more divine than the imitation of god’s awe-inspiring power and even the divine 
qualities of immortality and eternity.129 Drawing on his predecessor Polemo, Plutarch writes that 
our service to the gods is to look to the benefit of others. For Plutarch, unlike for Polemo, this 
activity follows from our imitation of the divine as ruler (ὁ ἄρχων) and is aimed not only at the 
salvation of and care for youths but for others in general (To an Uneducated Ruler 780D3–
7130).131 
The fulfillment of one’s own nature, found in imitating god in the ordering of one’s own 
                                               
128 Cf. Russell 1973, pp. 89–90: “What is notable in Plutarch is…the emphasis laid in all his moral judgments on 
mildness and humanity, praotes and philanthropia; these are qualities which, even if practiced in a self-regarding 
sense, involve at least some degree of concern and understanding for the feelings and aims of others.” Gentleness is 
itself a divine portion of virtue (θεῖον…μόριον ἀρετῆς τὴν πραότητα, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 
551C1–5). On gentleness (πραότης) in Plutarch see Martin 1960. Gentleness, as Martin notes (1960, p. 73, n. 27) is 
often linked with the virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη) in Plutarch’s writings (Lycurgus 28.13; Timoleon 37.5; Cicero 
6.1; Pelopidas 26.8; Pericles 2.5; Numa 6.3; 20.4; Lycurgus and Numa 4.13). Cf. also Hirzel 1912, pp. 23–32; 
Martin 1961; and Alexiou 2008, pp. 371–2, for the concept of φιλανθρωπία in Plutarch. On the personal nature of 
god with benevolent and beneficent characteristics cf. Brenk 2012 and n. 111 above. 
129 Cf. Plutarch Aristides 6.5: Although we are disposed to desire the divine in terms of immortality (καίπερ οὕτω 
διακείμενοι τῆς μὲν ἀθανασίας ἐπιθυμοῦσι), it is not something that our nature can obtain (ἥν ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν οὐ 
δέχεται). Virtue (ἀρετή) is the only aspect of the divine we can and ought to emulate (μόνον ἐστὶ τῶν θείων 
ἀγαθῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἐν ὑστέρῳ τίθενται). Cf. Plato, Symposium 206c1–208b6, where Diotima describes immortality 
as the goal that we all share. Sedley (1999, p. 310) considers this goal in the Symposium to be “Plato’s first serious 
brush with the idea, so influential in his aftermath, that god sets the standard for all lower life forms to emulate.” 
Plutarch, however, considers it a distracting goal that leads us away from the true imitation of god. 
130 For Polemo used to say that love is “service to the gods for the care and salvation of the youth, but one could 
more truly say that rulers serve god for the care and preservation of humans” (Πολέμων γὰρ ἔλεγε τὸν ἔρωτα 
εἶναι “θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εἰς νέων ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν”· ἀληθέστερον δ’ ἄν τις εἴποι τοὺς ἄρχοντας 
ὑπηρετεῖν θεῷ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν). On the notion that service to the god is a form of 
assimilation to god, see Boys-Stone 2017, pp. 323–32, and 460. 
131 Cf. Plutarch, Alcibiades 4.3–4 and Theseus and Romulus 1.6; Cf. also Plato, Symposium 184d–e; Phaedrus 240d, 
wherein lovers are said to render service to their beloveds. 
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soul, thus moves us outside ourselves,132 since it leads us to cultivate personal qualities that aim 
at the benefit of others.133 After bringing their own souls into good order through reason and 
intelligence, Plutarch explains, individuals serve god in caring for and saving other individuals 
through political engagement (Philosophers and Men in Power 777C1–7134; To an Uneducated 
Ruler 780B8–10,135 780D3–7136; Precepts of Statecraft 799B1–8,137 800A11–B4138; Phocion 2.6–
                                               
132 To be engrossed in concern for oneself (φιλαυτία) for Plutarch is a basic vice. See How to Tell a Flatterer from 
a Friend 48E–49B and 65E–66A; On Listening to Lectures 40F; Theseus and Romulus 2.2; Dion 46.2. Cf. 
Ingenkamp 1971, pp. 131–2; Opsomer 1998, pp. 151–5; Van der Stockt 1999 (esp. p. 594, n. 46) and Roskam 
2004b, pp. 251–2 and n. 22. 
133 On the concern for others, extending even to barbarians in Plutarch see Hirzel 1912, pp. 23–32. Pace Vlastos 
1981 and Reshotko 2006, we find a similar pattern of self-fulfillment and benefaction toward others already in 
Plato’s Phaedrus. The desire of the lover to improve the beloved is not self-interested in one’s own self-
improvement or progress. Contra Price (1989, pp. 96–102), neither is this desire aimed at one’s own self-fulfillment 
in becoming immortalized through another, for which see Ferrari 1991, pp. 180–2. 
134 “The end-goal of both internal and uttered speech is friendship, with oneself [through internal speech] and with 
another [through uttered speech]. For the former [i.e. internals speech], coming to completion in virtue through 
philosophy, provides the man always as harmonious with himself, blameless in the eyes of others, and full of peace 
and friendliness toward himself” (καὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ φιλία τέλος ἐστί, τοῦ μὲν 
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τοῦ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλοσοφίας τελευτῶν σύμφωνον ἑαυτῷ καὶ 
ἄμεμπτον ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μεστὸν εἰρήνης καὶ φιλοφροσύνης τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀεὶ παρέχεται τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον).  
135 “The ruler must first establish rule within himself and make straight his own soul and make firm his character and 
then in the same way make what is subject to his rule [in the city] in harmony with his character” ([δεῖ, 780B5] 
παραπλησίως τὸν ἄρχοντα πρῶτον τὴν ἀρχὴν κτησάμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κατευθύναντα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ 
καταστησάμενον τὸ ἦθος οὕτω συναρμόττειν τὸ ὑπήκοον).  
136 Quoted in n. 130 above. 
137 The statesman “must turn himself to the understanding of the citizens’ character, which is especially manifest as 
a mixture of all of their characters and is strong. For it is not easy or without risk for him to straightway attempt to 
form the character of the people and bring it into harmony, but it requires both a great deal of time and great power” 
(τρέπεσθαι χρὴ πρὸς κατανόησιν τοῦ ἤθους τῶν πολιτῶν, ὃ μάλιστα συγκραθὲν ἐκ πάντων ἐπιφαίνεται καὶ 
ἰσχύει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἠθοποιεῖν καὶ μεθαρμόττειν τοῦ δήμου τὴν φύσιν οὐ ῥᾴδιον οὐδ’ 
ἀσφαλές, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρόνου δεόμενον πολλοῦ καὶ μεγάλης δυνάμεως). 
138 “The statesman, while in power and while he is trusted, ought then to try to bring the character of the citizens into 
harmony gently, leading them to what is better and handling them with delicacy” (τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτῶν ἦθος 
ἰσχύοντα δεῖ καὶ πιστευόμενον ἤδη πειρᾶσθαι ῥυθμίζειν ἀτρέμα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ὑπάγοντα καὶ πράως 
μεταχειριζόμενον, 800A11–B2). To do this, one must bring one’s own soul into harmony: “exercise and bring into 
order your own character” (ἐξάσκει καὶ κατακόσμει τὸν τρόπον, 800B4). 
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9139; Dion 10.1–3140).141 Plutarch goes so far as to write that the greater accomplishment of 
philosophy, beyond what Plato wrote in his works on laws and constitutions, was the philosophy 
he implanted in the souls of his followers who worked to make the states in which they lived 
better (Reply to Colotes 1126B6–D7).142 The virtuous, for Plutarch, seek to emulate god in 
bringing about justice (Aristides 6.3–5),143 but one need not hold any office to act as a statesman, 
                                               
139 One emulates the sun, which, “as the mathematicians say, does not follow the heavenly movements with exactly 
the same movement” (ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ἥλιον οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λέγουσι μήτε τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ οὐρανῷ φερόμενον 
φοράν), but because of its slight deviations, “everything on earth is preserved and receives the best temperature” (ᾗ 
σῴζεται πάντα καὶ λαμβάνει τὴν ἀρίστην κρᾶσιν). The ruler likewise is to imitate the heavenly, godlike pattern 
in the inexact pattern that will promote the benefit of the state and its citizens. 
140 Dion encourages the young ruler Dionysius II to seek philosophical education “so that, becoming ordered in his 
character toward virtue by reason, and becoming like the most divine and most beautiful pattern of reality, which, 
because everything obeys it as its leader, the world is ordered from a disorderly state, he might acquire great 
happiness for himself and great happiness for the citizens” (ὅπως διακοσμηθεὶς τὸ ἦθος εἰς ἀρετὴν λόγῳ, καὶ 
πρὸς τὸ θειότατον ἀφομοιωθεὶς παράδειγμα τῶν ὄντων καὶ κάλλιστον, ᾧ τὸ πᾶν ἡγουμένῳ πειθόμενον ἐξ 
ἀκοσμίας κόσμος ἐστί, πολλὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν ἑαυτῷ μηχανήσεται, πολλὴν δὲ τοῖς πολίταις, 10.2–3). 
141 Cf. Plato, Republic 4, 443c9–442a2: One achieves a state of justice within one’s soul by bringing together all of 
its parts into a unity, binding them together entirely into one, becoming both moderate and harmonious (πάντα 
ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, 443e1–2). In so 
doing, he is putting his own parts in good order, beginning with himself and the three parts of his soul that he 
arranges, which are dear to himself, and become harmonious with one another (τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ 
ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, 443D3–
6). After arranging his own soul, he acts in accordance with his just constitution in his practical affairs and his 
engagement with others (οὕτω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη, 443e2–3). He, in fact, preserves his own constitution and brings it 
to completion by acting in accordance with his constitution to achieve justice and noble deeds (ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις 
ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πρᾶξιν, ἣ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν σῴζῃ τε καὶ 
συναπεργάζηται, 443e4–6). Cf also Republic 6, 500d5–9, quoted in n. 125 above. 
142 Cf. Bonazzi 2012b, pp. 145–6, for further discussion of this passage: “These are the products of the Academy 
and this is the legacy a Platonist can go proud of: no matter how wise or well-argued, a philosophical discourse is 
worthless unless it is able to bring about fitting actions…. Platonism can claim its superiority over other schools: the 
preeminence of Platonist philosophy is proven through their deeds, and their deeds depend on their philosophy” (p. 
146). Cf. also Plutarch, Precepts of Statecraft 798B4–C6, where, quoting Iliad 9.443, Plutarch describes the 
philosopher not only as a speaker of speeches, but also as a doer of deeds, since one could observe that the 
philosopher’s life (φιλοσόφου βίος) is demonstrated in political actions and public struggles (ἐν πράξεσι 
πολιτικαῖς καὶ δημοσίοις ἀγῶσι), since it is borne out in examples that are accomplished in deed and not merely 
word (παραδειγμάτων ἔργῳ μὴ λόγῳ περαινομένων). Plutarch is particularly critical of prominent members of 
the Stoa, naming Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Antipater, in particular, for being inconsistent 
between their teaching that one ought to benefit others through engagement as political citizens and their practice of 
staying out of any meaningful political engagement, living the life of leisured study (σχολαστικὸς βίος, On Stoic 
Self-Contradictions 1033A1–1034C5). The Epicureans serve as an additional target for lack of useful political 
activity (Whether “Live Unknown” is a Wise Precept 1128A–130E and Reply to Colotes 1126C5–1127E7). Cf. 
Roskam 2004b, p. 245, and Bonazzi 2012b, pp. 141–6. On the overlap between the σχολαστικὸς βίος of the Stoics 
that Plutarch criticizes, and the βίος θεωρητικός of reason alone, see Plutarch, Lucullus 1.6; Cicero 3.3. Cf. also 
Centrone 2000, pp. 576–8, and Bénatouïl 2009.  
143 Plutarch similarly reports that humans endeavor to emulate the divine in terms of incorruption / immortality, 
power, and virtue (τὸ θεῖον, ᾧ γλίχονται συνοικειοῦν  καὶ συναφομοιοῦν ἑαυτούς, τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, 
ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἀρετῇ), but that virtue, particularly justice, is the greatest emulation of the divine, is 
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but instead, by engaging others within one’s own life, one can act as a true statesman in seeking 
the good for oneself and others outside of official political positions (Whether an Old Man 
Should Engage in Politics 796C8–797A4).144 
In becoming virtuous, moreover, each imitates god according to their own nature and 
particular gifts, not just according to the limitations and conditions of human nature. We are each 
endowed with different allotments of passions, as though our passionate nature is sown from 
scattered seeds (On Tranquility of Mind 474C1–5),145 and each is to pursue imitation of the 
divine as a virtuous individual, given their own kind of life and the passionate nature fitted to it, 
since the storehouse of goods and evils lies within their own particular soul (473B7–10).146 These 
differences are not to be a cause for despair for those who are not born with the potential to 
become a Plato and write about the nature of reality (472B4–6 and 472D1–10). Just as the 
                                               
the most divine and revered of these qualities (ὧν καὶ σεμνότατον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θειότατόν ἐστιν) and is the only 
divine good that is within our power (τὴν δ’ ἀρετήν, ὃ μόνον ἐστὶ τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). 
   Reydams-Schils (2017, pp. 144–7) argues, contra Bonazzi (2012b, pp. 149–50) that human emulation of justice in 
Plato’s Theaetetus should be understood as aimed solely at achieving harmony within the soul, not toward bringing 
justice into the world within one’s community. For Plutarch, as I hope is clear in this section, emulation of god 
should be in terms of psychic harmony and practical action aimed at bringing justice to one’s community through 
actions for the benefit of others. 
144 On the connection drawn between politics and philosophy in Plutarch see Trapp 2004, pp. 193–8. Contra the 
view of Centrone 2000 (pp. 578–81), Bonazzi 2012b (pp. 151–3) convincingly argues that the political and 
philosophical lives in Plutarch’s view are not merely parallel activities and types of life, but can be collapsed into 
the same endeavor when understood as aimed at one’s own good and the benefit of others; one need not hold a 
political office to do so. Cf. Plato, Gorgias 521d6–522a7: Socrates claims to be perhaps the only true practitioner of 
the craft of politics, making men better, even though he serves in no official political role as a statesman. On 
providing political benefit as an advisor to those in rule, see Plutarch Cicero 52.4, Numa 20.8–9, and Dion 1.3. Cf. 
also Roskam 2002, pp. 175–89, and Bonazzi 2012b, pp. 153–5. Plutarch himself was politically active. On 
Plutarch’s attempts to be politically active as a philosopher see Centrone 2000, pp. 575–6 and Van Hoof 2010, pp. 
66–80. See also §II of the Introduction. 
145 “Since our nature receives from birth the seeds of each of these passions mixed together, and for this reason has a 
great unevenness to it, the man with sense prays for what is better while expecting even the worse, but nevertheless, 
by removing excess, he makes use of both” (τούτων ἑκάστου σπέρματα τῶν παθῶν ἀνακεκραμένα 
δεδεγμένης ἡμῶν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἐχούσης, εὔχεται μὲν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων τὰ 
βελτίονα, προσδοκᾷ δὲ καὶ θάτερα, χρῆται δ’ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρῶν). 
146 “The differences of passions make clear that every individual has the storehouses within himself of contentment 
and despondency, i.e. the jars of goods and evils, not “stored on the floor of Zeus,” [Homer, Iliad 24.527] but 
established within the soul” (ὅτι δ’ ἕκαστος ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τῆς εὐθυμίας καὶ δυσθυμίας ἔχει ταμιεῖα, καὶ τοὺς 
τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν πίθους οὐκ “ἐν Διὸς οὔδει κατακειμένους” ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κειμένους αἱ διαφοραὶ 
τῶν παθῶν δηλοῦσιν). 
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different deities have precincts of their own, we are to follow the gifts and strengths of our nature 
as we seek to imitate them and follow in their train (472A11–C5 and 473A7–8; cf. Plato, 
Phaedrus 252c3–253c6), which, once again, are largely determined by the kinds of passions and 
potential strengths of soul with which we are born. The type of life we lead follows from our 
natural dispositions, as a shoe moves with a foot (On Tranquility of Mind 466F2–4).147 Thus, we 
are to seek the harmony of virtue within our soul by blending our own particular elements 
according to our nature (474B1–3148 and 474C1–5149).150 
So, far from escaping all the passions to become like god, swept away from concern 
about human foolishness (φλυαρία) to contemplate reality by oneself,151 human likeness to god 
is manifest in moral virtues and the care for others in the world of here-and-now, in addition to 
contemplation of the divine. The theoretical life should lead one to live a practical life. As Mauro 
Bonazzi writes, “In Plutarch, homoiosis is never limited to the exercise of mere contemplation, 
but actually comes to a head through practical activity.”152 Becoming morally virtuous is part of 
the goal of the theoretical-cum-practical life that Plutarch envisions as conjoined, not mutually 
exclusive, “since the soul is both theoretical and at the same time practical in its nature” (καὶ 
                                               
147 “Thus, just as the shoe is twisted together with the foot and not the other way around, so do our dispositions 
make our lives like themselves” (ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ὑπόδημα τῷ ποδὶ συνδιαστρέφεται καὶ οὐ τοὐναντίον, οὕτω 
τοὺς βίους αἱ διαθέσεις συνεξομοιοῦσιν αὑταῖς). Plutarch, I take it, means that the foot drives the shoe this way 
or that, not that we force the foot to turn with the shoe. 
148 “Like musicians who always dull the worse elements by means of the better ones and encompass the bad with the 
good, [individuals should] make the mixture of their life harmonious and fitting to themselves” ([δεῖ] ὥσπερ 
ἁρμονικοὺς ἀμβλύνοντας ἀεὶ τοῖς κρείττοσι τὰ χείρονα καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τοῖς χρηστοῖς ἐμπεριλαμβάνοντας 
ἐμμελὲς τὸ τοῦ βίου μ⟨ε⟩ῖγμα ποιεῖν καὶ οἰκεῖον αὑτοῖς). 
149 See note 145 above. 
150 Cf. Panaetius’ four personae theory in which our universal rational nature, our own particular nature, our 
circumstances, and deliberate choice must be taken into consideration to determine what is appropriate (Cicero, On 
Duties 1.107–115). Cf. also Dillon 2010a who analyzes the failures of Dion and Brutus in their efforts to change the 
ruling regimes of their own times. They fail to take into account circumstances. 
151 Symposium 211e2–3; cf. Phaedo 62b, 64b–c, 64e–65a, 82d–e, and 115c.  
152 Bonazzi 2012b, p. 150. 
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μὴν θεωρητικῆς γε τῆς ψυχῆς οὔσης ἅμα καὶ πρακτικῆς, On the Generation of the Soul in 
the Timaeus 1025D11–E1).153 
 Comparing Plutarch’s view now with the Stoic end of virtue, Plutarch identifies the end-
state of “obeying reason” (τὸ πείθεσθαι λόγῳ) with “following god” (τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεῷ, On 
Listening to Lectures 37D9–E4)154 and “imitating god” (On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance 
550A1–10 and C12–E5).155 Stoics, probably drawing on Platonic sources, also identify the goal 
of becoming virtuous and “living in conformity with reason”156 with becoming equal to god in 
virtue (Plutarch, On Common Notions 1076A7–8=LS 61J).157 All of nature seeks to imitate god 
(On the Face in the Moon 944E6–8),158 but for Plutarch the imitation of god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ) 
                                               
153 See Bonazzi 2012b, esp. pp. 146–55 and 159. Bonazzi write that “theoria leads the way and is fulfilled through 
praxis” (p. 148). In his concluding remarks, Bonazzi also states: “Plutarch essentially rejects the contraposition 
between active and contemplative life as if they were two separate kinds of life addressing distinct objects and 
competences: Platonism is the philosophy that is capable of overcoming this false conflict, not by committing itself 
first to theoria and then to praxis (the model for mixed life), but by displaying the necessary union that should bind 
theoria and praxis.” 
   Alcinous also considers the practical life compatible with the theoretical life, but considers the practical life 
secondary, though not incompatible with the contemplative life: “From what has been said, it is in no way fitting for 
a philosopher to abstain from contemplation, but always to nurture it and make it increase, and, following it, to 
pursue the practical life also” (πρέπει δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ φιλοσόφῳ μηδαμῶς τῆς θεωρίας 
ἀπολείπεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ταύτην τρέφειν καὶ αὔξειν, ὡς ἑπόμενον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν πρακτικὸν χωρεῖν βίον, 
Handbook 2.3.5–8). See also Apuleius, On Plato 2.23, who also views the contemplative and practical life as 
compatible, and D.L. 3.78. Eudorus also appears to hold moral virtue to be a key component of the good life and 
happiness (Stob. 2.7.3f (p. 49, ll. 8–25)). Cf. Sedley 1999, p. 322, n. 19; Annas 1999, p. 59; and Boys-Stones 2014, 
p. 318. 
154 =[T93] in Chapter 5. 
155 See also Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler 780E9–F1 and 781A1–7=[T93]; Dion 10.1–3 and Aristides 6.3–5 
above. 
156 Stob. 2.7.5b10 (p. 66, l. 14–p. 67, l.4=LS 61G=SVF 3.560); 2.7.6e (p. 77, l.16–27=LS63A=SVF 3.16); 2.7.6a (p. 
75, l. 11–p. 76, l.8=LS 63B); Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 4.2.10–18=LS 65J=SVF 3.462. Cf. D.L. 
7.85–6=LS 57A=SVF 3.178. 
157 According to Chrysippus, “Zeus does not exceed Dion in terms of virtue” (ἀρετῇ τε γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερέχειν τὸν 
Δία τοῦ Δίωνος), reaching his perfection as a rational being in terms of his rational nature (D.L. 7.94). Chrysippus 
also enjoins us to emulate the “administrator of the whole” (τῶν ὅλων διοικητής, D.L. 7.87–8). He thus “co-opts 
the end of the Timaeus” (Reydams-Schils 2017, p. 148). Reydams-Schils (2017, pp. 148–9 and 156–7) also points to 
the Stoic quotation that Zeus is the beginning, middle, and fulfillment of all things (Plutarch, On Common Notions 
1074B) as an appropriation of Plato’s Laws 4, 715e7–716a2, in addition to the notion that human beings are the 
imitation (μίμημα) of the divine in Musonius Rufus 17 and l. 4 in Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus. The scholiast to this 
passage in the Laws connects this god with the Demiurge and attributes the idea to the Orphic tradition. 
158 “The desirable, beautiful, divine and blessed [nature that appears in the image of the sun], which all nature in 
different ways stretches out toward with longing… (τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον, οὗ πᾶσα 
φύσις, ἄλλη δ’ ἄλλως ὀρέγεται…). Cf. Helmig 2005, pp. 21–3. See Carpenter 2010 for an analysis of plants’ 
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and following our rational nature, the τέλος or end-goal of human nature, does not require a 
renunciation of our passions in this life, but instead involves their incorporation and integration 
within our human nature. We are to identify with the rational part within ourselves to guide and 
form our own desires and passions to be in harmony with reason (Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 
378C9–11159; On Moral Virtue 444C6–D1, 444E9–445A2, 449F2–4; Platonic Questions 9, 
1008E3–1009B2, 1009A1–B2; On Moral Progress 84A5–10; On the Delays of the Divine 
Vengeance 550E2–5160). 
Marrying a theory of identification (οἰκείωσις) through affection (φιλοστοργία) with 
the goal of becoming like god (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ),161 Plutarch avoids the pitfalls of the Stoic 
                                               
psychic capacities in Plato’s Timaeus and their derivative sense of desire and stretching toward completion as part of 
the cosmos. Cf. also Menn 1995, pp. 40–2. 
   On the Aristotelian active intellect of god in On the Soul 3.5 and cosmic emulation of it as final cause see Caston 
1999. For Stoic cosmology and its relationship to Aristotle’s biological model, particularly the notion that the 
universe emulates the divine through the agency of the λόγος σπερματικός, see D.L. 7.135–6 and 148–9; Hahm 
1977; Horowitz 1998, pp. 26–34. See also Zeller 1892, p. 172. 
159 “For nothing of those things that a human has by nature is more divine than reason, nor do any of these things 
have a greater influence for happiness” (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὧν ἄνθρωπος ἔχειν πέφυκε θειότερον λόγου καὶ μάλιστα 
τοῦ περὶ θεῶν, οὐδὲ μείζονα ῥοπὴν ἔχει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν). Cf. also ibid. 351C–D and Ferrari 1995, pp. 18–20. 
160 “For there is no greater benefit that a human naturally derives from god than to become settled in virtue by 
imitating and pursuing the noble and good qualities in god’s nature” (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅ τι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπος 
ἀπολαύειν θεοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ τὸ μιμήσει καὶ διώξει τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν 
καθίστασθαι). 
161 I argue here that Plutarch unites a version of οἰκείωσις with the Platonic goal of becoming like god (ὁμοίωσις 
τῷ θεῷ), even though the latter is often presented as the Platonic alternative to Stoic οἰκείωσις. See Shorey 1929, 
who draws on the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus 7.14–20 on this point. Boys-Stones (2014) also 
argues that the Platonic foundational theory of ethics is incompatible with the Stoic foundational theory of ethics 
found in οἰκείωσις, because, for a Platonist, one could never derive the concept of the good from the Stoic theory of 
οἰκείωσις, which can only be found through the Form of the Good. According to Boys-Stones, this theory could be 
accepted by Platonists for animal behavior, but not for the formation of human virtue (cf. Boys-Stones 2017, p. 462). 
See also Reydams-Schils 2017, for similar sentiments. For Plutarch, his version of οἰκείωσις and the Platonic goal 
of becoming like god are not mutually exclusive, since he does not take οἰκείωσις as describing the entire 
foundation of ethics, but instead as the starting-point and seeds, as it were, of our social lives and justice. 
   As Boys-Stones notes (2014, pp. 300–1, n. 7), Philo of Alexandria attempts to identify a form of οἰκείωσις with 
the Platonic goal of assimilation to the divine, contrasting this οἰκείωσις with another that aims at the care for the 
body (On the Descendants of Cain 12.2–7; 135.4–6; 157.1–4 and On the Giants 29.1–2). Although Philo’s view 
bears some similarity with Plutarch’s, since he writes that for humans to receive their fitting end, a strong love must 
be present (εἰ μὴ προσγένοιτο σφοδρὸς ἔρως…δίχα μὲν οἰκειώσεως τῆς πρὸς αὐτὰ τὸ ἁρμόττον τέλος οὐ 
λαμβάνει, 157.1–4), Philo describes οἰκείωσις as providing “seeds of thought” (τὰ φρονήσεως σπέρματα, On the 
Descendants of Cain 135.4–6), unlike the passionate seeds of justice that lie at the beginning of Plutarch’s account 
of οἰκείωσις. 
   Some have thought that Polemo laid the groundwork for a Platonic form of οἰκείωσις or prefigured the theory as 
structured by Zeno (institutio veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, Cicero, On Ends 5.23, for which, see Dillon 2003, 
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theory of οἰκείωσις, which, as I argued in Chapter 1, he sees as alienating us from our own care 
and concern for others and our own passionate desires. He dodges the Charybdis, as it were, of 
Stoic personal virtue that Plutarch believes to be too inward-focused, spiraling too much into 
concern for the preservation of one’s own constitution through appropriate actions, since our 
social lives begin with passion. At the same time, he also avoids the Scylla, as it were, of 
Platonic renunciation of the active life, moral virtues, and the passions. 
*** 
 In coming to the end of this final chapter, we revisited the first. I began Chapter 1 with 
Plutarch’s criticisms of the Stoic ideal life and its development from their theory of οἰκείωσις. 
We ended with Plutarch’s own form of οἰκείωσις and the end-goal of becoming like god 
(ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ). We found that Plutarch, far from slavishly copying his predecessors or 
collecting their views together into a contradictory amalgam of philosophical principles, adapts 
and modifies these views to fit within his own philosophical view. Together with pregnant 
metaphors, Plutarch presents his own view in which passions play an important and positive role 
from our nascent desire and initial impulses toward virtue through to the culmination of human 
nature. In contrast with the austere requirements of becoming free from passions in the Stoic 
ideal or leaving this world behind together with our human nature to become a creature of pure 
contemplation, Plutarch presents an attractive alternative kind of life. Plutarch preserves the best 
parts of our passionate nature, highlights their importance for moral progress, and incorporates 
them into the good life. He develops a form of passionate Platonism. 
                                               
pp. 162–5). See the quotation of Polemo in To an Uneducated Ruler 780D3–7 (quoted in n. 136 above). The 
evidence for a fully-fledged Platonic form of οἰκείωσις attributable to Polemo, however, is unsubstantiated and 
speculative at best. Cf. Tarrant 2012, pp. 158–62 and n. 17; Renaud and Tarrant 2015, pp. 109–10. 
   On Antiochus’ version of οἰκείωσις, described in Cicero, On Ends 5, and its similarities and differences from the 





In contrast with his contemporaries and predecessors, Plutarch comes across as 
surprisingly modern in his sentiments and sensitivities. He speaks to our common intuitions on 
the many good aspects of human emotion. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how Plutarch 
constructs and presents his own vision of human nature, moral progress, and the good life, and 
how in each stage of our existence, passions play essential, important, and positive roles. In the 
first chapter, we saw that Plutarch defends the vulnerability we experience in our passions 
because vulnerability and emotions are not only a natural feature of human nature, but they also 
make possible many good features of life, including the goods of friendship. Passions provide the 
glue, as it were, that bonds us together, and we cannot form deep and meaningful relationships 
with others unless we are emotionally vulnerable with them.  
This took us into Plutarch’s criticism of the Stoic theory of appropriation and 
identification (οἰκείωσις), which the Stoics claim is foundational for all human relationships, 
human virtue, and human fulfillment. Plutarch, we saw, rejects this theory because it leads to an 
impossible and inhuman ideal. If we are to pursue the Stoic ideal, we must attempt to deaden our 
passionate nature so that we are no longer vulnerable to pain and are unaffected by what is 
outside our control. The Stoic theory of appropriation and identification led ironically to 
alienation from human nature and interpersonal relationships. Instead of leading to the 
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fulfillment of human nature, it also led to its mutilation. This, I took to be a foil for Plutarch’s 
own view that our social lives begin with passion and continue to incorporate and develop 
passions throughout life, up to Plutarch’s own ideal of a morally virtuous life, which I discussed 
in the final chapter. 
In the second chapter, we found that Plutarch’s defense of passions, and grief in 
particular, seemed to be at odds with much of what is said about passions in Plato’s dialogues. In 
the Republic, we are advised to suppress grief as far as possible, since the virtuous person will be 
most self-sufficient and least affected by circumstances, even by the loss of friends and family. 
Passions such as grief, the Republic tells us, serve no useful purpose, and the entertainment of 
grief is a form of fruitless indulgence. Plutarch, however, holds that grief is natural and can even 
be useful in helping us to form close relationships with others and in helping us to influence one 
another to good ends. More generally, we found that Plutarch defends passions as necessary 
aspects of our nature that contribute positively to life; they are teleologically oriented to specific, 
useful purposes.  
In the second chapter, I also argued that Plutarch draws upon certain passages in Plato’s 
dialogues, which are more positive in their evaluation of emotions, to speak against other 
passages that appear to set the ideal of human life as essentially rational and free of the influence 
of passions, which often appear to be pollutions of the soul and necessary evils due to 
embodiment. Plutarch’s own conception of virtue requires that passions be moderate, going 
neither to excess nor deficiency; we must have the right amount of passion to be virtuous 
individuals. In formulating this view, Plutarch uses the metaphor of musical harmony and of the 
harmonious blending of humors within the body, which he draws from Plato’s dialogues, but he 
mixes this metaphor with the doctrine of the mean, which appears to be of Aristotelian 
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provenance. Though Plutarch is much indebted to Aristotle in his description of moral virtue as a 
mean state of passions, he would not see himself as parroting an Aristotelian view of ethics set 
against Platonic ethics or philosophy. He adapts Aristotelian ideas together with Platonic images, 
because he conceives of the Platonic Academy as a unified tradition from Socrates to himself, 
including Aristotle. Plutarch believes that this tradition aims above all else at discovering truth 
through philosophical investigation and not at securing dogmatic allegiance. Plato and his 
followers, including Aristotle, provide the best explanations and theories to date, but their views 
are subject to reevaluation and further exploration, since one’s theory must align with truth rather 
than received doctrine. My second chapter thus helped set the stage for the chapters that followed 
by framing Plutarch’s adaptations of ideas and arguments from Plato’s dialogues, Aristotle’s 
works, and the views of later Academics.  
In the third chapter, I explored Plutarch’s arguments that passions are not only necessary 
for practical action, but also enhance our lives. Passions are the Wind in Our Sails. They can be 
useful aids in providing motivation and in inciting a desire for moral progress as well as in 
fortifying our resolve to continue to strive for virtue and the good life in the face of difficulties. 
Plutarch argues that we not only could not do without passions, but we would not, since passions 
make life better. 
The fourth chapter explored the cognitive aspect of certain spirited emotions such as 
anger, shame, and the desire for honor. As we saw there, the spirited part of the soul has a greater 
capacity to align itself with noble pursuits and with the good life as opposed to the appetitive part 
of the soul. It also has a capacity to help regulate desires within the soul, which is revealed in 
periods of life when spirited emotions restrain illicit desires independently of the rational part of 
the soul. Spirited passions are able to do this because they can be shaped to retain certain 
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standards of judgment about what is honorable and what is shameful. They can thereafter help 
suppress errant desires according to these standards. 
These capacities become all important for Plutarch’s view on early childhood education, 
which we explored in the fifth chapter. Before the advent of reason in children, their passionate 
nature is shaped and molded as a form of preparation for virtuous character. In contrast with his 
Academic predecessor, Xenocrates, who calls education in mathematics, astronomy, and music 
the grips of philosophy, Plutarch holds the passions of the spirited part of the soul to be the place 
where virtue and philosophy get their first grip on one’s character. For Plutarch, early education 
of our passionate nature begins before our rational powers are developed. It involves the 
inculcation of beliefs about what types of actions are suitable or not, honorable or shameful. It 
also largely determines how well we will be able to develop our character into a virtuous 
character later in life, since it will be hard to bring our passions into alignment with sound 
reasoning about what is good, honorable, and virtuous later in life, if our desires and values are 
greatly skewed in our upbringing. We also saw that spirited emotions, according to Plutarch, 
must be anchored to correct reasoning through philosophy so that we are not manipulated by 
chance praise or blame. 
In the final chapter, we saw that passions play an important role in human nature from 
beginning to end for Plutarch. A capacity to identify with others and form just relations with 
other human beings grows from the seeds of our passionate nature. We also saw that for Plutarch 
these passions must be cultivated to bear the fruit of virtue. Passions provide the starting-point 
for human virtue, like seeds, but they are not sufficient to bring us to the fulfillment in virtue 
without good upbringing and skillful promotion of good aspects of our nature and the 
suppression and removal of the bad. By planting the seeds of virtue and human sociability in our 
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passionate nature, Plutarch provides an alternative account of human identification that contrasts 
sharply with the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις. The beginning of our social lives and the virtues of 
human nature grow from our passions.  
We cannot perfect our human nature through the growth of these passions without reason, 
but neither do we dispense with our passions as we mature and seek the fulfillment of our nature. 
Plutarch joins his own view of identification to the Platonic goal of becoming like god 
(ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ). We reach the end-goal of human nature in becoming like god, a common 
Platonic goal, but we do so with the whole of our human nature, which includes our passions. 
While some Platonists hold that we must leave moral virtue and the passions behind to become 
like god, seeking a life divorced from practical action enrapt in pure contemplation, Plutarch 
argues that we become like god while remaining fully human. The most divine attributes we 
emulate aim at benefitting others, like a divine ruler, but we cultivate these dispositions and 
virtues with other-regarding passions. The purpose of philosophy is to make those who become 
like god active agents in this world (Philosophers and Men in Power 776C8–D3).  
From this perspective we saw that passions for Plutarch are integral to human nature from 
life’s inception to its fulfillment. Passions help us begin the process of becoming fully human, 
they spur us on in the process of becoming virtuous, and they continue to be a part of our 
perfected nature. The good life that Plutarch describes is a very human life. It includes intimacy 
in human relationships, the joys and pleasures of human experience, and seeks to make this life 
the best that it can be not only for ourselves, but for those around us. 
After surveying and exploring a number of different texts in the preceding chapters, I 
hope it is now apparent, if not before, that passions are central to Plutarch’s philosophy and to 
his philosophical project. Throughout the Moralia and the Lives, Plutarch presents passions as 
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important to moral progress and as parts of the good life. If we follow this thread, we find that it 
unifies Plutarch’s overall project and reveals a distinctive kind of life as the human ideal. That 
life aims at cultivating the right kinds of passions into a morally virtuous life. 
This kind of life is accessible. We need not abandon society to live in a garden, nor must 
we become something other than human, dulling our sensitivities and extirpating our emotions to 
become invulnerable and perfectly rational. The best kind of life we should pursue here and now 
is an entirely human life. It is not completely alien to our intuitions about what makes life 
pleasant and good, which includes good emotions. It is the fulfillment of our desire to be in 
community with intimate and rewarding relationships while also fulfilling our own purpose in 
becoming the right kind of people. This kind of life takes into account natural differences among 
individuals, so that not everyone must aspire to be the next Plato, but it sets as a common goal 
the development of benevolent dispositions that aim at improving not only our own lives but 
those of others around us. This life is not apolitical, but neither does it advocate that everyone 
aim at holding political offices. As Socrates argues in Plato’s Gorgias, the true politician is the 
one who seeks to make others better (521d6–522a7). 
Plutarch’s philosophy is also accessible. Plutarch’s vision of the good life and the path 
we take to it permeates and informs his writings and reaches an audience that extends beyond his 
own philosophical circle and the schools that he engages with in debate. Plutarch makes his 
philosophical views available through a variety of different genres, in dialogues, letters, 
diatribes, and biographies. He uses different modes and methods to convey his message. He 
gives advice to friends and admirers and publishes polemical arguments against his opponents. In 
places he provides interpretive commentary to Plato’s dialogues, to the works of Aristotle, and to 
the writings and sayings of previous Academic figures. He also presents his own mythical 
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representations. He speaks to us through many voices, including those of his teachers, friends, 
mythical characters, and even in his own person and literary persona. 
 Plutarch’s philosophical project has been successful. Even if his Moralia have often been 
neglected, Plutarch’s biographies have spoken to generations. Even if over the last two centuries 
Plutarch’s philosophy in the Moralia was thought to be inconsistent or second-rate, his vision of 
the good life has nevertheless reached the readers of his Lives. Now it is time for Plutarch’s 
Moralia and his philosophical views to be appreciated not only for their part in underpinning his 
project in the Lives and deepening our understanding of Plutarch’s overall project, but also as a 




 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
 
Plato and Spirited Evaluation: A Background 
 
 
In §III of Chapter 4, I merely summarize the findings of the analysis that follows in this 
appendix. I repeat these points here for the reader’s convenience. In Plato’s dialogues, there is 
some ambiguity in the attribution of evaluative beliefs to the spirited passions, the non-rational 
spirited part of the soul, and the person as a whole. This obfuscates the extent to which we can 
understand the cognitive capacities of the spirited part of the soul and what role it plays in 
evaluating actions that it comes to oppose as inappropriate (§A.I.). A passage in Republic 10 
argues that different parts of the soul must be at work when two contrary beliefs are held at the 
same time, in the same respect, etc. The parts of the soul that hold beliefs in contrast with reason 
appear to fit the profile of the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul (§A.II.). Yet belief 
attribution to the non-rational parts of the soul appears to be problematic, given the definition of 
belief in Plato’s other works, namely the Sophist, Theaetetus, Timaeus and Philebus, where 
rational thought seems necessary for the formation of beliefs and for access to the contents of 
beliefs formulated as propositional statements (§A.III.).  
Passages in Plato’s Philebus, with possible parallels in the Timaeus, seem to indicate that 
all beliefs are formulated as propositional statements before this information is related to the 
non-rational parts of the soul. Even sense-perceptible information is filtered through the rational 
part of the soul before reaching the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. For the appetitive 
part of the soul, an inner painter draws representations of the propositional statements,
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and in the Timaeus the liver reflects statements as images or phantoms, since the appetitive part 
of the soul is incapable of understanding propositional statements. The spirited part of the soul 
has some capacity to understand the beliefs presented to it by the rational part, but belief-
formation occurs within the rational part of the soul, which structures all the information that 
reaches the lower parts of the soul. Information flows from the top, through reason, down to the 
non-rational parts of the soul (§A.IV.). In contrast with the top-down view presented in the 
Philebus, there are a few hints elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues that the spirited part of the soul can 
form beliefs independently of reason. In the Timaeus, there is also a hint that the non-rational 
parts of the soul may have a direct connection to sense-perception without sense-perceptible 
information going through the rational part of the soul first (§A.V.) 
 
§A.I. Plato and the Spirited Evaluation of Action 
Beginning with the analysis of spirited emotions in Plato’s Republic 4, after Socrates 
distinguishes the rational part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν) from its appetitive part (τὸ 
ἐπιθυμητικόν), Socrates gives the example of Leontius, who feels disgust toward his own 
shameful desire to pursue a shameful act because he considers the act and his desire to pursue it 
shameful, to draw a distinction between this third, non-rational spirited part of the soul and its 
non-rational appetitive part.1 In the example that Socrates provides, Leontius feels a strong desire 
                                               
1Although some authors consider the conflict between the spirited part of the soul and appetitive part to be a second-
order desire not to have the appetitive desire (see, e.g. Irwin 1977, p. 327; id. 1995, pp. 207–17; Price 1995, pp. 47–
8; Cooper 1999b, p. 123), I (along with Bobonich 2002, pp. 248–52; Moss 2005, p. 153; Lorenz 2006, pp. 16–17, 
45–6; and Erginel (forthcoming), pp. 16–17) do not think that that account can succeed in the context of the 
argument for partition. Two contrary first-order desires are needed for the argument of partition to succeed, since 
critical conflict requires that the opposites be directed toward the same object, in the same respect, etc. If the spirited 
part has a second-order desire, its object will be not to have the desire to do what is shameful vel sim., which is not a 
contrary force to the same object (the activity of looking at dead bodies in this case). I take it that the spirited part of 
the soul can have a representation of the appetitive desire as shameful that leads to a desire not to pursue that action. 
The evaluation is explanatory for why the spirited part of the soul opposes the appetitive desire, but it is the 




to gaze upon corpses as he walks through a field. Against this desire, which belongs to the 
appetitive part of his soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), Leontius feels disgust (δυσχεραίνειν) and anger 
(θυμοῦσθαι, Republic 4, 439e8–440b7), passions that belong to and issue from the spirited part 
of the soul (Republic 4, 439e1–3). In a moment of sarcastic self-rebuke, he chastises his desire, 
directed toward his eyes as the instrument through which the desire attempts to take satisfaction, 
“Take your fill of that noble sight, you damn wretches!” (ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ 
καλοῦ θεάματος, 4, 440a4). Through this sarcastic rebuke, Leontius indicates the shame he 
imputes to the act and the shame he feels in having the desire that led to his indulgence in gazing 
at cadavers: his appetitive desire to look upon the corpses is shameful.2  
So far, it is not apparent through which part of the soul Leontius comes to evaluate the 
action that is pursued by his appetitive desire and the desire itself as shameful. On the one hand, 
Glaucon gleans from the story that the spirited emotion of anger is what is arrayed against, and 
opposed to, the desires of the appetitive part of the soul: 
[A1] ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ. 
 
The story indicates that anger sometimes makes war against the desires, as one thing 
against a different one.      (Plato, Republic 4, 440a6–7) 
 
The attribution of agency in restraining and opposing appetitive desire falls squarely on the 
passion of anger in this passage. Thus far, we have the psychic activity of the spirited part, i.e. 
anger, opposed to the appetitive part’s activity, i.e. appetite, as one thing against another (ὡς 
ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ). 
 On the other hand, just after [A1] Socrates attributes the reason for feeling disgust and 
anger to a sense of shame that “someone” (τις) feels who believes an action has unjustly been 
                                               




performed by himself (τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν, 440b9) or against him (ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγῆται, 
440c6). The belief (οἴεσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι) is attributed to the person, i.e. the someone (τις), not 
explicitly the spirited part of the soul. This someone (τις) appears to be the individual or person 
who has a sense that he has committed or suffered an injustice and thereafter experiences the 
spirited emotions of shame, anger, and disgust (440b9–d3). So, while in [A1] it is the spirited 
passion of anger (ὀργή) that opposes desires of another part of the soul, namely, the appetitive 
part, it also seems that it is the person indicated by “someone” (τις) who senses the war within 
himself and evaluates what has happened and, as a result of that evaluation, experiences the 
spirited emotions of disgust and anger: 
[A2] οὐκοῦν…πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν 
ἐπιθυμίαι, λοιδοροῦντά τε αὑτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ 
ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ 
τοιούτου;  
 
Do we not often perceive, whenever desires force someone contrary to his reasoning, that  
he [that someone] both rebukes himself and gets angry with the part within himself that is 
compelling him, and, as though two factions in a civil war are fighting one another, do 
we not perceive that the spirited passion of someone like that becomes an ally to his 
reason?       (Plato, Republic 4, 440a9–b4) 
 
In [A2] we seem to be moving between an individual subject, the someone (τις) not directly 
identified with one part of the soul, and spirited passion (ὁ θυμός) in the explanation of psychic 
conflict. Someone (τις) rebukes himself (αὑτόν) and grows angry with the part of his soul within 
himself (ἐν αὑτῷ) responsible for coercing him into a shameful action, namely, the appetitive 
part of the soul, due to an evaluation of his desires, a belief-state attributed to the person (τις). 
 If we were to stop there, it would look as though attribution of spirited anger 
(θυμοῦσθαι) that opposes the shameful desire falls solely to the person as a whole, not to a 
particular part of his soul, especially considering that the subject of the participle, “gets angry 
with” (θυμούμενον) is the someone (τινα), the overall person, in this sentence. When we move 
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to the next clause, however, we find that it is spirited passion itself (ὁ θυμός) which opposes the 
appetitive desire, becoming an ally (σύμμαχον) with reason.  
 Emphasis on the passion itself points to the soul-part responsible for that passion as the 
agent responsible for that activity, since it is the opposition of these passions in [A2], that leads 
Socrates to conclude together with Glaucon that the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) is 
different from the appetitive part of the soul due to the Principle of Opposites. The spirited 
emotion of anger (ὀργή / θυμός) that opposes desires in [A1] and [A2] belongs to the spirited 
part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές):  
[A3] οὕτως καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ 
φύσει. 
 
In this way, the spirited part is a third part within the soul, being a natural ally to the 
rational part.     (Plato, Republic 4, 441a2–3) 
 
The conclusion in [A3] reveals that Socrates’ description of the passion that allies itself with 
reason in [A2] can be spelled out as the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) opposing 
appetitive desire because it is a natural ally to the rational part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν), as 
one thing set against another (ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ, 440a6–7 in [A1]). Socrates’ remarks that the 
spirited passion becomes the ally with reason in [A1] is not just a way of expressing a passion 
that someone (τις) has toward the appetitive desire to look at dead bodies. The passionate part of 
the soul is responsible for the contravening psychic activity as the subject of that activity. But it 
also indicates that the emotion in question is also representative of the non-rational part of the 
soul from which it issues as well (Republic 4, 439e1–3). If it did not, the flow of the argument 
for partition between the spirited part of the soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) and the appetitive part of the 
soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) would not succeed, as Socrates and Glaucon claim it does in [A3]. 
 The ambiguity between the person (τις) and part of the soul could still indicate that both 
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the evaluation and the psychic activity of anger truly, or more accurately, belongs to the part of 
the soul, even if we speak loosely in attributing it to the person. First, consider the initial 
characterizations of the different parts of the soul. Each part is described by an instrumental 
dative locution. The rational part, to which calculation belongs as its activity is “that with which 
[the soul] calculates” (ᾧ λογίζεται, 4, 439d5). The appetitive part is “that with which it 
experiences sexual desire, hunger, thirst, and grows excited over other desires” (ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ 
πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται, 4, 439d6–7). Finally, the spirited part 
is “that with which we grow angry” (ᾧ θυμούμεθα, 4, 439e2). So, perhaps we should not be 
surprised to find that in this passage the part with which one experiences or activates opposing 
motivations is often described instrumentally, as though the person as a whole is experiencing 
conflicting forces through these different parts of the soul.  
Secondly, Socrates makes the point that we can speak loosely or strictly in terms of the 
subjects of activity. The example of the archer who is both pushing and pulling on the bow is a 
prime example (Republic 4, 439b8–c1). The soul as a whole has conflicting forces and is at war 
with itself, but more strictly speaking, we should say that one part of the soul is the subject of an 
activity that is opposed to the activity of another part of the soul (4, 436b9–d2), just as one part 
of the archer, the first hand, pushes on the bow while another part, the second hand, pulls (ἄλλη 
μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ προσαγομένη, Republic 4, 439b10–c1).3  
                                               
3 Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b11–15: “And to say that the soul is angry is as if one should say that the soul 
weaves or builds houses. For it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities, learns, or thinks, but instead to say 
that the human individual does these things with the soul” (τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις 
λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ 
διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ). Interestingly, Aristotle considers it more proper to attribute the 
action to the person as a whole. He also construes the soul as instrumental to the activities in question. Aristotle does 
not explicitly describe the soul as the instrument (ὄργανον) that the human individual uses (χρῆσθαι), as he does in 
describing the soul’s use of the body in On the Soul 1.3, 407b25–6, where the soul’s use of the body is likened to a 
craft’s use of tools (δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι). Nevertheless, 
the soul in 408b11–15 is expressed by an instrumental dative, much as each part of the soul is characterized by an 
instrumental dative. While in Republic 4 the opposing activities belong to the different parts of the soul, described 
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Thirdly, in the Leontius example, the ambiguity between the person and part of the soul 
also occurs with respect to appetite: Leontius struggles with himself and is disgusted with 
himself, since he has an appetitive desire to look at the corpses:  
[A4] ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν. 
 
At the same time he desires to look but also feels disgusted with himself and turns 
himself away.       (Republic 4, 439e8–440a1) 
 
Although the appetitive desire here is attributed to the person, since he has the desire, we find 
that the desire more strictly belongs to the appetitive part of the soul; otherwise the argument that 
the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul are distinct would not succeed. Given these moves 
between loosely attributing activities to the person and more strictly attributing them to parts of 
the soul, it is possible that the attribution of an evaluation to the person as a whole could still 
more strictly speaking belong to the spirited part of the soul. 
 More could be pressed out of these passages from Plato’s Republic on the topic of soul-
part agency and personal agency in Platonic psychology, but it is outside the scope of this 
discussion to explore that topic satisfactorily.4 My purpose here is to emphasize the ambiguity in 
ascribing evaluation and agency to passion, a part of the soul, and the person as a whole, 
especially in terms of how one comes to evaluate an action as shameful or honorable, 
inappropriate or appropriate. So far, it appears that while the force of opposition belongs to the 
spirited part of the soul and is instantiated as the non-rational passions of anger, disgust and 
shame, the evaluation of the desire as shameful could still be taking place outside of the spirited 
part of the soul. In the Leontius passage, the representation of desires and actions as shameful so 
                                               
instrumentally, Aristotle argues that different activities of the soul should be understood in terms of the origin and 
termination of movement or activity in the soul, not as parts used as instruments: “This is not to say that the 
movement / activity is in the soul, but that sometimes it ends in it, while at other times it comes from it” (τοῦτο δὲ 
μὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ’ ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ’ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης, 1.4, 408b15–16). 
4 See Chapter 4, n. 38. 
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far is attributed only to the person (τις) evaluating actions. It could be that the rational part of the 
soul holds this view of appetitive desire as shameful and leads the spirited part of the soul to 
oppose it. 
If the evaluation of the appetite is indeed outside the spirited part of the soul, the 
argument for division between the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul still succeeds. All that 
is needed to separate the spirited part of the soul from the appetitive in Republic 4 is for one 
internal psychic force to be set against another, which we find in the Leontius example. The 
appetitive desire to gaze at cadavers is opposed by spirited anger. The opposed pro-attitudinal 
desire of the appetitive part and con-attitudinal anger of the spirited part are sufficient to 
establish that the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul are different from one another and fit 
with the examples of opposites that Socrates outlines in laying out the Principle of Opposites: 
[A5] τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαί τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ 
προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις… 
εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων.  
approving and disapproving, being eager to take something and refusing it, taking 
something and pushing it away, all things of this sort are opposites to one 
another…whether they are actions or passive experiences. (Plato, Republic 4, 437b1–4) 
 
Along with this list, Socrates and Glaucon also include desires, willing, and wishing and their 
opposites as pro- and con-attitudinal states that, when they occur simultaneously with regard to 
the same object, in the same way, etc., require that these states belong to separate subjects 
through the Principle of Opposites (437b6–7). 
 
§A.II. Evaluations and Beliefs of the Non-Rational Parts of Soul in Plato 
 In Republic 10, the list of opposites grows to include holding contrary appearances and 
beliefs about the same subject, at the same time, etc.: 
[A6] τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα 
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ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά. 
    ναί. 
οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι;  
  καὶ ὀρθῶς γ’ ἔφαμεν. 
τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν. 
  οὐ γὰρ οὖν.  
ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς. 
  Τί μήν; 
Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν. 
  Ἀνάγκη. 
 
Often, when this part of the soul [namely, the rational part whose function is reasoning 
(τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἔργον, 601e1–2)] has measured and indicates certain objects to be 
larger, smaller, or equal to others, contrary representations appear at the same time about 
the same things. 
   Yes. 
Surely then we said that it is not possible for the same thing to hold contrary beliefs5 at 
the same time about the same things, right [because of the Principle of Opposites]? 
  We rightly did say that. 
The part of the soul that holds to a belief contrary to measurement would not be the same 
as the part [that holds to a belief] according to measurement. 
  No, certainly not. 
Yet truly the part that trusts in measure and calculation would be the best part of the soul. 
  Well, yes, surely. 
Then what opposes this would be something belonging to the inferior parts within us? 
  Necessarily so.  
(Republic 10, 602e4–603a8)6 
 
So, in addition to the exhortative and volitional pro- and con-attitudes listed in Republic 4, 
belief-states whose content is contrary and concerned with the same objects, in the same way, at 
                                               
5 I have chosen to leave it unclear whether the non-rational parts of the soul can form beliefs in addition to 
entertaining or having beliefs in my translation of δοξάζειν here. As will become clearer below in my analysis of 
Plato’s psychology, and, as I have tried to show in Chapter 4 for Plutarch’s psychology, there is an important 
distinction to be made between having a belief and forming a belief. In my translation of this passage I also try to 
preserve the connection between having things seem a certain way or having a representation (φαίνεται), since I 
take it that the shift from the formulation of “contrary representations appear at the same time about the same 
things” (τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά) to “to hold contrary beliefs at the same time about the same things” 
(ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν) requires that the formulations be interchangeable in meaning in order for the 
argument in [A6] to work. This also is in accord with the connection made between representation (φαντασία, 
φαίνεσθαι) and belief in Sophist 264b1–2: “What we mean when we say ‘It seems’ is a mixture of perception and 
belief” (“φαίνεται” δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης=[Α7] below). See also Singpurwalla 2010, pp. 
885–6, who is careful to distinguish reasoned judgments that belong to the rational part of the soul from the 
appearances that the non-rational parts of the soul are capable of having as beliefs. I address this distinction below. 
6 Cf. Lycos 1964, pp. 498–500. 
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the same time, etc., is also sufficient to distinguish two different subjects that have the contrary 
beliefs.7 
More importantly for our purposes of discovering how the spirited part of the soul has a 
representation of actions as honorable or shameful, appropriate or inappropriate, it seems from 
what we learn in [A6] that the non-rational spirited part of the soul is indeed capable of having 
an evaluation of actions on its own, since it has a representation (φαντασία), or things seem a 
certain way to it (φαίνεσθαι), and it holds to a belief (δοξάζειν / δόξα) in contrast to the 
rational part of the soul’s evaluative representation and belief.8 Attribution of representation and 
belief also seem to apply to the non-rational appetitive part, since the non-rational passionate part 
of the soul under discussion here in Republic 10 covers both the appetitive and spirited parts of 
the soul, characterized by both sexual desire (belonging to the appetitive part) and anger 
(belonging to the spirited part, Republic 10, 606d1–7).9 
                                               
7 Cf. Singpurwalla 2010, p. 887. Along with Lorenz 2006, pp. 60–73, I take it that Republic 10 is intended to be read 
together with the arguments for a tripartite soul-division in Republic 4. Socrates asks Glaucon whether a person is 
experiencing psychic conflict in cases such as the one described in Republic 10, 602e4–603a8=[A6], and, instead of 
going through a detailed argument, says, “I recall that we do not need to come to an agreement on this point now, 
since in our arguments before we sufficiently came to agreement on all these things, namely that our soul is full of a 
myriad of oppositions like these that occur at the same time” (ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ 
ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων 
τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν, Republic 10, 603d3–6). I take it that Socrates is 
referring to the argument for partition according the Principle of Opposites in Republic 4. For dissenting views that 
take Republic 10 to describe a division of belief between two rational parts see Nehamas 1982, pp. 65–6; Price 1995, 
p. 44; Burnyeat 1999, pp. 223–6; Sedley 2004, p. 113. 
8 The attribution of “belief” / “appearance” (δόξα / φαντασία) should not be taken as always false vis-à-vis the 
cognitive state of calculated belief and the success-term of “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη). In the Republic, appearance / 
representation (φαντασία, φαίνεσθαι) can be used to describe true representations as well as false; cf. Stavru 2017, 
pp. 1–7. 
9 Against Nehamas (1982, p. 66), who believes that Republic 10 must be describing two different rational parts, one 
superior and another inferior, Lorenz (2006, p. 66, n. 17) convincingly argues that it would seem odd for Socrates to 
refer to the rational part of the soul within us as far from wisdom (πόρρω δ’ αὖ φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν, 10, 
603b1–2) and the foolish part of the soul (τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς, 605b7), even if there were an inferior rational part of 
the soul in addition to a superior one. Together with this line of argument, I would add, drawing on the previous 
note, that Socrates closely aligns the argument for different parts of the soul in Republic 10 to the argument for 
different parts of the soul in Republic 4, which distinguished the rational part from the non-rational parts of the soul. 
Additionally, as I note above, the inferior parts of the soul are later characterized in Republic 10 by the desires 
belonging to the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul, not to the rational part of the soul. 
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 Returning now to the example of Leontius in Republic 4, the opposites that Socrates and 
Glaucon recognize as necessitating a division between the appetitive and spirited parts of the 
soul are pro- and con-attitudinal: a desire to look at cadavers and a contrary motivation not to 
look at them. The discussion of opposing beliefs in [A6], while not necessary to establish the 
differentiation of spirited emotion from appetitive desire in Leontius’ case, nonetheless opens up 
the possibility that the evaluative aspect of Leontius’ spirited emotion might belong to the 
spirited part of his soul (τὸ θυμοειδές), since in [A6] we learn that the non-rational parts of the 
soul can have beliefs. The expression that someone (τις) has a sense that the appetitive desire is 
shameful, while ambiguous, might nonetheless still indicate that the spirited part of the soul itself 
holds to this belief. 
 
§A.III. High Standards of Belief (δόξα) in Plato’s Sophist, Theaetetus, Timaeus and Philebus  
 While Republic 10 seems to attribute beliefs to the non-rational parts of the soul, we 
should first note that in the context of the passage, the beliefs in question are exemplified as 
things appearing a certain way: an object appears large or small from a distance, a stick appears 
bent in water, and artistic renditions play off of appearances to present illusions (Republic 10, 
602c7–e3). In the immediate examples that precede [A6] something seems (φαίνεσθαι) a certain 
way in terms of visual representation, not necessarily in terms of propositional statements, where 
the non-rational part of the soul would have a belief that, for instance, the sun is as wide as a 
human hand. 
 For something to seem a certain way to the spirited or appetitive part of the soul, i.e. for 
the sun to seem small or a stick in water bent, need not involve an epistemic notion of belief, 
where one sees a reason to think, for example, that the sun is small. Instead, such visual 
representations may only imply that the non-rational parts of the soul have non-epistemic 
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representations in which, for example, the sun appears small to the non-rational part of the soul 
in question, not that there is a rational belief about the size of the sun that the non-rational part of 
the soul has formed.10 So, in Republic 10, it seems possible to consider Socrates’ view on belief 
as falling into two types: beliefs as representations that are non-epistemic and mere appearances, 
lacking measurement and calculation, and beliefs as representations that are epistemic, can be 
formulated in propositional statements, and are subject to measurement and calculation. 
 Other passages in Plato’s dialogues outright deny belief (δόξα) to the non-rational parts 
of the soul or define belief as involving rational capacities that the non-rational parts of the soul 
do not possess. When we turn to Plato’s Sophist, for example, it at first might seem, as in 
Republic 10 (602e4–603a8=[A6]) that the non-rational part of the soul’s capacity for 
representation (φαντασία) implies its ability to form beliefs (δοξάζειν, δόξα): 
[A7] “φαίνεται” δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης. 
 
 What we mean when we say “It seems” is a mixture of perception and belief.  
         (Plato, Sophist 264b1–2) 
 
While having something appear a certain way (φαίνεσθαι) to the non-rational parts of the soul 
seems to imply the formation of beliefs (δόξαι) in both this passage and in [A6], we quickly 
come to the problem of attributing rational thought (διάνοια) to the non-rational parts of the 
soul, if the understanding of δόξα remains the same between Republic 10 and throughout Plato’s 
Sophist. For the lines immediately preceding and following [A7] argue that belief (δόξα) 
“occurs in the soul according to thought” (ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται, 264a1–2) and is 
                                               
10 Cf. Moss 2012b, pp. 272, 279–80 and n. 37. Cf. also Caston 2006, pp. 331–5: Aristotle in contrast to Plato 
distinguishes an appearance from a belief, such as in the case that the sun appears a foot wide even though we 
believe that it is larger than the earth (On the Soul 3.3, 428a24–b9), or as one line in the Müller-Lyer diagram 
appears longer than the other, even after we measure and come to know that they are equal, and thereby makes our 
capacity to form representations and have appearances (φαντασίαι) more rudimentary than our ability to form 
beliefs (p. 332). At least in this example from Republic 10, Socrates seems to set representations of this kind in 
parity with beliefs so that they are able to account for critical psychic conflict of belief between the non-rational and 
rational parts of the soul. 
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“the end result of thought” (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, 264b1). But thought or thinking belongs 
to the rational part of the soul, not to the non-rational parts. So, it would seem from the further 
details we gather in Plato’s Sophist that belief-formation so understood must be denied to the 
spirited part of the soul, since it requires thought and is the end-product of thinking, which is not 
an activity that the spirited part of the soul, nor the appetitive part, is capable of performing. 
Beliefs according to this definition, then, must originate from the rational part of the soul. What 
Socrates called a belief held by the non-rational parts of the soul in Republic 10, if they are 
meant to originate in the non-rational parts of the soul, will not be considered a belief in the 
Sophist, but a non-doxastic representation (φαντασία).11 Alternatively, if the beliefs held by the 
non-rational parts of the soul are beliefs according to the Sophist’s definition, they must originate 
from thinking in the rational part of the soul; they will not have been formed in the non-rational 
parts of the soul. 
 Plato’s Theaetetus, like the Sophist, also sets the bar for belief and belief-formation out of 
reach for the non-rational parts of the soul. After discussing the possibility of true belief, which 
might be knowledge (κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, 187b5–6), Socrates 
describes belief (δόξα) as the formation of a statement (λόγος) to oneself: 
[A8] ἔγωγε “τὸ δοξάζειν” λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς 
ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν. 
 
I mean by “forming a belief” that one is making a statement and that a belief is a 
statement that has been expressed; however, I do not mean that it is expressed to another 
person or is uttered aloud, but that it is expressed to oneself silently.  
        (Plato, Theaetetus 190a4–6) 
 
Belief here is propositional: to form a belief is to make a statement (λέγειν), one that is 
                                               
11 See also Brogaard 2014, p. 383, who argues that visual representations are not beliefs but nonetheless can conflict 
with the beliefs: “[V]isual seemings clearly are not belief states. You can believe that p even if it visually seems to 
you that not-p.” For an overview of contemporary debates on conflicting beliefs and non-doxastic representational 
states see Quilty-Dunn 2015. 
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understood, presumably, according to thought (κατὰ διάνοιαν, Sophist 264a1–2).12 Further, if 
true belief is the same as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) or requires a similar process of rational activity 
as coming to have knowledge, which is being seriously entertained in this passage (Theaetetus 
187a7–8), then it also will require calculations (ἀναλογίσματα, 186c2–3), reasoning 
(συλλογισμός, 186d3), and reflection on one’s views, with the soul busying itself by itself 
(αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται) about these things (187a5–6). All of these belong to the 
rational part of the soul as its own peculiar activities and are denied to the non-rational parts of 
the soul.13 As in the Sophist, belief-formation appears peculiar to the rational part of the soul and 
impossible for the non-rational parts of the soul because it requires rational thought. 
 In Plato’s Philebus, belief-formation once more seems to require rational processes of 
thought that belong to the rational part of the soul. In a discussion on the nature of belief and 
belief-formation, Socrates and Protarchus discuss how one comes to have a definite belief 
(διαδοξάζειν) about something (38b12–13). In the discussion, they define belief (δόξα) as a 
statement (λόγος, 38e3–4) that is either true or false (38b6–7). One holds a belief, for instance, 
about the object in the distance, stating (λέγειν) to oneself or another that it is a man (ὡς ἔστιν 
ἄνθρωπος, 38d5–e7). As in the Sophist and Theaetetus, the belief is a propositional statement.14 
  The Philebus additionally gives the description of a scribe (γραμματεύς) within the 
soul, who, as it were, writes the propositional statements in the souls of individuals (γράφειν 
ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς…λόγους, 39a3) as they form beliefs. When the propositional statements 
are true, the belief is true (δόξα ἀληθής); when the statements are false, the belief is false 
                                               
12 As we will see below with the Philebus, these statements are truth-apt. As such, I take it that they express 
propositions. See Evans 2008, p. 96, n. 14, quoted below in n. 18. For an argument that the inner-speech that occurs 
in Plato’s dialogues is not propositional cf. Nuchelmans 1973, p. 21. 
13 Cf. Cooper 1999a, p. 184. 
14 Cf. Penner 1970, pp. 166–78; Evans 2008, p. 96, n. 14; Moss 2012b, p. 264. 
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(39a3–7). So, once again, it seems that the process of forming a belief, in general, requires 
statements (λόγοι) with propositional content.15 
 In the context of the last passage from Plato’s Philebus, there is reason to think the 
definition that Socrates and Protarchus come to in 38b6–39a7 could apply only to beliefs formed 
by rational reflection and calculation as it is described in Republic 10. In the context of the 
Philebus passage just discussed, Socrates and Protarchus describe common experiences in which 
someone wants to get a clear sense of an object in the distance and come to a correct belief about 
what it is: 
[A9] πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα συμβαίνειν 
βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ’ ἅπερ ὁρᾷ; 
 
Would you not say that it often happens that someone wants to make a judgment about 
what they see when those objects are not very clear because they are looking from a 
distance far away?       (Plato, Philebus 38c5–7)  
 
The scenario so described should remind us of the one given in Republic 10 above, where things 
viewed at a distance can give a false impression of size or, when the light is refracted through 
water, a false sense of shape. These first impressions must be corrected by a rational process of 
measurement or calculation (μετρεῖν, κατὰ τὰ μέτρα) if one is to come to a better 
determination of the actual size or shape of the objects. The first appearances that do not take 
measurement or calculation into account are attributed to the non-rational parts of the soul in 
Republic 10. Only the rational part of the soul uses calculation and measurement to come to a 
more accurate determination. 
                                               
15 Cf. Erginel 2013, pp. 207–8. Erginel wants to reject this conclusion. Although he does not draw out his own 
argument for the Philebus on this point, he seems to be entertaining the notion that the non-rational parts of the soul 
also have their own inner scribes that form beliefs. Based on the high standards of belief-formation of propositional 
statements (λόγοι) elsewhere in Plato’s works and the context of the passage leading up to the discussion of the 
inner scribe, which I address below, I do not see how Erginel’s proposal fits with the Platonic psychology we see 
developed on belief-formation. 
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 So, before proceeding further with the example, I would like to note that Socrates and 
Protarchus at this point in the discussion already are describing a situation in which a person 
seems to be reflecting on the appearance of objects, that is, someone is already at the stage of 
questioning appearances (Philebus 38c12–d3), presumably the immediate and unreflected ones 
they already have, and considering rational means of measurement to come to a more definite 
conclusion, that is, to make a judgment (κρίνειν) between appearances. The beliefs being formed 
at this point, marked by the verb διαδοξάζειν, “to come to a definite belief,” are using a rational 
capacity to reflect on and calculate about an appearance in order to form a belief. How one 
comes to have the immediate, unreflective appearances is not covered under the definition of 
belief in this discussion of the Philebus. 
 Turning to Plato’s Timaeus, Socrates outright denies belief (δόξα) along with reasoning 
(λογισμός) and intellect (νοῦς) to the appetitive part of the soul. The appetitive part of the soul 
has no participation in these capacities; it only has participation in sense-perception, pleasure, 
and pain (Timaeus 77b3–6).16 The appetitive part of the soul in the Timaeus is also not capable of 
understanding statements (λόγοι) due to its limited cognitive capacities. The gods in the 
Timaeus, when constructing the human body, took into account the fact that the appetitive part of 
the soul 
[A10] λόγου μὲν οὔτε συνήσειν ἔμελλεν, εἴ τέ πῃ καὶ μεταλαμβάνοι τινὸς αὐτῶν 
αἰσθήσεως, οὐκ ἔμφυτον αὐτῷ τὸ μέλειν τινῶν ἔσοιτο λόγων, ὑπὸ δὲ εἰδώλων καὶ 
φαντασμάτων νυκτός τε καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν μάλιστα ψυχαγωγήσοιτο. 
 
was not going to be able to understand a statement, and even if in some way it had a 
participation in some perception of them, it would not have a natural capacity to take 
thought of statements, but it would be led especially by images and phantoms night and 
                                               
16 Socrates states that the third type of soul (τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἴδους), which is located between the midriff and 
naval (ὃ μεταξὺ φρενῶν ὀμφαλοῦ τε), which in 70d7–e2 he made clear is the appetitive part of the soul, “has no 
participation in belief or reasoning or intellect whatsoever (ᾧ δόξης μὲν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ μέτεστιν τὸ μηδέν), 
but only participation in sense-perception and pleasure and pain with desires (αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἡδείας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς 
μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν). Cf. Lorenz 2006, p. 75. 
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day.         (Plato, Timaeus 71a3–7) 
 
The appetitive part of the soul has no access to propositional content: it cannot understand 
(συνιέναι) statements. Instead, it operates based on appearances, or representations, described as 
images and phantoms (εἴδωλα καὶ φαντάσματα) in this passage. The appetitive part of the 
soul’s capacity is so limited that the gods devise a method for the rational part of the soul to 
communicate with appetite through images, giving the body an organ, the liver, that translates 
propositional statements into imagistic representations. The force of thoughts from the intellect 
(τῶν διανοημάτων ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ…δύναμις) is translated to provide images (εἴδωλα 
παρέχοντι) and impressions (τύπους), as though being reflected in a mirror (ἐν κατόπτρῳ, 
71b3–5). Rational beliefs are thus translated, as though the soul paints phantoms (φαντάσματα 
ἀποζωγραφοῖ, 71c3–4) to which the appetitive part of the soul responds. Their mode of 
representation effects a response from the appetitive part of the soul, even though it has no 
access to propositional statements that they represent and takes no thought of them 
propositionally.17 
 The Philebus account also similarly describes a process in which the propositional 
content of beliefs, the statements engraved in the soul by the inner scribe (γραμματεύς), are 
translated into imagistic representations. The scribe within the soul is followed by a different 




                                               
17 I do not mean to imply here that the imagistic representations are not themselves somehow propositional in nature, 
just that the appetitive part of the soul cannot understand them as propositional statements. My point in making this 
distinction will be clear in the following note. Bobonich (2010a, pp. 151–4) argues that the imagistic interpretation 
of appetitive representational content will fail to account for all of the content needed for all appetitive desires. It 
will not be able to pick out salient features and deny others that are necessary for constructing desires for particular 
objects or types of objects. Take, for instance, the imagistic representation of the erotic desire of an adolescent male 
who desires to have sex with (a) a human, who is (b) not a parent and (c) not a sibling. How, Bobonich (2010a, p. 
153) asks, will an image relate the negations in (b) and (c) without some linguistic predication? 
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[A11] ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει. 
 
who, after the scribe, draws images in the soul of these things that have been stated. 
       (Plato, Philebus 39b6–7) 
 
These imagistic representations have the same truth-conditions as the statements they depict 
(39c4–5), i.e. they bear the same propositional content in an imagistic manner.18 Perhaps 
surprisingly, the imagistic representations follow the representations of information in 
propositional statements. We might have suspected that imagistic representation preceded the 
formation of propositional statements, but Socrates indicates the reverse here.19 Protarchus 
himself seems surprised by this and asks Socrates to clarify not only how the inner painter does 
this work, but also when: 
[A12] πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν; 
   ὅταν ἀπ’ ὄψεως ἤ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα 
ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ πως. 
  
 Tell me again,20 how do we say that he does this and when? 
   Whenever someone takes the beliefs that are being formed and made into statements 
from sight or some other sense-perception and in some way sees images in himself of the 
beliefs that were formed and put into statements.  (Plato, Philebus 39b8–c1) 
 
                                               
18 Cf. Evans 2008, p. 96, n. 14: “I translate λόγοι here as ‘propositions’ rather than ‘sentences’ because it is 
not clear that Socrates wants us to think of these psychologically inscribed items as natural language expressions. In 
fact, given what he says here about their relation to beliefs and assertions, it would seem that he wants them to serve 
as all-purpose truth-apt contents for anything from pictures and inscriptions to thoughts and speech-acts.” In my 
correspondence with Evans, he has agreed with me that if Plato has not changed his mind between the Timaeus and 
Philebus, the appetitive part of the soul understands imagistic representations, which translate or depict the 
propositions (λόγοι) of the rational part of the soul non-propositionally. For the imagistic representations must have 
the same propositional content as the propositional statements they depict, since their truth-conditions are the same. 
But since the appetitive part of the soul cannot understand the propositional statements, it is presumably persuaded 
by imagistic representations without having access to and understanding the content propositionally. For a similar 
distinction between a subject having propositional content but not being able to access that content see Sorabji 1993, 
p. 22. Sorabji argues that Stoic propositions (λεκτά) may be the sort of thing that animals perceive, though they 
cannot themselves understand the content so as to verbalize the propositions: “[T]he texts repeatedly insist on using 
the modal idea that such propositional appearances are verbalisable, not that they are verbalised. If they are in fact 
verbalised, this is due to an independent operation of the mind.” 
19 Cf. Evans 2008, p. 96, n. 15: “It is worth noting here that Plato’s view about the relative priority of discursive 
content to pictorial content in the formation of perceptual beliefs is the converse of the consensus view today. Most 
of us now suppose that it is the writer who follows the painter, not the other way round.” 
20 αὖ can be used to mark impatience in conversation. Cf. LSJ, s.v. αὖ, and Homer, Iliad 1.540; Aeschylus, Libation 
Bearers 1066 (both cited by LSJ). 
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If this is meant to be a general account for mental representations, then beliefs given as 
statements (λόγοι) with propositional content will always precede imagistic representations. 
 Compare the results from the Timaeus and the Philebus with the type of belief we found 
attributed to the non-rational parts of the soul in Republic 10. In the Timaeus, we find the 
appetitive part of the soul capable of having access to and responding to imagistic 
representations such as images and phantoms (εἴδωλα καὶ φαντάσματα). So far, this would 
still count as a belief that the non-rational parts of the soul are capable of having in Republic 10. 
But, in the Timaeus, this kind of representation does not count as a belief. It appears that the 
definition of belief (δόξα) differs between the Republic and Timaeus.21 What marks the 
difference? Statements (λόγοι) with propositional content are now required in the Timaeus to 
count as belief (δόξα). The appetitive part of the soul lacks the capacity to hold a belief, 
inasmuch as it does not understand propositional statements (λόγου οὔτε συνήσειν). So, while 
agreement (ὁμοδοξεῖν) between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul in Republic 4, 
when they are in harmony (442c9–d2), might seem to imply that the beliefs in question are 
understood in the same manner by both the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, the 
Timaeus describes a mechanism by which a belief, understood as a propositional statement, can 
be translated into a representation that it does not understand propositionally but to which it can 
still somehow agree. 
 The Philebus account likewise holds that belief is propositional in form, but that it can be 
                                               
21 Lorenz (2006, pp. 72–3) holds that Plato narrows the meaning of δόξα between the Republic and Timaeus, but 
that his understanding of the appetitive part of the soul’s capacity to hold to certain representations as beliefs 
remains the same in both dialogues. He entertains the notion that the city-soul analogy presses Socrates to call the 
appearances that the non-rational parts of the soul hold to “beliefs” to maintain the symmetry with the lower classes 
agreeing (ὁμοδοξεῖν) and being in harmony (ὁμονοεῖν) with the highest class or rulers. Cf. Moss 2012b, p. 274, n. 
26. Bobonich (2002, pp. 295–350, and 2010a), however, holds that Plato has changed his view on the capacities of 
the lower parts of the soul, which after the Republic cannot have beliefs but instead are dependent on the rational 
part of the soul for representational content. 
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translated into an imagistic representation that is not a propositional statement. The Philebus 
adds two further details. First, imagistic representations of beliefs all stem from statements with 
propositional content within the soul. The formation of beliefs as statements with propositional 
content precedes the representation of images that bear that content. Secondly, all of the 
imagistic representations are truth-apt and have the same truth conditions as the statements that 
they depict. That indicates that in the Philebus the images somehow bear the propositional 
content of the statements, even though the appetitive part of the soul cannot access this content 
propositionally. 
 What of the spirited part in the Timaeus? Unlike the appetitive part of the soul, we find 
that the spirited part of the soul responds to propositional statements. The spirited part reacts 
angrily when the rational part of the soul gives a report that something wrong is happening: 
[A13] τὸ μετέχον οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ θυμοῦ, φιλόνικον ὄν, κατῴκισαν 
ἐγγυτέρω τῆς κεφαλῆς…ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον ὂν κοινῇ μετ’ ἐκείνου βίᾳ τὸ 
τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κατέχοι γένος, ὁπότ’ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ τ’ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ 
μηδαμῇ πείθεσθαι ἑκὸν ἐθέλοι· τὴν δὲ δὴ καρδίαν ἅμμα τῶν φλεβῶν καὶ πηγὴν 
τοῦ περιφερομένου κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέλη σφοδρῶς αἵματος εἰς τὴν δορυφορικὴν 
οἴκησιν κατέστησαν, ἵνα, ὅτε ζέσειεν τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ μένος, τοῦ λόγου 
παραγγείλαντος ὥς τις ἄδικος περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται πρᾶξις ἔξωθεν ἢ καί τις ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἔνδοθεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὀξέως διὰ  πάντων τῶν στενωπῶν πᾶν ὅσον αἰσθητικὸν ἐν τῷ 
σώματι, τῶν τε παρακελεύσεων καὶ ἀπειλῶν αἰσθανόμενον, γίγνοιτο ἐπήκοον καὶ 
ἕποιτο πάντῃ, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμονεῖν ἐῷ. 
 
Therefore, the part of the soul that has a share of courage and anger, since it is victory-
loving, they [the gods] made to dwell closer to the head…in order that, since it is obedient 
to reason, it might suppress with force together with reason the group of desires whenever 
they are entirely unwilling, as far as they are concerned, to obey any of the commands and 
words from the central governance of the soul. They established the heart, the connection 
point for the veins and the source of blood that flows vigorously throughout all the limbs, 
as the guard-house, so that, whenever the rage of the spirit should boil, because reason 
reports that some unjust action from outside is occurring concerning these [parts of the 
body] or even from the desires within, every sense-perceptive organ in the body, quickly 
perceiving exhortations and threats through all narrow passageways, might become 
obedient and follow along in every way and allow the best part to rule in this way in 




In this passage, not only is the spirited part of the soul in alliance with the rational part, as we 
have seen already above, but it also reacts to information in propositional form, here described as 
a report by reason that (ὡς) something unjust has happened (τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος ὥς 
τις ἄδικος…γίγνεται πρᾶξις). Unlike the appetitive part of the soul, the spirited part seems to 
understand the propositional statements themselves propositionally, without requiring that this 
information be translated into a different format of representation. The spirited part of the soul 
reacts to this propositional content, boiling, as it were, because it receives and seems to 
understand this information.22 
 This passage, however, only suggests that the spirited part of the soul is capable of 
receiving propositional beliefs from the rational part of the soul and responding to them. We are 
given no indication that this part of the soul is able to form evaluative beliefs or judgments on its 
own apart from the rational part of the soul. As we will see below, Plato’s dialogues generally 
describe the flow of information as top-down, from reason to the non-rational parts of the soul. 
 
§A.IV. The Top-Down View: Receiving Beliefs from the Rational Part of the Soul in Plato 
 In the Timaeus and Philebus passages discussed above, we see that the rational part of the 
soul is capable of influencing the lower parts of the soul, passing along information to structure 
the beliefs or imagistic representations to which the lower parts of the soul respond. For the 
appetitive part of the soul, we are given two images of how the rational part translates 
propositional content into representations by which the appetitive part can be persuaded 
(ψυχαγωγεῖσθαι, Timaeus 71a3–7) without having access to the propositional content: the 
reflection of statements through the liver (Timaeus 71b3–5, c3–4) and the depiction of statements 
                                               
22 Cf. Moss 2012b, pp. 274–5. Given his view that the cognitive capacities of the non-rational parts of the soul are 
impoverished after the Republic, Bobonich (2002, pp. 297–8; 2010a, pp. 154–8) argues that the Timaeus exaggerates 
the agent-like capacities of the non-rational parts of the soul, especially the spirited part.  
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by the inner scribe (Philebus 39b6–c1) as imagistic representations.  
 Additionally, as noted above, the process of information acquisition from sense-
perception in the Philebus passage has an intermediary step before it reaches the appetitive part 
of the soul. Information gathered from sense-perceptions is formulated as propositional 
statements by the rational part of the soul before being translated into imagistic representations to 
which the appetitive part of the soul responds. If the Philebus passage is a general account of the 
flow of information, it appears to be top-down: all perceptual information is formulated as 
propositional statements by the rational part of the soul before it reaches the appetitive part of the 
soul. There is no direct link between sense-perception and the imagistic representations to which 
the appetitive part of the soul responds in this passage. 
 The flow of information to the spirited part of the soul also seems to be top-down in the 
Timaeus and Republic. The spirited part of the soul responds to the report of reason in the 
Timaeus, as we saw above (70a2–b5=[A13]), which can evince spirited reactions such as anger, 
disgust, and shame. Unlike for the appetitive part of the soul, there is no indication that the 
propositional statements must be translated for the spirited part to understand and obey. 
Nevertheless, for both the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul, information flows from the 
rational part of the soul, which structures the information as propositional statements before it is 
passed on to the spirited or appetitive parts of the soul. Information flow is top-down. 
 In similar fashion, the spirited part of the soul in the Republic exhibits courage when it 
holds steadfastly to the commands that it receives from the rational part of the soul: 
[A14] καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ οἶμαι τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ 
θυμοειδὲς διασῴζῃ διά τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν 
δεινόν τε καὶ μή. 
 
And I suppose that we call each individual courageous in virtue of this part of the soul, 
whenever his spirited part preserves through pleasures and pains the command given by 
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reason on what one should shrink back from or not.      (Plato, Republic 4, 442b10–c2) 
 
As in the Timaeus, the spirited part of the soul receives instruction, or a report (παραγγελθέν), 
and accepts it, adopting a belief that originates in the rational part of the soul. Agreement 
(ὁμοδοξεῖν, 4, 442c9–d2) between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul occurs when 
the flow of information is top-down.23 
 If the top-down view is correct, then we will need a story to account for the possibility of 
psychic conflict of belief. As we saw in Republic 10, psychic conflict of belief, wherein two 
parts of the soul hold contrary beliefs, is a common experience (602e4–603a8=[A6]). Yet, if the 
top-down view is correct, all beliefs originate in the rational part of the soul. So, we need an 
explanation of how the belief content of the lower parts of the soul come to be in conflict with 
the belief content of the rational part of the soul, since the rational part of the soul is responsible 
for the beliefs the non-rational parts of the soul come to have.  
 Further, if passionate responses such as desire and aversion for objects, actions, and the 
whole host of opposing attitudes described in Republic 4 (437b1–4=[A5], b6–7) are responses to 
belief or representational content, then the stakes are even higher. Not only is the argument for 
partition due to conflicting beliefs in Republic 10 at stake, but also the argument used to establish 
psychic tripartition in Republic 4. We will need an account of how belief content that comes 
from the rational part of the soul leads to attitudes in the non-rational parts of the soul that are in 
opposition to its own attitudes. Otherwise, if rational belief-formation stands between all sense-
perception and non-rational responses and, moreover, structures the information that the non-
                                               
23 I take it that the agreement that Socrates describes here is normative for the just soul. There are conditions, as 
explored in Republic 8 and 9, where reason gives in to the demands and desires of the non-rational parts of the soul, 
but in such cases, we might refer to reason as yielding rather than agreeing with the lower parts of the soul. It is 
compatible with the top-down flow of information view to think that while information must be structured by the 
rational part of the soul before reaching the non-rational parts of the soul, the non-rational parts of the soul may still 
vary in their response to this information and oppose the intentions of reason, which I touch on next. 
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rational parts of the soul respond to, it looks as though the rational part of the soul determines all 
non-rational activities. The control of the soul will resemble that of a puppeteer controlling the 
lower parts of the soul from above. Never mind that each part of the soul has certain desires 
peculiar to itself (Republic 9, 580d–581d), reason will determine how each desire is pursued, 
since it will determine what information is provided to each part of the soul, which leads to the 
pursuit of objects toward which each part exhibits its characteristic pro-attitudes.24 
 One possible solution to this problem, which still holds that all information passes 
through the rational part of the soul, is to stress that the non-rational parts of the soul respond 
only to certain types of information they receive from the rational part of the soul. We have 
already seen in the Timaeus and Philebus that the appetitive part of the soul cannot understand 
statements of the rational part propositionally. If we apply this to the Republic 10 scenario, the 
appetitive part has no access to the measurement and calculation that goes into determining the 
size or shape of objects by the rational part of the soul. The appetitive part only has access to 
some of the information represented. As for the spirited part of the soul, suppose that it also 
responds to some information it receives from the rational part of the soul but fails to understand 
                                               
24 For the puppeteer metaphor, see Plato, Phaedo 94b4–e6 and Laws 1, 644d7–645b1. The puppet metaphor of Laws 
1 (644d7–645b1) does not ascribe all agency within the soul to the rational part of the soul. The passions in that 
metaphor have their own force and direction; they are not inert strings pulled by the rational part of the soul: “the 
passions within us like strings or certain lines that are internal, both draw us and pull against each other, since they 
are opposed, set toward contrary actions” (τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσίν τε 
ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπ’ ἐναντίας πράξεις, 644e1–3). Nevertheless, we can imagine 
that if the rational part of the soul understands and can accurately predict how the different passions react to 
information, and if the rational part of the soul can fully control what information it conveys to the lower parts of the 
soul, it would ultimately be responsible for shaping the passionate responses that occur within the soul. For the 
puppeteer metaphor in Plutarch see On the Sign of Socrates 588F7–589A3: “But the soul of man, stretched with a 
myriad of impulses, is like the instrument that is most easily turned of all instruments with twisted strands that move 
toward an intended direction when it receives a twist from someone who touches it with due proportion. For the 
starting-points of the passions and impulses are stretched out into the part that understands. When this is disturbed, 
the passions are pulled and draw and stretch the man” (ψυχὴ δ’ ἀνθρώπου μυρίαις ὁρμαῖς οἷον ὕσπληξιν 
ἐντεταμένη μακρῷ πάντων ὀργάνων εὐστροφώτατόν ἐστιν, ἄν τις κατὰ λόγον ἅπτηται, ῥοπὴν λαβοῦσα 
πρὸς τὸ νοηθὲν κινεῖσθαι. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ εἰς τὸ νοοῦν αἱ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ὁρμῶν κατατείνουσιν ἀρχαί, 
τούτου δὲ σεισθέντος ἑλκόμεναι σπῶσι καὶ συντείνουσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον). For the instrument described here 
with “twisted strands” (ὕσπληγες), see the automaton described in Hero, Automata 2.8. Cf. Frede 2010. 
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the importance of other information, which nevertheless remains important for determining the 
correct course of action in a given situation. To illustrate the point, we will take up the example 
in Republic 4 of Odysseus growing angry with himself out a sense of shame. 
In differentiating the rational part of the soul from the spirited part of the soul, Socrates 
and Glaucon agree that the rational part alone is capable of determining what is better or worse 
in any given situation, while the spirited part of the soul, when it reacts in anger, does so without 
calculation: 
[A15] ὃ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἴπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου μαρτυρήσει, τὸ 
             “στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·”  
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος τὸ 
ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ. 
 
What we said before somewhere, the quotation from Homer, will bear witness [to this 
distinction between the rational part of the soul and the spirited part of the soul]: 
 “Striking his breast, he spoke a word of rebuke to his heart” [Odyssey 20.17].  
In that passage, Homer clearly represents the part that calculates about what is better or 
worse as different from the part that it is rebuking, which is angry without calculation. 
       (Plato, Republic 4, 441b3–c2) 
 
The key difference here is the use of information and access to content. The rational part of the 
soul (τὸ λογιστικόν) calculates ((ἀνα-)λογίζεσθαι) concerning what is better or worse (περὶ 
τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος). The spirited part of the soul, because it reacts without 
calculation (ἀλογίστως) to information, does not take into consideration further information that 
is important for determining what is better or worse. 
 Yet, while evaluation of what is better or worse is restricted to the rational part of the 
soul, the evaluation that something is wrong or inappropriate is not. The critical conflict between 
the spirited part and the rational part hinges, in fact, on the spirited part having grown angry over 
a perceived unjust suffering, i.e. an evaluation of the suffering as shameful and unjustly imposed 
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on oneself.25 As we saw in the Leontius passage in Republic 4 that precedes this passage, anger 
follows upon the sense of shame one experiences when shameful actions have been committed 
by oneself or against oneself (440b9–c6). 
 It might be the case that the spirited part only responds to certain types of information, 
such as “treated unjustly,” but not a determination that “it is best to wait,” since it lacks the 
capacity, unlike the rational part of the soul, to calculate and weigh options about what is better 
or worse in a given situation. Once set in motion with an angry response, we find that the spirited 
part of the soul has a tendency to pursue its course of action doggedly: 
[A16] τί δὲ ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται; οὐκ [ὁ θυμὸς, 440c4] ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ 
χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καί, διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν 
καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, 
πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ 
παρ’ αὑτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραϋνθῇ; 
 
What about the case whenever someone supposes that he has been wronged unjustly? 
Does not the spirited passion in this man boil and grow vexed and ally itself to what 
seems just, suffer hunger, cold, and everything of that kind for it, enduring and 
                                               
25 In [A15] we have little context to determine whether or not Odysseus’ angry reaction is due to a perceived sense 
of shame and injustice, but Socrates refers back to the earlier quotation of this line in Republic 3, 390d1–5, which 
provides additional context: “But if, I said, certain examples of endurance against all things are said or performed by 
men of importance, it should be seen or heard, as for example: ‘Striking his breast, he rebuked his heart: / endure, 
heart, you have endured something even more shameful before’ [Odyssey 20.17–18]” (ἀλλ’ εἴ πού τινες, ἦν δ’ 
ἐγώ, καρτερίαι πρὸς ἅπαντα καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, θεατέον τε καὶ 
ἀκουστέον, οἷον καὶ τὸ “στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· / τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον 
ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης”). The second line from Homer’s Odyssey in this quotation reveals that the anger of the non-
rational spirited part of the soul is due to something shameful that Odysseus has had to endure. This fits together 
with one of the causes of the spirited part’s anger given in the Leontius example: one grows angry when he 
perceives that he has been treated unjustly. In the context of the passage in Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus fights the 
urge to slaughter his female servants for disgracing his home by sleeping with and making merry with the suitors 
who have become parasites and have acted insolently toward his wife and son (20.5–8). He is angry because he feels 
that he has been disgraced and treated unjustly by the servants of his household. His sense that he has endured 
shameful suffering drives him to desire to take vengeance. He deliberates on whether or not he should straightway 
exact revenge or wait until a more opportune time: “His heart within his dear breast was stirred: / he anxiously 
debated greatly in his heart and wits / whether he should rush upon them and deal death to each of the maidservants, 
/ or should allow them still to consort with the insolent suitors / their final, last time; and his heart within him snarled 
like a dog” ( τοῦ δ’ ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι· / πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, / 
ἠὲ μεταΐξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἑκάστῃ, / ἦ ἔτ’ ἐῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι / ὕστατα καὶ πύματα· 
κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει, Homer, Odyssey 20.9–13). Taking the context from the Odyssey together with the 
preceding quotation, we see that while the evaluation of the situation brings a sense of shame and anger with a desire 
for vengeance in Odysseus, this anger of the spirited part of his soul is opposed by the rational part that weighs out 
what is better or worse in the situation. 
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overcoming and not letting up in its pursuit of noble actions until either it succeeds, 
perishes, or, like a dog called by the shepherd, becomes calm at the behest of the reason 
inside him?       (Plato, Republic 4, 440c6–d3) 
 
The spirited part of the soul reacts with an enduring angry passion, likened to a boiling and 
seething state that takes time to simmer down back to a calm. In this state, it continues its pursuit 
of the desired end until it achieves its purpose, which would be retaliation in the example of 
Odysseus here. Interestingly, Socrates states that its reaction is to what “seems just” (τῷ 
δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ) in the situation. This evaluation might be premature, an immediate response 
to a perceived injustice before all of the relevant information needed to determine whether one 
has suffered an injustice or what the best course of action is has been decided by more measured 
calculation. It might also be only partial, once again, since the spirited part of the soul may lack 
the capacity not only to calculate what is better or worse, but also to understand the outcomes of 
such calculations.26 
 According to Model 1, belief-formation occurs only in the rational part of the soul. So, in 
some sense, the rational part of the soul is responsible for the angry reaction that reason 
                                               
26  
Model 1: Spirited Part Responds to Partial Information from Rational Evaluation 
Rational Part of the Soul  Spirited Part of the Soul 
forms Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
              Retaliate] 
→ accepts Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
              Retaliate] 
weighs Options [Best to Retaliate Now OR Wait    
              & Retaliate Later?] 
 modifies Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
               Retaliate] through angry response to  
               Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
               Retaliate Now] modifies Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:                  Retaliate] to Evaluative Belief [Treated  
                Unjustly: Best to Wait & Retaliate   
                Later: Do Not Retaliate Now] 
 
holds Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly: Best   
          to Wait & Retaliate Later; Do Not Retaliate  
          Now] 
Critical Conflict holds Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
          Retaliate Now] 
↓  ↓ 




ultimately comes to oppose insofar as it provides the evaluative belief to which the spirited part 
of the soul reacts. It is not the case, however, that the rational part of the soul holds two contrary 
beliefs at the same time, in the same respect, etc. The initial evaluative belief that Odysseus 
suffers injustice and is being shamed originates in the rational part of the soul. The spirited part 
of the soul receives this evaluation from the rational part of the soul and grows angry. This anger 
incites a desire for immediate revenge. But, the evaluation is partial, not taking further 
considerations into account; it results apart from calculation (ἀλογίστως) of what is better or 
worse (περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος) and fails to take into account that in the given 
situation, there are other factors that should count in determining how to respond and what 
actions to take. After calculating about the best course to take in the situation, the rational part of 
the soul modifies its own evaluative stance and decides that, while retaliation is called for in the 
situation, it would be best not to pursue that course right now, but at a later, more opportune 
moment. Critical conflict comes between the final evaluation of what is best to do in the 
circumstances, and also in the action that one part of the soul pursues and the other refuses.27 
 Even in the Model 1 view, the evaluation is modified by the spirited part of the soul. 
Granted, the modification I have outlined is merely temporal: the angry reaction seeks immediate 
satisfaction of compensatory revenge. Nevertheless, we could say that, in some way, limited 
                                               
27 Cf. Singpurwalla 2013, pp. 62–3, who argues for this interpretation of the Odysseus example in Republic 4: “And 
this is exactly what his spirit aims to do [eliminate the source of the disrespect (i.e. the maids and the suitors)], for 
there is no reason to think that it is not his reason [the rational part of his soul] that recommends that he eliminate the 
offensive behaviour. After all, his reason does not recommend ignoring this insult, but rather waiting until he can 
execute a more powerful revenge. The trouble for Odysseus is that his reason counsels both that this behaviour is 
disrespectful and should be eliminated and that it is better to wait. Thus, Odysseus’ spirit must endure feeling 
shamed by the disrespectful behavior and not doing anything about it when its immediate impulse is to eliminate the 
behaviour promptly and show his strength and power” (p. 63). Cf. also Wilberding 2009, p. 365–8: “The conflict 
between reason and spirit comes about because the latter has a difficult time dealing with the former’s beliefs. The 
spirited part only has ears for reason’s beliefs concerning honor and shame, and so the belief that the current 
situation is insulting is going to evoke a spirited response in a way that the belief that the time to set things right is 
later will not” (p. 368). 
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though it may be, the spirited part of the soul is contributing to the evaluative belief it receives 
from the rational part of the soul. Its angry response calls for immediate action.28 
 Consider also a slightly modified version of Model 1, which denies that the spirited part 
of the soul can even modify the evaluative belief. Call this Model 2. Following suit with the top-
down view in which information passes from the rational part of the soul to the lower parts of the 
soul, Model 2 also assumes that belief-formation occurs exclusively in the rational part of the 
soul. In Model 2, however, the rational part of the soul is more directly responsible for setting the 
spirited part of the soul in pursuit of immediate retaliation. Reason decides to pursue retaliation 
immediately (at t1), but then very quickly changes its mind (μετανοεῖν) due to a calculation 
about what is better or worse. The rational part of the soul determines later (at t2) that it is best 
not to retaliate now, but to wait for better timing and circumstances. The spirited part of the soul 
receives the first evaluative belief (at t1) and follows in pursuing revenge immediately. The 
spirited part continues to hold to this initial belief, boiling and seething (at t2), even after the 
rational part of the soul has formed a new evaluation and judgment opposed to the first. The 
spirited part in this scenario retains and preserves the initial evaluation and judgment of reason as 
we see it is wont to do in Republic 4, 442b10–c2 (=[A14]), 29 perhaps due to a sort of momentum 
in the passion of anger, like a boiling and seething that take time to abate.30 
                                               
28 Cf. Erginel 2013, pp. 207–8, who does not seem to entertain this possibility. As an objection to the top-down 
view, Erginel argues that it would be odd if false representations of the lower parts of the soul originate from the 
rational part of the soul, since it would attribute the false beliefs that belong to wicked people to the rational part of 
their souls. As I have argued here, it could be the case that the non-rational parts of the soul only understand and 
respond to certain kinds of information, which causes their variation from rational beliefs. 
29 Cf. Plutarch, On the Control of Anger 459E2–4: “For time produces in passion mitigation and delay that ends it 
and our judgment discovers both the appropriate manner and fitting severity of punishment” (ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος 
ἐμποιεῖ τῷ πάθει διατριβὴν καὶ μέλλησιν ἐκλύουσαν ἥ τε κρίσις εὑρίσκει καὶ τρόπον πρέποντα καὶ μέγεθος 
ἁρμόττον κολάσεως). 
30 See the outline on the following page: 
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 In this scenario, the rational part of the soul would be responsible for producing the two 
contrary evaluative representations, but would not hold to both at the same time. In Model 2, we 
see that one evaluation and judgment is formed initially at t1, which the spirited part of the soul 
retains despite a reassessment and formation of a contrary evaluation and judgment by the 
rational part at t2. All evaluations and judgments originate in the rational part of the soul, but the 
spirited part of the soul is able to receive and act upon these evaluations and judgments, even 
retaining them once the rational part of the soul has changed its evaluation. 
 In both Model 1 and 2, the spirited part of the soul reacts only to certain types of 
information, such as that an injustice has been committed or one has been shamed. The 
implication of this view, however, is that the spirited part of the soul will always react in certain 
ways that disregard potentially important information that should influence one’s decisions to 
act. In cases in which one ought to wait to right others’ wrongs, following the correct course of 
action will always require suppressing a spirited reaction when it arises, since it is deaf to the 
                                               
Model 2: Spirited Part Accepts and Holds to First Evaluation from the Rational Part 
 
Rational Part of the Soul  Spirited Part of the Soul 
forms Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
           Retaliate Now] at t1 
→ accepts Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
              Retaliate Now] at t1 
↓  ↓ 
pursues Action [Retaliate Now] at t1 Agreement pursues Action [Retaliate Now] at t1 
   
reassess Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
                Retaliate Now] at t2 
  
weighs Options [Best to Retaliate Now OR Wait    




holds Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
          Retaliate Now] at t2 
modifies Evaluative Belief [Treated Unjustly:  
                Retaliate Now] to Evaluative Belief  
                [Treated Unjustly: Best to Wait &  
                Retaliate Later: Do Not Retaliate Now]  
                at t2  
Critical Conflict 
 
↓  ↓ 




information that determines it is better to wait. This has the troubling result that a well-
functioning spirited part of the soul, when it reacts within its optimal parameters, will inevitably 
be opposed to our rational calculations in situations that call for delayed response. Obedience of 
the spirited part will require yielding to the psychic motion of the rational part, but not following 
the information that structures the spirited part of the soul’s response. Unless the rational part of 
the soul has some means of communicating to the spirited part in terms that it understands, 
modifying its representations so that the spirited part yields to its commands as appropriate for 
satisfying the desire to right the wrong that has been committed, the spirited part of the soul does 
not seem to be in agreement with the rational part of the soul, at least not in understanding and 
holding to the same belief (ὁμοδοξεῖν).31 
 Model 2 also falls curiously close to the view provided by the Stoics in their denial of 
critical psychic conflict, which we encountered in Chapter 1, §III (Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 
446E8–447A4=SVF 3.459=LS 65G=[T3]). Unlike the Stoic view, however, Model 2 would 
require that the spirited part’s anger not be an after-effect from a change in the rational part of 
the soul, but that the spirited part of the soul continue to hold on to the initial evaluative belief at 
the same time that the rational part of the soul has a contrary evaluative belief. Otherwise, it will 
not count as a critical conflict of belief in [A6]. The explanation for why the spirited part holds 
this stance might be due to the, as it were, after-effect of anger’s passionate momentum, but the 
spirited part will nonetheless be in critical conflict of belief with the rational part. 
                                               
31 Whatever the truth-conditions may be for the propositional statements that the rational part of the soul forms, the 
non-rational parts of the soul, because they are limited in their capacities to understand these propositions, may not 
be holding to the same beliefs. The truth-conditions could thus be different. Whether we attribute this change to 
modification of beliefs or merely due to the limited understanding of the content of the beliefs, the non-rational parts 
of the soul could hold and react to different belief content from the belief content they receive from the rational part 




 Supposing that Model 1 or 2 is the correct way to interpret the flow of information in 
Plato’s psychology, there is room for the information to be interpreted or responded to in 
different ways from the evaluative belief that the rational part of the soul forms. Evaluative 
beliefs involve more than just the raw information flowing from the rational part of the soul to 
the spirited part, since the spirited part of the soul is primed to react to certain types of 
information and not others. 
 
§A.V. Spirited Evaluations Independent of Rational Evaluations in Plato 
 While Model 1 and 2 seem to fit with the Timaeus and Philebus passages analyzed above, 
there are hints in Plato’s dialogues, and even in the Timaeus, that the lower parts of the soul may 
be able to form beliefs independently of the rational part of the soul, perhaps even through access 
to sense-perception without rational mediation. In a few passages, Socrates seems to indicate that 
in dream-states the rational part of the soul itself ceases to rule over the lower parts of the soul. A 
host of lawless and shameful desires are allowed to be roused and act without restraint from 
shame or reason (Plato, Republic 9, 571c3–d1). Feverish nightmares ensue unless certain better 
desires that are normally allied with reason (μετὰ λογοῦ) continue to restrain these lawless 
desires (571b3–c1) even when reason takes to rest (εὕδῃ, 571c3–4). The better desires here 
indicate spirited emotions which act on behalf of the rational part’s desire to constrain errant 
desires without the rational part of the soul guiding this activity. So, in this instance, we seem to 
find a case in which spirited emotions operate independently of the rational part of the soul.  
 Something similar seems to occur in Plato’s Laws, where the rational part of the soul is 
inactive while one is in a drunken state, though the passionate parts of soul are still roused and 
active, as in childhood, when the rational part of the soul is undeveloped (Plato, Laws 1, 645e1–
3; 2, 672b–c). As in Republic 9, better passions that belong to the spirited part of the soul, such 
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as a sense of shame (αἰδῶς), help to keep worse desires in check (Laws 1, 631d6–632a2, 643c1–
644a2, 647a4–b7; 2, 653a5–c8, 654c3–d3). 
 It seems likely that previous influence from the rational part of the soul still has an effect 
on the spirited part of the soul’s evaluations. The spirited part is characterized as particularly apt 
to retain information and beliefs from the rational part of the soul, since it preserves the dictates 
of reason through thick and thin as it holds fast to what is deemed noble or shameful ([A14]), 
retaining certain standards of by which what is honorable and shameful are distinguished 
(Republic 3, 401c4–402a4; 4, 441a2–3; 8, 551a4–5). Yet it also seems the spirited part must still 
be able to apply these standards in particular instances or against certain types of appetitive 
desires on its own in dream-states and inebriated states, without the instruction of the rational 
part of the soul. The spirited part of the soul seems to apply standards of what is honorable / 
shameful by evaluating actions and desires, i.e. forming beliefs about the appropriateness of 
actions and desires.32 But this capacity for belief-formation and evaluation in the spirited part of 
the soul is only hinted at in both the Laws and Republic. 
 Against the top-down view of information flow we found in the Philebus, there are also 
hints that the spirited and appetitive parts may have intimate access to sense-perception without 
reason standing as an intermediary. The gods in the Timaeus equip human souls with a 
                                               
32 Cf. Nussbaum 1986, p. 216: “[I]n the second book of the Laws, we are told that the character of young citizens 
will be tested by putting the intellect to sleep through drunkenness. By observing the choices they make in this 
‘mad’ condition, we will see how their souls are trained with respect to values. It is clear that this test works only 
given a belief in the independent discriminating power of sense and emotion; in the psychology of the Republic the 
drunken sleep of intellect simply releases bestial urges and could show nothing of moral value.” While I agree with 
Nussbaum’s analysis of Laws 2, it seems clear to me that the same discriminatory power must be in use in Republic 
9 when the rational part of the soul is asleep and a sense of shame, belonging to the spirited part of the soul, 
continues to restrain bestial passions. The extent to which one has better desires to restrain bestial desires varies: 
there are many with strong bestial urges, though some hold them in check with their better desires, and a few 
individuals may have eliminated their bestial urges entirely or have only a few weak ones left (571b5–c1). The 
varying degrees of strength to restrain errant desires, moreover, seems to coordinate with the inculcation of 
moderation in the soul (571d7–8), which is a virtue. So, contra Nussbaum, I hold that in Republic 9, the 
discriminatory power of the spirited emotions is present and reveals moral value insofar as it reveals the extent to 




[A17] δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, μέγιστον 
κακοῦ δέλεαρ, ἔπειτα λύπας, ἀγαθῶν φυγάς, ἔτι δ’ αὖ θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε 
συμβούλω, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἐλπίδα δ’ εὐπαράγωγον· αἰσθήσει δὲ 
ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι συγκερασάμενοι ταῦτα, ἀναγκαίως τὸ θνητὸν 
γένος συνέθεσαν. 
 
having dreadful and necessary passions within it, first pleasure, the greatest snare of evil, 
then pains, which cause avoidance of goods, and thereafter courage and fear, foolish 
counselors, anger that is hard to appease, and hope that easily leads one astray: they [the 
gods, when they constructed the soul,] constructed this mortal type out of necessity, 
mixing these passions with non-rational sense-perception and desire that is ready to try 
and get hold of anything.  (Plato, Timaeus 69c8–d6 (continuation of [T29] in Chapter 3)) 
 
After listing different types of passions that belong to both the appetitive and spirited parts of the 
soul, Socrates adds that these passions have been mixed, or fused together, with sense-
perception. So, while it appears from the Philebus, and possibly also from the description of 
images reflected off the liver in the Timaeus itself, that the non-rational parts of the soul depend 
on the rational part to evaluate and form beliefs about sense-perceptible information before they 
have access to this information, here it appears that there may be an intimate and immediate 
connection between passions and the information gathered through sense-perception.33 In another 
passage of the Timaeus, there is an additional hint that the connection between the appetitive part 
of the soul and sense-perception may be direct: the appetitive part has no participation in reason, 
belief, and intellect, but it does participate in pleasure and pain with its desires and sense-
perception (μέτεστιν αἰσθήσεως, Timaeus 77b3–6).34 The top-down view may not be a general 
account of all representations,35 though there is strong evidence in the Philebus and some 
                                               
33 Cf. Lorenz 2006, pp. 67–8, who holds to this view. 
34 Note, however, that the appetitive part of the soul may have a sense of the content of propositional statements in 
[A10], which would not count as sense-perception. The passage indicates that it is unlikely that it does. 
Nevertheless, we see in [A10] that αἴσθησις need not indicate sense-perception, since gathering a sense of the 
propositional statements formed within the soul will not be an apprehension accomplished by sense-perception. 
35 Cf. Kamtekar 2010, p. 137: “[T]he fact that reason can be the source of the appetitive part’s images does not 
entail that it alone can be the source of such images.” Kamtekar also makes a good point that if representational 
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supporting evidence in other parts of the Timaeus that all representations originate in the rational 
part of the soul, since it alone has the capacities necessary for belief-formation according to the 
high standards of belief set out in Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus. 
 
                                               
content for the non-rational parts / motivational sources of the soul require reason or a rational part, then this view 
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